Ukraine Is Running Out of Time

PUTIN’S IRREDENTIST PROJECT

http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/09/12/ukraine-is-running-out-of-time/

ANDREW A. MICHTA

Putin’s goal is clear: to dismember Ukraine in whole or in part as a means of restoring Russia to great power status. The West has few opportunities left to prevent Moscow from achieving its end game.

Published on September 12, 2014

Ukraine has reached an inflection point in its war with Russia to preserve its territorial integrity. There are signs that an outright partition may not be far off. Whether it holds or not, the ceasefire with the “rebels” in eastern Ukraine, announced by President Petro Poroshenko on the margins of the NATO summit in Wales, has begun the process of Russia’s carving out yet another chunk of Ukrainian territory. With the military balance now shifted decisively in favor of Russia, Putin’s long-term objectives are firmly in view.

The ceasefire, brokered by Germany with support from other allies, has in effect allowed Russia to entangle the West in its goal of bringing about the abridgement of Ukraine’s sovereignty over its eastern provinces, implicitly underwriting Russia’s claim that Ukraine is fast shifting into its sphere of influence and control. The West has continued to deny Ukraine the military assistance it needs, and economic aid remains insufficient; whether consciously or unwittingly, it has become a co-participant in Putin’s game. By not branding Russia’s direct entry into Ukraine as an act of state-on-state aggression, choosing instead to frame the narrative as an “intrusion,” NATO seems to have implicitly acceded to that which it refuses to name. At the same time Ukraine’s President has been pushed to negotiate a deal with Vladimir Putin and sign an agreement with the very rebels who only a few weeks back were branded as terrorists. The ceasefire has put front and center the proposition that, as far as the largest European powers are concerned, the fate of Ukraine rests in Russia’s hands.

The West’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has consistently lagged behind the pace of events. This lag has become the dominant narrative of the crisis; if it doesn’t change, and if there is no unequivocal assistance for Ukraine in coming weeks, the country’s army will not survive a protracted winter campaign in the east. The Obama administration promised a modest $70 million in mainly non-lethal aid to include radios, rations, concertina wire, first aid kids, and limited supplies of body armor but no arms. Much of the assistance, including urgently needed night-vision goggles has yet to be delivered. The U.S. program to train 700 Ukrainian national guardsmen will not start until 2015. Europeans are divided on military aid to Ukraine, a few in support but others determined to oppose it all out. NATO’s stated position is that it will not supply weapons to Ukraine as a non-ally, even though individual states may choose to do so. In short, without military assistance Ukraine may not be able to hold on to its present borders much longer; ultimately it may also be unable to preserve its independence.

There is no question that not all of the blame for Ukraine’s current predicament can be laid at the West’s doorsteps. Riven by corruption and in deepening economic decline after two decades of mostly wasted opportunities, Ukraine has earned a large share of the blame for the approaching destruction of its sovereignty. Still, the greed and sloth of the Ukrainian political class haven’t had nearly as great an impact as Russia’s years-long efforts to undercut the government in Kiev. Russian strategy prior to the war focused on making inroads into Ukraine’s defense infrastructure—for instance, the 2010 deal with Ukraine that extended Russia’s lease for the Sevastopol naval base through 2042 and expanded Russia’s influence on Ukraine’s defense industry. The strategy also leveraged Moscow’s energy weapon and Ukraine’s deteriorating financial picture to bring it into an even closer orbit. When the Maidan uprising nullified that approach, Russia shifted to new pressure points: ethnic minority communities, an undeclared “hybrid” war, and now a direct invasion of Ukraine by Russian regulars. Territorial gains served as the yardstick of Russia’s progress: Crimea, then Donetsk and Luhansk, and now a new southern area around Novoazovsk and Mariupol, with Odessa likely to be the next goal.

US Has Lost ‘Dominance In Electromagnetic Spectrum’: Shaffer

By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR 

September 03, 2014 

Source Link

The Navy’s new EA-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft during sea trials.

NATIONAL PRESS CLUB: “We have lost the electromagnetic spectrum,” said Alan Shaffer, the Pentagon’s research and engineering chief, this morning. “That’s a huge deal when you think about fielding advanced systems that can be [countered] by a very, very cheap digital jammer.”

We’ve heard senior Pentagon officials fret about electronic warfare before, most prominently the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, but this is the bluntest and most alarming statement yet.

“We have got to, in my opinion, regain some dominance in the electromagnetic spectrum, or at least parity, so things that we buy continue to operate as we intended them to,” Shaffer said. For example, the Pentagon’s biggest program ever, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, has much-touted information technology built-in, but, he told reporters cryptically after his public remarks, “if we don’t really pay attention to the EM spectrum, it is not a good news story for the F-35.”

So what the hell happened? “There is no single answer,” Shaffer said when I asked him at the annual Common Defense (ComDef) conference here. Part of the problem is that the US government has sold off many of radio frequencies it used to own, “for good economic reasons,” he told the audience.

But by far the bigger factor is the global shift from analog to digital technologies, with a proliferation of high-powered, low-cost, commercially available equipment driven byMoore’s Law. The kind of electronic eavesdropping and jamming that used to require a nation-state’s resources are now available to small countries and even guerrillas (as well as to innovators inside the Defense Department). “People are able to create very agile, capable systems for very little money, and those agile, capable systems — if we don’t develop counters — can impact the performance of some of our high-end platforms,” Shaffer said.

What Shaffer didn’t say is that the US military neglected electronic warfare for at least the decade after the Soviet Union fell. After 9/11, radio-detonated roadside bombs triggered a rush to get EW gear to ground troops in Afghanistan and Iraq, but outside that narrow area, investments still lagged. While the Air Force has high hopes for the F-35, it has only a handful of dedication electronic warfare aircraft left, the EC-130H Compass Calls. The Navy has spent heavily to replace the geriatric EA-6B Prowler with the sleek EA-18G Growler — but to date it’s putting a lot of old electronics in that new airplane: A new Next-Generation Jammer (NGJ) to go on the Growler is still in development.

Al-Nusrah Front, Al-Qaeda’s Syrian Terrorist Arm, Publishes English-Language Monthly Operations Report September 10, 2014

Thomas Joscelyn

September 8, 2014

Al Nusrah Front releases English-language summary of monthly operations

The Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, has released a 26-page document summarizing its operations in the month of August. The propaganda document, which is written in English and titled “Monthly Harvest,” provides an overview of the group’s military operations and proselytization efforts throughout Syria.

The file was released on Al Nusrah’s Twitter accounts earlier today. It is not as slickly produced as other English-language jihadist publications, such as those released by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). But it is intended to showcase the scope of Al Nusrah’s activities.

The monthly summary was produced by Al Nusrah’s “correspondent network,” which includes seven Twitter accounts devoted to specific regions and an eighth Twitter page that retweets the reporting from the other seven. The regional Twitter correspondent pages cover Aleppo, Idlib, Deraa, Homs, Hama, Al Qalamoun, and Deir az Zour.

The document highlights Al Nusrah’s fight against the Assad regime and its allies, including Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran. One entry for Al Qalamoun, where there was heavy fighting between Hezbollah and Al Nusrah, reads: “The promise of victory is in sight. Here are your brothers in Jabhat al-Nusra and other groups debilitating Hezbollah and the regime’s army be deterring their advance in the barren mountains of Hawsh ‘Arab.”

Al Nusrah provides links to videos and other online files throughout the publication. But in some cases those links were either not included or were accidentally deleted. For instance, there is no link or picture associated with Al Nusrah’s entry describing the fight against Hezbollah in Al Qalamoun, despite the fact the publication reads, “Here are your brothers ….”

Another entry contains a picture with a caption that reads, “In collaboration with Jund al-Aqsa, Jabhat al-Nusra targeted with 6 tank shells, a resort hotel containing Hezbollah members in the city of Idlib.” Jund al-Aqsa is another rebel group that appears to be closely allied with Al Nusrah. And a third entry says that Al Nusrah killed two Syrian “officers and a number of Hezbollah members.”

Fifth Dimensional Operations

by Jeff D. Dailey

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/fifth-dimensional-operations

Fifth Dimensional Operations: Space-Time-Cyber Dimensionality in Conflict and War - A Book Review

Book Review— Fifth Dimensional Operations: Space-Time-Cyber Dimensionality in Conflict and War Edited by Robert J. Bunker and Charles “Sid” Heal. A Terrorism Research Center Book. Bloomington: iUniverse, 2014; 290 Pages. $19.76.

Fifth Dimensional Operations: Space-Time-Cyber Dimensionality in Conflict and War is a collection of fourteen articles from various military and police-focused journals. This volume, edited by Robert J. Bunker, Ph.D., and Charles “Sid” Heal collates much of the extant essential materials and analysis available on cyber security and the cyber threat. It paints a consolidated picture of the effects cyber may have, both on existing and future wars. The influence of cyber on virtually all aspects of warfare (and domestic policing) is, and should be frightening to intelligent people when viewed in context and within a single volume.

Dr. Bunker’s innovative approach and selected content reflect deep concern with the growing threat of cyber, particularly in terms of the U.S.’s failure to think beyond the normal “four” dimensions of threats, both domestic and international. Through the volume’s consolidation of the works of multiple authors, the perspectives and analyses of the cyber threats are wide ranging, covering various issues such as cybermaneuver through advanced battlespace (including the use of robots and remote sensors), information warfare, advanced non-lethal weapons, stealth, chaos theory applications, bond-relationship targeting (including manipulating the electromagnetic spectrum), environmental warfare, cybershielding, information-based mimicry, organic and cyber forms of camouflage, the critical electromagnetic infrastructure of the battlefield, and command and control networks.

The edited book is comprised of fourteen “sections,” which come from different journal articles dealing with some aspect of cybercrime, cyberwar, or the cyberthreat posed to modern society, published from 1996 to 2014. In addition, there is a postscript, a symbol key and glossary, and three appendices. Although several chapters/sections of the book deal with law enforcement applications, most of the book argues that our concepts of the “battlefield” are outmoded, primarily because they only deal with four dimensions (length, width, the vertical dimension, and time, or the temporal aspect), and not with the fifth dimension, cyber. Dr. Bunker argues that the future effectiveness of the U.S. Army is limited by its belief that the “battlespace is composed of separate, discrete physical and electromagnetic dimensions” (p. 6). He correctly states that “terrorists, narcocartels, and forces based on clan and ethnic affiliations bring to conflict characteristics that are asymmetrical to conventional Western forms of warfare” (p. 7). For Bunker, battlefield dominance in a future war will depend on “total cyberspace dominance—not just digital battlespace dominance” (p. 10).

Agile and deadly: Vision for the future Army combat vehicle

By Kevin Lilley 

Sep. 10, 2014 

Source Link

The GXV should be able to reach 95 percent of all terrain, according to goals set by the program. (Army Tank Automotive Research Development and Engi)

The combat vehicle could deflect incoming ordnance with 'movable armor' and stopa rocket-propelled grenade in midair via an unnamed weapons system. (DARPA)

A new research program aims to get the next-generation ground combat vehicle off the drawing board.

And if the drawings of it by an Army civilian are any indication, future soldiers could be riding in a lightweight, agile, easy-to-deploy platform ripped straight from the pages of a graphic novel.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency announced the launch of the Ground X-Vehicle Technology program last month, but in May, a report called “GXV Operational Vignettes” went out from the Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center. It includes more than two dozen pages of drawings from James Scott, with TARDEC’s advanced concepts team, offering views of a possible GXV design in a variety of scenarios:

■Swiveling its turret after somehow “sensing” an enemy sniper, then dispatching most of the building that housed the sni­per.

■Descending into the war zone via airdrop — eight stored in a single C-17 — and transporting up to 96 soldiers over uneven terrain and through urban environments thanks in part to four independent tracks that can maneuver like wheels.

■Deflecting incoming ordnance with “movable armor” and stopping a rocket-propelled grenade in midair via an unnamed weapons system.

War Council Supporting the Study of the Use of Force

BY MAJOR MATT CAVANAUGH

http://www.warcouncil.org/blog/2014/9/6/sports-and-military-leadership

*Disclaimer: The materials published on War Council are unofficial expressions of opinion; views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the US Military Academy, Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or any agency of the US (or any other) government. *Note: Link to cite for Blog Posts. 

Very famously, General Douglas MacArthur once said, "On the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that on other days, on other fields will bear the fruits of victory." But is this true? Does sport participation really produce better military leaders?

I spend a good deal of time running and love exercise. I grew up playing hockey, soccer, and a little rugby, some of which extended into college. I'm the Officer in Charge of the Marathon Team at West Point - so I still maintain a strong connection with organized sports. But long-held, standing assumptions about the way the world works can be wrong. Recent academic studies have debunked the importance of breakfast in weight loss, the necessity of post-run cool downs, and the value of stretching for (running) injury prevention. As Mark Twain put it, "It ain't what you know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so."

From what I can tell there is absolutely no scholarship on the link between sports and military leadership. Granted, there is likely a fair amount about the general connections between leadership and sports. But these would represent generic studies inapplicable to a military audience. For example, though an ex-quarterback may develop skills suitable for running a moderate-sized used car dealership - these ought not to be assumed sufficient for the chaotic violence of battlefield leadership. Consider the cases of two high performing former Army quarterbacks, Trent Steelman (West Point Class of 2012) and Nathan Sassaman (West Point Class of 1985). As athletes these two may have been successful on the football field - while with respect to war, onefailed outright while the other showed deep flaws that signaled he was not prepared for the rigors of combat. The two contests are simply not the same: on the battlefield, there is no referee to appeal to, no clock to run out, and no meaningful scoreboard as the perpetual threat of violent veto exists to cancel any "results." Yet we still persist in this sort of metaphorical military-football echo chamber. 

In truth, platoon leadership is often more analogous to coaching than the actual playing of a sport. For example, this past summer training I observed a cadet platoon leader taking his 40-person cadet platoon to an L-shaped ambush (of an enemy squad-sized element). The lacrosse-playing cadet platoon leader was doing really well until the lead element from the enemy squad came into his field of view. Instead of controlling his platoon, he was the first in the platoon to open fire and maintained sustained fire on the enemy squad throughout the engagement. His squad leaders tried calling the platoon leader on the radio several times, but, as he was busy firing at the enemy, he did not exert control over his platoon. In this case, though the platoon leader's job was to be engaged in the contest just as much as his soldiers, his role should have been different - slightly less physical, requiring more communication. In other words, kind of like a coach.

All this is not to deny any connection at all between sports and military leadership. Admittedly, it is intuitive that any group of people undertaking shared discomfort for some objective has to have some broad value. But what precisely is that value? Is it translatable to a military environment? How do we know? If we were to actually study this with any rigor, my sense is that we would find that sports participation matters, but not as much as we think it does beyond the maintenance of healthy personal habits and a bit of social development. I actually think we'd find that we ought to reallocate time to military specific activities - because the best preparation for military leadership is actual military training with opportunities for military leadership (insightful analysis there!). 

At West Point, we hang so much on MacArthur's statement; specifically, that the development of a "winning culture" will make for better platoon leaders. And now we're arguing over substantive changes to the cadet program which tip the balance in favor of the football "fields of friendly strife." I'm not entirely sure which way to come down on the football issue, but I do know one thing: we should not simply assume that sports participation makes for better military leaders.

Flynn’s Last Interview: Iconoclast Departs DIA With A Warning

By JAMES KITFIELD

Source Link

Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn in happier days, taking command of the Defense Intelligence Agency just two years ago.

In this exclusive exit interview with Breaking Defense contributor James Kitfield, the outgoing chief of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, talks aboutmetastasizing Islamic terrorism, his struggles to reform intelligence-gathering, and the risk of lurching from crisis to crisis in an Internet-accelerated world. – the editors.

“Disruptive.” That’s how Michael Flynn’s enemies reportedly described him during his time as director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a tenure that ends tomorrow – a year early – when the three-star general retires after 33 years in the US Army. Was Flynn forced out? The Pentagon said his departure had been “planned for some time” when it made the announcement in April. But Flynn had challenged the Obama administration narrative that al-Qaeda’s brand of nihilistic extremism had died with Osama bin Laden in 2011. He had bruised egos at the DIA trying to transform the 17,000-person bureaucracy into a more agile and forward-deployed intel operation, one shaped by the lessons he had learned as intelligence chief for Joint Special Operations Command in Iraq and Afghanistan, working for the ill-fated iconoclast Gen. Stanley McChrystal. As early as 2010, Flynn made waves with a report, Fixing Intel, that said US intelligence could not answer “fundamental questions” in Afghanistan.

James Kitfield: DIA is tracking global crises from Ukraine to the Mideast to North Koreaand the Western Pacific. Have you ever seen so many crises occurring simultaneously? 

Flynn:No. I come into this office every morning, and other than a short jog to clear my head, I spend two to three hours reading intelligence reports. I will frankly tell you that what I see each day is the most uncertain, chaotic and confused international environment that I’ve witnessed in my entire career. There were probably more dangerous times such as when the Nazis and [Japanese] Imperialists were trying to dominate the world, but we’re in another very dangerous era. We rightfully talk about the last decade being the longest war in American history, for instance, but when we pull combat troops out of Afghanistan at the end of this year, it’s not going to feel like that war is over. To me, it feels like we’ll be facing a familiar threat and heightened uncertainty for a long time yet.

JK: Why?

Strategic networking in the Indo-Pacific

Published: September 12, 2014 01:01

Rakesh Sood

India’s ‘look-east’ policy is maturing, with diplomatic and political linkages built up with Asian forums providing the Modi government a foundation to establish overlapping non-formal networks based on strategic convergences. Outreach with Japan and Australia are the building blocks

Last week, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s diplomatic outreach covered two established democracies of the Asia-Pacific, Japan and Australia. The outcomes reflect the geostrategic shift from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific and together, the two engagements provide interesting insights into Mr. Modi’s foreign policy agenda and diplomatic style.

The personal chemistry between Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo¯ Abe and Mr. Modi was evident during Mr. Modi’s Japan visit. Extra time spent together in Kyoto — feeding the carp and at the tea ceremony — sent its own message and further cemented the personal rapport between the two leaders. They come from very different socio-economic backgrounds but their shared sense of “nationalism” and “destiny” has drawn them to discover strategic convergences in their respective world views.

Both believe in the “Asian century” and are convinced that Japan as a “normal state” and an economically resurgent India can, together, be a force of stability and prosperity in the region. This sentiment can nurture a potential defence relationship, which for the first time finds prominent mention in the Tokyo Declaration.

The erstwhile “strategic and global partnership” with Japan has been elevated to a “Special Strategic and Global Partnership,” but negotiators were unable to bridge differences on the civil nuclear cooperation agreement that has been on the table now for over two years. Clearly, notwithstanding personal chemistry at the top, diligent homework and deft domestic political management are necessary, in democratic societies, to change deeply ingrained mindsets.

Civil nuclear opening

From suspicion to empathy: How India and Australia became happy allies

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2748518/From-suspicion-empathy-How-India-Australia-happy-allies.html

By KANWAL SIBAL

PUBLISHED: 8 September 2014 |
The transformation of India-Australia relations in the last decade has been remarkable. We have moved rapidly from a lack of empathy to recognition that our relationship can be mutually rewarding.

A non-aligned India and an allied Australia had separate political trajectories for decades.
Australia was suspicious of a strong India dominating the Indian Ocean, while Australia was seen as an interloper in Asia, the West’s “trojan horse” there.

Australia shared western prejudices on India-Pakistan issues and opposed India on non-proliferation ones.

+2

Australian’s PM Tony Abbott is looking to boost trade ties with India
Equations

India-Australia relations have felt the impact of changing equations in the post Cold War world, improved India-US ties, the India-US nuclear deal and the NSG exception for India for civilian nuclear cooperation, India’s Look East policy and the strategic implications for Asia of the phenomenal rise of China.

Pragmatism and enlightened self-interest have brought the two countries together.

The nuclear deal signed during prime minister Abbott’s visit to India last week has sealed the rapprochement between the two countries.

After Canada, which took the pragmatic decision to sign a bilateral nuclear deal in the interest of a broader relationship with a rising India, Australia has followed suit, but after prolonged internal political wrangling over nuclear ties with a non-NPT country.

If Australia supplies uranium to China, which is a non-democratic, territorially expansionist country with unacceptable maritime claims, and whose growing military strength and increasingly potent nuclear and missile capabilities potentially threaten western – and Australian - interests, refusing supplies to democratic India that poses no threat to Australian interests in the Pacific would make no rational geopolitical sense.

Australia has the largest uranium resources in the world, whereas India needs to import natural uranium for its nuclear power plants, creating an obvious tie from which both sides can benefit, especially as India has plans to expand its nuclear power generation in the years ahead, not least because clean energy production is necessary for environmental and climate change reasons.

This nuclear deal is doubly satisfying politically as the Japanese still resist normalisation of civilian nuclear ties with India.

+2

Australia's Tony Abbott bids farewell to India's Narendra Modi. Pragmatism and enlightened self-interest have recently brought the two countries together.

Will President Xi Jinping’s Visit change the Contours of Sino-Indian relationship?

http://www.vifindia.org/e-magazine/VIVEK-issues-and-options/2014/july-august

Vinod Anand

The coming visit of President Xi Jinping is being viewed as a visit that could define the next decade of engagement between the two Asian giants. It is generally accepted that Sino-Indian relationship could turn out to be more important than the Sino-US engagement if leadership of both the countries were to cooperate and give substance to the conception that the locus of global economy and power has shifted to Asia. Notwithstanding the fact that there is dissonance between the two countries on a number of issues both nations do share common perceptions on many of the international issues and especially so on the nature of emerging world order.

Further, the visit also needs to be seen in the backdrop of the unprecedented two summit meetings between PM Li Keqiang and Manmohan Singh last year, recent visit of Vice President Hamid Ansari to China to celebrate 60 years of Panchsheel and not to be left behind the visit of Indian Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh to China in first week of July (after a gap of 9 Years). All these engagements were topped by Xi and Modi meeting on the sidelines of BRICS where both leaders established a good rapport. These multifarious engagements have already brought to fore the Indian concerns and have indicated the direction in which both countries want to proceed further. One thing which is certain is that no dramatic breakthroughs in the relationship should be expected.

Modi’s mantra is development and growth and that has been the basis on which he has come to power. Having had firsthand experience during his visits to China as Gujarat Chief Minister he has been thoroughly impressed by the development and economic growth of China and especially its infrastructure in terms of roads, ports, highways and some of the new cities and towns. Therefore, he is keen to conclude agreements with the visiting President regarding Chinese infrastructure companies undertaking projects in India. India is looking for infusion of China’s surplus funds in Indian infrastructure and in other avenues of investment. Though an MOU for setting up an Industrial Park has been signed by our Trade and Commerce Minister during Vice President Ansari’s visit to China, it is just a small step; Modi is looking for a framework agreement on investment by China. Modi is keen to push infrastructure development by the Chinese in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Tamilnadu.

India’s requirements of funds are a huge 1 trillion US dollars as per its current Five Year Plan and it is hoped that China can contribute possibly 30 percent of such requirement over a period of time. But a Sino-Indian agreement for anything closer to 30 billion USD or even somewhat lesser amount in the coming visit could be a game changer. There would be some problems like the absorption capacities and many other difficulties connected with the local environment but all such issues can be overcome provided the political will is there from both sides. Recently, a country like UK offered 1 billion pounds (around 1.75 billion USD) for infrastructure development in India. Obviously, China’s capacities are much beyond this amount.

Isis sends a gruesome message but reveals little about itself

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7a3d60b0-338c-11e4-85f1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CPwKj96d

Financial Times, September 5 2014

By Ahmed Rashid

The Taliban were not very communicative but they were polite, writes Ahmed Rashid
When Osama bin Laden wanted to deliver a message to the west, he summoned a journalist or a television network. Before the attacks of September 11 2001 he even gave press conferences. He was available to the media as a physical presence. This was how he communicated. People paid attention to what he said, because he was saying it via trusted journalists.

When the head of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (known as Isis) wants to send a message, the movement does it differently. Social media is the new way of communicating, for businessmen and terrorists alike.

When the terrorist group’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has something to say, he posts it online, using multiple social media platforms so as to make it impossible for authorities to silence him. He need not appear in person before representatives of the western press in order to convince his audience that he is real. The message itself is enough.

Killing the messenger is an ancient way for kings to assuage frustration born of defeat or a political failure. Mr Baghdidi has taken this routine to another level. In his view, journalists are not messengers who convey information to the outside world, but merely intruders, who should be imprisoned, tortured and eliminated, or – especially if they are American or British – used as political pawns.

The tragic beheadings of American journalists James Foley and Steven Sotloff are part of this revolting new political game. Al-Qaeda briefly attempted something similar in 2001, with the beheading of Daniel Pearl. With Isis, it has become de rigueur. In this way it expects to force western governments to sit up and take notice.

In the years after 1993, I roamed around Afghanistan with the Taliban – the horrors of their day. As I did so, I learnt about their philosophy, saw how they governed and treated people, how they understood developments in geopolitics. I studied their military tactics and strategy. And I wrote books that informed others of what I had learnt. To think of those days now, when merely to show your face as a journalist in parts of Iraq or Syria is to invite a violent death, it seems like another era, another age.

THE FUTURE OF INDIAN AIR POWER: AN INTERVIEW WITH AIR CHIEF MARSHAL ARUP RAHA

By Gulshan Luthra and Air Marshal (Retired) VK Jimmy Bhatia

2014-09-07 In this exclusive interview conducted by our partner India Strategic with Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force, the COS provides an overview on how he sees the evolution of Indian Air Power in the joint context.

Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, PVSM, AVSM, VM, ADC, took over as Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) from Air Chief Marshal NAK Browne on December 31, 2013.

Commissioned into the Flying Branch of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in 1974, the CAS has to his credit over 3,400 hors, mostly flown on different types of fighter aircraft. In an exclusive interview with India Strategic (IS) on July 31, 2014, the CAS spoke at length on the IAF’s plans to equip and train itself against the myriad challenges facing the force.

IS: Having completed six months now at the helm of one the largest and battle-tested air forces in the world, what do you reckon are the major challenges facing the Indian Air Force (IAF)? How have you planned to cope with these?

CAS: The application of aerospace power would prove to be the decisive factor in winning the short and intense wars of the future, wherein the response would need to be prompt and precise.

Towards this, IAF envisages a multi-spectrum strategic force capable of addressing the myriad challenges posed by the prevalent security environment.

One of our major challenges is to remain a contemporary aerospace power, which possesses credible capability with a strategic footprint.

The response options so desired would be afforded by our comprehensive transformation plan involving acquisitions, upgrades and efficient management of legacy systems.

Flying training is another focus area where we are systematically building up our capability; both in terms of inducting modern trainers as well as enhancing our overall capacity.

Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha, Chief of the Air Staff, Indian Air Force in his office. Credit: India Strategic

The aircrew need to be capable of handling and operating the modern platforms in multiple roles in a multi-threat environment.

Maximum impetus is also being provided in training and preparing our air-warriors to absorb the intrinsic technologies and maintenance practices therein, in the least possible time.

IS: “The IAF in metamorphic transformation” is an oft-repeated statement, which continues to emanate from different quarters, within and outside the ‘Establishment’.

Do you agree?

If yes, could you elaborate, especially with regard to its concepts and ethos?

Indian Air Force Modernization and Joint Doctrine

CAS: The on-going transformation of the IAF involves a three-pronged approach of ‘Preserve, Upgrade and Acquire.’

INDIA’S CHALLENGE: TURNING GARBAGE INTO GOLD – ANALYSIS

By Curtis Chin and Meera Kumar

SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 

Rubbish containers in India 

Whether it is tattered plastic bags washing up on India’s beaches, piles of waste on the sides of smart city streets or discarded candy wrappers along the Himalayan trekking trails, India is facing a growing scourge: mountains of garbage that can no longer simply be swept away.

Throughout India the response to the challenges of solid waste management has been woefully inadequate. Among the specific problems are non-existent recycling efforts, overburdened garbage collection and inadequate sanitation services.

The impact on public health, the harm to the environment and the many downstream costs to the economy are enormous. Because these costs are so high, finding a solution will require a concerted effort from businesses, governments and private citizens.

The problem of poor waste management is a scourge that affects not only India but is spread across all countries of Asia. Indeed, the dimension of Asia’s garbage problem was underscored by the widespread confusion caused by vast amounts of plastic debris found floating in the region’s oceans during the search for missing Malaysia Airlines Flight MH370 earlier this year. Today, the North Pacific and Indian Oceans are ranked as the first and third -worst by volume of rubbish among the world’s oceans, according to California-based research group 5 Gyres.

A World Bank report estimates that some 3 billion urban residents today generate 1.2 kg waste per person per day, adding up to 1.3 billion tons of waste per year. By 2025, it is estimated, 4.3 billion urban residents will generate about 1.42 kg per capita per day, or 2.2 billion tons of waste per year.

As India’s economy has grown so, too, has its trash problem, with people adopting modern lifestyles — and embracing the disposable, packaged goods — of their consumer-driven counterparts in more developed nations.

One man’s trash…

But this increasingly widespread and seemingly intractable issue could prove a gold mine if India’s political and business leaders see trash as equal parts – challenge and opportunity.

To date, the waste market industry remains at an embryonic stage in Asia, but some of the region’s savviest businesspeople are beginning to pay attention to the opportunities that near-overflowing landfills can provide. Some have already proven that managing waste and harnessing landfill by-products, including methane and other gases released by decomposing garbage, offers money-making opportunities. There are several success stories that India should take immediate note of.

THE INDIAN JIHADIST MOVEMENT: EVOLUTION AND DYNAMICS – ANALYSIS

By Stephen Tankel

SEPTEMBER 10, 2014 

http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/inss/Strategic-Perspectives-17.pdf

India has been confronting a jihadist threat from Pakistan for decades. Expeditionary terrorism typically receives the most focus, but indigenous actors benefiting from external support are responsible for the majority of jihadist attacks in India. The Indian mujahideen (IM) network, which announced its presence to the public via media in 2007, is the latest and most well known manifestation of the indigenous Islamist militant threat. As this paper details, however, its members were active before then.

Moreover, a small number of Indian Muslims have been launching terrorist strikes—with and without Pakistani support—for more than two decades. The dynamics of Indian jihadism and the nature of India’s evolving counterterrorism response are not easy to comprehend. This is understandable given that, even among Indian security officials and analysts, a knowledge gap exists.

Discussions with issue experts and policy analysts prior to field research highlighted that three key areas regarding Indian jihadism remained opaque: the organizational nature and scale of the indigenous movement, the degree to which indigenous networks could threaten U.S. interests in India or across the wider South Asia region, and the nebulous ties between Indian jihadist networks and Pakistan-based groups. This paper addresses these and related issues and focuses on the evolution and dynamics of Indian jihadism.1 It begins by providing an overview of the evolution of the Indian jihadist movement, then explores the dynamics extant within that movement today, and concludes with an assessment of the threats posed by the movement.

The Four Phases of Indian Jihadism

Phase One

In December 1992, Hindu chauvinists demolished the Babri Masjid (Babur mosque) in Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh, India, which had been constructed by the first Mughal Emperor of India in the 16th century. Hundreds of Muslims were killed in the communal riots that followed the mosque’s demolition. An environment of relative deprivation afflicting Indian Muslims had already created a small pool of would-be militants.2 So too did pervasive abuse by the police, which grew once Muslims started becoming involved in homegrown terrorism and contributed further to a sense of political alienation.3 The demolition of the Babri mosque thus catalyzed a response among an already radicalizing portion of the Muslim community. Believing that established leaders of the Muslim community had failed to stand against a rising threat from Hindu chauvinism, radical members took it upon themselves to fight back.

In the wake of communal riots that killed hundreds of Muslims, Dawood Ibrahim, the Muslim leader of South Asia’s largest crime syndicate known as D-Company, worked with the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to engineer a lethal series of bomb blasts in Mumbai (Bombay at the time) in March 1993.4 This series of blasts remains the most deadly terrorist attack in India’s history and may have helped inspire or embolden would-be jihadists to take action. At the very least, D-Company became an important recruiting vehicle, using its logistical networks and ties to Pakistan to facilitate transit there for aspiring Indian jihadists in search of training and support.5

The link between organized criminality and Islamist militancy remained an enduring feature of the Indian jihadist movement. The Asif Raza Commando Brigade, formed by gangsters- cum-jihadists and discussed later in this section, constitutes one of the two major building blocks of that movement. The Tanzim Islahul Muslimeen (Organization for the Improvement of Muslims, or TIM) is the other.

Activists from the Gorba faction of the Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith in Mumbai formed the TIM in the Mominpora slum in summer 1985.6

Motivated by communal riots that erupted the previous year in Bhiwandi and spread to Mumbai and Thane, these activists converged around the need for a Muslim self-defense militia and the possibility of taking revenge for Hindu nationalist violence.7 Three key figures were present at the Mominpora meetings: Jalees Ansari, Azam Ghouri, and Abdul Karim (also known as “Tunda”). (For an alphabetical reference of these and 13 other key figures in the history of Indian jihadi activities, see appendix 1.)

Afghanistan or Talibanistan?

April 2, 2014 

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Afghan National Army soldiers learn to medevac casualties at Camp Shorabak in Helmand Province on Feb. 19, 2014. For many, this was the first time they had been aboard a helicopter. (U.S. Marine Corps)

Will the country see relative stability and freedom after 2014?

Col. Robert M. Cassidy

This year will see a set of key events in Afghanistan: variables of pivotal magnitude that may well determine whether it succeeds as a state or succumbs to another Taliban takeover.

If Afghanistan succeeds and endures, the struggle will have ultimately been the good war of the last 12-plus years: in terms of the justification for going to war, in the way the coalition ultimately prosecuted it, and in the context that the international community will have fulfilled a post-war moral commitment to the Afghan allies we supported and fought alongside.

The value of the political object, the morality of the war, and the perception of victory or defeat comprise the most compelling logic of the contest of wills there. There are impediments that increase the risk of failure, yet also momentum that favors success. And there is history, and the history of wars in Afghanistan does not suggest that catastrophic failure is inevitable – if the coalition continues to support Afghanistan after 2014.

The political object, and its perceived value, guide war. The value of the political object of the Afghan War – dismantling, defeating, and denying al-Qaeda sanctuary – derives from the horrific consequences of the 9/11 raids. The political object, when achieved and sustained, will prevent this from happening again. However, the perceived value of the object has diminished in the eyes of the supporting polities because of the costs and duration of this war. In other words, the political and domestic will to persevere have waned.

The Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Islamist zealots of similar cloth have endured significant disruption, displacement and dismantling of their capacity to carry on, yet their will to continue has not relented. This is because of the fanatical religious creed that animates these enemies, and because of the physical and materiel sanctuary and support they benefit from in Pakistan’s border areas. Generous funding from Saudi Arabia and other gulf states also helps. For the likes of the Quetta Shura and the Haqqanis, their mantra is ‘Islam or death.’ For Western polities, it is, ‘bring the troops home.’

Pakistani security elites believe they can counter their existential nemesis, India, by supporting the Taliban and using the Haqqanis to foment insurgency in Afghanistan. Although this notion of strategic depth is a figment of these elites’ febrile and fertile imaginations, their cost-benefit strategic calculus is not likely to change unless there is a huge shift in how the U.S. and the West confront Pakistani duplicity. In other words, in the minds of the Pakistani security leadership that decides strategy, the benefits of supporting and protracting the insurgency in Afghanistan outweigh the costs.

What Role Can India Play in Defusing Afghanistan's Election Crisis?

By Ankit Panda

September 10, 2014

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India’s external affairs minister is in Kabul. Can she help defuse the electoral crisis in Afghanistan? 

Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj is in Kabul on Wednesday as Afghanistan grapples with a prolonged electoral crisis that began in June. Most recently, one of the two Afghan presidential candidates involved in the run-off vote that took place on June 14, Abdullah Abdullah, declared at the last minute that he would not abide by an earlier agreement, brokered by the United States, that saw all 8 million votes cast in the run-off audited for fraud. Instead, Abdullah prematurely and unilaterally declared victory in the election — potentially polarizing his support base against that of his opponent, Ashraf Ghani. Swaraj’s trip to Kabul comes at a crucial hour and could result in important dividends for New Delhi once the current crisis is resolved.

Beyond Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s attendance at Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s inauguration in May, the governments of India and Afghanistan have not interacted at a high-level since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) took over in New Delhi. While Swaraj is slated to meet with the outgoing Karzai government, discussing routine matters such as development assistance, Afghan reconstruction, and security cooperation, she will also convey New Delhi’s desire to see the current electoral crisis resolved via negotiation and according to the terms of the U.S.-brokered, U.N.-enforced deal.

India bears the benefit of being perceived positively almost unanimously among mainstream Afghan politicians (this, of course, doesn’t include the Taliban and other extremist groups). Both presidential candidates have a positive understanding of India’s relations with Afghanistan (as does the outgoing government). With her trip to Kabul, Swaraj makes India visible at a crucial juncture in Afghanistan’s political transition. Given her trip’s agenda, it appears unlikely that she will attempt to broker a return to the prior agreement between Ghani and Abdullah (though she will meet with them). Afghan President Hamid Karzai has called for the two candidates to put aside their differences in the interest of the country. Swaraj would do well to communicate her agreement with that sentiment, at least to the Afghan press. While India can’t be a panacea for Afghanistan’s electoral troubles, it needs to ensure that it stands on the best possible footing to immediately engage Afghanistan’s next president.

By backing a return to the established agreement’s procedures, Swaraj would join a growing chorus of global voices including U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, and others that have called for composure and negotiation during this crisis. Abdullah’s declaration could have the disastrous effect of polarizing supporters to the extent that the fragile ethnic balance of this election collapses and inter-ethic violence breaks out along political lines. This outcome, naturally, would be a nightmare for India, which wants to see a prosperous and stable Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s Prime Insurgent Group Splits, but Don’t Count Them Out

Arif Rafiq

September 10, 2014

"One thing’s for sure: the Taliban wars in Pakistan and Afghanistan are far from over. They are only moving on to their next phase."

In December 2007, an umbrella organization of jihadist militias across Pakistan’s border regions with Afghanistan was formed, producing a united, ferocious front that would take on the Pakistani state and kill tens of thousands of civilians, as well as thousands of soldiers and security personnel. By the spring of 2009, the group known as the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) had taken over most of the country’s Pashtun belt. Two major, as well as many other smaller, Pakistan Army counterinsurgency operations pushed back the TTP, which was concentrated in the North Waziristan tribal area, as well as parts of Afghanistan. But as a terrorist force, the TTP resurged in 2011, despite the killing of its founder, Baitullah Mehsud, two years earlier.

While the TTP has experienced splintering and internal feuds in recent years, it faces its greatest threat today with the emergence of a counterumbrella force, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan–Jamaatul Ahrar (TTP-JA), which was formed last month by a group of dissident commanders.

Though he does not head the group, the driving force behind the TTP-JA is Umar Khalid Khorasani, an Afghanistan-based Pakistani militant who had commanded TTP forces in the Mohmand tribal area in Pakistan. Umar Khalid has always been somewhat of a renegade. For example, last September, as nascent talks between the TTP—then led by Hakimullah Mehsud—and the government were rumored to be underway, Umar Khalid said that he would oppose any decision by the group to engage in talks with Islamabad.

As peace talks between the TTP, led by Maulvi Fazlullah, and the Pakistani government proceeded this year, splinter groups, such as the Ahrar ul Hind outfit, emerged and continued terror attacks in Pakistan amid a ceasefire between the TTP and Islamabad. Fazlullah, who is based in Afghanistan and is not a member of the Mehsud tribe that provided the TTP’s first two central leaders, never quite consolidated control of the organization. There has been internecine strife, with drive-by shootings taking place in the North Waziristan tribal area, where the TTP had been concentrated, ahead of the Pakistan military’s ground operations in the area that began in June.

Much, though not all, of North Waziristan has been cleansed of the TTP and allied jihadist groups, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Terror attacks in Pakistan are down significantly this year; Pakistan is on pace to have its fewest terrorism-related deaths since 2010. Some militant groups, such as the Junood al-Hafsa led by Asmatullah Muawiya, have reportedly decided to focus on Afghanistan, instead of Pakistan.

Obama Hopes That the New War Against ISIS Will Largely Remain a Proxy War

U.S. to Rely on Local Forces to Fight Islamic State

Julian E. Barnes and Siobhan Gorman

Wall Street Journal , September 11, 2014



Peshmerga fighters stand guard at Mosul Dam in Iraq last month. Reuters

WASHINGTON—A cornerstone of the expanded U.S. military campaign against Islamic State militants will be reliance on U.S.-trained local forces to confront the group head on.

But the U.S. has a poor track record of taking or keeping control in areas such as Iraq and Libya for extended periods, experiences that underscore the risks of depending on moderate rebels in Syria and state security forces in Iraq.

Relying on local forces and eschewing the use of American combat troops has become a favorite strategy of President Barack Obama as a way to reduce the risk of being dragged into a protracted foreign conflict. But some defense officials and experts say that approach also can heighten the risk of failure.

In Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan and elsewhere, results have been mixed at best in U.S. efforts to push local forces to the forefront of fights against extremists. U.S. military campaigns conducted with little or no local ground support—such as those in Pakistan and Yemen—have met with some success but have lasted for years. Success, officials and experts say, is especially difficult when American troops are prohibited from serving alongside local units on the front lines or without a yearslong U.S. presence to train, advise and mentor the partner forces.

American defense officials are divided over whether it is possible to train local forces in Iraq and Syria without at least a small number of American “boots on the ground,” something that Mr. Obama has vowed to avoid. Weeks of American airstrikes in Iraq have arrested the progress of Islamic State fighters, preventing them from claiming more territory. But few military experts or officials believe Hellfire missiles and guided bombs will be enough to roll back the group’s gains.

Taking back territory in Iraq, defense officials insist, will require a push by Kurdish and other Iraqi forces. In Syria, the U.S. plans to expand efforts to train moderate rebels, who in theory could challenge both Islamic State and the regime of Bashar al-Assad.

U.S. officials acknowledge big risks with the strategy and that not all of the potential pitfalls have been addressed. In Syria, officials have repeatedly raised the problem of adequately vetting rebels to ensure the people trained and armed by the U.S. don’t join the ranks of Islamic State. In Iraq, the U.S. believes that many of the Shiite-dominated military forces have been penetrated by Iranian agents.

"You’re relying on lots of different forces who are in some cases highly unreliable and highly divided," said a U.S. official. "It’s a delicate balancing act. Unless we play it really smartly, it could really go poorly. There are real risks there."

*** New Military Campaign Extends a Legacy of War

By PETER BAKERSEPT. 10, 2014

WASHINGTON — In ordering a sustained military campaign against Islamic extremists in Syria and Iraq, President Obama on Wednesday night effectively set a new course for the remainder of his presidency and may have ensured that he would pass his successor a volatile and incomplete war, much as his predecessor left one for him.

It will be a significantly different kind of war — not like Iraq or Afghanistan, where many tens of thousands of American troops were still deployed when Mr. Obama took the oath nearly six years ago. And even though Mr. Obama compared it to the small-scale, sporadic strikes against isolated terrorists in places like Yemen and Somalia, it will not be exactly like those either.

Instead, the widening battle with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria will be the next chapter in a grueling, generational struggle that has kept the United States at war in one form or another since that day 13 years ago on Thursday when hijacked airplanes shattered America’s sense of its own security. Waged by a president with faded public standing, the new phase will not involve many American troops on the ground, but seems certain to require a far more intense American bombing blitz than in Somalia or Yemen.Continue reading the main story Video

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ISIS’ Goals and Tactics Worldwide

Some background on goals, tactics and the potential long-term threat to the United States from the militant group known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.Video Credit By Natalia V. Osipova and Christian Roman on Publish Date September 10, 2014. Image CreditReuters

The battleground for that new phase will now extend beyond the well-known sands of Iraq into the new theater of Syria, a nation racked by more than three years of brutal civil war. After years of trying to avoid entangling the United States in another “dumb war,” as he called the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Mr. Obama is now plunging the United States into the middle of one of the world’s bloodiest, most vicious and fratricidal conflicts.

Whether he can wage this war in a more effective way, crushing a jihadist group while minimizing American casualties, could be the central national security test of his final two years in office — and the first one confronting his successor. Mr. Obama acknowledged that “it will take time to eradicate a cancer” like ISIS, but gave no estimates.