The New Face of African Conflict In Search of a Way Forward

By John Prendergast

MARCH 12, 2014

Congolese soldiers walk past a former M23 armory near Congo's border with Uganda, November 2013. (Kenny Katombe / Courtesy Reuters)

As a new wave of violent conflicts has ravaged Africa, borders and conventional peace processes have done little to contain them. A cold war between Ethiopia and Eritrea has spilled over into Somalia, where Eritrea has supported the jihadist group al Shabaab in its fight against the Ethiopian-backed government in Mogadishu. Meanwhile, the group has helped fuel the illegal ivory trade and launched terrorist attacks in neighboring Kenya, one of which killed 67 people in a Nairobi mall last fall. Sudan and South Sudan have supported insurgencies in each other’s backyards, and Sudanese Janjaweed militias have fought in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan rebel group led by Joseph Kony, has sought refuge and wreaked havoc in the Democratic Republic of Congo, CAR, and South Sudan. And civil war in Congo has been the deadliest of them all, long subject to cross-border destabilization from Rwanda and Uganda.

Cover: Developing Army Leaders Developing Army Leaders

Lessons for Teaching Critical Thinking in Distributed, Resident, and Mixed-Delivery Venues

by Susan G. Straus, Michael G. Shanley, James C. Crowley, Douglas Yeung, Sarah H. Bana, Kristin J. Leuschner

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Research Questions 

How effective is the Common Core — the first phase of the U.S. Army's system for developing critical thinking skills in its officer corps and to what extent are there differences among delivery venues? 

Based on current measures, how can course delivery be improved? 

How well do current methods of evaluation gauge course success and point to needed improvements? 

Abstract

The U.S. Army uses the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) as a key component of its system for developing critical thinking skills and abilities in its officer corps. The Common Core is the first phase of CGSOC. The Common Core is taught in three venues: a resident course taught at Fort Leavenworth and at satellite campuses; Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL), a web-based, self-paced course that uses interactive multimedia instruction; and The Army School System (TASS), primarily for Reserve Component officers, which combines resident and interactive multimedia instruction and is taught by the U.S. Army Reserve Command's 97th Brigade and its three subordinate battalions. CGSOC consists of nine blocks of instruction taught as stand-alone modules in the resident course (14–16 weeks long) and organized into three phases in TASS and ADL (designed to be taken over a period of up to 18 months). In response to the interests of Army leadership, this study sought to answer the following questions about the Common Core, focusing on the 2009–2010 academic year: Based on current methods of evaluation, how effective is the Common Core, and to what extent are there differences among distributed, resident, and mixed-delivery venues? Based on current measures, how can course delivery be improved? How well do current methods of evaluation gauge course success and point to needed improvements? To answer these questions, the authors analyzed available data from Command and General Staff School, including responses to student surveys, grades on assignments, and student characteristics. In addition, the authors conducted a quasi-experimental study to assess consistency in grading among faculty members.

The Future of War (no. 17): Policymakers' options will be reduced to operating under the radar or going all-out in a big war

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BY Thomas E. Ricks 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

MARCH 13, 2014 

By Lt. Col. Dan Manning, USAF 

Best Defense Future of War essay contest entrant 

Necessarily, America's view of war and the calculus involved in making the decision for military intervention have been, at least temporarily, altered by its operational experience in both Afghanistan and Iraq. America's appetite for committing thousands of troops and billions of dollars to military interventions is not the same as it was in the afterglow of the end of the Cold War or in the fear driven aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. While America's core national interests have not changed significantly, the arguments national leaders use to convince the democracy to go to war have lost their savor and will be ineffective in the 5- to 10-year future. 

In the recent past, Americans could be persuaded to go to engage in military action through a steady diet of arguments such as "we must take preventative action to thwart an evil regime's evil plans," "we must eliminate a ruthless dictator and install a democracy," or "we need to eliminate terrorist havens in ungoverned spaces" -- with a side of stopping human suffering. These arguments were sufficient for military intervention in Iraq during both Operation Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom, as well as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Libya. President George W. Bush argued the United States should go to war because an evil Middle Eastern dictator likely possessed chemical weapons. When President Obama, however, tried to use similar arguments to build support for U.S. airstrikes in Syria after its government actually used these weapons, Americans's support for the airstrikes plummeted to 28 percent according to a Pew Research Center poll, and America's most reliable coalition partners could not muster parliamentary support for any action. 

What changed? Americans have become habituated to the threat of terrorism with persistent warnings in airports, on public transportation, and nightly news. In the years after 9/11, Americans have adapted to a new normal, and attacks such as those against the Boston Marathon remind Americans that they are vulnerable to terrorism at home, even after committing thousands of lives and billions of dollars to fight it abroad. 

Additionally, Americans now realize that replacing an evil regime with a democratic one is not as easy as its post-Cold War experience would suggest. In the 1990s, establishing democracy seemed as easy as flipping a switch in Eastern and Central Europe. Erstwhile enemies of the Warsaw Pact succumbed to the inexorable attraction of self-determination and cast off their shackles of oppression to walk to the light of democracy. It sounded so nice that former Vice President Dick Cheney famously predicted Americans would be greeted as "liberators" in Iraq. America's attempts to impose democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan have not produced the responsive, citizen-led governments U.S. policymakers envisioned. Even when America is not directly involved in regime change as in the Arab Spring, democratic conversions are violent, slow, and sometimes lead to U.S. officials being pelted by tomatoes and shoes, as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton experienced in Egypt in 2012. 

In the future, U.S. policymakers will continue to feel a responsibility to respond to threats, even if they cannot convincingly articulate those threats to the American people. As a result, policymakers will continue to pursue very small, very limited military interventions where possible. Drone strikes are among the smallest of these interventions, but small footprint, low press interventions such as those currently ongoing in Djibouti, Mali, and the Central African Republic will continue to be palatable. 

The Gulf Military Balance: Volume II

The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions 

By Anthony H. Cordesman, Bryan Gold 

MAR 14, 2014 

The United States faces major challenges in dealing with Iran, the threat of terrorism, and the tide of political instability in the Arabian Peninsula. The presence of some of the world’s largest reserves of oil and natural gas, vital shipping lanes, and Shia populations throughout the region have made the peninsula the focal point of US and Iranian strategic competition. Moreover, large youth populations, high unemployment rates, and political systems with highly centralized power bases have posed other economic, political, and security challenges that the Gulf states must address and that the United States must take into consideration when forming strategy and policy. 

Publisher CSIS/Rowman & Littlefield 

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BURKE CHAIR BOOKS AND MAJOR WORKS, BURKE CHAIR IN STRATEGY

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DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

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GULF STATES, MIDDLE EAST

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Toward a Balanced Combat Air Force

March 3, 2014 • By Mark Gunzinger and David A. Deptula • Studies

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This report suggests that it is time for DoD and the Congress to take a hard look at the mix of combat air forces that will be needed to sustain America’s asymmetric airpower advantage. In particular, it argues that they should give precedence in the current age of austerity to fielding new long-range ISR and strike aircraft that will bolster the U.S. military’s Asia-Pacific posture and enable it to project power rapidly when and where needed.

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March 11, 2014

What Would Jimmy Carter Do?

March 10, 2014

A Tale of Two Budgets

March 10, 2014

George Bush and the Spring of 1989

James Graham Wilson

March 14, 2014

Editor’s Note: The following is excerpted fromThe Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptation, Reagan’s Engagement, and the End of the Cold War, copyright 2014, Cornell University Press. Used by permission of the publisher, all rights reserved.

President George H. W. Bush detected winds of change in Eastern Europe as he took office. He had no way of knowing where the changes were headed or at what point they might cease. His priority was to make sure they did not lead to widespread violence.

As a politician and leader, Bush did not resemble Ronald Reagan. He pledged, drolly, to try to hold “his charisma in check” and professed to lack “the vision thing.”[1]

“If you give me a ten, I’m going to send it back and say, ‘Give me an eight,’” he told his speechwriters. “And you'll be lucky if I deliver like a six.”[2] At times he spoke directly. “We know what works: freedom works. We know what's right: freedom is right.” Other times, Bush sounded nothing like his predecessor. “We will always try to speak clearly,” he stated during his inaugural address, “for candor is a compliment; but subtlety, too, is good and has its place.”[3]

Bush brought to the White House a sterling résumé—congressman, ambassador to the United Nations, US. envoy to China, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and, for the previous eight years, vice president. His father, Prescott Bush, one of the “wise men” of the Eastern establish­ment who had surrounded FDR and Truman, a Republican in the mold of Henry Stimson, Robert Lovett, and John McCloy, had imbued in his son a sense that duty to country comes before politics. George Bush had been the youngest aviator in the navy during World War II; he was the last veteran of that conflict to serve as president.

“For the common man and the intellectual alike, the direction of change today is not leftward,” Bush proclaimed on the campaign trail. “The gloom of the West, the ‘malaise’ we heard so much about just a few years ago, is in retreat, replaced by a healthy confidence in our ability to cope, to change, and to grow.” It was an assessment not necessarily shared by American intel­lectuals as 1989 began. Yet Bush remained optimistic. “If we continue on this course,” he stated, “the revolutionary concept of freedom embodied in Western democracy will surely prevail.”[4] While Bush aspired to prevail, he also understood that 1989 in Eastern Europe was a time and place for caution and subtlety. Whether change occurred peacefully depended on how the Kremlin reacted. Bush knew that verbal pronouncements could not change reality. He was not the person who had employed the phrase “evil empire” in 1983 or spoke of “another time, another era” in 1988. He was not a bel­licose Cold Warrior, and he had not, in the course of the 1980s, become a naive optimist. “The Cold War isn’t over,” Bush told a reporter in the wake of Reagan’s visit to Red Square.[5]

Handling ethical problems in counterterrorismRead Online Handling ethical problems in counterterrorism

An inventory of methods to support ethical decisionmaking

by Anais Reding, Anke Van Gorp, Kate Robertson, Agnieszka Walczak, Chris Giacomantonio, Stijn Hoorens

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Abstract

This document presents the findings of a study into methods that may help counterterrorism professionals make decisions about ethical problems. The study was commissioned by the Research and Documentation Centre (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek- en Documentatiecentrum, WODC) of the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie), on behalf of the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, NCTV). The study provides an inventory of methods to support ethical decision-making in counterterrorism, drawing on the experience of other public sectors — healthcare, social work, policing and intelligence — and multiple countries, primarily the Netherlands and United Kingdom.

Cover: Countering Others' InsurgenciesRead Online Countering Others' Insurgencies Understanding U.S. Small-Footprint Interventions in Local Context

by Stephen Watts, Jason H. Campbell, Patrick B. Johnston, Sameer Lalwani, Sarah H. Bana

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Research Questions 

Why do counterinsurgents adopt particular counterinsurgency strategies and practices? 

What are the likely consequences of these strategies, in terms of conflict outcomes and civilian casualties? 

When the United States finds a partner government's counterinsurgency strategy and practices problematic, what can it do to influence its partner's actions to improve the chances of a favorable outcome? 

What are the conditions under which small-footprint interventions are likely to succeed in bringing an end to insurgencies that both the United States and its partners seek to combat? 

Abstract

This study examines the counterinsurgency strategies and practices adopted by threatened regimes and the conditions under which U.S. "small-footprint" partnerships are likely to help these governments succeed. The report's findings are derived from a mixed-method research design incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analysis. Simple statistical analyses are applied to a dataset of counterinsurgencies that have terminated since the end of the Cold War (72 in all), and more in-depth analyses are provided of two recent cases of U.S. partnerships with counterinsurgent regimes, in the Philippines and Pakistan. The quantitative analysis finds that the cases of small-footprint U.S. operations that are commonly touted as "success stories" all occurred in countries approximating a best-case scenario. Such a verdict is not meant to deny the importance of U.S. assistance; rather, it is meant to highlight that similar U.S. policies with less promising partner nations should not be expected to produce anywhere near the same levels of success. The majority of insurgencies have taken place in worst-case conditions, and in these environments, counterinsurgent regimes are typically unsuccessful in their efforts to end rebellion, and they often employ violence indiscriminately. The case studies of the Philippines and Pakistan largely reinforce the findings of the quantitative analysis. They also highlight the challenges the United States faces in attempting to influence partner regimes to fight counterinsurgencies in the manner that the United States would prefer. The study concludes with policy recommendations for managing troubled partnerships.

Some thoughts about The Basic School: The lousy command climate explained

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BY Thomas E. Ricks 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

MARCH 14, 2014

Military

National Security In my response to my request for someone to tell me about what is going on at The Basic School, the Marine training school for new officers, a friend writes: 

It's basically a function of going from Dale Alford as CO of TBS to Todd Desgrosseilliers. 

Under Dale, TBS had a focus on tactical proficiency and ethics training/acculturation for lieutenants. Dale made changes like taking out administrative humps and incorporating them as tactical marches into the POI, made field training more realistic and demanding, and really put a lot of attention into ethics and character. And he solved cultural problems fairly thoughtfully -- remember, this is our best COIN guy. Instead of having a war with lieutenants over consensual sexual relationships -- forbidden, difficult to enforce, and leading to punitive action when discovered -- he ended the dating restriction, but mandated a fairly enforceable ban on any romantic activity in the BOQ (enforceable because the populace supported it). The flipside is that the staff had a lot of freedom -- you could PT when you wanted on your free time and wear whatever athletic attire you wanted, uniform spit and polish wasn't a focus -- and there were a few captains who abused that ("look how salty a Tactics instructor I am -- I don't wear a skivvy shirt since I was in the 'Stan"). 

Under Todd, there have been some ambitious and interesting changes made in NCO professionalization. But there has also been a maniacal focus on garrison stuff, and a loss of focus on tactical/professional preparation of lieutenants. If you PT on your own, green-on-green only; if I catch windows open in the BOQ, I will summarily fire the Co. commander (no shit, that actually happened). Captains in the bullpen will be used as a labor force for stuff like painting rocks. That last one has become symbolic of the madness there -- painting rocks is something we did at the worst commands in the '90s because it was easier to make your garrison area look nice than come up with a creative, challenging training plan that prepares Marines for operational and life challenges. BTW, I don't mean policing your area and having it squared away, I mean stuff like captains on their hands and knees edging the grass and painting/arranging rocks to make stuff look pretty. That inspires rage and contempt in the staff 

Talked a little earlier to a friend who recently left TBS, asked him his take, and he said (not a direct quote, paraphrase): The difference is that Col. Alford was really concerned about critical thinking -- he wanted Lt.s to be able to figure out "What are the rules I can break on my own, or who can I ask permission to break, because it's stopping me from doing the right thing, or making me do something stupid?" On the other hand, Col. Desgrosseilliers' favorite saying is, "All I want you to do is follow the fucking rules" -- he says that all the time. 

I thought that was an interesting perspective.

Crimea: The Revenge of Geography?

March 13, 2014

By Robert Kaplan

The Obama administration claims it is motivated by the G-8, interdependence, human rights and international law. Russian President Vladimir Putin is a more traditional historical actor. He is motivated by geopolitics. That is why he temporarily has the upper hand in the crisis over Ukraine and Crimea.

Geopolitics, according to the mid-20th century U.S. diplomat and academic Robert Strausz-Hupe, is "the struggle for space and power," played out in a geographical setting. Geopolitics is eternal, ever since Persia was the world's first superpower in antiquity. Indeed, the Old Testament, on one level, is a lesson in geopolitics. Strausz-Hupe, an Austrian immigrant, wanted to educate the political elite of his adopted country so that the forces of good could make better use of geopolitics than the forces of evil in World War II.

Adherence to geopolitics allowed the British geographer and liberal educator Sir Halford J. Mackinder in a 1904 article, "The Geographical Pivot of History," to accurately forecast the basic trend lines of the 20th century: how the European power arrangement of the Edwardian age would give way to one encompassing all of Eurasia, with a battle between Western sea power and Russian land power. Geopolitics was at the heart of 19th-century America's bout of imperialism in the Greater Caribbean: By dominating its nearby sea the United States came, in turn, to dominate the Western Hemisphere, enabling it to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere -- the story of the 20th century. Geopolitics was at the heart of World War II, with the German military machine's lunge for the oil of the Caucasus and the Japanese military machine's lunge for the oil and raw materials of Southeast Asia. Geopolitics was at the heart of the Cold War, with U.S. bases and allies guarding the southern Eurasian rimland from Greece and Turkey to South Korea and Japan against the Soviet Union. The celebrated diplomat George Kennan's "containment" strategy was, in significant part, a geopolitical one.

It isn't that geography and geopolitics supersede everything else, including Western values and human agency. Not at all! Rather, it is that geography in particular is the starting point for understanding everything else. Only by respecting geography in the first place can Western values and human ingenuity overcome it. It is not one or the other, but the sequence of understanding which is crucial.

Offsets Facilitation Cell: Optimizing its Potential

Amit Cowshish

March 14, 2014

On Feb 14, 2014, MoD issued an office memorandum about operationalization of a Offsets Facilitation Cell. This is the perhaps the first positive step in a long time and the MoD needs to be complimented for it. However, absence of an operating procedure, clarity about the exact nature of mandate and guidelines for those who will man the cell could turn out to be a bane for this wonderful initiative.

The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has set up a Facilitation Cell of the Defence Offsets Management Wing (DOMW) at SCOPE Complex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi. DOMW, it may be recalled, was set up as a successor to the Defence Offsets Facilitation Agency (DOFA) in August 2012 for managing offsets.

The foreign vendors and the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs) had been getting exasperated with inaccessibility and unresponsiveness of DOMW. All this is hopefully set to change with MoD announcing through an Office Memorandum issued on February 14, 20141 that with the operartionalization of the Facilitation Cell, the foreign vendors and the Indian Offset Partners (IOPs) can interact and clarify their queries on offset related issues. The memorandum goes on to say that while this cell will be manned on all working days of the week, a team from MoD/DOMW will also be available on Tuesdays between 1000 and 1300 hours and on Thursdays between 1430 and 1700 hrs.

This is the perhaps the first positive step in a long time and the MoD needs to be complimented for it. However, absence of an operating procedure, clarity about the exact nature of mandate and guidelines for those who will man the cell could turn out to be a bane for this wonderful initiative.

To begin with, this facility should not remain confined to only those who have an ongoing contract or are in the process of submitting a revised proposal after being declared L1. It should be open to the prospective vendors and IOPs to approach the cell with whatever doubts and queries they have, even if these are hypothetical and not related to any Request for Proposal (RFP).

The clarification given by the cell in such cases would be authoritative advance rulings. Doubts that arise before or while an offset proposal is being formulated must be clarified by an authority empowered to do so. This will help in submission of offset proposals which are fully compliant with the letter and spirit of the offset policy as viewed and interpreted by the MoD.

This is possible only if those who have to man the cell are empowered to give such rulings or made responsible for processing the queries and issuing the clarification within a prescribed time frame with the approval of the competent authority in the MOD. The new arrangement could come a cropper if neither of these two conditions is met. The process of decision making in the MoD, especially on contentious issues, is painfully slow. Subjecting the queries and doubts raised by the vendors and the Indian industry to the same routine would defeat the very purpose of setting up the cell.

One cannot help wonder whether in the last one and a half years since the promulgation of the current offset guidelines, no doubts or queries have been raised by the foreign vendors and the Indian industry. That does not seem possible, which begs the question why the MoD/DOMW has so far issued no written clarifications on those doubts and queries. It could have made the life easier for those who will now be called upon to man the cell and issue clarifications.

Excerpts from Dr. Ashley Tellis's Public Lecture

Pivot or Pirouette: The U.S. Rebalance to Asia

by ISSSP

Ashley J. Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Text of the Public Lecture, National Institute of Advanced Studies, January 3, 2014

For the complete text of the lecture click here

For the video of the lecture click here

Excerpts from Dr. Ashley Tellis's Public Lecture

The subject that I am going to speak on today is very important for the future of both our countries: the United States and India. I am going to talk about the U.S. effort that is underway to rebalance to Asia. It is important because it goes to the issue of what kind of geo-political environment is going to exist in this part of the world in the years to come. If we do not quite get that context right, then obviously the choices that it will impose on all the states that inhabit this region will be far more difficult. Understanding what the United States is trying to do, I think, is a useful first step in trying to assess the future of the broad Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, I am going to focus my remarks on this subject: understanding the genesis, the phenomenology and the consequences of the U.S. rebalance to Asia.

Rebalancing is really a strategic effort to go back to dealing with the fundamentals of the strategic situation. First, it is evidence of the American recognition that China’s rise is an enduring rise and not a flash in the pan. China is not suddenly going to disappear and take care of itself because of some internal crisis. It is the second element of rebalancing, the objective of managing China’s rise, which is going to be an extremely challenging one. Managing China is going to be a challenging task because it requires the United States to simultaneously socialise, integrate, deter and reassure China.

Rebalancing essentially involves three components. The strategic component is the one which has acquired a lot of attention in the public discourse. The other two equally important elements are the diplomatic and the economic components.

The idea, at the end of the day, is if all three components work as planned, the United States will begin to do much better than it did before in economic terms. That improved wealth and welfare performance will translate into greater availability of resources to the American state with respect to national defence. Those marginal increases in defence capabilities will in turn contribute to both defeating Chinese efforts to prevent the United States from being able to operate in Asia, while simultaneously reassuring American friends and allies. That, in a nutshell, is the logic of the strategy.

One also has to remember that this is a multi-player game. There is a U.S. relationship with China, there is a U.S. relationship with partners, and there is a relationship between partners and China. There is also a relationship among the partners themselves, and some partners do not happen to like one another.

For countries like India, Japan, Korea, and Australia, important nations that have proud histories and seek independent destinies, the success of U.S. rebalancing is vital. This is so because it is not yet clear to me that these countries have the capacity, either individually or in collaboration, to balance China independently of the United States. If that was the case, then the worst fears that the United States has with respect to Asia would be attenuated. Until the point where countries like Japan, India and Australia can muster the resources to assure themselves that they can successfully balance Ch

Ukraine’s Lessons for Asia

by Alyssa Ayres

March 5, 2014

A signboard is seen from the Indian side of the Indo-China border at Bumla, in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, November 11, 2009 (Adnan Abidi/Courtesy Reuters). 

This post is one of a three-part Asia Unbound series on the implications for Asia of the crisis in Ukraine. See related posts from my colleagues Elizabeth Economy and Sheila Smith. 

The most significant international crisis in recent years—Russia’s invasion of the Crimean peninsula in Ukraine—has left global and western institutions scrambling to respond. What lessons do these events offer thus far for Asia? 

First, at a time when a focus of the U.S. strategy toward Asia has emphasized strengthening regional institutions to deal with differences—establishing strong “rules of the road”—the crisis in Ukraine shows the capabilities as well as limits of such rules. In the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Europe has strong economic and security institutions, with decades of experience working together, managing differences, facilitating shared security burdens, and coordinating the continent’s trade approaches to the world. 

In many ways the system worked; there has been no Russian move into alliance members like Latvia or Lithuania, which also have Russian-speaking minorities. Ukraine, at the EU frontier and outside of NATO, is much more vulnerable by comparison. 

But the crisis also reveals the limits of rules and norms. Moscow seemed unconcerned that NATO members might view an invasion of neighboring Ukraine as a direct threat. Nor did fear of possible alienation from the G8, or condemnation from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), dissuade Russia from an invasion in the name of protecting Russian speakers. The other side of the rules of the road argument would be their limited power. 

*** The Missing Piece in Ensuring Afghanistan’s Peace

Much has gone right in Afghanistan. It’s more secure, stable, and even optimistic. But there's one final tweak needed before America says goodbye. 

BY James Stavridis 

MARCH 14, 2014 

So now the United States approaches the endgame -- long predicted -- in Afghanistan. 

While it is tempting at times to simply walk away, doing so serves no geopolitically sensible purpose, and indeed may be snatching certain defeat from the jaws of a very possible success. 

All is not lost: The United States still has a better-than-even chance of a successful outcome in Afghanistan. That is to say, Washington should execute its strategy and move forward -- not take counsel of its fears and frustrations to abruptly depart. 

The security situation and the upcoming elections have been a focus of the attendant political process. Both are, of course, important. But the real key to whether the United States succeeds will be the health of the Afghan economy and its long-term prospects. To be effective, Washington should emphasize developing growth and stability through private-public partnerships. 

But what does success look like, exactly? Recognizable security throughout most of the populated areas of the country, with a low-grade insurgency rumbling around parts of the south and east; a roughly credible democratic political process, albeit with some corruption and malfeasance; a functioning economy with the possibility of improvement based on minerals; improved medical and educational benefits; and enhanced rights for women and children throughout most of the urban areas. Not perfect, but vastly better than a 14th-century existence under the Taliban. 

Why are the odds better than even? Despite all the challenges, much has gone right in Afghanistan -- in terms of security, politics, economics, and culture. 

In the security sector, more than 50 nations have contributed troops over the past decade, and a principal focus has been the build-up of 350,000 Afghan police and security, which have the approval of more than 70 percent of the population according to recent surveys. Today, the Afghan National Security Forces are fully responsible for ensuring security throughout the nation's 34 provinces, conducting patrols along the borders, and flying their own aircraft. They are holding territories that the Taliban deeply desire to occupy, including the spiritual heartland of the Taliban movement in the south and the rugged mountainous east. Despite a certain amount of Sturm und Drang, the Baseline Security Agreement (BSA) will almost certainly be signed in the next few months (by Afghan President Hamid Karzai's successor), and somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 troops from the NATO-led coalition will likely remain to train, mentor, and monitor the Afghan forces. In all, it is a sustainable and positive outcome, assuming that the 50 or so contributing nations continue the some $4 billion in annual funding -- a bargain compared to keeping 150,000 allied troops there, which cost upward of $100 billion a year. 

Politically, Afghanistan seems on track for a reasonably successful election in April. There is a vibrant campaign in progress: Many views and ethnicities are on offer among the candidates, security planning is moving apace, and Karzai seems content to hand power peacefully to an elected successor. While there will be both security and corruption challenges to overcome, at this stage most observers feel that Afghanistan will have the first handover between elected leaders in its history this spring. 

China Increases Focus on Afghanistan

Ayaz Gul

February 24, 2014

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, left, speaks during a press conference with his Afghan counterpart Zarar Ahmad Osmani at the foreign ministry in Kabul, Afghanistan, Feb. 22, 2014.

ISLAMABAD — Internal and external security concerns appear to have prompted China to intensify involvement in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan in the wake of the planned U.S. military drawdown in December. Regional analysts say Beijing is well-placed to play a central role in Afghan reconstruction beyond 2014 because its non-interventionist policy has earned China goodwill in Afghanistan. China has also increased engagement with close ally Pakistan to achieve its Afghan goals.

The United States and allied troops plan to wind down their Afghan combat mission in December, but there is no let-up in the deadly Taliban insurgency in the country and Kabul’s efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of the conflict have so far remained unsuccessful.

The continued violence has prompted regional fears the foreign military drawdown will strengthen Islamist militants and Afghanistan could return to the civil war of the 1990s.

Chinese concerns that a prolonged conflict in the neighboring country could fuel unrest in its Muslim majority western Xinjiang region are likely behind its increased engagement with the Afghan government. 

Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s rare trip to Kabul Saturday is seen as part of Beijing’s diplomatic efforts. After meetings with Afghan leaders, Wang emphasized the importance of a stable Afghanistan for his country. 

“Afghanistan has special and important influence. The peace and stability of this country has an impact on the security of Western China and more importantly it affects tranquility and development of the entire region,” he noted.

The Chinese foreign minister warned that Afghanistan will have no future unless it overcomes political and ethnic divisions. 

“So, we hope to see a broad-based and inclusive political reconciliation in Afghanistan as soon as possible and China will play a constructive role to facilitate that,” Wang said.

He called on the international community to deliver its promised aid to Afghanistan and help the war-shattered country achieve sustainable growth, saying only with economic growth can poverty be tackled and a breeding ground for extremism be removed.

US-CHINA COLD CONFRONTATION: NEW PARADIGM OF ASIAN SECURITY

Prof Chintamani MahapatraProfessor, School of International Studies, JNU 

IPCS Article 4333 : March 10, 2014. The US Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent visit to China exemplified a complex dynamics of relations between the existing superpower and an aspiring one. The US’ “Manifest Destiny” and China’s “Middle Kingdom Mentality” appear ready to accelerate cold confrontation between the US and China. Both the US and Chinese officials reject the theory of “Great Power Transition” that stipulate armed conflict between the departing hegemonic power and the new hegemon.

Former Chinese President Hu Jintao was of the opinion that war was not inevitable between a declining power and a rising power. His successor, Xi Jinping, is pushing for a new kind of Great Power relations.

On the eve of Kerry’s trip to China, Evan Madeiros, a senior US National Security Council official, remarked, “We’re aware of the historical predictions that a rising power and an established power are destined for rivalry and confrontation. We simply reject that premise.” 

Although a military clash between the US and China is progressively becoming improbable, a kind of cold confrontation between them has been quietly developing in the Asian theatre.

The Sino-US cold confrontation is the result of an altered geopolitical order in the Asia Pacific from the early years of 21st century. As the US stayed engaged in warring against the Afghan insurgents and the Al Qaeda activists; indulged in misplaced military intervention in Iraq; and experienced a faltering economy, Chinese economic influence in Asia sky-rocketed, and its military modernisation perceptually began to threaten US hegemonic presence in the region.

The People’s Liberation Army of China developed anti-access and area-denial capability, threatening the hitherto uninterrupted movement of the US naval vessels in the region. The wide-ranging debate over the relative decline of the US influence and China’s drive towards a superpower status reflected an indisputable contest for influence in the Asia Pacific.

Currently, the US consternation that China may surface as an Asian hegemon, and the Chinese angst that the US intends to restrict the growth of the Chinese power, will shape strategic landscape in Asia in coming years.

The current Sino-US cold confrontation has taken the shape of a passionate competition for regional influence, an occasional show of force, and conflicting positions on bilateral and regional disputes.

Instances of the Sino-US cold confrontation are discernible in critical differences between Washington and Beijing on the North Korean and Iranian nuclear issues; the Syrian civil war; the Sino-Japanese disputes over the Shenkaku/Diaoyu islands; the Sino-Filipino disputes over Mischief Reef and the Scharborough shoal; and the Chinese declaration of a nine-dash-line encompassing its sovereignty in the South China Sea.

Taiwan Watching Crimea with Nervous Eye Toward Beijing

J. Michael Cole

March 14, 2014

Days ahead of a referendum that could result in the loss of the southern territory of Crimea to Russia, Taiwan, which like Ukraine lives in the shadow of a great power, is watching closely to see whether Moscow’s gambit could embolden Beijing to adopt similar strategies toward the island democracy.

While Crimea serves as an imperfect analogy for Taiwan’s situation, there are enough parallels to warrant an exploration of the current crisis and its denouement to determine if they can possibly create a precedent for Chinese behavior. Key to this effort is the fact that both Moscow and Beijing have notions of the “Near Abroad”—that is, territories that, while foreign and sovereign, their governments regard as fair game.

Sunday’s referendum, which will occur under the shadow of the Russian military, only presents two options: “Are you in favor of the reunification of Crimea with Russia as a part of the Russian Federation?” and “Are you in favor of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of Crimea as a part of Ukraine?”—a Constitution that for all intents and purposes would give rise to an independent, albeit pro-Moscow, state within Ukraine.

The situation in Taiwan, which according to Beijing’s version of history was “stolen” from China at the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War in 1895, is vaguely similar, though the proportion of citizens who identify as ethnically Chinese is substantially lower than that of Crimeans who identify as Russians. Support for unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which has dropped steadily over the years, now stands in the single digits, while desire for independence has gradually risen, with a preference for maintaining the status quo remaining the preferred option—at least as long as China threatens force should the island declare de jureindependence, a not insignificant factor in poll responses.

While circumstantial, it is interesting to note that both Crimea and Taiwan are haunted by the year 1992—the “1992 Constitution” and the “1992 Consensus”—under arrangements that are meant to curtail the choices of the peoples involved (under the so-called 1992 consensus, both sides agree that there is only one China, though both agree to disagree on what “one China” means).

China’s Ideological ‘Soft War’: Offense is the Best Defense

China Brief 

February 20, 2014 

By: Nicholas Dynon

Cultural exchanges with developing countries are a way of preserving an 'ideologically heterogenous world,' preventing encirclement by Western values

Beijing regularly reminds us that its foreign policy eschews the export of ideology and meddling in the political affairs of other countries. According to its concept of “peaceful development,” China has no intention of exporting ideology or seeking world hegemony, nor does it seek to change or subvert the current international order. In the same breath, Beijing frequently chides the United States as a serial offender in exporting ideology to shore up its international hegemony as the world’s dominant superpower.

China sees itself as the target of powerful Western political, military and media efforts to pursue neoliberal strategies of ideological world dominance.

Beijing thus purports to maintain a defensive posture in relation to the export of ideology by other actors and the United States in particular. It articulates this in terms of safeguarding its “ideological security” against “ideological and cultural infiltration.”

Beijing characterizes its strategic intentions as mainly “inward-looking” while the United States’ are “outward-looking.” Thus, their strategic intentions do not clash (China Daily, September 9, 2013). While this inward versus outward characterisation appears prima facie to suggest a non-competitive arrangement, reality suggests otherwise. In addition to its defensive ideological posture—and as much as Beijing might state otherwise—there is an “outward-looking” element to this posture. While there exists no evidence that Beijing is exporting ideology for the purpose of universalizing its political values, there is evidence that it is doing so to safeguard its own ideological security in the face of a US-led “soft war.”

By examining Chinese discourse on the subject, this paper examines the extent to which Beijing is exporting its ideology to shore up support abroad, most notably among non-Western developing nations. To this end, it will be shown that Beijing is maneuvering to put its worldview forward as an alternative to the ideological hegemony of the West.

Defending Against Ideological Infiltration

“Exporting ideology” is used as a pejorative term by Beijing to refer to a state or non-state actor attempting to indoctrinate a country’s government and/or people. The Chinese concept of the export of ideology (shuchuyishixingtai (v.); yishixingtaishuchu (n.)) incorporates notions of hegemony, homogenization and universalism. Beijing conceptualizes “exporting ideology” as a universalizing endeavor in which a state or non-state actor seeks to globalize their ideology by replacing all others.

Pivot, Rebalance and What Next?

13 March 2014 

D Suba ChandranDiretcor, IPCS 

The American strategy towards the Asia Pacific is facing serious challenges. What started as a new “pivot” to Asia and later shifted to a “rebalance” now needs serious re-adjustment. Not because the American strategy is problematic, but more because of what is happening in multiple regions in Asia, starting from Syria in the Middle East to Japan in the East Asia. Therein lies the challenge to a hegemon in decline, and multiple actors who are not afraid to confront the sole super power. Perhaps, the US faces a bigger challenge than what it faced during the Cold War.

The rising China, no more peaceful, as could be seen from its recent strategies in East Asia, undoubtedly poses the biggest challenge to American rebalancing strategy towards Asia. China has clearly chosen its battleground to challenge the US might, where the latter feels the weakest – the South China Sea and East Asia. Despite all the bravado of the US and its allies like Japan, the recent pronouncements and actions in South China Sea, especially the proclamation of the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), has clearly been a successful strategy by China to undermine the American influence in the region.

The US feels helpless and is faced with fewer options in South China Sea and East Asia. Though the US may want to be proactive and aggressive in addressing Chinese designs in the region, it has few options in the ground (or in the sea) to address the challenges posed by Beijing. On its part, China is carefully choosing its zone of conflict, based on its own strengths. More importantly, China is also carefully calibrating its options – attempting to show how ineffective the US power is, and how helpless those countries would remain if they expect Washington to come to their support.

More than the Chinese grand designs to upset the American plans, what really challenges the American options is the role and strategies played by its own allies, especially Japan. Under Abe’s leadership, Tokyo is on a collision course – not only vis-à-vis China, but also vis-à-vis South Korea, which is another valuable US ally in the region. Japan, under Abe, has been extremely offensive – pushing the threshold, for whatever reasons only known to its leadership led by Abe. The biggest challenge for the US in East Asia does not come from China, but from an aggressive Japan.

Unlike the previous decades, where Japan played the part of a perfect ally to the US by yielding to Washington’s larger strategies in the region and elsewhere, Tokyo today has a mind of its own. The hard reality for the US is to manage an increasingly aggressive Japan, which is on a decline (economically) and a rising China (both economically and militarily). Japan with an ageing population and declining economy is certainly not good news; it is only a matter of time before Japan further falls economically – beyond any redemption in terms of its inner strengths to bounce back. 

RUSSIAN CYBER WEAPONS HIT UKRAINE: HOW TO DECLARE WAR, WITHOUT DECLARING WAR

March 13, 2014 

by Fortuna's Corner 

Russia’s Cyber Weapons Hit Ukraine: How to Declare War Without Declaring War

By targeting the Ukrainian government with a cyber weapon, the Russians are able to effectively engage in an aggressive, kinetic act without actually declaring war, or other countries reacting like it is an act of war. This will not last forever.

http://www.csmonitor.com/ layout/set/print/Commentary/ Global-Viewpoint/2014/0312/ Russia-s-cyber-weapons-hit- Ukraine-How-to-declare-war- without-declaring-war

Temp Headline Image

A man looks at posters from an international campaign to support Ukraine in Kiev, March 12. Commentary contributor Alec Ross writes: ‘The absence of a set of broadly held norms and treaties governing the use of cyber weapons has not led to the firing of guns or launching of missiles, but this will not always be the case. We need something more than playground rules.’

(Efrem Lukatsky/AP)

By Alec Ross, Commentary contributor / March 12, 2014 at 10:24 am EDT

The playground fights I got into when I was a kid had closely observed, unwritten rules: You could punch, you could kick, and you could even choke your opponent, but you couldn’t use a weapon. Pick up a rock or a stick and bring that into the fight, and you were going to earn derision, and maybe a butt-kicking, from the entire playground crowd.

Similarly, during the cold war there were some important, unspoken rules about combat. It was OK if militaries of Soviet and American satellite states fought and killed each other, but it was not OK for an American or Soviet soldier to engage one another directly, lest the uneasy equilibrium in that Great States conflict between the world’s two superpowers be thrown off balance.

Today, utilizing cyber weapons falls into the category of largely being accepted (even if unhappily) as part of how countries exercise their power while falling short of the line of armed conflict treated as an act of war.