28 April 2022

Army progresses on electronic warfare revamp

ANDREW EVERSDEN

WASHINGTON: The US Army’s electronic warfare portfolio is maturing with critical electronic warfare capabilities scheduled for fielding or prototyping in the next year.

The service is in the midst of a multi-year effort to rebuild its EW capabilities, after largely not investing in those platforms since the end of the Cold War. Through several new platforms, soldiers at the brigade level and higher will receive systems that will enable them to do electronic sensing and attack, as well as give commanders a better understanding of the electronic environment on the battlefield

Seven reasons Putin hasn’t launched a cyberwar in Ukraine - yet

Chris Zappone

Something of a mystery has emerged since the Russian invasion began: the lack of a cyberwar.

Russia and Ukraine hackers have honed their skills over many years targeting each other. Ukraine’s numerous allies make a rich set of targets. Western governments had been warning of action to come.

So, when Russian tanks began rolling over Ukraine’s border on February 24, many expected an online throw-down of epic proportions.

Post-war Russia and the Return of Karafuto

Daniel McKay

By now, no one can believe that economic sanctions will force Putin’s Russia to rethink its invasion of Ukraine. The rouble has stabilized, methods of bypassing sanctions are well known, and China will keep economic lifelines open. It may sound trite, but Russia isn’t going to back off just because McDonald’s has shut down its Moscow branches.

As the fighting grinds on, however, another reality becomes clear: Russia’s war chest will suffice for carrying out its ‘special military operation,’ but those resources are unlikely to see it through the peace that follows. At that point, foreign capital will be necessary in order to offset its decoupling from the Western World.

RUSSIA IS LOSING A WAR AGAINST HACKERS STEALING HUGE AMOUNTS OF DATA

Micah Lee

RUSSIA IS KNOWN for its army of hackers, but since the start of its invasion of Ukraine, dozens of Russian organizations — including government agencies, oil and gas companies, and financial institutions — have been hacked, with terabytes of stolen data leaked onto the internet.

Distributed Denial of Secrets, the transparency collective that’s best known for its 2020 release of 270 gigabytes of U.S. law enforcement data (in the midst of racial justice protests following the murder of George Floyd), has become the de facto home of the hacked datasets from Russia. The datasets are submitted to DDoSecrets mostly by anonymous hackers, and those datasets are then made available to the public on the collective’s website and distributed using BitTorrent. (I am an adviser to DDoSecrets).

A New Iron Curtain Splits Russia From the West

Carla Norrlöf

Today’s standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine can be traced back to 2004, a little more than a decade after the end of the Cold War. At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin was just embarking on his second term, and he began nurturing a cult of personality, voicing grievances about perceived threats on Russia’s security perimeter, and positioning himself as the defender of Russia’s great power status.

Macron Now Has to Put France Back Together Again

Judah Grunstein

Unlike European Union directives, which must be published in the languages of all the bloc’s member states, the sighs of relief heard across much of Europe at the outcome of yesterday’s French presidential election needed no translation. The suspense had already receded in the two weeks since the first-round ballot, as polls showed French President Emmanuel Macron widening his lead over far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. But with Macron’s reelection now sealed, the sense of having dodged a bullet in Brussels, the capitals of Europe, Washington and of course Paris is no less palpable.

A negotiated peace is the only way to end Russia's war on Ukraine

Jeffrey Sachs

(CNN)There is only one answer to the war in Ukraine: a peace deal.

The two-pronged US strategy, to help Ukraine overcome the Russian invasion by imposing tough sanctions and by supplying Ukraine's military with sophisticated armaments, is likely to fall short. What is needed is a peace deal, which may be within reach. Yet to reach a deal, the United States will have to compromise on NATO, something Washington has so far rejected.

Sanctioning Russia Won’t Stop Putin. Just Look at Iran.

Kourosh Ziabari

The atrocities in Bucha, Mariupol, and other Ukrainian cities have taken the severity of Russia’s war in Ukraine to a whole new level. Graphic footage emerging of bullet-riddled bodies with tied hands, charred corpses piled together dumped in the streets, and buildings and cars blown to pieces have exposed how an apparently unquenchable thirst for power and domination can be boundless. In response, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Sweden, Spain, the United States and a handful of other countries expelled more than 325 Russian diplomats from Moscow’s missions.

Russians at War Putin’s Aggression Has Turned a Nation Against Itself

Andrei Kolesnikov

In early April, the coffin containing the body of 75-year-old Vladimir Zhirinovsky—the ultranationalist and populist who was a crucial pillar of the Russian state for two decades—was taken to the Hall of Columns in central Moscow for people to pay their respects. Sixty-nine years ago, it was there that Stalin had lain in state, in the process killing one last wave of Russians, who were crushed to death in the huge crowds that had gathered to bid farewell to the Soviet dictator.

World military expenditure passes $2 trillion for first time


Military expenditure reaches record level in the second year of the pandemic

World military spending continued to grow in 2021, reaching an all-time high of $2.1 trillion. This was the seventh consecutive year that spending increased.

‘Even amid the economic fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic, world military spending hit record levels,’ said Dr Diego Lopes da Silva, Senior Researcher with SIPRI’s Military Expenditure and Arms Production Programme. ‘There was a slowdown in the rate of real-terms growth due to inflation. In nominal terms, however, military spending grew by 6.1 per cent.’

The Geopolitical Implications of the Russo-Ukraine War for Central Asia

Andrew Latham and Audun Sundeen

In the aftermath of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, a storm is brewing in another part of the former Soviet space – Central Asia. This region, rich in resources, is caught in a field of forces defined by Russian, Chinese, Iranian, Turkish, Indian and American (as related to the war in Afghanistan)’s interests. As a strong Russia defending and backing the five republics that comprise the region becomes weaker and the states are forced to look elsewhere for patronage and support, the resulting geopolitical void will create the conditions-of-possibility for extreme shifts in power that will have significant knock-on effects for the global balance of power. As a result, we may see a world where China and Iran border each other, allied against the Russians and Turks. We may see Indian-backed Central Asian republics. Depending on who does what, these changes may precipitate NATO involvement. Altogether, Russia and Ukraine’s war is likely to have significant – maybe even ominous – geopolitical consequences outside of Europe that will reshape world politics, political alignments, and the security environment far beyond the region.

Russia’s War Goals in Ukraine

David R. Marples

The war in Ukraine began after the Maidan uprising that occupied central Kyiv for the period from late November to 21 February 2014. The protests resulted in the departure of President Viktor Yanukovych, new presidential and parliamentary elections, the annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the fomenting by the latter country of a war in the eastern part of Ukraine. By the late spring, two breakaway republics had been formed in the eastern part of Donetsk and Luhansk regions but the majority of east Ukrainian cities had rebuffed the attempted takeovers. The conflict was brutal, and came to a halt thanks to the Minsk Protocol, hosted by Belarusian president Aliaksandr Lukashenka, initially in September 2014. The Protocol mediated by the French and German presidents in what was termed the Normandy format, was signed by Russia, Ukraine, and the OSCE (the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine). More fighting soon broke out, however, and a new agreement was signed in Minsk on February 12, 2015, which stipulated the removal of heavy weaponry from the battlefield, release of prisoners on both sides, and constitutional reforms in Ukraine including the provision of autonomy for the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Ukraine was to regain control of its borders and early elections were to be held in the two regions.

China’s ‘World-Class’ Military Modernisation

Ian Seow Cheng Wei

The PLA was formed in 1927 after the Nanchang uprising, and it has played an important role in China’s domestic and foreign affairs. From 1952 to 2016, the PLA has undergone 11 major military modernisation and restructuring programmes and has grown significantly in military strength and capabilities. (Allen et al., 2016). Military modernisation is defined as upgrading and adopting new technologies or platforms to counter emerging challenges. Military restructuring refers to policies to improve the efficiency of the military and realigning its objectives to address current threats.

Who has the advantage in the war for eastern Ukraine?

Joshua Keating

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill once famously cautioned following a decisive battlefield victory in 1942, when the tide of World War II seemed to be turning in the allies’ favor, that it was “not the end, not even the beginning of the end but, possibly, the end of the beginning.”

It’s a phrase that may apply to the recent withdrawal of Russian forces from the areas around Kyiv: an “end of the beginning moment” for the war in Ukraine.

27 April 2022

Afghan IS Group Claims Series of Bombings Targeting Shiites

Kathy Gannon

An Islamic State affiliate on Friday claimed a series of bombings a day earlier that targeted Afghanistan’s minority Shiite Muslims, while Pakistan issued a warning of IS threats in its eastern Punjab province.

The deadliest of three bombings on Thursday in Afghanistan exploded inside a Shiite mosque in northern Mazar-e-Sharif. Hospital officials say at least 12 people were killed and as many as 40 were hurt.

Is Japan Willing to Pay the Price of Sanctioning Russia?

Christopher Edward Carroll

Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio has moved forward with key measures in response to Russian aggression in Europe. Following discussions with world leaders, Kishida announced that Japan would triple its loans to Ukraine, bringing the total to $300 million. Speaking from Europe in March, Kishida pointed out that now remains an important time for cohesion among the international community to support Ukraine.

Kishida’s government is intent on sanctioning Russia and supporting Ukraine. But can Japan’s prime minister remain focused on foreign policy challenges while keeping voters at home onside, particularly with the potential for these measures to contribute to inflation and impact Japan’s economic recovery?

India’s Subtle Shifts Toward the West and Away From Russia

Niranjan Marjani

Since the start of the Russia-Ukraine war India has abstained from voting 11 times whenever this issue has come up – be it the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

However, India has unequivocally condemned the violence and called for the resolution of the conflict through dialogue and diplomacy. Further India has called for respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries. India also sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine and expressed its outrage at the civilian killings in Ukraine’s Bucha, calling for an independent probe into this incident.

There’s a Crisis Unfolding in Southeastern Myanmar

Nai Aue Mon and Maggi Quadrini

On April 4, residents in Kawkareik township, Karen State (also known as Kayin State) awoke to heavy artillery fire by the junta’s 97th Infantry Battalion. A 17-year-old girl was struck by the shells and was killed on the way to the hospital. Four others were seriously injured.

The strikes were only the latest in a series of ongoing, relentless attacks against civilians in southeastern Myanmar. The Karen National Liberation Army, an armed wing of the Karen National Union (KNU), confirmed that the junta’s fighter jets had attacked Kyeik and Paikaldon village tracts, an area held by the KNLA’s 6th Brigade. The fighting continued through the first week of the month, forcing roughly 600 villagers to flee in at least four airstrikes over the last month.

How to develop the cyber warfare leaders the military needs

Tom Temin

The armed services need to expend their numbers of high-ranking cybersecurity and cyber warfare officers. The next guest on the Federal Drive with Tom Temin says the place to do that is at the war colleges, because right now there’s not enough educational capacity in the military. Alfredo Rodriguez is senior analyst to the Marine Corps deputy commandant for information, and a retired Army signal lieutenant colonel.

3 ways Russia has shown military ‘incompetence’ during its invasion of Ukraine

James Dwyer

Two weeks into Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it has become apparent Russia’s military is experiencing failures – both technical and strategic – that are perhaps unexpected from one of the world’s largest military forces.

There are multiple issues one could look at in relation to Russia’s poor military performance in Ukraine to date, such as being unable to effectively counter Ukrainian drones, or failing to deliver on the kind of cyber warfare expected.

The Unreformed Russian Military

Jeff Hawn

In late March, Russia’s military said it was withdrawing from northern Ukraine after a month of failing to capture the Ukrainian capital. Its withdrawal revealed grim evidence of war crimes. In towns like Bucha, previously a leafy suburban town of Kyiv, excavators found traces of at least 300 civilians murdered, mostly men of military age — some dumped in mass graves, others left in the street. Similar crimes have also been widely reported in Irpin, Borodyanka, and Hostomel. These towns witnessed cases of murder, as well as looting, rape and sexual abuse.

History Shows The Russian Army Can Mount A Comeback In Ukraine

Julian Spencer-Churchill and Attila Arslaner

Prior to the war in Ukraine, intelligence gathering by the Russian GRU failed to appreciate the rise of Ukrainian identity and morale, nor did it anticipate their resistance, facilitating Russia’s exceptionally poor performance in its February invasion of Ukraine. In addition, poor logistics planning, and in particular an absence of training by the armored and air force, has led to egregious equipment and personnel losses. This creates an inability to either achieve air superiority or advance quickly on the ground.

Lessons From the Battle for Kyiv

Alex Vershinin

It has been eight weeks since the Russian government launched a multi-pronged offensive into Ukraine. In the north, the Russian army laid siege to Kyiv for almost a month. The operation rapidly degenerated into an urban battle of attrition favorable to Ukraine, and eventually the Russian government withdrew its troops, conceding defeat in the battle for Kyiv, while preparing a second phase of the war in Donbas. While the fog of war prevents in-depth analysis, two initial lessons stand out from the first phase of the conflict. First, do not rely on the invaded nation’s popular support. The Russian government appeared to build its operation around the assumption that Ukrainian elites and the populace would support the overthrow of their government, or at the very least stand aside. They did not expect heavy resistance from the Ukrainian population. Second, know when to quit. The Russian government accepted a tactical defeat and the political costs associated with it in order to preserve their combat power for a decisive battle under more favorable circumstances. Both lessons seem self-explanatory, but, previously, many governments have hoped an invasion would trigger a regime change and then refused to correct course when popular support failed to materialize.

How Ukraine Won the Battle for Kyiv

Oz Katerji

Before Russia launched a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, intelligence assessments coming out of Washington and London were bleak about Kyiv’s chances of survival. It and the rest of Ukraine were set to be outmanned, outgunned and surrounded by one of the most powerful modern military forces ever assembled, they believed.

As Russian troops were advancing on the city, US officials even offered to evacuate Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelensky from Kyiv, only for him to shoot back: “The fight is here; I need ammunition, not a ride” in what is now one of the most famous political quotes of the 21st century.

Usage of Reservists and Irregulars in Ukraine


I had already written on why Ukraine was so successful in its resistance to Russian invasion. Reasons are many, but here I will be addressing one reason in particular: usage of reservists and irregular units.

Ever since the end of the Cold War, NATO had been turning to a professional army model, under assumption that it is more effective and easier to deploy. But the professional army is essentially an offensive army: good for NATO’s imperial interventions, but not good for national defense or a protracted defensive war. Home Guard / territorial defense can be extremely effective for the purposes of home defense, and war in Ukraine is an excellent example.

Can Sanctions Really Stop Putin?


When Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine in February, trampling on the sovereignty of a neighbor, international sanctions were the best path forward for the United States and its allies to take. The ruthlessness and grave atrocities toward civilians that have ensued since only reinforce that call.

As of this week, those sanctions have made dents in both Russia’s economy and its ability to wage war in Ukraine. As foreign companies have withdrawn operations from Russia, Moscow’s mayor, Sergei Sobyanin, estimated that some 200,000 people there are at risk of losing their jobs, and there’s some evidence that the decision by Europe and the United States to restrict the export of microchips has already affected Russia’s ability to produce and repair tanks. The sanctions have also sent a vital message of support to the Ukrainian people.

The New Nuclear Reality

Nicholas Konrad

In his Nobel Peace Prize speech, in 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last leader of the Soviet Union, pronounced that “the risk of a global nuclear war has practically disappeared.” Moscow and Washington had veered “from confrontation to interaction and, in some important cases, partnership,” he said. The Soviet Union’s collapse—which birthed fifteen new states, including Ukraine—transformed the world. In the new Europe, Gorbachev added, every country believed that it had become “fully sovereign and independent.” Historians imagined that the end of the Cold War would lead to the demise of the nuclear age, amid new diplomacy and arms-control treaties. The ingrained fears—that kilotons of destructive energy and toxic radiation could decimate a city and incinerate tens of thousands of human beings—began to dissipate. Beyond policy wonks, the word “nuclear” largely dropped from the public lexicon.

A New Iron Curtain Splits Russia From the West

Carla Norrlöf

Today’s standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine can be traced back to 2004, a little more than a decade after the end of the Cold War. At the time, Russian President Vladimir Putin was just embarking on his second term, and he began nurturing a cult of personality, voicing grievances about perceived threats on Russia’s security perimeter, and positioning himself as the defender of Russia’s great power status.

Is China looking for a greater role in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan?

Dr. Anwesha Ghosh

When the Taliban ceased power in Afghanistan on August 15, 2021, most countries closed down their diplomatic mission in Kabul and started evacuating their citizens out of Afghanistan. But there were four notable exceptions- China, Pakistan, Russia and Iran, who decided to continue. China was among the first nations to develop a diplomatic channel with the Taliban regime and declared that it was ready for a “friendly and cooperative”[i] relations with the regime - the groundwork for that prompt decision, however, was laid down much earlier. Over the years, China had maintained direct communication with the Taliban, and both sides have met on several occasions, bilaterally and internationally, underscoring China’s warming ties with the Islamist group.

Has Turkey become an armed drone superpower?

James Jeffrey

Once better known for its distinctive style of making potent coffee and its gelatinous confectionary cubes called Turkish Delight, these days Turkey is making a name for itself through a more deadly means: as a major global player in armed drone development.

I first got an inkling of this after Tigrayan forces in Ethiopia’s dreadfully drawn-out civil conflict mounted an astonishing counterattack southward through enemy territory that left them positioned to take the capital and topple the Ethiopian government. It had seemed it really could be over for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who called on the capital’s civilians to arm and ready themselves for a last-ditch defence. But suddenly the Tigrayan forces withdrew all the way back north, from whence they had attacked so decisively.

Russia’s Nuclear Threats in the War against Ukraine


The Kremlin has given the war in Ukraine an explicit nuclear dimension through various actions and statements. First, Russia conducted a manoeuvre with its nuclear forces in mid-February, shortly before the invasion. While it had been known for a few months that the exercise would take place in early 2022, the choice of timing seemed linked to the Ukraine crisis. After all, this annual exercise of Russia’s nuclear forces normally takes place in the fall, and Russian news coverage deliberately drew attention to the event. On February 24, the day Russia invaded Ukraine, Putin then warned in a speech that there would be unprecedented consequences should third states attempt to “obstruct” Russia. Such wording is traditionally considered to imply a threat to use nuclear weapons. The Rus­sian president went further on February 27, announcing that Russia’s deterrent forces, which include nuclear weapons, would be placed on a “special regime of alert”.

If We Don’t Want Nuclear War, Why Are We Pushing for One?

Ted Galen Carpenter

The principal features of the U.S. and NATO response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are now readily apparent. In addition to the U.S.-led effort to orchestrate a campaign of global economic warfare to isolate and punish Russia, Washington and its allies have adopted a policy of showering Kyiv with sophisticated weapons to boost the effectiveness of the country’s military resistance. Proposals also keep surfacing to provide Ukraine with more capable jet fighters. In addition to the weaponry, the United States and other NATO members are actively sharing military intelligence with Ukraine.

Was NATO Enlargement a Mistake?

Francis Gavin, Joseph S. Nye and Stephen M. Walt

Foreign Affairs recently published a number of pieces on NATO, the decision to proceed with its enlargement, and its impact on European and global security. To complement these articles, Foreign Affairs solicited a broad pool of experts for their take. As with previous surveys, dozens of authorities with specialized expertise relevant to the question at hand, together with leading generalists in the field were approached. Participants were asked to state whether they agreed or disagreed with a proposition and to and to rate their confidence level in their opinion.

Four Unanswered Questions about the Intersection of War and Nuclear Power

Julien de Troullioud de Lanversin

For a night on March 3, Russian military forces seized the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine, damaged its infrastructure, and spread fear of a nuclear catastrophe. Fortunately, the attack did not threaten sensitive areas of the nuclear power plant, and radiation levels around the plant did not raise concern. Still, the crisis underscored the danger posed by a war that crosses paths with a nuclear power plant. Since this may be a case of when, not if, the next wartime attack on a nuclear power plant happens, scholars and policymakers would be wise to revisit concepts for assessing and protocols for responding to nuclear power plant crises in war zones.

Putin’s struggles in Ukraine may embolden Xi on Taiwan

Hal Brands

One of the biggest questions of the Ukraine war concerns tensions half a world away: What lessons will China draw from the Russian invasion?

Western observers hope that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s faltering invasion of Ukraine will convince China to go slow — that it will discourage President Xi Jinping from undertaking an invasion of Taiwan. Yet there’s a real possibility that it could actually induce Beijing to go fast — to use force more harshly and decisively in hopes of avoiding the type of quagmire into which Moscow has stumbled.