Neighborhood Ravaged on Deadliest Day So Far for Both Sides in Gaza

By ANNE BARNARD and ISABEL KERSHNER

JULY 20, 2014

GAZA CITY — The mayhem began in the early hours of Sunday morning in Shejaiya, an eastern neighborhood of Gaza City, where Israeli forces battled with Hamas militants. Terrified civilians fled, sometimes past the bodies of those struck down in earlier artillery barrages. By dusk it was clear that Sunday was the deadliest single day for the Palestinians in the latest conflict and the deadliest for the Israeli military in years.

At least 60 Palestinians and 13 Israeli soldiers and officers were killed in Shejaiya alone, and the shattered neighborhood was quickly becoming a new symbol of the long-running Israeli-Palestinian conflict, underlining the rising cost of this newest Gaza war.

The death tolls and the withering assault on Shejaiya appeared to shake the international community, with world leaders continuing to carefully call for both sides to step back but with criticism of Israel rising. Within hours, President Obama had called the Israeli prime minister for the second time in three days, the United Nations Security Council had called an emergency session at the urging of the Palestinians, and Secretary General Ban Ki-moon had issued a statement calling the attack on Shejaiya “an atrocious action.

OPEN GRAPHIC

By early evening, the Obama administration announced that Secretary of State John Kerry would head to Cairo to meet with Egyptian officials in an attempt to negotiate a cease-fire to end the bloodshed.

Throughout Gaza, at least 87 Palestinians were killed by Israeli fire on Sunday, according to the Palestinian Health Ministry, bringing the death toll there since the Israeli air offensive began on July 8 to at least 425, with more than 3,000 injured. The toll includes more than 100 children.

Israel has lost 18 soldiers so far, as well as two citizens killed by rocket and mortar fire. Two Americans were among the soldiers killed in Gaza; Jen Psaki, the State Department spokeswoman, identified them as Max Steinberg and Sean Carmeli. Mr. Steinberg’s family lives in California, and Mr. Carmeli was from Texas, The Associated Press reported.

In Shejaiya, the panic Sunday was palpable. Some of the men, women and children who streamed out of the area were barefoot. Israeli shells crashed all around, rockets fired by Palestinian militants soared overhead in the direction of Israel and small-arms fire whizzed past. Asked where they were going, one woman said, “God knows.”

The casualties quickly overwhelmed local hospitals. Doctors treated some victims on the floor.

As the day wore on and the casualties mounted, it became apparent that what had begun on Thursday night as a limited ground invasion to follow 10 days of intense airstrikes had developed into a more extensive and dangerous phase for both sides.

Going at it in Gaza: New Realities in an Old Conflict

Jacob Stoil

July 21, 2014 

Hamas needs a game changer, while Israel’s military doctrine is undergoing one. The effects of the Gaza blockade and the closure of the Egyptian border and many of the tunnels under it have driven Hamas’ decisions since the latest outbreak in the Hamas-Israel conflict on June 27. Hamas relies on its finances to help maintain its support in Gaza by providing support to the local populace, engaging in some degree of governance, and paying other local power brokers to remain on side. However, recently it has suffered from a severe curtailment of its cash flow. Hamas first attempted to solve its financial woes through the establishment of the Palestinian unity government. This, however, failed to alleviate the problem. The Hamas financial crisis has been building for over a year and the day before the first salvo of rockets from Gaza last month, workers hired by the Hamas administration in Gaza went on strike over a lack of pay. Now Hamas has made a bet that renewed war and subsequent ceasefire negotiations can accomplish what a unity government failed to achieve. The primary goal in these negotiations was a lessening of border restrictions and an end to the crackdown on smuggling, which might have rescued Hamas’s position in Gaza.

Egypt’s effective closure of the border also rendered resupply difficult for Hamas, providing additional motivation for Hamas’ decision to continue escalation. With the closed border and Egyptian activity against the tunnels that run underneath it, Hamas has had trouble adding to its considerable stockpile of long-range, heavy munitions, ammunition, and other military supplies or raising additional revenue from taxing commercial goods brought across or under the border. Without an alteration of the border situation, Hamas will see its effective military capabilities degrade over time. This removes the motivation for holding forces in reserve — Hamas might as well use what it has to achieve a result while it can. This explains Hamas’ willingness to employ its full range of capabilities, including UAVs, offensive tunneling, long-range rockets, and amphibious assault teams. The twin pressures of finance and supply explain why, at each phase of escalation, Hamas has made the decision to double down and go for broke. Early on in the current round of the conflict, a long-term ceasefire that addressed the border situation might have been sufficient to end things; however, as the pattern of Gazan rockets and Israeli strikes continues, for Hamas, such an agreement will no longer suffice.

Hamas is not immune to the logic of mission creep and escalation. These contribute to changes in the ceasefire terms Hamas will seek. As the clash escalates, Hamas needs a bigger visible payoff in the ceasefire negotiations to justify its actions and the damage suffered in Gaza. Whether a result of organizational chaos, indecision, or the logic of escalation, Hamas’ rejection of the terms of the original Egyptian ceasefirehave raised the bar even higher. Should Hamas accept something resembling those terms, it would need to justify any damage to Gaza or loss of life that took place after the initial ceasefire attempt. Hamas would also have trouble projecting the image of being a victorious resistance organization and its reputation might suffer, especially relative to more radical competitors. The ineffectiveness of its operations against Israel has exacerbated this dynamic. Increasingly, Hamas risks looking impotent — its amphibious teams were killed, its infiltrations countered, and its rockets have yet to cause major damage to Israel, or disrupt its economy significantly. As a result, Hamas needs a long-term ceasefire that will, at the very least, allow it to save face as well as resolve its financial and logistical problems. In short, because of its logistics, finances, and the real potential of waning support in Gaza, if Hamas does not want to lose big, it must score a big win.

To achieve a big win, Hamas has few remaining options but to hope for a major Israeli incursion. Like a forward trying to draw a foul, Hamas successfully drew Israel into an invasion. The general rule of these situations is the bigger the fight, the bigger the ceasefire compromise. Knowing that Israel does not wish to remain in an indefinite reoccupation of Gaza and that a large-scale invasion may erode the relative support Israel has received from the international community in the operation thus far, Hamas could hope that after an Israeli invasion, the border might open and money might again flow into its coffers, with Hamas being perceived as a victor for surviving.

Gaza: What Does Israel Want?

K. P. Fabian

July 21, 2014

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As the global citizen was eagerly expecting the commencement of a cease-fire earlier announced to come into effect on July 18, the breaking news came that Israel had started a ground offensive. The US had publicly and deferentially cautioned Israel against a ground offensive. The stunning paradox of US-Israel relations is that the giver of military aid and diplomatic support has hardly any leverage over the recipient. In fact, Israel not only takes in the aid but also enjoys huge leverage over US policy in the region. Students of International Relations will find it difficult to see another example of this strange phenomenon. John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their well- researched book The Israeli Lobby and the US Foreign Policy (2006) demonstrated how the pro-Israel lobby works. Those who expected that with Obama as the President the lobby will lose at least a part of its influence have been decisively proved wrong.

The current Operation Protective Edge started on July 8. To understand why this operation has been mounted one has to go back in time. A time line that starts with the abduction and killing of three Israeli boys in June or another which starts with rockets from Gaza hitting Israel on July 7/8 with Israel’s starting the operation in response misses the big picture.

The Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) won an election in Gaza in 2006 against its rival Fatah. The election was free and fair. Since US has stated repeatedly that it wants to see democracy take root in the region, it should have felicitated the Hamas on its victory and lent it support to strengthen democracy in the region. Instead, compelled by Israel, US, the EU, Canada and Japan declared that the Hamas was a terrorist organization. In other words, the Hamas became a terrorist organization in the eyes of US and others only after, and only because, it won an election.

Israel’s argument is that the Hamas does not recognize Israel’s existence. That argument is, up to a point, technically correct. But, a moment of reflection will show that recognition is exchanged only between states and that since Israel has prevented the emergence of an independent Palestine, it has no right to expect recognition from the other side. Incidentally, Israel and the Hamas negotiated and come to agreements a number of times. In other words, the Hamas does recognize Israel in practice. More over, it is obvious that given the asymmetry in military might and the assured protection from US, Israel is in no danger for its existence.

The Hamas government in Gaza was virtually strangled to death by Israel and its allies, including Egypt. Gaza is like a large prison for its 1.687 million population in an area of 360 sq. kms, bounded by Israel, Egypt, and the Mediterranean. Egypt under former President Mohammed Morsi partially opened the border with Egypt and after his fall in July 2003, practically closed it. Since 2007, Israel imposed a blockade after the Hamas took over the government.

According to Oxfam, the blockade "has devastated Gaza's economy, left most people unable to leave Gaza, restricted people from essential services such as healthcare and education, and cut Palestinians off from each other…More than 40% of people in Gaza - nearly 50% of youth - are now unemployed and 80% of people receive international aid. Many key industries, such as the construction industry, have been decimated as essential materials are not allowed into Gaza. Exports are currently at less than 3% of their pre-blockade levels, with the transfer of agricultural produce and other goods to the West Bank and exports to Israel entirely banned.”

The Hamas government in Gaza found itself bankrupt and could not even pay its employees. However, Israel overplayed its hand as eventually the Hamas government resigned, and Fatah and Hamas got together in April 2014, to Israel’s utter consternation. Since then Israel has been looking for an opportunity to destroy the Hamas. If Israel really wanted peace and security, it could have welcomed the reconciliation between the two Palestinian groups and engaged in serious negotiations with Fatah whose government does not include any one from the Hamas. But, Israel is not looking for a window of opportunity for a peaceful, negotiated resolution with the Palestinians and it rendered futile Secretary of State John Kerry’s hard work.

The three Israeli boys kidnapped in June were found murdered on July 1. Israel asserted, without evidence, that the Hamas was responsible. Israel started arresting suspects, the Palestinians staged protests, and ten Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli Defence Forces. Hundreds were arrested, many of whom had nothing to do with the abduction and killing of the three boys. On July 7, the Hamas, reportedly, started sending rockets to Israel, much to its satisfaction, and Operation Protective Eagle started.

GAZA: ISRAEL’S ASYMMETRIC AGGRESSION – OPED

By Joshua Pringle

JULY 21, 2014 

As Israel continued its ground offensive on Sunday, the Gaza Strip saw its deadliest fighting so far, with more than 60 Palestinians and 13 Israeli soldiers killed. In reading Western media reports of the recent escalation of violence in the Gaza Strip, one might get the impression that the conflict involves two sides that are equally engaged in and equally responsible for the fighting. Or, depending on the news outlet, one might get the impression that Hamas is primarily responsible and that Israel is merely defending itself. Such accounts gravely distort realities on the ground.

This is an asymmetric conflict. To begin, look at the death count. More than 430 Palestinians have been killed since July 8, about 80 percent of them civilians. On the Israeli side, 18 soldiers and two civilians have been killed. Since 2005, 23 out of every 24 deaths in this ongoing conflict have been Palestinian. Then consider the difference in weaponry. The rockets being fired into Israel are small, short-range and inaccurate, and of those that aren’t intercepted by Israel’s Iron Dome, most land in unpopulated areas. Israel, on the other hand, is equipped with the most advanced weaponry in the world, sponsored by the United States. Israel has invaded a people with no army, crippled water and electricity supplies, and no place to run.

One narrative that has been echoed by various media outlets is that Hamas rejected a ceasefire agreement proposed by Israel and Egypt, and that that is why the violence is continuing. It is true that Hamas rejected a ceasefire agreement, but for good reason. The proposed ceasefire, which Hamas was not consulted on, would have merely restored the 2012 ceasefire agreement, which Israel has repeatedly violated, thus perpetuating the status quo. Hamas has given its conditions for a ceasefire, which include a stoppage of airstrikes; a lifting of the siege on Gaza, opening the passage of goods and people; non-interference with the Palestinian unity government; and release of the Palestinian prisoners who were released during the Shalit prisoner exchange and then recently re-arrested. “In contrast,” says human rights attorney Noura Erakat, “it is not clear what Israel’s endgame is. It seems willing to accept a ceasefire on condition of Hamas’ unconditional capitulation.”

What is often missing in Western accounts of this conflict is a sense of context. When four Palestinian children were killed by Israeli bombs while playing at the seashore, an Israeli official said this was another example of Hamas using civilians as human shields, and CNN printed it, along with the repeated false claim by Israeli officials that the Israeli military doesn’t target civilians. What CNN and many other outlets omit is that Palestinians, in both Gaza and the West Bank, are living under an illegal occupation, “which is characterized by a discriminatory apartheid legal regime and brutal repression,” Erakat tells the Institute for Middle East Understanding. “When the rockets stop flying and the aerial strikes cease, Palestinians will continue to die a slow and protracted death under the boot of Israel’s occupation. In particular, the population in the Gaza Strip faces a horrific future. By 2020, it is predicted that Gaza’s one source of clean water will be unusable and the World Health Organization says the 150-square-mile Strip will be unlivable.”

What is happening in Gaza right now is a repeat of what happened in 2008-2009 and November 2012. Over this six-year period, Gazans have had to live under the shadow of terror and abject poverty, and large numbers have been displaced. At the moment, more than 50,000 Gazans are seeking shelter in U.N. schools. The U.N. Palestinian refugee agency says it is running out of food and medicine. The United Nations describes the blockade as “collective punishment.” Israel has systematically attacked homes, schools, hospital and mosques in Gaza, then blocked the import of supplies needed to rebuild. Meanwhile in the West Bank, settlements continue to expand. Look up a map of Palestinian territory in 1948, and then compare it to a current map. It’s been swallowed up. None of this is to say that members of Hamas or anyone else in Gaza have the right to launch rockets over the wall, but when the media portrays “the occupier as the victim and the occupied as the aggressor” — as the Palestine Solidarity Campaign described such bias in an open letter to the BBC, criticizing BBC’s recent coverage — they are effectively conspiring in the perpetuation of a narrative that allows the United States to continue to pursue a blindly pro-Israel policy, at the expense of human rights.

Gaza and Israel: New Obstacles, New Solutions

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Middle East Briefing N°3914 Jul 2014

OVERVIEW

Israel and Hamas are locked again in combat likely to yield – beyond tragic life and property loss – a return to a destructive status quo. The immediate triggers were the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli yeshiva students, for which Israel holds Hamas responsible, and the revenge torture and murder of a Palestinian teen by vigilante Israeli Jews. The nature and extent of Hamas’s involvement in the initial obscenity remains unclear, but the attack’s consequences are anything but. Since Israel launched Operation Protective Edge on 8 July, 168 Palestinians have been killed (80 per cent civilians, a fifth of whom were children) and about 1,150 wounded. Some 1,000 rockets have been launched toward Israel, of which about 200 were intercepted by the Iron Dome defence system. Previous rounds ended with each side claiming at best a Pyrrhic victory, because Israel can achieve lasting stability only when Gaza does, and vice versa. Breaking this pattern is even more urgent today, because the stakes of this escalation could be higher.

The reconciliation agreement of 23 April 2014, signed by Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), led principally by Fatah, offers both a further challenge and an opportunity. The situation in Gaza has deteriorated markedly since then. The new PA government formed on 2 June was supposed to take over governance in Gaza but has not. The Strip runs on administrative inertia, since the new ministers have not assumed their responsibilities. An estimated 43,000 employees, hired since Hamas took over Gaza in 2007 and who still largely run the Strip, have not received their salaries in months; in frustration, they have prevented some of the other 70,000 employees – who were not hired by Hamas and in most cases had been paid by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority (PA) on the West Bank to stay home during those years in order to weaken the Hamas government – from obtaining theirs. Electricity, fuel and medical supplies have grown scarcer. Now that conflict has erupted, the flux in the Palestinian political system introduces a new variable into efforts to achieve calm.

But the reconciliation agreement might also hold the key to squaring the ceasefire circle. Though opposed by Israel, the deal, if implemented, offers the best chance of alleviating Gaza’s misery and lessening Hamas’s incentives to fight. The Islamist movement long resisted admitting any PA presence, but now that it has renounced governance, a door has been opened, and with it, an opportunity to redesign the peace process and advance the well-being of Gaza’s 1.7 million residents. Hamas for the foreseeable future will continue to be the de facto security authority on the ground, even if reconciliation moves forward; indeed, reconciliation will need to be implemented in a manner that does not wholly abandon or alienate the employees hired by Hamas and thereby trigger new civil strife. Continuing Gaza’s isolation, however, would do nothing to loosen the movement’s control. And should it, it would only be in the direction of jihadis.

Why Israel Launched a Ground War in Gaza

By AARON DAVID MILLER 

July 17, 2014

After days of ominous buildup, it’s finally happening: Israel has launched a ground incursion into Gaza. But why, you say? War, what’s it good for? Israel’s Iron Dome has kept the home front safe; Hamas’ rejection of the Egyptian cease-fire offer has given Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu the political high ground; and there’s a big risk of losing it if Israel charges into Gaza and ends up killing many more Palestinian civilians. Which it inevitably will. And what’s more, why do the Israelis believe that a ground war will lead to a better outcome than the last one in 2008/9? Hamas still ended up with more lethal, precise and long-range high trajectory weapons.

All true. But despite the risks, the logic—political, psychological and strategic—favored a significant intervention. Here’s why Bibi did it.

1. The military clock

By MICHAEL COHEN

These conflicts have military clocks and diplomatic clocks. And the former was ticking down much faster than the latter. The longer this inconclusive war dragged on, the greater the odds that the stronger party—Israel—would act to change the balance. Hamas is unlikely to agree to a cease-fire without conditions that Israel can’t accept. Sure, Iron Dome has ensured that there were almost no Israeli casualties from Hamas’ rocket attacks. But Netanyahu can’t allow a new status quo in which Israel is subjected to the uncertainties, disruptions and potential casualties of what had become daily rocket attacks, however inaccurate. The responsibility of a government is to guarantee not just security but normalcy. And life isn’t normal today, however inured Israelis have become to it. Moreover, sooner or later Hamas was bound to get lucky. Its missiles, or some terrorists tunneling out of Gaza, would succeed in killing a significant number of Israelis. And if that happened, the clamor on Netanyahu’s right would become a deafening roar. So Bibi had to act now.

2. The rockets didn’t stop

Accurate or not, Hamas has plenty of high trajectory weapons still to be fired. And the fact that they can still launch with impunity after the pounding the Israeli air force has delivered tells you two things. One, Hamas has developed an underground infrastructure that allows launches seemingly impervious to degrading by air; and two, the only way to deal with the threat is to go in and destroy as much of this infrastructure as possible. Sure, two or four years from now, Hamas might restore its arsenal. That’s an important concern, but it doesn’t deal with the reality of now. You want the rockets stopped? Either you put boots on the ground or Hamas agrees to do it.

3. No cease-fire in time

Egypt tried and failed, however insincerely, to get Hamas to agree to a cease-fire. Qatar stuck its nose out, too. But this isn’t just about finding the right mediator. Yes, it’s true that Egypt’s relations have been bad with Hamas ever since the military threw out the Muslim Brotherhood president and elected one of its own. But it’s the substance of what is required for the deal that’s the real problem. Hamas needs to present an image of victory. And Israel is equally determined to deny that image. Hamas wants the border with Egypt opened, salaries for its government workers paid and the release of the 50-plus Hamas guys whom Israel picked up in their recent sweeps of the West Bank. Given enough time—and enough punishment in Gaza—maybe a deal might be worked out. But right now we have a big game of Middle East chicken: Israel will not start negotiating with Hamas and make the terrorist group a winner any more than Hamas will capitulate without a fundamental improvement in economic life for Gaza. Looking around, it’s hard to see who can put this deal together. Qatar’s too close to Hamas; the United States has influence with Israel but not Hamas. The Turks have a rocky relationship with Israel. Israel doesn’t trust the United Nations. And even Egypt would probably like to see Hamas weakened further. So from the Israeli perspective, war-war looked like a better bet than jaw-jaw.

The Bizarre Moral Criticism Against Israel

Eric H. Yoffie

July 14, 2014

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Israeli soldiers rest beside shells for a 155mm M109 Dores self-propelled howitzer at a position in Southern Israel near the border with Gaza, on the seventh day of Operation Protective Edge, on July 14, 2014.Li Rui—Xinhua/Sipa

What does it mean to say that casualties are “disproportionate”? 

On “NBC Nightly News” on July 12, David Gregory spoke of growing pressure from the United Nations for a ceasefire in Gaza. He noted that the United States and many other nations believed that Israel had a right to self-defense. Nonetheless, Gregory reported, these countries were likely to be sympathetic to calls for a ceasefire because of the “disproportionate” number of casualties between the two sides. Among the residents of Gaza, the death toll then exceeded 100, while Israel had suffered dozens of injuries but no casualties. 

Mr. Gregory was simply reporting the news, but I found his comments disturbing, nonetheless. What does it mean to say that the casualties are “disproportionate”? And is that really the moral issue that we need to be concerned about? 

The implication of the “disproportionality” claim is that, given their losses, the people of Gaza are the real victims. But morally and politically, this is an intolerable and distorted interpretation of the realities in the region. 

The reason that Hamas has not killed more Israelis is not because they haven’t tried. In the seven years during which it has controlled Gaza, Hamas and its proxies have fired more than 5000 rockets into Israel; almost 800 have been launched just this past week. Each one has been aimed at civilians and intended to murder and maim. The reason that more Israelis have not died is that the weapons are mostly crude and inaccurate and that, over time, Israel has prepared herself with shelters, warning sirens and an anti-missile system. In addition, Israelis have been just plain lucky. 

But that luck could change at any moment. If a single rocket were to hit a school or a mall, the number of dead could balance out in a flash. Then, to be sure, you would have “proportionality,” but there is no moral calculus by which additional dead civilians is a preferable outcome. 

How the West Chose War in Gaza

By NATHAN THRALL

JULY 17, 2014 

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Gaza and Israel: The Road to War, Paved by the West

JERUSALEM — AS Hamas fires rockets at Israeli cities and Israel follows up its extensive airstrikes with a ground operation in the Gaza Strip, the most immediate cause of this latest war has been ignored: Israel and much of the international community placed a prohibitive set of obstacles in the way of the Palestinian “national consensus” government that was formed in early June.

That government was created largely because of Hamas’s desperation and isolation. The group’s alliance with Syria and Iran was in shambles. Its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became a liability after a July 2013 coup replaced an ally, President Mohamed Morsi, with a bitter adversary, Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Hamas’s coffers dried up as General Sisi closed the tunnels that had brought to Gaza the goods and tax revenues on which it depended.

Seeing a region swept by popular protests against leaders who couldn’t provide for their citizens’ basic needs, Hamas opted to give up official control of Gaza rather than risk being overthrown. Despite having won the last elections, in 2006, Hamas decided to transfer formal authority to the Palestinian leadership in Ramallah. That decision led to a reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization, on terms set almost entirely by the P.L.O. chairman and Palestinian Authoritypresident, Mahmoud Abbas.

Israel immediately sought to undermine the reconciliation agreement by preventing Hamas leaders and Gaza residents from obtaining the two most essential benefits of the deal: the payment of salaries to 43,000 civil servants who worked for the Hamas government and continue to administer Gaza under the new one, and the easing of the suffocating border closures imposed by Israel and Egypt that bar most Gazans’ passage to the outside world.

Yet, in many ways, the reconciliation government could have served Israel’s interests. It offered Hamas’s political adversaries a foothold in Gaza; it was formed without a single Hamas member; it retained the same Ramallah-based prime minister, deputy prime ministers, finance minister and foreign minister; and, most important, it pledged to comply with the three conditions for Western aid long demanded by America and its European allies: nonviolence, adherence to past agreements and recognition of Israel.

Israel strongly opposed American recognition of the new government, however, and sought to isolate it internationally, seeing any small step toward Palestinian unity as a threat. Israel’s security establishment objects to the strengthening of West Bank-Gaza ties, lest Hamas raise its head in the West Bank. And Israelis who oppose a two-state solution understand that a unified Palestinian leadership is a prerequisite for any lasting peace.

Still, despite its opposition to the reconciliation agreement, Israel continued to transfer the tax revenues it collects on the Palestinian Authority’s behalf, and to work closely with the new government, especially on security cooperation.

But the key issues of paying Gaza’s civil servants and opening the border with Egypt were left to fester. The new government’s ostensible supporters, especially the United States and Europe, could have pushed Egypt to ease border restrictions, thereby demonstrating to Gazans that Hamas rule had been the cause of their isolation and impoverishment. But they did not.

Instead, after Hamas transferred authority to a government of pro-Western technocrats, life in Gaza became worse.

Does the Shootdown of the Malaysian Airliner Mark the Beginning of the End for the Pro-Moscow Separatists in the Ukraine?

The Missile That Will End the War

Mark Galeotti

Foreign Policy, July 18, 2014

There is little room for doubt that a missile fired by separatist rebels brought down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, killing 298 innocent people. It seems that the rebels didn’t realize they were targeting a civilian airliner. Indeed, intercepted telephone conversations between rebel commanders reflect their surprise and dismay: They presumably had thought it was a Ukrainian government military aircraft (that is certainly what rebel “minister of defense” Igor Strelkov claimed). But it is hardly relevant whether the downing of MH17 was a deliberate atrocity or a murderous mistake. Regardless, this disaster poses the greatest challenge yet for the Kremlin in its months-long covert war in Ukraine, one likely to bring the war to a close soon — if not without more bloodshed.

While there are undoubtedly grounds for resentment in eastern Ukraine — and while most of the rebel fighters are locals — the rebellion is, for all intents and purposes, a Russian creation. Since the insurgency began, Russia has armed, encouraged, facilitated, and protected the rebels while maintaining an official air of detachment. Strelkov is a known Russian intelligence officer; weapons andvolunteers have been moved across the border into Ukraine on a constant basis; and Moscow has threatened retaliation if the Ukrainian government takes tough measures against a rebellion within its own borders. Despite all that, the Kremlin claims that Ukraine’s woes are simply an internal matter.

Moscow cannot and will not continue to be able to pretend not to be involved, in the wake of MH17’s deadly descent.

Moscow cannot and will not continue to be able to pretend not to be involved, in the wake of MH17’s deadly descent.

Of late, the Kremlin had been showing signs of impatience and uncertainty when it came to eastern Ukraine. Separatist leaders, including Strelkov, have beengrumbling about a lack of support from Moscow. Kremlin mouthpieces dulysmeared them back. Eduard Bagirov, one of Putin’s main political managers, went further and publicly warned that Strelkov would be “squashed like a flea" if he didn’t come to heel.

However, compelling evidence emerged at the same time that the Russians were upping the ante in Ukraine. After the fall of Slavyansk, until then the epicenter of the rebel military, Russian forces apparently launched short-range rocket strikes on Ukrainian positions, and the U.S. government stated that the rebels had started to receive more heavy equipment from across the border, including artillery and armored vehicles.

Don’t Think Russian Rebels Can Learn How to Fire an Anti-Air Missile? Try This Simulator SAM Simulator models old Soviet surface-to-air weapons

Robert Beckhusen 

20 Jul 2014

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Here’s a morbid experiment. Try to see if you can figure out how to fire a Soviet anti-aircraft missile.

Turns out, it’s not exactly easy. But it’s not at all impossible for non-specialists given some experience and training. The U.S. believes Russia’s proxy rebels in eastern Ukraine received training from Russian advisers on to operate a 9K37 Buk missile system that destroyed Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 on July 17.

Turns out, people are training themselves how to operate sophisticated surface-to-air missile systems.

After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Hungarian amateur surface-to-air missile community—yes, there is a community for this—got access to detailed documentation on how to operate the country’s various, decommissioned Soviet-made SAMs. The sleuths also got into contact with some of the out-of-work operators and came close enough to photograph the instrument panels.

Put it all together, the result is a free simulator—known as SAM Simulator—that is a close approximation of the real thing. There’s no Buk missile launcher. But the 2K11 Krug is available. Both the Buk and the Krug use semi-active radar homing missiles.

Soviet anti-air systems are also more alike than they are different. The Soviet military tried to duplicate its systems over succeeding generations as much as possible. That makes the weapons simple to produce and easy for conscripts to use.

These weapons are not idiot proof like comparatively simple shoulder-fired, anti-air missile launchers, or MANPADS. The instructions are complicated, and looking through the steps has an eerie feeling to it, considering what they’re capable of.

As was horrifically—and criminally—made clear last week, Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine knew enough to acquire a target and fire, but did not bother or were unable to correctly identify their target as a civilian aircraft. Two hundred ninety-eight people lost their lives.

Putin’s Dangerous Proxy War

By MICHAEL COHEN 

July 17, 2014 

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Vladimir Putin has been playing a dangerous game in Eastern Ukraine. On Thursday, it backfired badly.

Ever since seizing Crimea earlier this year, the Russian president has been offering tacit – and sometimes more direct – support to pro-Russian separatist groups battling the Ukrainian government. Although Putin seems to have backed off the idea of a cross-border military invasion and has been trying, half-heartedly it appears, to disengage himself from the conflict, he’s yet to make a full break with the rebels.

After Thursday’s shoot-down of a Malaysian Airlines flight over rebel-held territory in Ukraine’s volatile east, killing 295 people, he may no longer have much choice in the matter.

If the rebels are responsible for the downing of Flight 17 (and from all appearances that seems to be the case), they have dealt Putin a grievous blow – one that will likely force him to cut ties with them or face even harsher economic and diplomatic censure. But whatever choice he makes, the fallout from this tragedy could reverberate for years to come. It provides an object lesson in the dangers of getting too cozy with insurgents who are neither under one’s control nor with whom one’s interests are firmly aligned.

That lesson extends to Washington. For many months, armchair military strategists on Capitol Hill and elsewhere have harshly criticized President Obama for refusing to arm the motley groups of rebels in the Syrian civil war. In recent weeks Obama has begun to ramp up moves in that direction. But the blowback from Putin’s support of the separatists in Ukraine is a reminder that such a policy brings with it real downsides.

While few of those calling for U.S. aid have been pushing for surface-to-air-missiles to be sent to the Syrian rebels, the larger point holds. Insurgents who are armed with U.S. weapons but who are not governed by U.S. law or American military chains of command can do what they like; they could easily sell them to other, more extreme groups or, even worse, use them to commit human rights atrocities. Both the death squads in Latin America supported by U.S. aid in the 1980s and more directly, the Sabra and Shatilla massacre in Beirut by Christian groups allied with Israel are tragic examples of the latter. Or, as was the case with American support for the Afghan mujahedin during the 1980s, the freedom fighters of today could one day in the future turn their attention—and their guns—against America.

To be sure, every situation was different, but well before the downing of Flight 17, Putin had been facing plenty of fallout from his effort to destabilize Ukraine. On Wednesday, the United States imposed a new set of sanctions on Russia that targeted some of the country’s major banks, defense firms and key energy companies, including the country’s largest oil firm, Rosneft. The European Union followed suit by suspending new investment in Russia by the European Investment Bank and seeking to stop loans from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Although these were a tougher set of sanctions than those already in place, the impact was unlikely to be dramatic, but that has never been the intention of sanctions. Instead, they were geared toward increasing international pressure on Putin. And guess what: It’s worked. The combination of sanctions, regional instability and Russia’s isolation helped to scare away foreign investment and spurred major capital flight from the country. Already this year there has been $75 billion in capital outflows, more than twice the amount in 2013. With this latest incident, earlier predictions of $100 billion for the year seem low. Russia is already headed toward recession and the downturn that began earlier this year will likely only get worse.

Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17: What If Russia Wasn’t Involved?

By Zachary Keck

July 19, 2014

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There is an increasing amount of evidence that Russia wasn’t necessarily directly involved in the tragedy. 

Nearly immediately after Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 was downed by a surface-to-air missile on Thursday, all eyes in the West turned to Russia. Ukrainian and Western officials, along with most of the Western press, have all but blamed the incident on Russia. Even if Russian agents weren’t directly involved in the incident, Russia is accused of providing the rebels with the material and technical support necessary to carry out the attack.

For Ukrainian and Western officials, this is a smart strategy. If I was an adviser to the U.S. or Ukrainian government, I would undoubtedly advocate that trying to leverage the tragedy to pressure Russia to abandon its support for the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine (albeit, I would advise against making falsifiable accusations before the facts were in). I would also advise that the American or Ukrainian government seek to use the situation to rally greater European support for sanctions against Russia if Moscow did not back down. There are good reasons to think that this strategy would work and the downing of MH17 will end up being a game changer in the ongoing civil war in the Ukraine.

That being said, the Pacific Realist is not on the payrolls of the U.S., Ukraine or any government. As such, I feel at liberty to state what seems to be increasingly obvious but largely ignored: namely, that it’s quite possible that Russia wasn’t directly involved in the MH17 incident.

Which isn’t to say that it is not possible that it did play some role. U.S. and other intelligence seem to confirm that the surface-to-air missile was fired from rebel-controlled areas of the Ukraine, not from Russian soil. Still, Russia has non-uniformed military and intelligence officers on the ground in eastern Ukraine, and some of these forces could have participated in the operation that shot down the plane. Alternatively (or additionally), Russia could have provided the rebels with the Buk surface-to-air missile system that was used to shoot down the plane. Even if Moscow didn’t provide the system itself, it could have provided the rebels with technical training to allow them to operate the system.

Still, it seems increasingly likely that Russia wasn’t involved at all (at least directly). While Russia certainly has some military and intelligence officers on the ground, it’s difficult to believe they’d be incompetent enough to think it’s a good idea to shoot down an aircraft flying at a high altitude without having any idea whether it is a military or civilian plane. I understand that many in the West see Russia as an adversary, and rightly so. But it is foolish to assume that one’s adversaries are stupid.

A Plane Full of U.S. Commandos Had to Land on a Road in Uganda Incident highlights contractors’ role in Africa

Joe Trevithick 

21 Jul 2014

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On July 18, a small plane full of U.S. commandos made an emergency landing on a road in Uganda. This incident shines a light on the important role contractors continue to play in U.S. operations in Africa—and the competitive nature of the business.

The aircraft developed an undefined technical difficulty during its flight and attempted to return to Entebbe airport in Uganda. The pilots successfully put the twin-engined transport down on a stretch of road in the town of Kiwawu after running out of fuel.

No one on the plane or on the ground was injured.

The small CASA-212 cargo aircraft was en route from Uganda’s Entebbe airport to South Sudan. Nine Americans were on board, along with a crew of two.

We don’t know for sure what units the individuals were from or what their exact mission might have been. But other reports have already identified the troops as American commandos and the local news footage showed on soldier who appeared to be wearing a green beret.

NTV Uganda television channel interviewed, at the scene, a U.S. Marine Corps colonel with parachute wings and no visible unit insignia. The individuals were working with Uganda’s People’s Defense Force, Colonel Duke explained to NTV’s reporter.

These troops could have been helping hunt down member’s of the notorious Lord’s Resistance Army rebel group and its leader Joseph Kony. The UPDF provides the bulk of the African forces for this mission, which spans across Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan.

The CASA-212 in question also supports the conclusion that the individuals were assigned to Special Operations Command Africa. Private contractor EP Aviation LLC owns the plane.

EP Aviation in turn acts as a subsidiary of the AAR Corporation. In November 2013, AAR won a contract to fly SOCAFRICA operators around central Africa.

The Pentagon works with almost all of the countries on the continent tofight terrorism, train professional militaries, deal with regional crises and more. Special operations unit have historically been the go-to force for these missions, though regular troops are increasingly involved.

Contract air force

But Washington has only one formal base on the continent and does its best to maintain a low profile during operations. After centuries of colonial domination, African governments are generally keen to assert their independence and downplay the presence of foreign troops.

As a result, Africa Command relies heavily on contractor-flown planes and helicopters to haul troops and cargo to what it prefers to call “operating sites” and “forward operating locations.” Small, innocuous, civilian-type aircraft are far less imposing that large, gray Air Force transports.

In fact, the Pentagon requires the planes to be as inconspicuous as possible. One 2012 airlift contract specifically said that contractors would have to get formal approval to fly aircraft in any other color than white.

GAO Report on Radiological Security

By Nickolas Roth

July 2, 2014 

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Recently, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a hearing that highlighted some truly alarming information about the status of radiological security in the United States. The hearing began with a description from Senator Carper (D-DE) of the Boston marathon bomb attacks. He then speculated on the hypothetical consequences of the use of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD) or “dirty bomb” (interestingly, an old high-activity Cs-137 source was removed from Massachusetts General Hospital after the bombing).

The hearing largely focused on a recently released Government Accountability Office (GAO) report about the need for additional actions to increase the security of U.S. industrial radiological sources. Among other things, the report is an eye-opener about how much the United States still needs to do to ensure that Senator Carper’s scenario never occurs. 

According to GAO, radiological material is used across the United States in a wide range of industrial activities, from radiography to sterilization. As of September 2013, nearly 800 companies in the United States were licensed to use radiological material. Five hundred of those licenses were for radiographic purposes, with approximately 4,000 radiological sources (totaling 214,000 curies) of mostly iridium-192 and cobalt-60 associated with U.S. radiographic machines. An additional 1,736 radiological sources that use high risk material are used for well logging(13,000 curies). In total, there are 1,400 facilities with high risk radiological material containing 126 million curies spread across the United States. To put that in perspective, the source whose theft and recovery in Mexico made headlines in December 2013 contained 3,000 curies of radioactive cobalt-60.

Unsecured skylights at industrial facilities (GAO Report, "Additional Actions Needed to Increase the Security of US Industrial Radiological Sources") 

Given how widespread radiological material is, one would think that radiological security would be highly regulated at the national level with strict rules about security. This is, unfortunately, not the case. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for establishing minimum regulations for radiological material security in the United States—except in 37 “Agreement States” where the NRC has relinquished its authority over security of certain materials.

The Foreign Policy Essay: The Trouble With Nation-Building

By Dov Zakheim

July 20, 2014

Editor’s Note: As Iraq collapses into yet another bloody civil war and chaos sweeps across the Middle East, Americans are once again hearing calls for rebuilding the institutions and societies of the Middle East echoing through the halls of Washington. However, the U.S. record of success when it comes to nation-building is less than stellar, and it is not clear if the United States has the will or the skill to do it any better in the future. Dov Zakheim, who served as civilian coordinator for Afghan reconstruction and as a senior Department of Defense official in the George W. Bush administration, questions whether U.S. military forces should be involved in nation-building and calls instead for U.S. allies to play a leading role going forward.

Nation-building as a concept has a history that dates back at least to the creation of the United States. The nineteenth-century revolutions against Ottoman rule in the Balkans, followed by the emergence of European nation-states in the aftermath of the First World War, all called for, and led to, what is today termed “nation-building” (and is actually state-building, as the latter focuses on primarily on supporting central governments). Nation-building was also attempted in the Ottoman Empire’s Middle Eastern territories, which obtained their independence during the decades after the Great War. In most of these cases—Israel being a notable exception—the states were the artificial creation of European officials, notably the 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement. In other words, in the aftermath of Sykes-Picot there was a real need to create nations where none—other than the notions of the umma (the community of Muslims), the remnants of the Ottoman order, and pan-Arabism—had existed within the boundaries that emerged from that agreement.

Nation-building became the subject of political debate in the 1990s, when it took on a specific connotation in the aftermath of the Balkan wars. The emergence of six new states from the ashes of the former Yugoslavia was accompanied by a need for outside support to foster good governance; ensure civilian control of the military; provide for the rule of law; encourage free enterprise; expand educational opportunity for men and women; and nurture civil society, such as trade and professional unions and a free press. At issue was whether, and to what extent, the Clinton administration should undertake such efforts, and, more particularly, whether military forces stationed in the Balkans were the appropriate vehicles for doing so.

The American defeat of the Taliban, followed by the invasion of Iraq, added more urgency to these debates. In both cases, the Bush administration undertook, with the support of many governments but with America clearly in the lead, to rebuild both states. Washington met with some initial success in Afghanistan, though in fact nation-building was a misnomer with respect to that country. Afghanistan had been an independent state several decades before the United States came into being. What Afghanistan required, and its leadership requested, was support for the central government’s attempts to assert its authority throughout the country. In addition, Kabul sought help in its efforts to bolster its economy and educate its populace. Initially, American-led efforts met with success. Moreover, the relatively small military presence in the country ensured that it was traditional aid organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as other civilian agencies, such as Save the Children and Oxfam, that took the lead in helping to put Afghanistan back on its feet.

The war in Iraq diverted American attention from Afghanistan, as Washington sought to stabilize and then “rebuild” that troubled country. Once again it was Washington that led an international coalition, smaller and less capable than that in Afghanistan, first to defeat Saddam’s forces, and then to reconstruct the country. In Iraq, however, the large American military presence led those in uniform to take the lead in the nation-building effort. In addition to the difficulties that the military faced in carrying out missions for which they had not actually trained, Washington had to confront the reality that, after nearly 70 years of independence, Iraqis remained more loyal to their tribes, ethnic groups, and co-religionists than to what was, after all, an artificially created state. Finally, security issues overshadowed development programs, and both in Iraq, and increasingly in Afghanistan once a revived Taliban threatened that country’s stability, the results were poorly planned projects that led to tens of billions of dollars in waste, fraud, and abuse.

What Kind of Material Needs What Level of Security?

By Matthew Bunn

April 15, 2014 

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In August of 2002, the United States – assisted by a gift from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, when it turned out no U.S. agency had money that was not blocked from doing what was needed – helped airlift 48 kilograms of 80% enriched highly enriched uranium out of the Vinca nuclear research institute in Serbia. A force of 1,200 armed troops guarded the shipment as it moved from the lab to the airport. Under international rules, this was dangerous “Category I” material requiring the highest level of security. But under Department of Energy (DOE) rules for categorizing nuclear material, if the same material had been at a DOE site, it would have been considered “Category III” material requiring hardly any security.

Clearly there are serious disputes about what material terrorists could most easily make a bomb from, and therefore which material requires the most security. Unless the world gets this right, nuclear security resources will be focused on the wrong places. In a recent talk, I outlined an approach – described in more detail in a forthcoming book – for adjusting the security required for different kinds of material based on how much chance terrorists would have of making a bomb if they got that particular type of material. Factors that should be considered include isotopics, chemical form, weight and mass, and level of radioactivity.

HEU awaiting secure transport

by rail (NNSA photo) 

One important piece of progress on this front in recent years has to do with how much radiation is enough to scare terrorists off from stealing nuclear material. Both U.S. and international rules used to say that if someone a meter away from the material would get a dose from it of one Sievert per hour, the material was “self protecting” from theft, and could have much less security. But careful time-and-motion studies suggest that level of radiation would not be remotely enough to stop thieves who did not care about their own health from carrying out a theft. To actually disable someone while the theft was taking place would require a dose rate of many tens of Sieverts (thousands of rads) per hour. Hence, the latest DOE rules say you cannot reduce the level of security for nuclear material based on its radiation level unless it is radioactive enough to ensure “a high probability of failure of task(s) by an adversary” – that is, they will be disabled by the radiation while the theft is still under way. And the latest IAEA recommendations suggest that states should “carefully consider” not reducing the level of security based on material’s radiation if their design basis threat includes adversaries “willing to commit a malicious act.”

Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals

March 18, 2014

Authors: Matthew Bunn, Professor of Practice; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom,Martin B. Malin, Executive Director, Project on Managing the Atom, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate, Project on Managing the Atom, William H. Tobey, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: International Security; Managing the Atom; Science, Technology, and Public Policy

In the lead-up to the nuclear security summit in The Hague, Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals outlines what was accomplished in a four-year effort launched in 2009 to secure nuclear material around the globe—and what remains to be done.

The report finds that the four-year effort made significant progress: 

Nuclear security summit meetings in Washington and Seoul elevated the issue to the level of presidents and prime ministers, transforming the global nuclear security dialogue. 

Thirteen countries eliminated all the highly enriched uranium (HEU) or separated plutonium on their soil. 

All of the locations in non-nuclear-weapon states where there was enough high-quality HEU for the simplest type of terrorist nuclear bomb were either eliminated or had significant security improvements. 

Many countries strengthened their rules and procedures for securing nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, nuclear facilities, or dangerous radiological sources. 

The nuclear security role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was significantly strengthened, as were the IAEA’s recommendations on physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. 

Despite this progress, the report warns that some weapons-usable nuclear materials still remain “dangerously vulnerable,” with security systems that do not provide effective protection against the full spectrum of plausible adversary threats. The report’s authors highlight the continuing danger of nuclear and radiological terrorism and call for urgent actions to reduce these risks..

The report highlights these dangers by describing incidents in several countries – including the United States, Russia, Pakistan, South Africa, and Sweden – that involve dangerous intrusions at nuclear facilities, worrisome corruption, or adversaries with capabilities that might overwhelm nuclear security systems. “The imperative for effective nuclear security will last as long as terrorists bent on mass destruction and nuclear weapons both exist,” said Matthew Bunn, one of the authors of the report. William Tobey, another of the authors, called on the leaders gathering in The Hague “to take difficult steps—to change standard operating procedures, close unneeded facilities, and spend money on sustaining security measures,” arguing that they would only do so if they were motivated by a clear understanding the of threat and the remaining nuclear security vulnerabilities.