China’s Epic Fail in the South China Sea

Bill Hayton

August 5, 2014 

Whatever Beijing hoped to achieve with the deployment of HS-981—oil, territorial advantage or long-term strategic gain—didn’t work out.

By whatever metric you choose, China’s recent oil-drilling adventure in the South China Sea was a disaster. No new oil will reach Chinese consumers, no new maritime territory has been gained and regional advantage has been handed to the United States. ASEAN solidarity has held firm and the positions of ‘pro-Beijing’ forces in crucial countries, particularly Vietnam, have been seriously weakened. China’s foreign-policy making has proven to be incompetent. How did it all go so wrong?

We can’t know what the Chinese leadership hoped to achieve when it approved the deployment of the country’s largest oil rig and a small armada of protecting vessels into waters also claimed by Vietnam. It seems unlikely that the operation was simply an attempt to find oil. There are many better places to go prospecting. On March 19, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) announced it had discovered a mid-sized gas field in uncontested waters closer to Hainan Island. Exploitation of that field was delayed while the Paracels adventure unfolded farther south.

The two areas of seabed explored by the giant drilling rig HS-981 are not good prospects for hydrocarbons. A 2013report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration suggested the Paracels’ energy potential is low. It seems significant that CNOOC, China’s most-experienced offshore operator, was not involved in the expedition. Although CNOOC’s subsidiary COSL was operating the rig, the overall operation was directed by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) which has much less experience of exploration in the South China Sea.

HS981 ended its mission a month early, in the face of the impending arrival of super-typhoon Rammasun. CNPC declared that the rig had found hydrocarbons, but was very unspecific about details and amounts. It is almost certain that they will never be commercially exploited for both technical and political reasons. This operation was not really about oil.

One motivation can be safely ruled out. We know that the mission was not an attempt to rouse popular nationalist feeling in China because, as the Australian researcher Andrew Chubb has shown, news about the clashes between the rig’s protection fleet and the Vietnamese coast guard was kept out of the Chinese media for a week afterwards.

There may well have been another political purpose, however. An operation of such magnitude must have been planned well in advance and approved at the highest level. Chinese authorities announced that the rig had arrived on station on May 3, exactly one week before the summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was due to get underway in Myanmar. Perhaps Beijing was hoping to repeat its success at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in July 2012. On that occasion, ASEAN split: Cambodia vetoed a collective statement, leaving the Philippines and Vietnam isolated in their sea disputes with China.

Beware, China: India's Economy Could Have an Even Brighter Future

Christopher Whalen

August 6, 2014 

"When all is said and done, the difference between India and China can be summed up in one word: freedom."

This past May, India’s Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won a historic mandate in the country’s general election, emerging with 282 of 543 parliamentary seats, more than enough to form a government without having to broker a post-election coalition. BJP head Narendra Modi, borrowing images from the gigantic public-works projects of Communist China, floated the idea of building “a hundred new cities,” of extending a high-speed rail network across the subcontinent and undertaking the environmental cleanup of the Ganges River.

But since the election, however, the results have so far been few. Modi, the former Chief Minister of the western coastal State of Gujarat, has a reputation for delivering on promises of economic development, but also being tough on issues like law and order. In 2002, communal riots in that state saw over 1,000 people killed, most of them Muslims. Many of India’s Muslims are wary of the BJP and Narendra, but about 15 percent of Muslims actually supported him, according to the BJP.

India and its neighbors, such as China, share similarities and notable differences, and also striking ironies. Both are among the most ancient nations in the world, yet are reckoned to be “emerging economies.” Each endured the humiliation of decades of colonial rule, but India emerged from the experience as a democracy while China is an authoritarian communist state. India has a dynamic market-based economy, while China’s economy is essentially a Soviet-style allocation model with sectors, such as housing, that have some degree of freedom.

Mindful of the differences in the two political economies, India’s growth may seem lower than that of China, but a close examination of the comparison is revealing. In 2014, India’s rate of growth in GDP slowed to less than 5 percent,well below the hopes and expectations of investors and analysts. Meanwhile, China claims a growth rate of over 7.5 percent in the second quarter of 2014—if you believe the official statistics. The quality of India’s growth, however, is arguably superior and may suggest bright prospects for the future.

Zhou’s Fall About Institutions, Not Personalities

By: David Cohen

July 31, 2014

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People's Daily Online has published a series of graphs illustrating Zhou's patronage network.

On Tuesday, Chinese official media confirmed the long-anticipated arrest of Zhou Yongkang (Xinhua, July 29). Zhou, a former member of the Politboro Standing Committee and head of China’s state security apparatus, is the first member of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) highest echelon to fall from power since and the 1989 Tiananmen Square crisis, and the first ever to be charged with corruption (Zhao Ziyang, CCP General Secretary at the time of the crisis, was placed under informal house arrest). The following day, the Politboro confirmed rumors that the fourth plenary session of the Central Committee in October will focus on “governing the country according to law,” strongly suggesting that China’s top leaders aim to reform legal institutions to consolidate the effects of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign (People’s Daily, July 30).

Zhou’s arrest has been definitively interpreted in Chinese state media as proof that “no matter how high their post or how long their service, all cadres must answer to party discipline and the law,” as a front-page editorial in People’s Daily put it (People’s Daily, July 30). So far, every story longer than Xinhua’s two-line announcement of the arrest has emphasized this point (see also People’s Net, July 29 and July 30; Caixin, July 30).

Who Targeted Zhou?

Meanwhile, many foreign analysts have interpreted the bagging of China’s largest “tiger” yet as evidence of Xi’s personal power, attributing it either to factional conflict or a determination to reform the party. While Xi’s anti-corruption campaign played a major role in the lead-up to Zhou’s arrest, there is also evidence that a consensus against him emerged among Party leaders and elders before Xi took office in 2012, highlighting an important determinant of Xi’s power that has not been sufficiently examined: the striking unity of China’s top leaders behind Xi’s reform agenda.

Xi appears to have had support to pursue Zhou in the first months of his term, targeting officials linked to the former security czar at the outset of his anti-corruption campaign and before assuming the office of President (NTD TV, February 11, 2013). Furthermore, at the time he became General Secretary of the CCP, the Party reduced the membership of the Standing Committee from seven to nine—placing Zhou’s successor on a lower rung of the CCP hierarchy and placing an official perceived as an un-ambitious administrator at the head of the Ministry of Public Security (China Brief, February 1, 2013). These moves—decided by a broad but poorly understood group of Party elders and retiring leaders—sought to weaken the office as well as the man, strongly suggesting a consensus that the security czar had accumulated too much power. This explanation of Zhou’s downfall suggests that we should look past Xi when explaining the dramatic move—that the source of this and other high-profile reform drives lies not only in the personal power of China’s President, but in agreements made among China’s top leaders.

Helping Cadres Interpret Zhou’s Arrest

What History Says about China's Chances in a War with America

James Holmes

August 5, 2014 

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"If it's possible for the weaker contender to play a weak hand wisely, it's also possible for the strong to play a strong hand foolishly."

"TOKYO, July 31, 1894 -- 'For the foreseeable future,' declares an American defense expert, 'no rational Japanese naval planner could present a plan to defeat the Chinese navy, even in the Yellow Sea.' Why say such a thing? Because it stands to reason. Japan has been a modern industrial nation only since the Meiji Restoration of 1868-1869. That's under three decades.

"And after centuries of self-imposed seclusion, Japan has no seafaring tradition to speak of. Its navy? Posh. The Imperial Japanese Navy (INJ) got its start as an ironclad fleet only 25 years ago, when it took custody of the French-built ramStonewall. CSS Stonewall was a hand-me-down from that notable naval power, the Confederate States of America.

"These are sketchy beginnings. Tokyo has had too little time to overcome them. The hodgepodge IJN fleet would stand little chance against a bigger, better-funded Qing Dynasty navy that -- unlike its Japanese nemesis -- possesses battleships. And battleships are the arbiters of naval warfare."

"TOKYO, April 17, 1895 -- Today the Chinese and Japanese imperial governments signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ending the limited war that broke out last August. Under the treaty's terms the Qing government relinquishes its suzerainty over Korea, cedes Formosa, the Penghu Islands group, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan, and opens new treaty ports to Japan on a most-favored-nation basis.

"But the treaty's impact goes well beyond that. Foreign commentators see Shimonoseki as signifying Japan's arrival as Asia's preeminent power. This limited war, in short, transformed the regional order.

"How? The crucial event in this Sino-Japanese War was last September's Battle of the Yalu, off the Korean west coast. That's where the IJN Combined Fleet met and crushed the Qing navy's Beiyang Fleet -- defying prewar estimates of the naval balance."

China's Five Deadliest Weapons of War: Land Edition

Kyle Mizokami

August 5, 2014 

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Beijing isn't just focusing its defense resources on naval assets alone...

Editor’s Note: Please see previous works from our “Weapons of War” series including Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear, Five American Weapons of War China Should Fear, Five Japanese Weapons of War China Should Fear, Five Best Weapons of War from the Soviet Union and Five Taiwanese Weapons of War China Should Fear.

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army is in a period of extended change. In the wake of the 1991 Gulf War, the PLA made the conscious decision to shift from a manpower-intensive army to a technology-intensive army. Since 1980, the Army has shrunk by 60 percent.

At the same time, the Army has become more capable. New equipment has been introduced tailored to China’s security environment. New tanks, missiles and amphibious vehicles have entered service to make the PLA one of the best-equipped armies in the world.

Not that anyone would know it. Curiously, many of these new systems have been all but invisible to the outside world. The PLA guards China’s secure borders, and the Air Force and Navy are seen as being in the vanguard of China’s territorial disputes, especially with Japan and the United States.

Still, there are situations in which Chinese land forces could be a decisive factor. An invasion of Taiwan is one possible scenario. Action in the Diaoyu, Paracel and Spratly islands could require ground forces. With that in mind, here are five of the most lethal Chinese ground weapons:

ZTZ-99 Main Battle Tank

The ZTZ-99 is China’s third-generation tank and currently the most modern tank fielded by the People’s Liberation Army. Designed and prototyped in the early 1990s, the ZTZ-99 shows obvious Western- and Russian-design influences. The tank is in low-rate production, with between 200 to 300 having been built.

The turret appears to be an angular version of the frying pan-shaped turret of Soviet T-72 tank. The 125mm main gun is a copy of the 2A46 Soviet tank gun and is serviced by an autoloader that can load up to 8 rounds a minute. The tank stores 41 rounds internally, a mix of armored piercing, high-explosive antitank, and high-explosive. The tank is also rumored to field a version of the Soviet AT-11 Sniper, a long-range antitank missile fired from the tank’s main gun. Rounding out the ZTZ-99’s armament is a 12.7mm heavy machine gun for engaging aerial threats and a 7.62mm machine gun mounted alongside the gun.

Japan White Paper Slams China Over Disputed Territory

By Clint Richards

August 05, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/japan-white-paper-slams-china-over-disputed-territory/

Japan’s 2014 Ministry of Defense white paper was released on Tuesday, and regional territorial disputes figured heavily in the 505-page report. While North Korea was mentioned, most of the report’s findings focused on China and its growing military presence in the East and South China Seas. The overt focus on China could have an interesting effect on Japanese foreign and military policy, as the Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe adopted the report on the same day. Abe has recently been pushing through multiple channels to meet with Chinese President Xi Jinping, claiming that “his door is always open” to mend ties with the Chinese president. However, the Cabinet’s adoption of a normalized view on collective self-defense in late June makes this latest white paper more ominous than previous iterations.

The most incendiary portion of the new report states that China’s “dangerous acts” concerning its claims in the East China Sea could lead to “unintended consequences” for the region. In particular the report singled out the implementation of China’s new Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) as a “profoundly dangerous act” that “raise[d] concerns over China’s future direction.” With regard to the South China Sea, Japan used language preferred by its chief ally the U.S. by stating that China’s actions were “incompatible with the existing international law” and that it was “attempting to alter the status quo by coercive measures.”

This is exactly the type of language that Japan and the U.S. used when confronting China at the Shangri-La Dialogue hosted by Singapore in May, after which Japanese/Sino relations reached another low point. The difference now is that the Abe government is well on its way to enshrining its new self-defense capabilities through proposed legislation in the Diet and by having the right included in the update to the Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation guidelines scheduled for the end of this year.

It is difficult to reconcile the government’s increasingly hawkish behavior with Abe’s direct requests to meet with Xi later this year at the APEC summit in Beijing this November. Abe said at a press conference on Saturdaythat “If issues of concern exist, then dialogue should be held” and that the two countries should return to a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.” It would appear that for now Abe is still much more interested pursuing a stronger defense posture relative to China than seeking a path of mutual benefit. As his actions on collective self-defense are likely much more indicative of his true position on China, his pursuit of dialogue can be seen almost as an insurance policy. As Japan ratchets up its military capabilities and singles out China as the region’s premier threat, Abe will be able to point to several public and private attempts at dialogue with China that went unanswered, attempting to be the voice of reason should territorial disputes again take a turn for the worse.

China Is Losing War on Terror

By Zachary Keck

August 04, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/china-is-losing-war-on-terror/

All evidence suggests that China is losing its new war on Uyghur terrorism. 

China appears to be losing its “people’s war” against Islamist terrorism carried out by Uyghurs in the western province of Xinjiang.

Back in May, Xinjiang’s Party chief Zhang Chunxianannounced the CCP was launching a one-year campaign to “safeguard stability and resolutely prevent malignant violence and terrorist attacks.”

The campaign was launched after a spat of terrorist attacks across China starting late last year. One attack in May in Urumqi–the capital city of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region–killed 39 people injured 94 others.

In the first month of the new terror campaign, China said it arrested 380 individuals, executed 13 others, broke up 32 “violent terrorist” gangs and confiscated 264 devices capable of detonating 3.15 tons of explosives.

Then, during July– the holy month of Ramadan– Chinese authorities in Xinjiang province banned Muslim students and civil servants from participating in the holiday, including forbidding fasting. “No teacher can participate in religious activities, instill religious thoughts in students or coerce students into religious activities,” one school in the province posted on its website.

This has done nothing to stop the violence in the area. While the CCP forbids foreign journalists from reporting in Xinjiang province, making information scarce, China announced on Sunday that “37 civilians were killed and another 13 injured in a terrorist attack Monday in Shache County, Kashgar Prefecture, northwest China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.” Chinese state media also reported, citing the police, that 35 of those killed were ethnically Han while the other two were Uyghurs. If anything, these numbers probably understate the level of violence.

A ‘New Situation’: China’s Evolving Assessment of its Security Environment

By: David Bradley

July 31, 2014 

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From early 2013 through the present, high level Chinese officials have consistently used the phrase “under the new situation” (zai xin xingshi xia) when discussing strategic concerns such as military reform, readiness and foreign affairs. The phrase refers to a critical reassessment of the international context of Beijing’s domestic power and development path, and the forces shaping its quest for the “China Dream.” This distinctly new assessment provides impetus to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) military reform effort, anti-corruption campaign in party and military, foreign policy initiatives and justification for future changes to China’s national military strategy.

What is the ‘New Situation’?

The 2008 financial crisis—which presented “challenges and opportunities never before seen since China’s reform and opening up”—accelerated China’s reassessment of its development prospects and national security environment (Renmin Wang, January 4, 2010). The analysis encompassed complex changes such as multi-polarization, globalization of the world economy, rapid technological advances and increased comprehensive national power competition. An essay published in 2010 by the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) states that the results of this reappraisal were communicated in a series of prominent CCP conferences including the 4th Plenum of the 17th CCP Central Committee in September 2009 (Contemporary International Relations, March/April 2010). The official 4th Plenum decision document coined the “new situation” to summarize China’s national power and prospects for continued growth amid a world that “…is undergoing a period of great development, great change and great adjustment” (Qunzhong Luxian Wang, May 30, 2013). The “new situation” is a formulation that represents the official analysis of these changes, and implies both confidence and wariness about macro-level changes affecting China’s path to attain the “China Dream.”

Changes in Perception under Xi 

Under the Xi Jinping administration, China’s overall perception of its development and security environment has distinctly shifted in two ways. First, previous articulations of the new situation were careful to characterize that the complex changes wracking the world were ongoing phenomena. Yet in 2013, two important government documents on national security and foreign policy began referring to those changes as past events. Secondly, since 2013 the frequency and authoritativeness of uses of the “new situation” phrase has increased significantly, in particular in foreign policy and military reform contexts. This increase has corresponded with a disappearance of the Hu-era “harmonious world” characterization of the international sphere, although official documents note that “peace and development” remain a “trend of the times.”

The first change in tone for the security environment occurred in China’s latest defense white paper, “The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces,” published in April 2013. For the first time, the paper announced that a “New Situation, New Challenges, New Missions” (xin xingshi, xin tiaozhan, xin shiming) comprised its “security situation” (anquan xingshi)—the term previously used (Xinhua, April 16, 2013; State Council of the PRC, April 16, 2013). The key distinction in the 2013 white paper is the sense of timing: the 2011 paper definitively states that “…the international situation is currently undergoing new profound and complex changes,” (emphasis added) while the 2013 paper states that those changes “…have taken place” (State Council News, March, 2011; Gov.cn, March, 2011). Furthermore, the 2011 paper says that “China is still in the period of important strategic opportunities for its development,” whereas the 2013 paper avers that “China has seized and made the most of this important period of strategic opportunities for its development.” Thus, the 2013 white paper describes a distinct change in both the domestic development situation and international milieu.

Can India Work With China on Climate Change?

By Dhanasree Jayaram

August 04, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/can-india-work-with-china-on-climate-change/

Modi’s history in Gujarat shows he is ready to partner with China on clean energy. 

With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leaderNarendra Modi decisively winning the general elections held in India earlier this year, speculation over his National Democratic Alliance-led government’s approach toward its “belligerent” neighbor China has been making the rounds in the strategic and media circles of both countries. After all, Modi declared during the election campaign that China must discard its “expansionist mindset.”

Yet post-victory Modi is a man with altered foreign policy goals that have been focused on engagement and cooperation rather than estrangement and confrontation with India’s neighbors. This was exemplified by his gesture of inviting the heads of state of all the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations, including Pakistan, to his government’s swearing-in ceremony.

As for Modi’s policy towards China, it is not expected to deviate significantly from his previous accommodating engagements as the chief minister of Gujarat. Not only did he visit China four times before becoming prime minister, he also managed to bring in substantial Chinese investment to the state of Gujarat.

One area in which Indian and Chinese leadership could take cooperation to a new level is climate change.

During his time in Gujarat, Modi undertook many steps to promote climate change mitigation and adaptationpolicies. Some of them include a government department dedicated to climate change and a robust state solar mission (even before the launch of the National Solar Mission). Modi even authored a volume on climate change:Convenient Action. The only other political leader to do this was former U.S. Vice President Al Gore.

With this, many started to characterize Modi as a “green crusader,” who might not be an environmentalist as defined by Western intellectuals, but who has certainly made a mark by embarking on a distinctive path that endeavors to view development and environmental protection along a continuum, and not at odds with each other. He has repeatedly made it clear that climate change is “a subject close to his heart.”

The renaming of the environment ministry to include “climate change” (the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change) is a clear acknowledgement of the new government’s commitment to addressing this issue. This move implies that Modi sees climate change as an issue that is as much domestic as it is international in nature. India needs to deal with several implications of climate change on its soil, while playing a constructive role in the international climate change negotiations.

However, what Modi has also pointed out categorically is that this issue cannot be dealt with by analyzing theenvironment versus development debate through a Western prism that works in binaries. This perspective looks beyond this narrow debate and pays equal attention to equity and justice. A clean yet diverse energy model is integral to Modi’s development agenda, which primarily focuses on electricity generation and poverty alleviation. The slogan – “Generate More, Use Rationally, Waste Less” – mentioned in the BJP’s election manifesto, signals the government’s attitude toward energy generation for advancing development while underscoring the need for energy efficiency.

Nepal: Indian PM’s Visit: Update No. 299

By Dr. S.Chandrasekharan

5-Aug-2014

http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1585

It was understandable that PM Modi during his short visit could connect with the people of Nepal. The enthusiasm shown by the people of the streets in Kathmandu was genuine and spontaneous.

The government of the Nepali Congress- UML combine did its best to make the visit a great success. The euphoria noticed in the Nepalese media was a pleasant surprise as one is normally used to subtle and even open anti Indian propaganda!

I only wish the PM had visited the Terai also even if was for a few hours at least to the Janakpur temple which compared to Pasupathinath Temple in Kathmandu is in a neglected condition both in the upkeep of the temple and the infrastructure leading to it.

His address to the Parliament in Hindi understood by all the members was a great success and he dispelled many misgivings about Indian policy spread by a few individuals. While not detailing the full itinerary and the promises he made, a few points that are relevant to the Indo Nepal friendship and its future course can be discussed.

* First is the line of credit of one billion dollars given to Nepal for developmental purposes. I only wish the Indian bureaucrats do not stipulate conditions in using the funds as it happened in Bangladesh where there was an insistence to procure where available, Indian-made goods and equipment. 

* Second is the clear declaration of non interference in the internal affairs. I recall one able journalist whom I respect, mentioned in one of the Indian papers that since 2005 India has been interfering in the internal affairs of Nepal. Coming as it is from the PM, at least the people of Nepal should understand that India has nothing to gain by interfering.

* Third, again is the firm declaration from the Prime Minister himself of India’s support to democracy and its further development in Nepal. This gives a lie to some of the JNU types in India as also some of those on the left who were spreading the word that the new government is out to restore monarchy in Nepal.

* Same goes to the rumour that the new government in India would support those elements in Nepal who want Nepal to return to being a “Hindu State.” To me it looks that it hardly matters whether Nepal is declared a Hindu or a Secular State. One has to only witness the huge crowds that assemble in the posh area of New Road at the Ganesthal in Kathmandu, or the crowds that assemble even in winter in the early hours at the Pasupathi temple for bhajans or the long trek undertaken by people to Mukthinath and to Mankamna ( there is a rope way now). Hinduism cannot be taken away from the people no matter how the country is now declared to be.

* Fifth is the declaration made by the Indian Prime Minister that transmission lines will be laid soon for Nepal to get power from India for the next ten years. Nepal hardly produces one percent of its potential and those regular visitors to Nepal would know that the city has blackouts for extended hours of ten or even more. The Indian PM said that ten years hence, may be India could get power from Nepal. I am not sure whether Nepal will be in a position to look after its own needs even after ten years and the question of power purchase from Nepal appears to be very unlikely. It is understood that an Indian draft on power purchase was criticised by the Nepalese officials as being too stiff and that no respect is being given to Nepal as the upper riparian! This mind set will continue in any initiative taken by India and it is best left to Nepal to decide what it wants to do with its surplus power as and when it does have one.

* Sixth is the amendment to certain provisions to the Pancheswar agreement. It is almost two decades ago that the Pancheswar agreement was signed and even the DPR is not ready. While not going into the details, it looks that the Pancheswar project is unlikely to be completed in near future. It is in the interest of India that in its projection and meeting its requirements, power from Nepal is not taken into consideration at all.

* Finally, there is a strong reiteration on the revision of the 1950 treaty in keeping with the modern times. The 1950 treaty is outdated and no sovereign country would accept the humiliation of some the clauses found in the treaty. Nepal should be free to decide what type of relationship it wants and what would suit them to continue the close cultural, economic and security relations between the two countries. Every government in power in Nepal has sought a revision without specifying what type of relationship they would need in future. If Nepal is serious, it should come out with specifics so that the full implication of the revision can be discussed and settled.

Forget the South China Sea: China's Great Game in the Arctic Draws Near

Peter Giraudo

August 4, 2014

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Twenty years from now China’s gaze will not focus upon the South China Sea or the Central Asian steppes to fuel economic growth. Instead, Beijing will look to a far more inhospitable place to satiate its appetite for natural resources. The vast, barren northern part of the planet called the Arctic Circle holds about 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas. Greenland, sitting on the rim of the Arctic Circle, boasts of one of the world’s most abundant supplies of rare earths. By September of 2030, when many scientists believe the polar ice cap will have melted, the region may offer a bonanza for natural resources. By that time a new Great Game will have already enveloped the world’s most northernmost region. We can be sure that China will be eager to play.

Although it is the world’s second biggest economy, China depends on imports for many of the raw goods it needs to fuel its relentless pace of economic growth. In the coming decades, it will have to look for natural resources farther and farther away from the mainland if it is to continue on its current pace of development. This explains China’s recent moves into the South China Sea (SCS) and its interest in resource-rich Africa. But China still risks a catastrophic supply shock if war were ever to break out in the SCS since most of its trade passes through the Straits of Malacca. The Northern Sea Route (NSR) that passes through the Arctic Circle thus offers China an unprecedented opportunity to diversify its trade routes and tap into untouched natural resources. Furthermore, trade between China and Europe via the NSR will be faster and cheaper: the NSR shortens the distance between Rotterdam and Shanghai by some 3,000 miles and saves thousands of dollars on fuel. Some scenarios suggest that 5-15% of Chinese trade could pass through Arctic waters by 2020. It is no wonder that China has been making great efforts to improve its relationships with Arctic Circle states.

Yet despite all its advances into the region China is not an Arctic Circle state and it does not sit on the Arctic Council, which currently consists solely of Arctic Circle states. So far this has been to China’s benefit. As a neutral observer of the Arctic Council, China has avoided the kinds of disputes Russia has had with member states—like one that erupted when Russia planted its flag at the North Pole in 2007—that have hurt its influence on the council. China has stuck to its scientific and environmental projects to build credibility.

In fact, China is going to spend $60 million dollars a year on polar research at its new China-Nordic Arctic Research Center in Shanghai. A commitment to conducting rescue missions in the Arctic has also helped improve its image. But for all its efforts in science it is clear why China is in the Arctic: natural resources and trade. Strengthening bilateral relationships with Arctic Council members is, therefore, of paramount importance to Beijing. China prefers these types of relationships because it can bring its economic might to bear on smaller states separately. A new free-trade deal with Iceland and $500 million dollar currency-exchange support program for Icelandic banks are just the beginnings of this strategy. The more economically dependent these smaller states are on China the more likely they are to give Beijing a permanent seat on the Arctic Council, even if it is not an Arctic border state.

Recent world events also point in China’s favor as the Great Game in the Arctic becomes an ever more real phenomenon. It looks as if Russia will become isolated from the West as a result of the Ukraine crisis. This will have major implications for Russia’s position in the Arctic. As the new Sino-Russian gas deal shows, China is Russia’s most natural partner in the East when it comes to energy and large-scale trade. Russian companies, isolated from western partners, will have to turn to Beijing for money and assistance in the Arctic. Indeed, China National Petroleum Corporation already has made a deal with Rosneft, the Russian energy giant, for Arctic oil exploration. Joint deals like this one will be crucial if China is to access the region’s untapped oil reserves because most of the oil along the NSR is within Russia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. These trends will only continue as China’s energy needs grow.

The Great Game in the Arctic Circle is just beginning. For now, it will continue to be shaped by events far away from the polar ice cap. Soon that may change. The West should recognize China’s ambitions; the Far North may not remain cold forever.

Moscow Needs a Plan B in Ukraine

By Georgy Bovt

Aug. 05 2014 20:27 

Last edited 20:27 

"It would be good if we could learn to see at least one step ahead," President Vladimir Putin said recently in a speech on the 100th anniversary of the start of World War I. He could have said much the same thing about the current crisis in Ukraine.

It would, in fact, be interesting to know how many steps ahead both of the sides involved in this conflict have planned. Recklessly posturing, both parties in this game of brinksmanship seem to have lost control and are headed for the edge of the cliff. Do the two major players even have a Plan B, a backup option, if their initial plans fail or if their goal turns out to have been misguided?

For now, the West's main leverage against Moscow is tighter sanctions. Their goal? "The cessation of Russia's efforts to destabilize Ukraine." It is probable that a complete halt to any aid for separatists in the southeast would be considered a sufficient concession to prevent new sanctions.

But what would be the next step? If these demands are met, will the current sanctions be lifted? Most likely not, and then Crimea will be the next issue up for discussion. How does the West plan to carry out the return of the peninsula to Ukraine, on a purely practical level?

Should Moscow receive any security guarantees in return for handing back Crimea, or will its experience mirror that of Saddam Hussein in his exit from Kuwait? Where should Russia's Black Sea Fleet go? What should be done about the referendum that has already taken place in Crimea?

And of course the March referendum was just the latest: A vote in the early '90s produced very similar, pro-Russian results. Should both referendums be simply annulled as "illegitimate" and inconsistent with the Ukrainian constitution? Or should a new referendum be held in five years to test the validity of the previous one? Or 10 years? Or even right now, under the control of numerous international observers, as was done in Kosovo?

Of course such questions seem absurd today, but this is what a "situational analysis" is, when the consideration of even the most unlikely scenarios reveals both sides' potential, their resources, and their strengths and vulnerabilities. The ideal result is an appropriate evaluation of the current situation.

But in any case, vague calls to "stop the bloodshed" and "punish Putin" are no longer sufficient. Neither of those can be an end goal. Both sides must decide whether they should continue on a path of escalation or look for creative measures that will, at least, stop the slide toward total catastrophe. At the moment, though, its seems both are playing a game of blitz chess, with no time to think.

For the West, it seems likely that the end goal of "pressuring" Putin with sanctions, beyond the short-term and likely unachievable aim of ending Russian influence in Ukraine, is for him to resign as president. This is the West's Plan A.

This won't happen immediately, which begs the question: How far will this pressure go?

Germany faced up to its past but now has to act like a great power

By Charles Moore

01 Aug 2014

Source Linkl

A hundred years on from the Great War, the Hun has turned into Mother Hen under Angela Merkel - but it needs to confront Russia over the Ukraine

In Britain, it is commonplace to celebrate our servicemen from both world wars. In Germany, it remains a controversial political statement to praise its own Photo: ALAMY

On Sunday, in the church of the village in which I was brought up, a talk will be given (by my sister, as it happens) about the six men from the parish who died in the First World War. Then there will be a service, and afterwards, tea. No doubt thousands of similar events will take place across the country. There will also be national commemorations. On Monday night, there will be a vigil at Westminster Abbey, ending at the moment when war with Germany officially began precisely a century ago.

We can feel justifiably proud of the way we do these things, and even of the fact that we do them at all. There is no other major European country which was on the right side in both world wars, which survived them unconquered, and which retains, unbroken, the constitutional system which existed before them.

The Queen’s grandfather, George V, was King of the United Kingdom in 1914. She is Queen – minus southern Ireland – of the same kingdom. The soldiers, sailors and airmen whom we commemorate owed their allegiance to him. Their successors today owe their allegiance to her. Never, in all that time, have our Armed Forces been corrupted by politics or forced to buttress dictatorship. Although the world has twice been torn apart and remade – three times, if you include the end of the Cold War – there has been no fundamental doubt about the legitimacy of the British state (again excepting Ireland) and parliamentary government.

Yes, the U.S. Really Will Defend Japan

By Jun Okumura

August 05, 2014

Leaving Japan to fend for itself would be an end to the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty. 

Professor Paul Sracic suggests in his July 26 essay “Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?” on The Diplomatthat President Barack Obama is likely to consult Congress if and when he is forced to decide whether to come to the assistance of Japan, in case of a military conflict with China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and that it is not a given that Congress will consent. On the first point, he will do so – unless the sequence of events renders a formal consultation unnecessary or impractical. However, in the event that Obama does consult Congress, it is unthinkable that Congress will decide to stop him from giving military assistance under the Mutual Defense Treaty– unless Congress intends to put an end to the bilateral alliance. Let me explain.

Again, on the first point, Professor Sracic gives the 2011 imposition of the no-fly zone in Libya as a case in which Obama did not seek Congressional authorization – actually, the War Powers Resolution specifies that “[T]he President in every possible instance shall consult with Congress” and does not use the word “authorization” – but the president for all practical purposes had already gone through the consultation process by the time he committed U.S. military power to enforcing the no-fly zone. Specifically, on March 1, 2011, the Senate unanimously adopted S.RES.85, which “urges the United Nations Security Council to take such further action as may be necessary to protect civilians in Libya from attack, including the possible imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.” On March 18, the president held consultations with Congressional leaders, including bringing the Senate majority and minority leaders, the speaker of the house, and the House majority and minority leaders to the White House for consultations. On March 19, “U.S. military forces commenced operations,” as the president informed Congress, on March 21.

There could be occasions on which the president may not be able conduct prior consultations. For example, if the Chinese PLA Navy assaults Japanese Coast Guard vessels in the Senkaku/Diaoyu vicinity while the U.S. Seventh Fleet is passing by – I know, that would be extremely foolish of the PLA Navy, but bear with me – and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe requests U.S. assistance, is Obama going to tell him that he must consult Congress before the U.S. Navy makes a move? Of course not. And that must be why the law says “every possibleinstance.” But it is highly likely that Obama will consult Congress as long as it is technically feasible. After all, the law does say “every possible instance.”

But the more important question is: Will Congress consent to giving U.S. military assistance? If Congress decides to deny consent – I am not sure how that process would work in practice, but let’s assume that it does – Obama could still go ahead and help Japan militarily, but Congress has the legal means to put an end to that assistance, and it is doubtful that the president would go ahead in the first place.

But I believe that it is extremely unlikely that Congress would deny consent.

ISIS Now Targeting Saudi Intelligence Officers, Report

Bill Gertz 

August 5, 2014 

ISIL Targets Saudi Intelligence 

The ultra-violent al Qaeda offshoot group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS) has targeted Saudi Arabian intelligence officers for a campaign of assassination as part of plans by the group to expand activities inside the oil-rich kingdom. 

A Twitter campaign by ISIL terrorists was launched Friday that sought information on Saudi intelligence officers. It followed a fatal knife attack against a Saudi police officer last week. 

U.S. intelligence agencies monitoring ISIL’s social media communications identified the campaign as a crowd-sourced effort to gather names and other personal information about Saudi intelligence officials for the assassination campaign. 

The campaign, according to U.S. officials, appears aimed at destabilizing Saudi Arabia, the location of two of Islam’s holiest cities. 

U.S. officials said social media monitoring indicated that thousands of Saudis are supporting ISIL, as indicated by social media use. Twitter users in the kingdom account for 40 percent of all Twitter users in the Arab world. 

An Android app used by ISIL for propaganda messages and recruitment was very active in Saudi Arabia between April and June, when Google Play removed it for terms of use violations. 

The assassination campaign is also part of a larger effort by ISIL to recruit jihadists in the kingdom and, as it did in other locations in the Middle East, to gain the release of Muslim terrorists held in prison. 

In the case of Saudi Arabia, ISIL wants to increase its ranks by winning the release of imprisoned jihadists, including women terrorists. 

Evidence of the ISIL recruiting drive in Saudi Arabia first appeared in June when leaflets were distributed in the capital, Riyadh. 

The campaign is being carried out under a hashtag in Arabic that translates to “Revealing the identities of the dogs of the Saudi intelligence agencies.” 

A pro-ISIL propagandist who is known to U.S. intelligence is said to be leading the campaign. 

New Details of U.S.-Israeli SIGINT Relationship

Glenn Greenwald

August 4, 2014

Cash, Weapons and Surveillance: the U.S. is a Key Party to Every Israeli Attack

U.S. President Barack Obama (L) greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during a press conference on March 20, 2013 in Jerusalem, Israel. Photo credit: Lior Mizrahi/Getty Images

The U.S. government has long lavished overwhelming aid on Israel, providing cash, weapons and surveillance technology that play a crucial role in Israel’s attacks on its neighbors. But top secret documents provided by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden shed substantial new light on how the U.S. and its partners directly enable Israel’s military assaults – such as the one on Gaza.

Over the last decade, the NSA has significantly increased the surveillance assistance it provides to its Israeli counterpart, the Israeli SIGINT National Unit (ISNU; also known as Unit 8200), including data used to monitor and target Palestinians. In many cases, the NSA and ISNU work cooperatively with the British and Canadian spy agencies, the GCHQ and CSEC.

The relationship has, on at least one occasion, entailed the covert payment of a large amount of cash to Israeli operatives. Beyond their own surveillance programs, the American and British surveillance agencies rely on U.S.-supported Arab regimes, including the Jordanian monarchy and even the Palestinian Authority Security Forces, to provide vital spying services regarding Palestinian targets.

The new documents underscore the indispensable, direct involvement of the U.S. government and its key allies in Israeli aggression against its neighbors. That covert support is squarely at odds with the posture of helpless detachment typically adopted by Obama officials and their supporters.

President Obama, in his press conference on Friday, said ”it is heartbreaking to see what’s happening there,” referring to the weeks of civilian deaths in Gaza – “as if he’s just a bystander, watching it all unfold,” observed Brooklyn College Professor Corey Robin. Robin added: ”Obama talks about Gaza as if it were a natural disaster, an uncontrollable biological event.”

Each time Israel attacks Gaza and massacres its trapped civilian population – atthe end of 2008, in the fall of 2012, and now again this past month – the same process repeats itself in both U.S. media and government circles: the U.S. government feeds Israel the weapons it uses and steadfastly defends its aggression both publicly and at the U.N.; the U.S. Congress unanimously enactsone resolution after the next to support and enable Israel; and then American media figures pretend that the Israeli attack has nothing to do with their country, that it’s just some sort of unfortunately intractable, distant conflict between two equally intransigent foreign parties in response to which all decent Americans helplessly throw up their hands as though they bear no responsibility.

House Intel Committee Publishes White Paper on Buying Spy Satellites

Zach Rausnitz

August 5, 2014

House Intelligence Committee declassifies report on intelligence satellite cost-savings

The U.S. intelligence community could save billions of dollars in satellite costs without compromising capabilities, according to a report from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

While the report is classified, the committee did publish an unclassified white paper (pdf) that summarizes the findings of the report.

The National Reconnaissance Office purchases intelligence satellites at a faster pace than it needs to in order to merely satisfy its mission needs—but it does that on purpose, to make sure that the satellite production industry remains stable.

However, the committee’s report “concludes that those concerns are not fully justified and result in the excess purchase of satellites at taxpayer expense,” the white paper says.

The committee recommended that the NRO start including multiple “paces” when soliciting proposals for satellite acquisitions.

Under the plan, the NRO could acquire satellites when it actually needs them without concerning itself about sustaining the industrial base. Even though the agency wouldn’t necessarily purchase satellites according to that pace, it would be able to see how expensive satellites could actually become if the agency didn’t buy an excess amount.

That would help the agency scrutinize its assumptions about the need to stabilize the industrial base, the white paper says.

IN SUPER SECRET CYBER WAR GAME, PRIVATE SECTOR TECHIES PUMMEL ACTIVE-DUTY CYBER WARRIORS

by Fortuna's Corner
August 5, 2014
In Super Secret Cyber War Game, Civilian/Private-Sector Techies Pummel Active-Duty Cyber Warriors — Establishment Of A Cyber Surge Capacity Needed 

 

http://www.fortunascorner.wordpress.com

Andrew Tilghman, writing in the August 4, 2014 edition of TheArmyTimes, writes that “when the military’s top cyber warriors gathered last year (2013), inside a secret compound,” inside NSA’s headquarters at Ft. Meade, Maryland, “for a classified war game exercise, a team of active-duty [military] troops faced off against several teams of reservists. And, the active-duty team, apparently took a beating,” writes Mr. Tilghman.

“They were pretty much obliterated,” said one Capital Hill staffer who attended the exercise,” wrote Mr. Tilghman. “The active-duty team didn’t even know they’d been attacked,” the staffer added. “The [cyber] exercise highlights a sensitive question emerging inside the military’s cyber warfare community about what future roles reservists will play in the Pentagon’s overall cyber force.” “At stake, Mr. Tilghman adds, “is a massive pot of money; and, thousands of military jobs for a critical mission that will be mostly shielded from budget cuts slamming nearly every other part of the force under sequestration.”

Real-World Experience

“The cyber warfare mission is unique, many experts say, in that reservists bring training and expertise from their work in the civilian sector that can be far more advanced than what’s found in the military itself,” notes Mr. Tilghman. “While military missions like the infantry or submarine warfare have no direct civilian counterpart, some reservists are full-time cyber security experts on Wall Street; or, software programmers with top technology firms, especially those attached to National Guard units in high-tech hotspots like California’s Silicon Valley, Seattle, and northern Virginia,” he noted. “The guys and gals who work day jobs in suits and ties — or tie dyes and blue jeans — a lot of them have real-world experience in cyber that is far and above the limited skills that…..regular military people have,” said Matthew Aid, a technology and intelligence expert, and author of “The Secret Sentry, The Definitive History Of The National Security Agency.”

“Yet, many reservists fear that active-duty leaders at the Pentagon and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), are drawing up preliminary plans that do not specifically include reserve component units in the mission,” Mr. Tilghman notes. “That debate will heat up,” he adds, “later this year; Congress has ordered the DoD to prepare a report on its cyber warfare plans, with special focus on “requirements for both active duty and reserve components,” as well as civilian assets,” according to legislation enacted last year.”

Reservists Shut Out?