Japan Looks to Build Indigenous Fighters

By Ankit Panda

August 22, 2014

Although it’s committed to the F-35, Japan may still build indigenous stealth fighters.

According to reports out of Tokyo, Japan might begin indigenously building its own fighters, taking greater initiative within the framework of its defense cooperation with the United States. The news is likely to raise concern in China and elsewhere around the region that Japanese militarism may be on the upswing. Previous Japanese attempts to experiment with domestic fighters were met with resistance from the United States, but Japan and the U.S. have jointly collaborated on fighter projects, including the F-2.

According to Defense News, Japans’ “defense ministry plans to seek about ¥40 billion ($387 million) in state funding for the next year starting in April 2015 to test experimental engines and radar-dodging stealth airframe designs for a purely Japanese fighter.” According to Tokyo’s plans, its near-term plan (over the next four years) is to study the financial viability of going with a fully indigenous program. The strategic necessity for Japan to field a robust fighter force comes from a growing perceived threat from China, which has become more assertive about its territorial claims in the East China Sea where Japan and China dispute the sovereignty of several islets. For its part, Beijing regularly warns of impending Japanese aggression, harkening back to Japan’s historical aggression against China in the 1930s.

The most likely starting point for an indigenous Japanese fighter is Mitsubishi’s Advanced Technology Demonstrator-X (ATD-X). It currently exists in prototype form and has been under development for about four years. The Japanese defense ministry has commissioned Mitsubishi “to develop a stealth fighter jet,” likely based on the technology demonstrated by the ATD-X. For Japan, a major deciding factor is likely to be the cost-per-unit of a domestic fighter. One way to alleviate this would be to find foreign customers and collaborators, but Japan hasn’t indicated if it is interested in this route. Furthermore, given that Japan is already committed to purchasing the multi-role (and highly expensive) F-35, it is likely that any indigenous fighter will focus on air superiority. Given what we know about the ATD-X, it is unlikely that Mitsubishi would attempt to re-factor the design as a multi-role jet.

The move fits a broader trend in Japanese defense policy under Shinzo Abe, Japan’s nationalist prime minister who was elected in December 2012. Abe has described his vision for Japanese defense policy as “proactive pacifism,” indicating that while he does not intend to fully abandon Japan’s post-World War II constitutional commitment to pacifism, he does want to modify it to meet the current needs of Japan’s strategic environment. To that end, his government recently passed a resolution reinterpreting Article 9 of the Japanese constitution to allow the country to exercise the right of collective self-defense. Furthermore, as Clint reports on the Tokyo Report, Japan is set to increase its military trade in coming years. It has also lifted its self-imposed ban on weapons exports and will export weapons to India, among other countries. In addition, Japan has signed defense cooperation deals with the United Kingdom and France this year, signaling a greater interest in defense research and development (R&D).

Triangulating Cyberespionage for Better US Diplomacy

By Lawrence L. Muir, Jr.

August 22, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/triangulating-cyberespionage-for-better-us-diplomacy/

Why the US should seek a meaningful trilateral treaty with China and Russia on cyberespionage. 

The United States is under significant diplomatic pressure. International turmoil that began with destabilizing events in smaller nations, such as North African coups and Venezuelan protests, has grown into the testing of boundaries by two of the world’s most powerful nations, Russia and China. As Russia tests American resolve with its actions in Ukraine, and China tests America with its actions in the South China Sea, foreign policy experts have expressed their opinions on what the United States needs to do to stabilize international affairs. An article in Foreign Affairs suggested that theUnited States must reach a “grand bargain” with Russia to stabilize Europe. An article in The Diplomatsuggested the United States must reach a “grand bargain” with China to stabilize Asia. These individual grand bargains with Russia and China are, however, the wrong efforts at the wrong time. Rather than pursuing grand bargains with each nation individually, the United States would secure a much-needed strategic diplomatic victory by triangulating the two nations and forming a trilateral treaty concerning cyberattacks.

American relations with both countries are failing, while relations between China and Russia are strengthening. China has reached an agreement with Russia to supply it with discounted energy at bargain prices, bolstering the economies of both nations going forward. The American government is too fractured to reach consensus on what a grand bargain with either nation should contemplate, and American diplomatic capital is too bankrupt to achieve the grand bargain even if the U.S. could frame it. Instead of negotiating separate grand bargains with each country, the United States should negotiate a small but important agreement between the three nations. By forming a trilateral agreement on cyber issues, specifically cybercrime, cyberespionage and cyberwarfare, American diplomats could resolve an important geopolitical issue, while strategically pulling Russia and China closer to America and further apart from each other. By opening diplomatic talks with a smaller issue, the cyberattack treaty would allow for a linkage of issues that could ultimately lead to stabilization.

The United States is on the brink of both a trade war and a cyberwar with each country. Chinese cyberespionage, for which China accepts no responsibility, has contributed to America’s economic malaise. McAfee estimates cybercrime reduces U.S. GDP growth by up to 0.8 percent. In response to Chinese hacking, the FBI indicted five officers of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army on cybercrime charges. This unilateral American effort, undertaken because bilateral diplomatic efforts failed to reach an accord on cyber-issues, has proven to be a foreign policy blunder. American companies have faced retribution from the Chinese government. The U.S. has retaliated with trade sanctions against Chinese solar companies. The Chinese, in turn, have stated that a promising bilateral investment treaty now faces serious difficulties. The two nations, so dependent upon each other for economic growth through exports, stand on the precipice of a trade war exacerbated by a cyberwar, due in no small part to the foolishness of an indictment that will never produce convictions.

While the Dragon receives the lion’s share of attention for illicit cyberactivity, one must not overlook the Bear. More specifically, the “Energetic Bear,” a Russian-linked form of malware that infected energy companies in the United States and Europe. The malware allowed the controllers to monitor energy consumption, another form of economic espionage directed against the United States. Moreover, Russian hackers recently stole 1.2 billion passwords from websites, further demonstrating Russia’s offensive cyber-capabilities. As with China, American bilateral diplomatic efforts with Russia have failed to achieve desired American outcomes. American sanctions against Russia over Ukraine have not only failed to retard Putin’s ambitions in the region, but they have led to Russian sanctions against American agricultural imports. These sanctions have pushed the two nations towards a trade war, with cyberthreats looming in the background.

Perhaps the simplest explanation for these bilateral failures is that both Russia and China pursue national interest diplomacy (the best interest of its nation) compared to America’s preference for collective security diplomacy (seeking multinational moral responsibilities). Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, responding to the American sanctions against Russia, taunted the United States. He chided the Americans for not appreciating that the Russians have a national interest in how they conduct foreign affairs, and proclaimed that the American foreign policy arsenal is not very rich. As to the cyber-issue with China, U.S. President Barack Obama wants to work with China to set rules that all nations can agree upon, language that rings hollow with Chinese diplomats in theory, and in practice has stalemated negotiations on the issue.

In light of these bilateral failures, triangulation may provide the United States with an opening to achieve diplomatic success with both nations. Though the cyberattack issue is significant, cyberattacks are less threatening to geopolitical stability than the events in Ukraine and the South China Sea have been. The reduction in significance enables open discourse on a less volatile subject, thereby allowing the United States to find areas of cooperation and agreement between the three nations, while also exploring potential diplomatic fault lines between Russia and China.

Despite the energy deal, Russia must have concerns about Chinese interests toward Russia, and must worry about becoming the junior partner in their blossoming geopolitical romance. Russia and China have a long-standing historic rivalry, including skirmishes in the Border Conflict of 1969. Russia has significant energy resources in Siberia, a region over which China has staked historic claims. As China makes investments in Russia, while populating Siberia with ethnic Chinese immigrants, Russia must watch its partner closely for signs of assertiveness in that region. Moreover, as Russian energy fuels Chinese economic expansion, it reduces the Russian share of the balance of power between the two nations, which is a significant problem for Russia’s bid for greater Asian influence.

The cyber-issue highlights the growing economic disparities between Russia and China. The United States invests 2.9 percent of its GDP in research & development. China invests 1.7 percent of its GDP in the same way. This gap is partially explained by the fact that China has been stealing American intellectual property, skipping the expensive costs of economic growth and heading straight to production. As stolen American intellectual property fuels Chinese economic growth, Russia becomes more subordinate to China, thus providing Russia with a national interest in preventing Chinese cybertheft of American intellectual property. If Chinese economic growth falls below 7 percent, it cannot maintain full employment, which would create internal problems for the Chinese government; problems that could work to Russia’s favor in pursuing its Asian strategy.

Cyberattacks emanating from Russia provide America with an opening for rapprochement with Russia, wherein they may realize their mutual national interests in reducing Chinese cyberespionage, thereby drawing America and Russia closer. The outcome of the discussions should be inviting China to negotiate a trilateral treaty on cyberactivity, setting ground rules for cybercrime, cyberespionage, and cyberwarfare amongst the three nations.

China would seemingly have no interest in curtailing cyberattacks against the United States, but there are two reasons China should come to the negotiating table. First, as China has leveled reciprocal accusations at the United States, entering into a treaty on cyberattacks would seemingly vindicate Chinese feelings of victimization. Moreover, as the U.S. has produced damning evidence of Chinese cyberespionage, China must either join the treaty for its own protection from foreign cyberattack, or risk signaling to the rest of the world that its cries of American cyberespionage ring hollow. Second, as roughly five percent of Chinese GDP comes from exports to the United States, China cannot afford a trade war with America. China will not be able to hit its economic growth targets or full employment measures without continuing to maintain a robust trading partnership with the United States. America must make China aware that if it wishes to continue its upward economic trajectory, it must maintain a close relationship with the United States. That relationship should hinge upon China entering into the cyber treaty with Russia and the United States. Should China refuse to negotiate, it risks escalating the trade war with the United States, and risks American support of an Asian balance of power that includes stronger Russian influence, as well as continued support for America’s long-standing regional allies.

Some experts believe the Russian economy is near collapse, with Ukraine-related sanctions expediting the decline. If true, then a prolonged trade war with the United States and Europe could threaten Putin’s regime. Russia could use rapprochement on the cyber-issue to provide the diplomatic room to extract itself from its expedition into Ukraine. The cybertreaty enables Russia to use a legitimate issue between the two nations to mask the more important discussions of Russia’s economic relationship with Europe and the United States. For the present good of the Putin regime, and for Russia’s long-term goal to be an Asian power rivaling China, Russia should work with the United States on cyber issues.

The U.S. must be prepared to stake out its national interest in reducing both the volume of cyberattacks and the resultant damage. By approaching Russia and demonstrating why it is in Russia’s national interest to work with the United States on the cyber-issue, America will demonstrate its foreign policy arsenal is indeed rich. As the United States warms its frosty relationship with Russia on this issue, it puts pressure on the Chinese to work with America. If the United States finds agreement with China on the cybertreaty, the cooperation may flow over to the bilateral investment treaty and other foreign policy initiatives, such as reversing the course of the U.S.-China trade war. But if those days are to come, they will come only if America leads. American leadership begins with a meaningful trilateral treaty on the cyber-issue, leaving grand bargains to be negotiated only after American diplomatic capital has been fully replenished.

Lawrence L. Muir, Jr. is an adjunct professor of law at Washington & Lee University School of Law, where he teaches cybercrime law.

DoD’s DISA To Undergo Cyber-Focused Restructure

by Fortuna's Corner 

August 22, 2014 

http://fortunascorner.com/2014/08/22/dods-disa-to-undergo-cyber-focused-restructure/

DISA to Undergo Cyber-Focused Restructure

DISA is likely to reorganize to take better advantage of its

collaboration with US CYBERCOM, says DISA Vice Director

MG Alan Lynn. (Barry Rosenberg/C4ISRNet)

Defense Department officials are considering a reorganization at Fort Meade, Maryland, that could restructure the Defense Information Systems Agency and other cybersecurity-focused military offices in a bid to better defend DoD networks.

Planning for the reorganization is in the early stages, but the goal is to create a more comprehensive defense strategy and to secure the DoD information network (DoDIN). The move would give greater oversight, visibility and authority to DISA, and would create a new joint force headquarters dedicated to DoD network defenses.

“We’re posturing the greater organization of DISA to be better prepared for what we see as our future,” MG Alan Lynn, DISA vice director, said at the annual Forecast to Industry held Aug. 20 at Fort Meade. “We’ve always been in the cyber business, and that business keeps increasing so we see ourselves more and more involved in that.”

DoD launching DISA cybersecurity joint task force

DISA searches for fit with evolving Cyber Command

Lynn said DISA is “in great collaboration” with Adm. Mike Rogers, commander of U.S. Cyber Command and director of the National Security Agency. The planned reorganization will enable that collaboration to continue and expand, Lynn said.

DISA will not take over the networks of the military branches, said Lynn and other officials. The goal is to build better cooperation between the organizations.

“I think the services are doing a great job protecting their networks. What we want to have better capabilities in and visibility into is all the data feeds that they have for, say, attack vectors coming toward them – they all can see that individually,” Lynn said. “Where we have greater impact is if we could see the total picture of the attacks so that we could do the large data analytics…and spread the word to the other services [so] that they can better defend.”

Lynn’s comments came just days after Rogers called for “an operational construct” between DISA, CyberCom, NSA and the services—one expected to be formalized by this fall under a new Joint Force Headquarters DoD Information Networks, according to a DoD release.

“Under the current network structure today, those networks are largely run by [the] services. So we’ve got to create a relationship between DISA and the services that is very operational because you’ve got to maneuver networks, you’ve got to react to changes, and you can’t do that in a static kind of environment,” Rogers said. “One of the core missions is the defense of the DoDIN. The forces associated with that mission will be assigned to DISA, to the services [and] to the combatant commanders.”

Lynn said that so far he has not received any orders designating the JFHQ-DoDIN yet, but he is anticipating the decision.

According to Mark Orndorff, DISA program executive officer for mission assurance and network operations and chief information assurance executive, the current structure could provide opportunities for adversaries to gain entry to DoD’s networks.

“If you say let the services do a defense mission, let DISA do a defense mission, let NSA do a defense mission, and we each have our own view of what’s going on, we’ve created seams and a defense approach that don’t make any sense from a cyber defense effects perspective,” Orndorff said. “That gives the adversary an opportunity to walk through those seams and be undetected in terms of getting the full visibility of the adversary’s intent and objectives. So getting the visibility required, getting a consistent security architecture and still enabling the services to do their core cyber defense roles and responsibilities is exactly what we’re trying to do.

Where The Web Thugs Are: Inside Russia's Cyber Underworld

Mehdi Atmani

Source Link

The Russian hacking community is as ambigious as the country itself: admired and feared, all at once. A reformed hacker takes us into the bowels of the criminal Deep Web. 

Russian gamers at a Kaspersky-sponsored event 

MOSCOW — Whether an organized crime expert or a solitary con man, an intelligence services agent or the Kremlin's cyber soldier, Russian hackers are often at the heart of Internet fantasies. An ambiguous and protean figure, the hacker has as many faces as Russia itself. The country, from which many of these nefarious crimes originate and where Edward Snowden remains in asylum, is both a nation of cyber censors and IT experts. Welcome to Russia's Internet underworld. 

The 28-year-old hacker I'm interviewing establishes the rules of the game. He won't give his name — only his pseudonym, "X311" — and won't answer all of my questions. "If I reveal too much, it could go badly for me," he says. A strong code of silence prevails in the Russian hacking world. It took me recommendations from about 10 mutual acquaintances for "X311" to finally agree to speak to me. 

After a long and perilous hunt, his conditions are finally mine. Our interview takes place online, in the middle of the night in Moscow, and on an Internet Relay Chat — one of many online communications protocols. Our exchanges are protected by the cryptography protocol Off-the-Record Messaging (OTR). This is the essential prerequisite to our conversation, and the token of his trust. 

"X311" writes in unusual but decent French. The hacker found refuge in France when his "personal situation became way too dangerous" for him to stay one more week in Russia, he says. He agrees to unveil some aspects of his country's cybernetic underworld, only because he's now joined "the white side of the force." In the hacker community, people are clearly divided in five different color groups. 

The deep web's golden era 

First off, there are the "black hats" — hackers driven by profit and the desire to wrong the market's actors. These are criminals who are either isolated or organized in mafia. On the opposite end are the "white hats," the cyberspace avengers who track down pirates and those threatening their interests — "the grey hats." Then come the "blue hats," who specialize in Windows hacking, and the "red hats," experts in the UNIX operating system.

None of them ever says what color group they identify with. "A real hacker never discloses he's one," X311 says. Our man did, out of choice and necessity. 

The Moscovite was a 15-year-old high school student when he first entered the "black hat" Russian underworld. He studied programming in Moscow and developed secured software during his spare time. "Back then, you had to find mentors to learn and practice," he says. X311 found these code masters — with questionable ethics — on IRC chats. These are all solitary and experienced souls, navigating the deep web. 

Up to 90% of online content slips through the pages of classic search engines. This is what we call "the deep web," the submerged part of the digital iceberg where the "black hats" hide and thrive. These hackers buy, sell and trade sensitive data — debit cards, confidential information, hacking programs. They do so via the Tor network (an acronym for The Onion Router), which provides them with secured protection of information. 

Quickly, X311 built a solid reputation, earning respect among other hackers. "I was young, experienced, I was a good worker," he says via chat. Trading data and sensitive information with another "black hat" just for the love of risk, he quickly became an expert in "cracking" and "phreaking." These practices consist of breaking into security safeguards to hack debit cards, or phones. 

"Back then, it was heaven," the hacker says. "There wasn't as much security on debit cards or on logins." He could easily hack into news websites or user accounts of large hosting service providers. Apart from the "American and European banks," things were easy for young hackers like him. 

Exporting the American Culture War

Published on August 20, 2014

RELIGION AND MODERNITYExporting the American Culture War

America’s cultural left and right have globalized the battle over questions of sexuality.

The phrase “culture wars,” or its singular “culture war,” is now commonly used to refer to the conflict between conservatives and progressives in contemporary America. (I rather prefer the singular—because, while there are many battlefields, there is also an overall clash between worldviews.) The phrase has been made popular in a 1992 book by the sociologist James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. (I also like the singular form of the phrase because it alludes to an earlier conflict, the Kulturkampf in the 19th century between Bismarck’s militantly Protestant state and the Roman Catholic Church—first in Prussia, then in newly reunited Germany as a whole. At the end of that day, the Church won.) Except in the minds of theorists, worldviews are not logically consistent entities, nor are the cultures in which worldviews are embedded. The ideas that make up a worldview are often contradictory, haphazardly put together. And the groups propagating them are typically alliances between different interests. Nevertheless, there are more or less distinct conservative and progressive subcultures in America; if you are familiar with the country, you will know in which of the two you happen to find yourself. Furthermore, the two major political parties have come to be associated with one or the other of the two subcultures—cultural conservatives are an important constituency for the Republican Party, cultural progressives for the Democratic Party. Issues south of the navel are important (though not exclusive) battlefields in the culture war—gender, sexual ethics, homosexuality, abortion, and (to a lesser degree) contraception. For the past fifty years or so much of domestic politics has revolved around the culture war. But America is not just any country. While it may no longer be politically or economically hegemonic, both its popular and its “high” culture are enormously influential throughout the world. Not surprisingly, both subcultures have become export commodities. Put differently, the American culture war has become globalized.

As is my (possibly obsessive) habit, I will juxtapose two recent news items. On August 9, 2014, the Economist carried a story about extramarital sex in Iran. The publication (in my opinion the best international news magazine) was founded in 1843 in London, where its headquarters is still located. Ever since, it has stood for free markets and free trade. The title story of this issue is “The Sex Business,” approvingly reporting how information technology is making it possible for prostitutes to become independent entrepreneurs—yet another instance of an emerging free market. I don’t know to what extent adulterers and prostitutes in the Islamic Republic of Iran have become technologically sophisticated, but the notion of sexual freedom that legitimates their behavior is of unmistakably American provenance (on this, regretfully, I must agree with the ruling Shi‘i clerics—on empirical grounds, even though I do not share their moral judgments). On August 1, 2014, the New York Times reported that the Constitutional Court of Uganda declared the recently passed draconic anti-homosexual law to be invalid. I don’t know to what degree the international outcry against this law influenced the Court, but its decision was on purely technical grounds—the law was passed by parliament when a quorum was not present. The government said that it would appeal further, so that this is not necessarily the end of the story. In this case, one need not speculate about American influences: The law was proposed in parliament as a result of an intensive campaign by American Evangelicals.

The Iran story: Iran’s parliamentary research department published an 82-page report on sexual behavior in the country. Some of the results must have deeply disturbed the theocratic elite. Thus, among other findings, 80 percent of unmarried females are supposed to be sexually active and 17 percent of students to be homosexuals. Of course both behaviors are strictly illegal in the Islamic Republic. Did some of the respondents lie? I don’t know the methodology of this study. Nor do I know whether the issuing of this document was part of a political agenda by either side of the dispute between moderates and hardliners in the regime; both may have an interest in unmasking the reality behind what the Economist story calls an “unspoken accord”: Do what you want, as long as it is done behind closed doors. Be this as it may, this report confirms anecdotal accounts of a sexual underworld existing under the radar of the official morals police. This dichotomy seems to span the Shi‘a/Sunni divide currently inflaming the Middle East: Both in Iran and in Saudi Arabia sophisticated individuals manage to circumvent the officially imposed moral rectitude—that is, individuals who understand English, can access American media, and even perhaps have studied at American universities. It is worth noting that the libertine influence from the Great Satan comes from both sides of the aisle—from the popular culture that is happily consumed by Tea Party activists who also bemoan American decadence—and from emissaries of the progressive ideology of sexual liberation (see the excellent article by Martha Bayles, “American Misguided Gender Missionaries,” in the March-April, 2014, issue of The American Interest).

How in the World Do You Make a Tank Stealthy?

How in the World Do You Make a Tank Stealthy?

Pentagon wants a smaller, lighter, elusive armored vehicle

The Pentagon’s future tank could resemble a stealth fighter jet more than an armored behemoth like the current M-1 Abrams.

The military wants a vehicle that can survive lethal anti-tank missiles, but without having to haul around so much armor plate that it can barely move. It should also have stealth capabilities to avoid detection.

What might this future tank look like? A conceptual drawing of the Ground X-Vehicle looks like something out of Star Wars—four wheels, no turret, a rotating gun and a chassis so small that it couldn’t accommodate more than one or two crewmen.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency—the Pentagon’s future technology lab—has stated some ambitious goals for the Ground X-Vehicle. It should be half the size and weight of today’s tanks, but with twice the speed.

It should also have half the crew, be able to traverse 95 percent of the terrain it encounters and have reduced sensor signatures.

The latest M-1A2 weighs 60 tons, is 26 feet long, moves at 25 miles per hour and has a crew of four. If DARPA gets its way, the new vehicle would weigh 30 tons, be 13 feet long—smaller than a Humvee—zoom at 50 miles per hour and have a crew of two.

The Pentagon has some radical suggestions for achieving this seemingly impossible dream. To increase mobility, prospective tank designers should consider “rapid omnidirectional movement changes in three dimensions.” This sounds like a vehicle that can raise or lower its chassis like the famously oddball Swedish S-Tank.

For added protection without heavy armor plate, the GXV might automatically dodge incoming threats, which suggests a computer-controlled system that takes evasive action. DARPA also mentions “active repositioning of armor,” which could mean the tank automatically reorienting itself so its thickest armor is facing enemy fire … or some kind of flexible armor plate that rearranges itself to deflect enemy projectiles.

Most interesting is DARPA’s desire for “signature management” to reduce the enemy’s ability to detect the tank through visible light, infrared radiation, sound, or electromagnetic sensors such as radar.

If this sounds familiar, it’s because the description also matches stealth aircraft such as the F-35.

SSBNs destablising? Not if command and control is maintained

12 August 2014 

Source Link

Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) became the seagoing platform of choice for the deployment of strategic nuclear weapons by 1960, with the availability of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Today there are five countries with operational SSBNs. The US, the UK, France and Russia all have a major part of their deterrent capability deployed on SSBNs, while China has three or four SSBNs, though not all are operationally available.

Before getting into a discussion on how the spread of sea-based nuclear weapons in Asia would affect stability, it is worth revisiting some concepts regarding 'stability'. To clarify, this discussion is about nuclear stability, not about prevention of conventional conflict. In other words, our frame of reference is to examine whether the possession and deployment of nuclear-armed submarines in Asia would provoke, or conversely prevent, escalation of a conflict over the nuclear threshold. With this in mind, the following is a brief review of the existing concepts: 

Strategic stability exists when there is mutual acceptance of relative nuclear force levels (which is not the same thing as the forces being equal) and neither side has the intent or desire to alter it. A change in this relativity could induce willingness to strike first, either by the side that perceives itself as weaker (as a pre-emptive defensive measure) or by the side that sees itself as stronger and therefore immune from effective counterstrike. 

Crisis stability exists when the nuclear weapons of both sides are not vulnerable to inadvertent or unauthorised launch, when both sides are confident in each other's determination to avoid escalation, and when the command and control (both politico-military as well as technical) is robust and can withstand political crises. 

Deterrence stability prevails when each side knows that the nuclear forces of the other will survive an attack and be able to deliver an effective retaliatory strike with consequences that will be unacceptable to it. 

The only Asian country that currently has SSBNs in service is China, though their detailed operational status is not clear. India is in the process of operationalising its first SSBN; however it is not clear when a matching submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) will be available. Pakistan does not have any SSBNs and has not declared any intention of building or acquiring any, though there are reports of it considering nuclear warheads for its submarine-launched cruise missiles. The only other nuclear weapons deployed in the Asian maritime region are those on US and Russian submarines. With this background we may consider the question at issue. 

Let us for convenience consider the relevant countries in dyads, beginning with the US-China equation. The US has overwhelming nuclear superiority in forces as well as technology, and the SSBNs that China can deploy against it will not seriously affect the balance between them for some time to come. If however China's SSBN program goes smoothly and it has five or six operational units in the next three or four years, that would be a significant challenge which the US would have to address. From a theoretical standpoint it is more destabilising when one nuclear power in a dyad has the overwhelming advantage, and China having a demonstrable ability to retaliate, albeit with a much smaller force, will reduce the possibility of a preemptive strike by an adversary.

THE VIRTUE OF BEING A GENERALIST, PART 3: VIPER AND THE PITFALLS OF ‘GOOD ENOUGH’

JON PARIS 

AUGUST 19, 2014 

http://cimsec.org/virtue-generalist-part-3-viper-pitfalls-good-enough/12575 

In both Part 1 and Part 2 of this series, I compared various naval counterparts – laying the groundwork for discussing what the U.S. Navy’s Surface Warfare Officer community is getting right, and what areas could use improvement. It is easy to complain. Surface Warfare Officers are notorious for it. I am infamous for it, as my peers and superiors alike will attest. Combine our penchant for complaining and our ingrained inferiority complex and it is no wonder that so many SWOs think that everyone else is “doing it better.” This time, though, it is not typical-SWO wanking: they are doing it better, and we must pull our heads out of the sand and catch up. Royal Navy Warfare Officers, U.S. Naval Aviators and nuclear trained officers are specialists and are unmatched masters of their trade. They must train endlessly and they feverishly adhere to standards written in blood to remain at the top of their respective callings. They are role-models and could teach us a thing or two about being the best. As for Surface Warfare Officers – we are good, and that is the problem.

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL launches TLAMs into Iraq

Surface Warfare Officers – and the ships we drive, fight, and lead – guarantee the free flow of commerce across the world. We deliver critical readiness to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and we send a powerful message to both overt and would-be enemies. What we do, works. Our ships deploy and our navy projects unparalleled power around the globe. As an inherently expeditionary force, we ply the world’s oceans, go where we please, and influence international events as a matter of course. We conduct prompt and sustained combat operations like no other nation can. Our ships are leaving port and returning safely, they complete the widest variety of operational tasking of any military community, our personnel are advancing, and finally, as one senior community leader put it to me, “We are pretty damn good… I would take our top 50% Department Heads and put them against the top 10% of PWO (RN, Principle Warfare Officers) or Snipes (engineers) and bet on our people.”

Millenials Bring a New Mentality

I currently supervise a crew that spans five generations, with millennials (those born between 1980 and the late 1990s) abundantly represented. They have a different dynamic from generations past. I’ve struggled with their perceptions regarding the chain of command, their definition of a work ethic, and the need for instant reward. Recently I attended a webinar titled Manage Millennials and Keep Them Engaged , and my concerns were validated: this generation has me questioning how they can acclimate to the highly traditional, structured U.S. military. Here are some of the behaviors I’ve noticed:

• The younger generation postures to work only the bare minimum number of hours required. Additionally, they continuously request more time off in the form of early liberty, shorter workdays, the ability to go home after an office luncheon, and so on. This is aside from federal holidays and their 30 days’ annual leave.

• Upon hearing they would not be in-zone for promotion or advancement in a given year, these younger members declare they are fed up with the service and wish to resign. They have an expectation of accelerated advancement through the organization, without regard for the value that experience provides to those in leadership positions.

• There are an increased number of negative confrontations between very junior members and senior leadership. Rather than saying “Yes Sir” or “Yes Chief” when tasked with a project or simple task, our newer members frequently question why they have to do it.

• Customs and courtesies are eroding. Juniors are no longer smartly saluting seniors or verbally acknowledging higher ranks. On an almost daily basis, I hear, “Hi, how’s it going?”

• Texting is becoming the primary mode of communication. It has already become a means of jumping the chain of command as a condoned communication tool.

Like it or not, millennials will be the future senior leaders of our organization. Therefore, we must mentor them. The military structure, adherence to the chain of command, and our tireless, selfless acts to preserve the liberties this country enjoys today have served us well. The public values our service members because of the discipline and dedication they demonstrate. So how does our structured military culture adapt to this new generation?

First, we must educate them on the importance of patience in our systems. Promotion and advancement boards are designed to ensure that members are not advanced until they have the maturity and experience demanded of good leaders. Waiting one more year will only serve them better in the end, as they’ll be more equipped to take on increased levels of responsibility. If this doesn’t sit well with a young member, he or she should be subtly reminded of the current economy and associated unemployment rate.

They need to be “course-corrected” immediately if they show signs of insubordination or disrespect. If this does not happen, an unspoken compliance to the behavior is demonstrated, and it will continue, if not get worse. We must get back to basics. Customs and courtesies are the foundation of our military traditions. Personnel inspections should be increased. Members should be smartly stopped on the street if a proper salute isn’t rendered. Verbal salutations should be quickly corrected. Instead of “Hi,” demand “Good morning, Sir/Ma’am.”

They also need positive feedback early and often. Little gestures such as going to their offices and offering accolades for jobs well done gives encouraging reinforcement and the feedback for which they hunger.

These four practices may sound like common sense, to be expected of leaders today anyway. However, they are even more important with this new generation. And finally . . . this needs to be said: We must be prepared for the tough conversation. Will they truly be able to adapt to the service? Do they want to be a part of a service that honors traditions and structure? We take pride in the missions we perform, serving as humble servants to the public. If millennials are more focused on what’s in it for them, they may not be the right fit. They should be reminded that there’s a long line of people outside the door waiting for a Coast Guard spot.

While I embrace the fact that we have a new generation that’s better educated, technologically astute, and poised to preserve our nation’s liberties, I also hope we can find a middle ground that will capitalize on their strengths and preserve our proud traditions.

Commander Cunningham is Commanding Officer of U.S. Coast Guard Base Los Angeles in Long Beach, California.

Democratization and Instability in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus

Authored by Dr. Robert Nalbandov.

Democratization and Instability in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus

Added June 26, 2014 

Type: Monograph 

208 Pages 

Download Format: PDF

Cost: Free 

This monograph analyzes the interconnections between the democratic institutionalization of the newly independent states of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus, their political (in)stability, and economic development and prosperity. By introducing the concept of regime mimicry into the field of public administration, this monograph extends the epistemological frameworks of the democratization school to the phenomenon of political culture. Successes and failures of the democratic institutionalization processes in these countries largely depend on the ways their institutional actors reacted to internal and external disturbances of their domestic political, econmic, and cultural environments. While Georgia’s political culture revealed the highest degree of flexibility in accepting the externally-proposed institutional frameworks and practices, the bifurcate political culture in Ukraine impeded its democratic institutionalization, while the rigid political culture in Belarus completely stalled the process of institutional transformations.

Learning from NREGA

Published: August 23, 2014 

Jean Drèze

Photo: The HinduFIGHTING FRAUD: Surveys point to a sharp reduction in the extent of embezzlement of NREGA funds in recent years, at least in the wage component of the programme. Picture shows NREGA workers Kancheepuram district, Tamil Nadu.

Corruption in NREGA works has steadily declined in recent years. There are important lessons here that need to be extended to other domains

One neglected aspect of the debate on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) relates to the process aspects of the programme. In the process of planning works, organising employment, paying wages or fighting corruption, many valuable activities take place: Gram Sabhas are held, workers agitate for their rights, social audits are conducted, technical assistants are trained, administrators find out how to speed up wage payments, and so on. These activities, aside from being valuable in themselves, are also a great opportunity to learn.Prevention of corruption

One productive area of learning has been the prevention of corruption. The principal method of embezzlement in labour-intensive public works programmes is well known: muster rolls are inflated and middlemen pocket the difference. Before the Right to Information Act (RTI) came into force, muster rolls were beyond public scrutiny and the crooks had a field day. Things improved after muster rolls were placed in the public domain, and even displayed page by page on the internet. Even then, an enterprising middleman might fudge the muster rolls and hope that no one will bother to verify them. So, further safeguards were introduced one by one including mandatory social audits of all NREGA works.

A major breakthrough was the transition to bank (or post office) payments of NREGA wages. This was a painful affair — the system was not ready for it and the overload led to long delays in payments. Five years later, banks and (especially) post offices are still not equal to the task. For the prevention of corruption, however, this was a step forward: the new system makes it much harder to embezzle NREGA funds since the money now goes directly to workers’ accounts.

One major qualification is that village post offices are still vulnerable to capture by powerful middlemen. Extracting money from someone else’s bank account without his or her knowledge is very difficult because banks have strict norms of identity verification. But for a suitable commission, a village postmaster can often be persuaded to use the accounts of illiterate workers as a conduit to siphon off NREGA money. Over time, workers learn to collect their wages in person from the post office and verify the passbook entries. But it will take a while for many of them to protect their account from fraud. And the crook’s next refuge is to involve workers themselves in the scam.

DIVIDED OR DESTROYED - Remembering Direct Action Day

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140823/jsp/opinion/story_18735231.jsp#.U_fS9fmSxqo

Politics and play - Ramachandra Guha

The 14th of August is Pakistan’s Independence Day. The 15th of August is India’s Independence Day. They were both first celebrated in 1947. Yet those two nations owe their origins to another day in August, a single day — fortunately never to be repeated — in the previous year.

On the 16th of August, 1946, the Muslim League called for a “Direct Action Day”. Its leader, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, proclaimed that we shall have “either a divided India or a destroyed India”. The violence unleashed on that day set in train a series of events that made the Partition of India unavoidable. The riots started in Calcutta, but soon spread to the Bengal countryside. Then Bihar and the United Provinces erupted, and finally, and most savagely, the Punjab.

Many historians (including myself) have written of the causes and consequences of Direct Action Day. Recently, while working in the archives, I found a vivid first-hand account of what happened that day in the city where the rioting was most intense — namely, Calcutta. This took the form of a letter written by the anthropologist, Nirmal Kumar Bose, to his friend, the writer Krishna Kripalani, who was then living in Delhi. It was written on the 2nd of September 1946, two weeks after the events it describes. This is how the letter begins.

“The 16th began as an anxious day for everybody. No one knew what was going to happen. [The Muslim League Leader, Khwaja] Nazimuddin’s statement that the Muslims did not swear by non-violence did not lead us to anticipate that active preparations for looting etc. had been going on in the meantime. Anyway, no police men were visible anywhere, and even the traffic police had been withdrawn. The trouble started in Shambazar about mid-day, and earlier in other quarters. There was going to be a very big Muslim meeting at the Maidan at about 2, and Muslim crowds began to pour in from towards Cossippore about 12. Every one noticed with some anxiety that the processionists carried lathis and brick bats in hand. … The processionists asked the shopkeepers to close their shops, and before that could be done, a Kaviraje’s shop was broken up in Baghbazar Street. A doctor’s house was attacked, and the crowd shoved in burning rags through the cracked door. Some ten or fifteen young men rushed out from the neighbouring houses and with lathis fought the crowd. The crowd swayed back from Baghbazar St. and continued on its way southwards.”

FOR THE UNITY OF THE NATION

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1140823/jsp/opinion/story_18739487.jsp#.U_fTBPmSxqo

Abhijit Bhattacharyya

Inherently and axiomatically, diplomacy reflects the officially accredited activities of the diplomats of a sovereign nation, to be treated as ‘equals’, while dealing with other sovereign nations. International diplomacy recognizes open-ended activities, with designated officials enjoying mutually accepted ‘diplomatic immunity’, unlike secret services and their agents, who operate clandestinely under diplomatic passports. Hence the ‘foreign services’ of every sovereign country carry a tinge of aura and awe. However, there also exists in the contemporary world a ‘back channel diplomacy’, the most famous proponent and successful practitioner of which was the American ‘super sleuth diplomat’, Henry Kissinger, whose nocturnal and surreptitious ‘diplomatic activities’ through Pakistan brought the mutually inimical Chinese and Americans on the same diplomatic high table, thereby marking the beginning of pathbreaking bilateral relations in the early 1970s.

Understandably, Kissinger’s pioneering activities and success came as a tonic to the protagonists of ‘track-II’ diplomacy, which India has so enthusiastically embraced during the last several years to reach a diplomatic consensus with Pakistan. It soon became apparent that although ‘unofficially accredited’, owing to the inherent faith and confidence reposed in them by the powers-that-be, some of the retired/former diplomats have started enjoying ‘extra- special’ power. They projected themselves as ‘super diplomats’ and started a sustained campaign for ‘imminent peace with the neighbour’, thereby spreading the wrong idea that they are the closest possible confidantes of the ruling government in trying to resolve the Indo-Pak dispute surrounding Jammu and Kashmir. They assumed undefined roles with additional power and responsibility, thereby completely sidelining their former colleagues who were now the serving-line officers, to achieve ‘extra-jurisdictional, extra-territorial, extra-legal or extra-curricular missions’. As mentioned earlier, Henry Kissinger was their avowed idol whom they wanted to emulate, though in vain.

With the best of intentions perhaps, the cue from the American formula was picked up by the nostalgic ‘underprivileged child of Partition’, the prime minister of India, and carried to dizzying heights when his trusted and hand-picked track-II diplomats virtually eclipsed the established system, headed by serving foreign office mandarins, through a process of ‘direct reporting’ to the head of the Indian government. Seeds of ‘hope for peace’ were sown through highly secretive ‘unofficial/personal back channel’ discourse, in the guise of official diplomatic discussions between Delhi and Islamabad.

The track-II specialists were on their ‘final mission’, as late as mid-May 2014, to pursue their clandestine diplomacy by trying to manipulate the incoming prime minister, Narendra Modi. Unfortunately, however, Modi did not have the clandestine diplomacy pertaining to Jammu and Kashmir and the line of control in mind while seeking votes from the people of India. Breaking all traditions, by refusing to play ball vis-à-vis the unwritten but accepted code of election conduct and play a supremely divisive role by harping on the fear psychosis pertaining to the historical faultlines of religion, caste, language and ethnicity, Modi gave a clarion call of development for all. This earned him spectacular and unprecedented dividends. With the unsolicited advice to convert the LoC into an international border, the ‘peaceniks’ from a bygone era made a last-ditch attempt to capture the imagination of the “outsider”, Modi, to cling on to their diplomatic privileges and remain relevant in the charmed circuit of Lutyens’s Delhi. With predictions of fresh turbulence and efforts at destabilization by those who were, and are, constantly referring back to the “disastrous days” of rule by the ‘Hindu Nationalist Party’, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the job at hand for the new prime minister is daunting. The real challenge is yet to come.

Create Defence-Industrial Giant

http://www.newindianexpress.com/columns/Create-Defence-Industrial-Giant/2014/08/22/article2391250.ece

By Bharat Karnad

Published: 22nd August 2014 

Prime minister Narendra Modi extolled “Made in India” products from “satellites to submarines” in his Independence Day address. A day later he demanded that “Instead of having to import even small things...India...become an exporter of [military] equipment over the next few years”. And, he exhorted foreign countries and companies to “make in India”. Rendering the country self-sufficient in armaments, it turns out, will help India emerge as workshop of the world manufacturing all kinds of quality goods economically. But it will require the PM to do to the Defence Public Sector Units (DPSUs) overseen by the ministry of defence (MoD) what he did to the Planning Commission—utilise their resources more effectively.

At the core is a fact that cannot be glossed over: DPSUs are deadweight. Despite outputting some 800 combat aircraft and thousands of jet engines not an iota of any of the technologies, for example, have been absorbed let alone innovated over the past 60 years by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. Indeed, DPSUs haven’t progressed much beyond assembling platforms from imported kits achieved during the Second World War when Harlow PC-5 and Percival Prentice trainer aircraft, trucks, and mortars were mass-produced for the Allied armies. In this context, the indigenous HF-24 supersonic fighter developed from scratch in the 1960s seems an aberration. It is because the DPSUs have stayed stuck at the screwdriver technology level that the department of defence production in MoD has evolved a procurement system willy-nilly funnelling billions of dollars to foreign vendors with minimal transfer of technology (ToT). DPSUs neither ingest foreign technology nor let the private sector benefit from it.

How much the ToT provisions are eyewash and how much the military procurement system favours imports and enriches foreign countries may be gauged from a few facts. Firstly, the technology transfer content in deals is not required to be divulged by the foreign vendors until after the bids are in and a supplier chosen! This empowers the vendor to restrict the technology it chooses to transfer, usually basic stuff related to the platform—a ToT threshold DPSUs are comfortable with. As prime buyer India doesn’t use its leverage to squeeze state-of-the-art technologies out of the suppliers, is uncommonly generous in forking out huge sums at the outset, and tolerates delays in delivery and non-transfer of technology. Hence, gains from indigenisation even from the offsets policy are minimal. It leads to imports of high-value packages being locked into long-term deals. Dassault, for example, will supply 30% of the advanced avionics amounting to over $10 billion of the $30 billion plus contract for the full duration of the Rafale programme.

*** The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability

By Aram Nerguizian

AUG 19, 2014 

http://csis.org/publication/struggle-levant-geopolitical-battles-and-quest-stability

The United States and its allies compete with Iran in a steadily more unsettled and uncertain Levant and Middle East. The political upheavals in the Middle East, economic and demographic pressures, sectarian struggles and extremism, ethnic and tribal conflicts and tensions all combine to produce complex patterns of competition. The civil war in Syria, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Gaza, and the internal upheavals in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon all interact and affect the competition between the US and Iran.

The Burke Chair is circulating a review draft on US and Iranian strategic competition in the Levant. This study shows that the United States faced an increasing level of instability across the Levant, which in turn affected every key aspect of US competition with Iran in the broader Middle East and North Africa. It asks how do the US and Iran compete in the Levant, where do they compete, and what are the forces and constraints that shaped this contest in the past, present, and possibly in the future?

The study is entitled The Struggle for the Levant: Geopolitical Battles and the Quest for Stability and is available on the CSIS web site at:

http://csis.org/files/publication/140820_Iran_VIII_Levant_report_1.pdf

The study examines how the US and Iran compete in the Levant, where they compete, and what forces and constraints that shape their competition: 

The first chapter of this report introduces the analysis. 

The second explores US and Iranian interests in the Levant. 

The third chapter addresses how the US and Iran compete by considering the conventional military balance in the Levant. 

The fourth chapter goes beyond conventional forces and considers an area where Iran has been especially effective over time, namely in shaping the regional asymmetric balance. 

The fifth chapter looks at the history, evolution and current state of play in the Arab and regional state system. 

A complementary sixth chapter looks at the evolution of socio-economic forces that shaped the Arab uprisings and their lingering regional effects. 

The seventh to twelfth chapters examine how the US and Iran compete in each country in the Levant. 

The thirteenth chapter evaluates persistent and emerging challenge or “wild cards” in the region. 

The final chapter derives key implications that are likely to shape future US policy towards the Levant. 

The analysis shows that deep socio-economic, political and sectarian cleavages, the pervasiveness of the Arab-Israeli conflict and a cycle of popular protests, all combine to make the Levant a growing challenge to the US in shaping its regional struggle with Iran. The US Role in the Levant

Examining the Assam-Nagaland Border Crisis

Namrata Goswami

August 21, 2014

Source Link

On August 19 and 20, more than 20 protestors were injured and two killed in police action at Rangajan, Golaghat District, Assam against an economic blockade on Asian Highway 1 (also called NH 39) leading into neighbouring Nagaland. The protestors from several local organisations including Asom Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chhatra Parishad, All Assam Tea Tribes students Association, All Assam Tai Ahom Students Union, and All Adivasi Students Association were holding up traffic of Nagaland bound vehicles since last week on NH-39. In a related incident, the visiting Assam Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi’s convoy was assaulted by angry protestors at relief camps in Uriamghat village, Golaghat District near the Assam-Nagaland border. These protestors were part of the affected people embroiled in the latest incidents of killings and violence in this sensitive inter-state border area. On August 12, at least nine persons from the Tea and Tai Ahom Tribes were killed inside the Assam side of the border allegedly by armed Nagas from Nagaland. The miscreants torched over 200 houses across seven border villages after which over 10,000 people fled to Urmianghat.

The Assam-Nagaland border is disputed since Nagaland achieved statehood in 1963. The disputed land is claimed by private individuals and communities on both sides of the official border based on historical rights in the absence of bona fide documents. In spite of the Supreme Court’s intervention, the dispute remains unresolved with an interim agreement between Assam and Nagaland to place the disputed border areas under the control of a neutral Central Police force. The border area of these latest incidents, a small part of the larger Disturbed Area Belt (DAB), is roughly the size of 12 football fields in the Dhansiri subdivision, Golaghat District and is officially inside Assam and owned by the government’s Forest Department. So while the Assam Chief Minister has blamed the central government and its forces for failing to contain the violence, the Centre claims it could only assist the state government responsible for policing.

Genesis of the latest violence

Not as much reported were earlier incidents of arson and violence in the contiguous areasinside Nagaland, which was the prologue to later escalated events. Bordering the affected areas in Assam is the Ralan circle in Wokha district of Nagaland inhabited by the Lotha Naga ethnic group. According to reports, members of the Tea Tribes from neighbouring Assam migrated to settle in areas several years ago around Chandalashung B Lotha Village after signing official land usage agreements with the Lotha Nagas.1 Tension has been building up in villages of Ralan circle since July 25, with incidents of confrontation, house damage, kidnapping and extortion between the Tea Tribes and the Lotha Nagas.