How Trump Can Escape His Iran Jam

By AARON DAVID MILLER, STEVEN SIMON and RICHARD SOKOLSKY 

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Steven Simon is professor of international relations at Colby College. He served as the National Security Council senior director for counterterrorism and for the Middle East and North Africa, respectively, in the Clinton and Obama administrations. He is the co-author of Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the US-Israel Alliance.

Richard Sokolsky, a non-resident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, was a member of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Office from 2005-2015.

President Donald Trump has no good options with Iran in response to its recent strikes on critical Saudi oil facilities. The choices, thanks to his administration’s diplomatic malpractice and campaign of maximum pressure, range from very bad to worse: Not responding forcefully gives some administration officials a severe case of reputational anxiety; in their telling, America will be exposed as a paper tiger if it fails to stand up to Iranian aggression and defend its regional partners. But a direct U.S. military strike against Iran would be infinitely worse because it would be untethered from any viable strategy to deter Iran from further attacks and could easily spiral out of control.

The Drone Strikes on the Saudi Oil Facilities Have Changed Global Warfare

by PATRICK COCKBURN

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The devastating attack on Saudi oil facilities by drones and missiles not only transforms the balance of military power in the Middle East, but marks a change in the nature of warfare globally.

On the morning of 14 September, 18 drones and seven cruise missiles – all cheap and unsophisticated compared to modern military aircraft – disabled half of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production and raised the world price of oil by 20 per cent.

This happened despite the Saudis spending $67.6bn (£54bn) on their defence budget last year, much of it on vastly expensive aircraft and air defence systems, which notably failed to stop the attack. The US defence budget stands at $750bn (£600.2bn), and its intelligence budget at $85bn (£68bn), but the US forces in the Gulf did not know what was happening until it was all over.

How Yemen’s Houthis are bringing down a Goliat

By PEPE ESCOBAR

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“It is clear to us that Iran bears responsibility for this attack. There is no other plausible explanation. We support ongoing investigations to establish further details.”

The statement above was not written by Franz Kafka. In fact, it was written by a Kafka derivative: Brussels-based European bureaucracy. The Merkel-Macron-Johnson trio, representing Germany, France and the UK, seems to know what no “ongoing investigation” has unearthed: that Tehran was definitively responsible for the twin aerial strikes on Saudi oil installations.

“There is no other plausible explanation” translates as the occultation of Yemen. Yemen only features as the pounding ground of a vicious Saudi war, de facto supported by Washington and London and conducted with US and UK weapons, which has generated a horrendous humanitarian crisis.

So Iran is the culprit, no evidence provided, end of story, even if the “investigation continues.”

The Gulf Simmer: The New-Old Normal in the Gulf Tepid War

By Nathan W. Toronto

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Now that the worry and saber-rattling after the September 14 attack on targets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia seem to have largely petered out in a flurry of recriminations, posturing, and sanction announcements, it is time to accept reality: the U.S. and its allies in the Gulf should embrace gray zone operations. The likelihood of all-out war was low before the attack, and it is low afterward. Iran has become adept at gray zone operations, needling its Arab Gulf adversaries in annoying and deniable ways, which has turned the conflict across the Gulf into a Tepid War, too warm to be a genuine, deterrence-based standoff but too cold to let things get out of hand. In this reality, which is nothing new, the best option for the U.S. is to signal Iran that this kind of attack is not acceptable by engaging in gray zone operations against Iran, led by Arab Gulf allies.

There are at least three reasons why the attack on the Abqaiq processing facility and the Khurais oil field was never likely to lead to a broader military conflagration. First, there is a glut of oil on the market. Russia is right when it says that lost Saudi production can be made up, and Gulf oil producers have been concerned for some time about the systemic buildup of oil stockpiles. A setback of this magnitude is an opportunity. If the price of oil remains high, albeit not high enough to draw more North American producers into the industry, then the chances of a successful Aramco IPO would be higher, as long as Saudi Arabia can answer questions about defending its oil infrastructure. The price of Brent crude rose over ten percent on news of the attack, but the Arab Gulf states could benefit from this momentary price hike. This may help explain why the response to the attacks has been so muted.

Iran Is Testing the Trump Administration

By Dennis Ross 

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On September 14, drones and cruise missiles struck Saudi Arabia’s most important oil-processing facility, at Abqaiq. The attacks don’t just threaten the global oil supply, of which Abqaiq accounts for roughly five percent. They pose a critical test for the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump.

Iran has chosen to act very brazenly with these strikes. If there is no consequence for that choice, the Islamic Republic will be even more emboldened. Worse, an ineffectual response will send a message internationally that there are no rules, no limits, and anything goes. 

The day of the strikes, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo lost no time in attributing them to the Iranians. The Saudi Ministry of Defense has displayed remnants of the drones and cruise missiles used—all Iranian made—and the ministry’s spokesman, Colonel Turki al-Malki, said the attack was “unquestionably sponsored by Iran.”

The best of journeys: Justin Marozzi’s monumental trek through the history of the Muslim world

Jason Burke

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This impressively clever, careful, and often beautiful book is the best sort of journey. It takes us through 15 cities that represent Islamic civilisation, but also through 15 centuries of Islamic history. Our voyage takes us through the core of the Middle East, but also to Fez in what is now Morocco and to Samarkand, in what is now Uzbekistan.

We are introduced to very attractive characters such as Akbar, the tolerant and cultured warrior-poet who was Mughal emperor in the 16th century, and Harun al-Rashid, who turned Baghdad into a cultural and commercial centre so rich and powerful that its fame resonates more than a millennium later. We also meet less savoury types, who torture, burn and kill in innumerable inventive ways, and less powerful ones, such as writers, architects, traders and pilgrims. Our guide is never predictable, continually fascinating, and his elegant writing makes for a very comfortable ride.

Justin Marozzi is a traveller, journalist, Arabist and scholar whose reading is deep and his touch, though not always light, is always clear. A preceding work, an excellent historical biography of Baghdad, has clearly laid the ground for this more ambitious project.

NATO’s Not Ready For Saudi-Style Drone Attacks; ‘It’s A Serious Problem’

By PAUL MCLEARY

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THAAD missile defense launcher.

WASHINGTON: A senior Pentagon official said today that NATO isn’t prepared to fend off attacks by swarms of small drones and short-range missiles, like those that struck Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities.

“We’re seeing asymmetric investments in things like swarming UAS technology, like unmanned aerial systems that really fly more like the cruise missiles,” John Rood, under secretary of defense for policy said. “It’s a serious problem.” Rood didn’t specifically mention the Saudi attacks, but the parallels are clear. He pointed to the type of assaults Russia launched in Ukraine, and Iran in Saudi Arabia earlier this month.

Speaking at a Center for European Policy Analysis event in Washington, Rood said the threats from such weapons and tactics have developed faster than NATO’s ability to rework missile defense and radar systems to detect smaller, faster-moving objects. 

NATO’s Not Ready For Saudi-Style Drone Attacks; ‘It’s A Serious Problem’

By PAUL MCLEARY

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THAAD missile defense launcher.

WASHINGTON: A senior Pentagon official said today that NATO isn’t prepared to fend off attacks by swarms of small drones and short-range missiles, like those that struck Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities.

“We’re seeing asymmetric investments in things like swarming UAS technology, like unmanned aerial systems that really fly more like the cruise missiles,” John Rood, under secretary of defense for policy said. “It’s a serious problem.” Rood didn’t specifically mention the Saudi attacks, but the parallels are clear. He pointed to the type of assaults Russia launched in Ukraine, and Iran in Saudi Arabia earlier this month.

Speaking at a Center for European Policy Analysis event in Washington, Rood said the threats from such weapons and tactics have developed faster than NATO’s ability to rework missile defense and radar systems to detect smaller, faster-moving objects. 

Egypt’s Sisi Is a Strong, Confident—and Vulnerable—Autocrat

Frida Ghitis 

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Egyptians witnessed something rare last Friday night: protests against President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Amid heightened repression, Egyptians have mostly stayed home ever since Sisi took power in a 2013 coup, two and a half years after mass protests had led to the ouster of longtime President Hosni Mubarak. Sisi quickly and ruthlessly crushed any opposition, starting with the Muslim Brotherhood. He jailed Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, and other Islamist leaders, along with any perceived critics of his regime. It’s no wonder most Egyptians have opted to keep their heads down.

Friday’s protests, which unfolded in Cairo and other cities, were small but significant. Just as telling was the government’s reaction. Taken together, and in the context of some of Sisi’s foreign policy decisions, they add up to a picture of an authoritarian leader who is strong and confident, but not without vulnerabilities.

Donald Trump’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran has backfired

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Pulling out of the nuclear deal has emboldened Tehran and exposed Saudi Arabia DAVID GARDNER Add to myFT Donald Trump with Mohammed bin Salman. The Abqaiq oil attacks put another dent in the credibility of the Saudi crown prince © Kevin Lamarque/Reuters Share on Twitter (opens new window) Share on Facebook (opens new window) Share on LinkedIn (opens new window) Save David Gardner YESTERDAYPrint this page8 Saudi Arabia’s parading of its purported military might this week to mark its independence day had an air of histrionic muscularity that, if anything, spotlighted the kingdom’s vulnerability after the spectacular September 14 missile and drone attack on the state oil company, Saudi Aramco. 

The US blames the attack, almost certainly correctly, on Iran. It targeted the Abqaiq crude processing plant and a nearby oilfield and took out about half of Saudi oil production, equivalent to 5 per cent of world output. It was a devastating assault on the kingdom’s crown jewels, also one of the world’s most neuralgic oil hubs. Its audacity has left the Middle East holding its breath. Yet it looks as though, for all his bluster and bombast, US president Donald Trump may not respond militarily. It was Saudi Arabia, not the US, which was attacked. The shale oil revolution has radically reduced US dependence on oil from the Middle East. The US president seems averse to risking a conflagration going into his re-election year. And, not least, Mr Trump’s primary interest in Saudi Arabia would appear to be that it is the biggest importer of weapons in the world — and the bulk of them are American-made. 

How Americans Were Driven to Extremes

By Thomas Carothers and Andrew O'Donohue 

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Every day brings more evidence of the United States’ profound political polarization. Partisan intransigence, vitriol, and divisiveness now contaminate most government institutions. What is more, these sentiments have steadily infiltrated every nook and cranny of American life. The 2020 presidential campaign will only further intensify the country’s partisan tribalism. And despite the lofty praise that news media and civil society heap on politicians who work across party lines, the divisive trend continues with no end in sight.

The more than 35 books published on this subject in the past decade have shed much light on partisan dynamics. Yet almost without exception, they examine U.S. polarization as an isolated phenomenon, separate from the experiences of other countries. In our research and advocacy work, we have taken a different tack.

Britain and the United States

By George Friedman

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The United States and Britain have agreed to sign a trade agreement by next July, The Sun newspaper reported on Monday. The accuracy of the story is not yet clear, but for Britain, leaving the European Union and building a closer trade relationship with the United States, and therefore with North America, follows geopolitical logic.

Britain’s historical stance toward Europe was to try to maintain a balance of power on the Continent so that no force there would be able to threaten British sovereignty. One force driving British imperialism was the need to develop markets and sources outside Europe so as not to become excessively dependent on Europe. The Royal Navy was designed both to protect Britain from continental powers and, in time of war, to blockade hostile European powers without being excessively drawn into combat on the Continent. The British hesitated for a long time before agreeing to join the European Community and the powers on the Continent (particularly the French) hesitated for a long time before admitting them. The British were instrumental in creating the “Outer Seven” bloc of nations on the Continent’s periphery as an alternative to what would eventually become the European Union.

TO WIN GREAT POWER WAR, TREAT INFORMATION AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE

By LCDR Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN
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A strategic resource is one for which states compete. Land is the classic example of a strategic resource, but virtually any resource can be strategic if it is essential to a nation’s interests and if gaining and maintaining access to it requires states to formulate and pursue competitive policies. In the twentieth century, petroleum often was held up as the preeminent example of a strategic resource. It was viewed as such a resource because it could be leveraged—assuring access for friendly states and denying it to adversaries. This leverage required a whole-of-nation approach which included private industry, diplomatic policy, and military planning. For example, in 1980, the United States declared that it would use military force, if necessary, to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf region—a policy known as the Carter Doctrine—to assure Western access to oil resources while denying it to the Soviets.1

Since the end of the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued rapid military expansion coupled with cyber-enabled and information-related geo-economic strategies to capture and control key industries, networks, and infrastructure in order to replace the liberal international order with a Beijing-led order, supplanting the U.S. as the dominant superpower. The American response, while welcome, remains constrained to issues related to either trade balances or intelligence-collection risks. A holistic approach is required.

After Trump, How Will the Next U.S. President Reintroduce America to the World?

Howard W. French 

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This time every year, just as surely as summer yields to fall, the United Nations becomes the hosting ground of an annual ritual as fixed as the turning of the foliage or the migration of birds: the General Assembly. It traditionally serves as an opportunity for small nations to speak to the world about their progress or plead for help with problems—think the Pacific islands that are sinking under rising seas—and for countries in conflict to spin their cases, as one can expect this week from Iran and other actors in the inflamed Middle East.

Sometimes, the United Nations can be the stage for a reset, as when a new government takes over after a period of great corruption or national disgrace and seeks to make amends for the sins of its predecessor. Few venues, after all, lend themselves better to pious vows about commitment to democracy or the rule of law or respect for universal values. ...

TO WIN GREAT POWER WAR, TREAT INFORMATION AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE

By LCDR Robert “Jake” Bebber, USN
Source Link

A strategic resource is one for which states compete. Land is the classic example of a strategic resource, but virtually any resource can be strategic if it is essential to a nation’s interests and if gaining and maintaining access to it requires states to formulate and pursue competitive policies. In the twentieth century, petroleum often was held up as the preeminent example of a strategic resource. It was viewed as such a resource because it could be leveraged—assuring access for friendly states and denying it to adversaries. This leverage required a whole-of-nation approach which included private industry, diplomatic policy, and military planning. For example, in 1980, the United States declared that it would use military force, if necessary, to protect its interests in the Persian Gulf region—a policy known as the Carter Doctrine—to assure Western access to oil resources while denying it to the Soviets.1

Since the end of the Cold War, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has pursued rapid military expansion coupled with cyber-enabled and information-related geo-economic strategies to capture and control key industries, networks, and infrastructure in order to replace the liberal international order with a Beijing-led order, supplanting the U.S. as the dominant superpower. The American response, while welcome, remains constrained to issues related to either trade balances or intelligence-collection risks. A holistic approach is required.

Is there a plan to protect the electric grid from cyberattacks?

By: Andrew Eversden 

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Key government organizations charged with protecting the electric grid from cyberattacks do not have sufficient plans in place to handle the expanding threat landscape, according to a Sept. 25 Government Accountability Office report.

The GAO found that the Department of Energy did not have what equated to a national strategy for the protection of the electric grid. According to the GAO, the Energy Department had scattered plans and assessments, but the documents “do not fully address all of the key characteristics needed for a national strategy.”

The watchdog found that a risk assessment done by the Energy Department had significant shortfalls. In one anecdote, the department modeled a risk assessment on one portion of the grid based on how that sector operated in 1980. In 1980, that sector’s power capacity was one-quarter of what it is now.

Cyber War as an Intelligence Contest

By Joshua Rovner 
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Bottom line: Despite what its name suggests, “cyber warfare” is more like an intelligence contest than an act of war. As military leaders develop an approach to this emerging tactic, they should keep this distinction in mind.

There is a distinct difference between military contests and intelligence contests.

The former “is a test of physical power” and involves everything from weapons development and testing to military exercises. The goal of these contests is either deterrence or prevention. Meanwhile, cyber contests are efforts to collect and operationalize strategic information, either to undermine or sabotage an enemy. Cyber contests may play an important role in a larger military contest, but ultimately are not “directly related to military posturing or war.”

The current state of cyber warfare is a direct result of the post-Cold War security environment.

Pentagon’s Non-Lethal Weapons Office Pushing Gray-Zone Warfare Tools

By: Megan Eckstein
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An Active Denial System from the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate is staged before conducting a counter personnel demo during Weapons and Tactics Instructor course (WTI) 2-17 at Site 50, Wellton, Ariz. on April 4, 2017. US Marine Corps Photo

MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO, Va. – The Pentagon’s Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate is hoping to reframe the talk about non-lethal weapons amid a push by the Defense Department to boost lethality for high-end warfare.

The office’s director, Marine Corps Col. Wendell Leimbach, instead wants to talk about capability gaps in an era of gray zone warfare with Russia and China and where “intermediate force capabilities” – an umbrella term that also includes non-lethal weapons – would give American forces a better chance to compete.

‘But who’s in charge’ is the question for feds in cybersecurity

By: Andrew Eversden 
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In an event that brought two Cabinet secretaries and around 50 top federal and state officials together for three days of discussion on cybersecurity and critical infrastructure, one question remained: Who has the lead on information security issues in the United States?

It was an issue pondered aloud by Sen. Ron Johnson, R-Wisc., the chairman of the Senate’s Homeland Security committee. Johnson said Sept. 19 he had recently sat through a classified 5G briefing with cabinet officials and had a similar inquiry then.

“The No. 1 question I [had] is ‘who’s in charge? Who is actually doing the problem definition when it comes to our challenge with 5G?,’” Johnson said at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s second annual national cybersecurity summit at National Harbor. “And nobody would really answer the question.”

The 5G marketplace may require a government intervention

By: Andrew Eversden   

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The security concerns posed by the introduction of 5G technology extends beyond the borders of the United States and will require a serious discussion about the government’s role in that market moving forward, top officials said Sept. 19.

The potential threats are great enough, according to Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., that they’ve created a bipartisan awareness on Capitol Hill and an understanding that traditional market forces may not solve the issue. Instead, the new technology could require government intervention.

“You would be amazed at the number of my colleagues from both parties who understand this threat and realize that our traditional laissez-faire approach may not work here,” Warner said. “We may need to find ways to develop a better product, support one or more of the entities out there, urge them to collaborate together.”

Idealists Study World War II; Realists Study World War I

by Sam Canter
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Scenario one: a dominant superpower, serving as the unquestioned head of an international alliance, and possessing unmatched military and economic strength. This superpower appears exceptionally led at the military, political, and bureaucratic levels, and possesses the time and space to conceptualize a focused strategy against a specific threat.

Scenario two: several powerful nations operating in a multipolar world, pursuing divergent interests, with none possessing an absolute advantage over the others. Exceptional political and military leadership is lacking, and the rapid pace of change means these nations are carried forward by events over which they exercise little control. Few are certain what a future threat or strategy may resemble.

Our first scenario describes the world of 1945; the triumphant United States at the head of a new international order and poised to combat a clear challenger. Our second describes the world of 1918: victorious powers fighting over diverging interests, squandering their opportunities of peace, but convinced in their conceit that the world could be ordered in their image.

On War and National Interests

By Anthony Cowden

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Meanwhile, somewhere in a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) classroom…

Instructor: OK, so far we have covered national interests and DIME[1], the four major components of national power - now I’d like to look at some case studies: some times that the United States has used the "M" component of national power, seeing as we are at a military war college. So, any ideas?

Student A: WWII?

Instructor: Ah, the last "good" war! OK, any others?

Student B: Vietnam?

Student C: Desert Storm?

Instructor: Good, good - and that one has the advantage of having both a deterrence phase - Desert Shield - and a kinetic phase, Desert Storm - good!

Student Z: Sir?

Instructor: “Tony”

Student Z: Sir?

Five Reasons The Air Force's Digital Century Series Is Doomed To Failure

Loren Thompson

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The Air Force has embarked on a revolutionary approach to aircraft, satellite and software development that it hopes will greatly compress the time required to bring major advances into the active force. Dubbed the “Digital Century Series” after a burst of early Cold War innovation, the new approach could reduce the time required to develop new combat aircraft to five years, with additional years of time saved in developing military spacecraft and major software advances.

At least, that’s what the service’s charismatic chief weapons buyer, Dr. Will Roper, proposed at the Air Force Association’s annual air, space and cyber exposition last week. In an eloquent call for faster progress in fielding weapons, Roper talked about high-leverage development tools such as agile software generation, open architectures and digital engineering with the confidence that you would expect from an intellectual who earned his doctorate in mathematics at Oxford.

Roper said that the Air Force needs to think of itself more like a technology company, investing in game-changing innovations that disrupt the military marketplace and disorient potential adversaries. Rather than taking decades to field new planes or spacecraft by tapping a handful of big system integrators, Roper wants to award more contracts to a wider range of innovators, relying on competitive prototyping to turn out combat systems on timelines not seen since the early 1950s.

India’s Narendra Modi Isn’t a Game-Changer

BY MANJARI CHATTERJEE MILLER
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On Sunday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi spoke in Houston before a crowd of around 50,000 cheering attendees. If that weren’t enough of a triumph for a foreign leader visiting the United States, U.S. President Donald Trump joined him on stage in Texas.

The fact that the event was titled “Howdy, Modi,” with the spotlight pinned firmly on the prime minister rather than the country he represents—or even on Trump, who loves nothing more than an adoring crowd—is telling. It encapsulates the meteoric rise of a leader who until just five years ago had been banned under the U.S. Congress’ International Religious Freedom Act from setting foot in the United States. His strongman, globe-trotting, leader-hugging image, and his appeals to religious nationalism and populism, all stand in contrast to his rather less colorful political opponent, Rahul Gandhi of the Indian National Congress party.

It is commonplace to argue that the rise of Modi and his party, the right-wing, Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), marks the grim demise of India’s own grand old party, the Congress party; the Nehru-Gandhi family that has led it; and its vision of India as a secular and nonaligned world power. But that isn’t quite right. Even under the BJP, many aspects of Indian foreign policy today still lean on old, institutionalized ideas of India’s role in the world. Beyond that, it is incorrect to think of previous Congress governments as monolithic in their viewpoints and strategies. In turn, it is a mistake to see a dichotomy between the foreign policy vision of India under Congress and India under the BJP today. In many ways, there is much continuity.

US Exit from Afghanistan: The Pakistan Factor

By Mercy A. Kuo

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Trans-Pacific View author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into the U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with M. Nazif Shahrani – Afghan American Professor of Anthropology, Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies, at Indiana University and Advisory Board Member of the National Center for Dialogue & Progress (NCDP), Kabul, Afghanistan – is the 204th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain the implications of President Trump’s July meeting with Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan. 

President Trump made shocking remarks at the press conference with Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan (July 22, 2019). He said: “I think Pakistan’s going to help us out to extricate ourselves. We’re like policemen, we’re not fighting a war. [If] We wanted to fight a war in Afghanistan and win it, I could win that war in a week. I just don’t want to kill 10 million people … if I wanted to win that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth.” 

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Volatile Border – Analysis

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*

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An Army Major and a sepoy were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the Mohmand District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in Pakistan, on September 20, 2019. Major Adeel Shahid and Sepoy Faraz Hussain “fell victim to an IED planted by terrorists from across the border”, the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) tweeted. The squad was supervising fencing work in an area “which carried [a] critical infiltration route”, the ISPR added.

On September 14, 2019, three soldiers were killed and one sustained injures when militants opened fire from across the Pak-Afghan border on Pakistan Army troops who were busy in border fencing in the Dir District of KP.

On September 13, 2019, one soldier was killed when terrorists opened fired on a routine patrolling party of Security Forces near the Abba Khel area of Spinwam tehsil (revenue unit) in the North Waziristan District of KP. In the exchange of fire, two militants were also killed.

Pakistan-Afghanistan: Volatile Border – Analysis

By Tushar Ranjan Mohanty*
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An Army Major and a sepoy were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) explosion along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in the Mohmand District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) in Pakistan, on September 20, 2019. Major Adeel Shahid and Sepoy Faraz Hussain “fell victim to an IED planted by terrorists from across the border”, the Director General of the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) tweeted. The squad was supervising fencing work in an area “which carried [a] critical infiltration route”, the ISPR added.

On September 14, 2019, three soldiers were killed and one sustained injures when militants opened fire from across the Pak-Afghan border on Pakistan Army troops who were busy in border fencing in the Dir District of KP.

On September 13, 2019, one soldier was killed when terrorists opened fired on a routine patrolling party of Security Forces near the Abba Khel area of Spinwam tehsil (revenue unit) in the North Waziristan District of KP. In the exchange of fire, two militants were also killed.

Beyond the Brink: Escalation and Conflict in U.S.-China Economic Relations

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As the United States and China mark their 40th anniversary of formal diplomatic relations in 2019, the world’s most important bilateral relationship is increasingly defined by mistrust, competition, and uncertainty. After four decades of deepening economic integration, the talk in Washington today is about the extent to which the two economies will “decouple” over the years ahead. We drew on several different academic disciplines to help us model how an economic conflict between the United States and China could escalate and eventually de-escalate. Despite the challenges inherent in modelling economic conflict, our model was validated to a surprising extent by both our simulations and real-world developments. The project produced several findings that were both unexpected and relevant to policy, including that economic conflict is likely to be an enduring feature of the U.S.-China relationship for many years to come. Until perceptions of relative costs in the two countries shift, Washington and Beijing seem set on a path of continued escalation, no substantial trade deal, and at least partial decoupling of their economies. Reflecting on these findings, the report also provides recommendations for U.S. policymakers seeking to engage in successful economic bargaining with China.

How China Challenges the EU in the Western Balkans

By Austin Doehler

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In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced what we now know as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a $900 billion global project that would seek to connect international trade routes in a modern day version on the Silk Road. As a result of this project, China has emerged as a relatively new yet significant actor in the Western Balkans. 

The cornerstone of China’s economic expansion into southeastern Europe has been its purchase of the Greek port of Piraeus, which China has transformed into the second largest port on the Mediterranean. This makes the Western Balkans a key strategic region for investment from China’s perspective, as China has a vested interest in seeing infrastructure in the Western Balkans improve so it can transport goods shipped in from Piraeus through the Western Balkans and into the EU’s common market of over half a billion consumers. Additionally, an assumed interest of China’s is that its investments in the Western Balkans are also a way for it to gain economic footholds in countries that are supposed to eventually become EU member states, some potentially as early as 2025.

China, Japan and South Korea Cautiously Look to Renew Their Collective Ties

J. Berkshire Miller 
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The foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea met in Beijing last month, where they agreed to seek closer economic ties and push for “free and fair trade” amid a climate of rising protectionism. A leader’s summit in China could follow later this year— an opportunity, perhaps, to resolve some festering troubles in a region mired in mistrust.

This diplomatic progress in collective ties comes at an inauspicious time. Attempts by Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul to work together have been undermined constantly over the past decade due to various rivalries in Northeast Asia. An inaugural trilateral leaders’ summit was held in 2008 in Beijing and was followed by consecutive meetings over the next four years, with the host nation rotating each year. Yet since 2012, the three leaders have only met twice—in 2015 and 2018—and meaningful progress on trade and other areas of cooperation have been scant. ...

China In The Middle East: Reshaping Regional Politics – Analysis

By Ilan Berman*
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China has well and truly arrived in the Middle East. After years of relative passivity, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is now making a concerted effort to expand its strategic presence and economic clout in the region.

For Middle East nations, Beijing’s newfound drive for regional prominence is one of the most consequential—albeit least reported—trends of recent years. It holds the power to reshape regional markets as local governments increasingly reorient their economies to take advantage of Chinese outreach and largesse. But the proliferation of Chinese political and economic influence also increasingly threatens to upend longstanding regional security arrangements and fragment solidarity in the Islamic world. The spread of China’s model of technologically-empowered censorship, meanwhile, carries with it the potential to reinforce some of the worst political impulses of the region’s autocrats.

Expanding Outreach

The real threat from China isn't "spy trains"

by Bruce Schneier

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Part of the reasoning behind this legislation is economic, and stems from worries about Chinese industries undercutting the competition and dominating key global industries. But another part involves fears about national security. News articles talk about "spy trains," and the possibility that the train cars might surreptitiously monitor their passengers' faces, movements, conversations or phone calls.

This is a complicated topic. There is definitely a national security risk in buying computer infrastructure from a country you don't trust. That's why there is so much worry about Chinese-made equipment for the new 5G wireless networks.

Untold stories of American spies

Get unprecedented access to the world of espionage with CNN Original Series "Declassified," airing Sundays at 9 p.m. ET/PT starting September 29.

It's also why the United States has blocked the cybersecurity company Kaspersky from selling its Russian-made antivirus products to US government agencies. Meanwhile, the chairman of China's technology giant Huawei has pointed to NSA spying disclosed by Edward Snowden as a reason to mistrust US technology companies.

Myanmar: Renewed Fighting By Northern Alliance, Is China Part Of Problem? – Analysis

By Dr. S. Chandrasekharan
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Despite declaration of “unilateral” cease fire by both sides, there has been intensive fighting between the three groups of the Northern Alliance- the TNLA, MNDAA and the AA- the Arakan Army with the Myanmar Army- Tatmadaw.

The offensive by the three groups on August 15th disrupting communication and trade on the Chinese border near Musse for many days is said to have surprised the Army and the Myanmar Government. It is doubtful whether the Chinese could also have been surprised.

The pre-planned simultaneous attack at many places in the northern Shan State and even in places close to Mandalay region could not have been done without proper planning and preparations for many days. The movement of insurgents spreading out over a wide area and transport of military supplies over many days could not have happened without knowledge if not acquiescence from the Chinese authorities in Yunnan.

Despite three rounds of meetings on China’s intervention, the most recent one being on the 18th, no agreement could be reached. All that was agreed was that they would meet again for further discussions!

Trump’s Iran-Saudi Arabia Dilemma

By Philip H. Gordon

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The president is in the difficult position of either backing down in the face of Iranian threats and suspected attacks or escalating the conflict in ways he clearly wants to avoid.

U.S. officials say they are building a coalition to counter Iranian aggression in the Gulf following last week’s attack on Saudi oil facilities. Does this mean talk of war is de-escalating?

It seems clear that President Trump is keen to avoid the slippery slope toward conflict that might result from a robust military response against Iran, the presumed author of the attacks. The administration knows that failing to respond to such a brazen attack would only embolden Tehran, but Trump also knows that attacking Iran militarily could lead to a wider conflict, a global energy crisis, rising U.S. gas prices, an election-year recession, and anger among his political base—which was counting on him to avoid more wars in the Middle East. That explains why Trump, despite all his tough talk, seems to be hedging, by expressing lack of certainty over who is responsible for the attacks, stressing U.S. energy “independence,” suggesting that it’s up to Saudi Arabia to decide how to respond, and announcing “new sanctions” on Iran even though he had been claiming the United States had already reached “maximum pressure.” He seems determined to avoid a military conflict, if he can.

The Drone Strikes on the Saudi Oil Facilities Have Changed Global Warfare

by PATRICK COCKBURN
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The devastating attack on Saudi oil facilities by drones and missiles not only transforms the balance of military power in the Middle East, but marks a change in the nature of warfare globally.

On the morning of 14 September, 18 drones and seven cruise missiles – all cheap and unsophisticated compared to modern military aircraft – disabled half of Saudi Arabia’s crude oil production and raised the world price of oil by 20 per cent.

This happened despite the Saudis spending $67.6bn (£54bn) on their defence budget last year, much of it on vastly expensive aircraft and air defence systems, which notably failed to stop the attack. The US defence budget stands at $750bn (£600.2bn), and its intelligence budget at $85bn (£68bn), but the US forces in the Gulf did not know what was happening until it was all over.