It may be called the "Ukraine crisis," but it's really all about NATO.
As we approach February 21, the first anniversary of the start of the Ukraine crisis, a question that still seems to vex many observers is: what, exactly, does Mr. Putin want?
Answers vary and usually depend on the ideological predisposition of the respondent. Last week, former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul told PBS’s Gwen Ifill, “I still think Putin gains very concretely to his ultimate objective, which is to weaken and ultimately destroy the government in Kiev. That’s what he really wants to do.”
Neoconservatives and liberal interventionists (by now, surely, a distinction without a difference) also generally believe that Mr. Putin wants to at the very least dominate (economically, culturally, militarily) Ukraine—if not resurrect the Soviet Union—and then move on to reclaim the Baltic states for Russia. After that, with the help of the Kremlin’s vast propaganda apparatus and its nefarious far-right clients in Europe, he will begin to tighten his grip over Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and, should the Le Pen and Farage insurgencies continue to gain momentum, France and the UK.
If this is what Mr. Putin wants—a kind of malign hegemony over large swathes of Eastern, Central and Western Europe—then the West would be well-advised to fight Putin in Ukraine, so it won't have to confront him down the road in, say, Riga or Manchester. The argument is eerily similar to the one (or one of the ones) trotted out by the second Bush administration in the lead-up to Iraq: fight 'em over there, so we don't have to fight ‘em over here. It also is an echo of the ‘60s-era domino theory which led to (among other niceties) our decade-long engagement in Vietnam. An intuitively and viscerally appealing idea, it is also completely and utterly discredited. Yet, it persists. Last week, theEconomist’s lede article included this old chestnut:



