Indian Strategic Studies

17 July 2024

Opinion – Modi’s Strategic Moscow Visit

Radhey Wadhwa

“Hearing the word Russia, the first word that comes to the mind of every Indian is India’s companion in happiness and sorrow” is how Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India-Russia relations. Modi’s visit to Russia began with his arrival in Moscow on July 8th, 2024, to attend the 22nd India-Russia annual summit. During the visit, Modi aimed to promote peace and strengthen bilateral relations, culminating in the signing of nine agreements. These agreements spanned various sectors, including defence, energy and trade, emphasising the multifaceted cooperation between the two nations.

Modi’s decision to choose Russia for his inaugural bilateral visit over a neighbouring nation marks a departure from the tradition. This signals a shift in India’s diplomatic approach and reflects a change of style and method on India’s part. Regarding messaging and timing, Modi’s visit to Russia holds substantial significance. Notably, the visit comes amid the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, where India has maintained a neutral stance. India abstained from UN resolutions condemning Russia’s actions but has also called on Russia to end the war. During the meeting with Putin, Modi made it clear that “there is no solution on the battlefield” and called for a diplomatic end to the war.

The timing of the visit follows Modi’s attendance at the G-7 summit in Italy, where he engaged with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy and other leaders. This visit coincides with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Washington, D.C., marking the alliance’s 75th anniversary. Modi’s visit has been criticised, particularly by the Ukrainian President, who called it a “huge disappointment”. Indian PM would be aware that the decision to meet Putin now would not have pleased Western leaders, especially given the ongoing NATO summit. The Kremlin has quickly pointed this out and suggested how “West is jealous”. Jealous or not, one can bet Western nations—especially the United States, will be keeping a close eye on the visit.

India is losing interest in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

Brahma Chellaney

India appears to be having second thoughts about its involvement in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as the group’s anti-Western orientation is increasingly at odds with the subtle pro-Western tilt of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign policy.

New Delhi’s creeping doubts about the SCO were first evident last year when as rotating host of the group’s annual leaders’ summit, Modi chose to convene the meeting online rather than in person. And this month the prime minister skipped the latest summit held in Astana.

India’s growing discomfort stems in part from the fact that rival China is increasingly in the driver’s seat at the SCO. In fact, except for India, the other members of the SCO are all participants in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which New Delhi has opposed since its launch as a neocolonial enterprise. India can also be said to be the only full democracy among the SCO’s nine member states.

India To “Boost” US Navy’s Fighting Capabilities; USN Warships To Be Repaired In India Amid Chinese Threats

Ritu Sharma

So far, only the non-commissioned ships of the US Navy (recognized by the prefix USN) have been repaired at the Indian shipyard. Still, the two partners are also contemplating whether the commissioned warships of the US Navy (USS) can be refurbished at the port.

In a two-day Defense News Conclave organized by the US consulate in Kolkata and Indian think tank CUTS International, US Ambassador to India Eric Garcetti expressed hopes that relations between the two countries would improve to the point where US warships would come to India for repair.

With an eye on China in the Indo-Pacific, the US has been working on making India a major hub for the repair and maintenance of the US Navy warships. So far, the Auxiliary ships have undergone maintenance; in the future, destroyers, amphibious warships, and other big ships will also come to India for refurbishment. Nuclear-powered ships, like aircraft carriers and submarines, are not part of this vision.

US warships are getting fewer steaming hours because of growing maintenance delays and costs. This has been a troubling trend as the US struggles to keep pace with China’s growing fleet and faces other adversaries at sea, including Russia.

Afghanistan Is Still There

S. Frederick Starr

Over the two decades following the attack on the World Trade Center the United States lost nearly 2,500 soldiers and spent more than $2 trillion fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Then the U.S. abruptly withdrew. America may have washed its hands of Afghanistan, but the country did not disappear. It is time for the United States to acknowledge this, and to address fresh challenges that are as yet acknowledged and unmet. Only this will advance America’s longterm interests and prevent their being further eroded in a neglected but important world region.

The problem is not that Washington has done nothing. America’s voice is prominent in the international choir opposing Taliban restrictions on women. Three senior Taliban officials have struggled to articulate an acceptable response, but so far fallen have far short. What the State Department terms “pragmatic engagement” combines non-recognition, sanctions, and over-the-horizon monitoring of terrorist activities on Afghan soil, with the provision through third parties of aid to the fifteen million Afghans who, according to the United Nations’ World Food Program, don’t know where their next meal will come from. Washington also refuses to return the seven billion dollar of frozen Afghan assets in American banks until the main women’s issues are resolved. It meanwhile devotes the interest on these funds to humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan and to defraying the cost of lawsuits against the Taliban government.

Such an approach falls short, not because it does too little but because it does nothing either to deter our enemies or strengthen our friends. Its altruistic goals are laudable but insufficiently strategic. What is needed is a targeted strategy that addresses the dangers posed by the actions of China and Russia and takes cognizance of carefully calculated steps taken by Afghanistan’s regional neighbors. Only such a targeted approach will bring advance America’s interests and those of its regional friends and deter global powers that aspire to control the heart of Asia.

Afghan Canal Project Affecting Not Only Central Asia But China And Russia Too – Analysis'

Paul Goble

Afghanistan is pushing ahead with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal to divert water that has been flowing into neighboring countries to slow the desertification of its own territory and the threat of starvation to its population. The impact of Kabul’s decision on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has attracted some attention (see EDM, March 7).

Now, the project, launched in 2022 and slated to be completed by 2028, is having a far broader impact on more distant Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have long enjoyed the reputation of being “water surplus” countries that do not need water from others (Window on Eurasia, August 19, 2021; Cabar.asia, February 29; TASS, March 20; The Times of Central Asia, June 11). The canal is also affecting China and Russia’s influence as the two outside powers most heavily involved in regional geopolitics (see EDM, December 7, 2021; Radio Azatlyk, March 29, 2023; Forbes.kz, April 8). While the Taliban’s recent decision to self-finance the project will slow down construction, Kabul hopes to limit the leverage of other countries in the region to influence the canal’s completion and operation.

The Afghan canal is on its way to having a more serious impact on Tajikistan than any other place in Central Asia. Water shortages in the country are already raising the specter of widespread hunger, and, given Dushanbe’s reliance on hydropower, the Qosh Tepa Canal will lead to a reduction in electric power production (TASS, March 20). Those twin developments, in turn, threaten to amplify Tajikistan’s difficulties in controlling its enormous but sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, a restive province bordering Afghanistan. China, Russia, and the United States have all tried to help Dushanbe stabilize the territory, lest the Taliban or other Islamist groups expand their influence northward (see EDM, June 22, November 3, 2022; ASIA-Plus, July 26, December 26, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, October 31, 2023).

Bamboo in the Wind: Vietnam’s Quest for Neutrality

Nguyen Khac Giang

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Vietnam’s foreign policy has gradually transformed from an ideologically-driven approach to a more interest-based one. In doing so, Hanoi has managed to overcome its isolation and deeply integrate into the international society. This integration has been achieved by normalizing relations with global and regional powers, particularly the United States and China, and actively participating in various multilateral platforms, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), with a primary focus on economic integration. Through its neutrality and flexibility in dealing with great powers, Vietnam has greatly benefited from the post-Cold War world order. It has maintained strong military ties with Russia while enjoying access to the vast export markets of the West and reaping the benefits of trade with China. As a result, Vietnam has emerged as one of the top performers in terms of economic growth over the past four decades, all the while enjoying a relatively peaceful international environment. Hanoi has also become a leader within ASEAN.

China’s third plenum is unlikely to significantly correct an ailing economy

Alicia García-Herrero

China’s third plenum, taking place in Beijing from 15 to 18 July, is a once-in-every-five-years conclave of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, where a range of policies to address long-standing issues are unveiled. Historically, this event has seen announcements of major policy shifts and economic reforms. This time around, markets and China watchers hope the third plenum can answer a specific question: will sufficient growth-enhancing measures be announced to revive the Chinese economy after years of underwhelming performance?

The party’s official channels have been previewing the third plenum as a platform for “comprehensive” reforms, but foreign observers and some academics are not convinced. Increasingly serious problems have been piling up for China during the last few years, including the demise of the real-estate market, the difficult financial situation of local governments, rapidly declining returns on assets because of over-investment and the deflationary pressures in the economy.

The response to all these woes, as aired by China’s leadership during the past few months, will be the further strengthening of China’s manufacturing capacity under the mantra of ‘new productive forces’. Chinese manufacturing capacity is already nearly a third of global capacity, while its consumption is less than half that amount. Given such a huge imbalance, one might expect that measures to foster private consumption would be the main takeaways from the third plenum, but this does not seem to be the direction China’s leadership is taking.

With or Without Opening? Previewing China’s Third Plenum Reforms

Nathaniel Sher and Ray Wang

In the days ahead of the Chinese Communist Party’s long-delayed Third Plenum, few observers expect that the reform announcements will be enough to revive confidence in the economy. Instead, most expect more of the same: a focus on Party centralization, national security, technology-led development, and skepticism toward foreign businesses. This is despite the fact that China’s economy continues to struggle with a property downturn, weak consumer and business sentiment, distressed local government finances, and subdued foreign direct investment. Many assume that a turn away from Xi Jinping’s “comprehensive” reform agenda could occur only alongside a diminution in his political centrality. Therefore, major market-oriented reforms are unlikely.

Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that the Party leadership will exhibit a degree of flexibility at the Third Plenum. Positive rhetoric from authoritative Party outlets and modest stimulus measures unveiled in recent months indicate that next week’s reforms could exceed expectations. The Party’s leading journal, Qiushi, recently reprinted a 2013 quotation of Xi Jinping stating, “Only by focusing on the top priority of development can we deploy comprehensive reforms.”

It will be prudent to wait and see what specific reforms are announced and whether the government follows through on the Party’s directives. As in 2013, any announcements could stall during the implementation phase. Even so, early indications point to the fact that Beijing is seeking to stabilize market confidence to enhance its broader reform agenda.

What To Expect From China’s Upcoming Third Plenum – Analysis

Yiping Huang

On 23 May 2024, Chinese President Xi Jinping chaired a symposium of high-profile business and academic representatives in Jinan, the capital city of Shandong province. A widely publicised presentation from my colleague and well-known reform-minded scholar, Zhou Qiren, to that session raised expectations of an ambitious reform agenda at the upcoming Third Plenum of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, which will kick off on Monday, 15 July.

Nearly 46 years ago, the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress, in December 1978, decided to undertake China’s economic reform. Since then, each of the past eight Third Plenums has maintained the tradition of focusing on economic reform.

China’s Politburo Meeting on 30 April suggests that the key themes of the upcoming Plenum include deepening comprehensive reform and modernisation. It set out a policy approach of ‘running toward the problem and focusing on correcting it’. Instead of adopting a grand scale liberalisation policy, the Plenum is more likely to announce policy measures to overcome some specific bottlenecks to sustainable growth.

The biggest factor in China’s economic success during the past decades was its transition from a centrally planned system toward a market economy. It also benefited greatly from conditions such as its low-labour cost advantage, its demographic dividend and open international trade and investment regimes.

Navy Modernizes Ship Defenses to Counter Chinese "Carrier-Killer" Missiles

KRIS OSBORN

The Navy is working intensely to better prepare itself for fast-evolving Chinese ballistic missiles which are not only growing in number but improving in their guidance systems, maneuverability and attack ranges.

The concern was raised by Rep. Hal Rogers, R-Texas, at a House Appropriations Committee, Defense, who questioned Navy leaders about current plans to strengthen ballistic missile defenses in light of the Chinese threat in the Pacific.

Chinese Cruise Missile Threat

“The range of Chinese cruise missiles are projected to vastly increase to reach as far as Guam in 2025. This expanded range poses great challenges for our posture in the Pacific. Should the Navy not be able to defend against potential attacks, we would have to withdraw troops from the area,” Rogers said to Navy leaders.

China Isn't the Strongest Military in Asia

The four most influential countries in Asia are China, Russia, India, and Japan. With their economic power, global influence, and combined military might, these four countries are a force. While the United States may rank as the most powerful nation, militarily speaking, these countries can each hold their own with their impressive militaries. One common thread between the most powerful militaries on the Asian continent is their air power. Russia, India, and China each boast some of the strongest air forces in the world, exerting dominance over their respective territories.

According to the United Nations, there are 48 Asian countries in what is best known as the world’s biggest continent. These smaller nations on the continent do not fully exert military dominance on the world stage; instead, they fall into a hierarchy of power within different regions, each of these countries exhibiting different strengths and weaknesses.

To determine the countries with the strongest military might in Asia, 24/7 Wall St. reviewed the 2024 Military Strength Ranking from Global Firepower, an annually updated defense-related statistics website with information on 145 countries. Global Firepower ranked 145 countries based on their PowerIndex, a composite of over 60 measures in categories such as military might, financials, logistical capability, and geography. The smaller the PowerIndex value, the more powerful a nation’s theoretical conventional fighting capability is. We also included supplemental information regarding active military personnel, military aircraft, vehicles, and naval power.

Oman: Partisan Non-Intervention

Roby C. Barrett and Leah Sherwood

Since the end of the Cold War, foreign policy experts have often labelled Oman as neutral. While Oman often adopts non-interventionist positions, it is an oversimplification to call Muscat neutral. Indeed, the notion fails to capture the complexity of Oman’s policies and the tangled internal historical experience that informs its foreign relations. Contemporary Omani policy results from Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Bu Said’s (who ruled from 1970–2020) perceptions of regime vulnerabilities in the sultanate’s post-independence era. These perceptions are a direct product of Oman’s past and, if the present under Sultan Haitham bin Tarik (who has ruled from 2020–present) is a measure, they will continue to provide the guiding principles for the future. Oman’s external behaviour cannot be described as neutrality, as Oman has used non-aligned or non-interventionist policies as a tactical façade since the 1980s. It does this to manage conflicts and relationships that could pose a threat to the Al Bu Said regime or Oman’s territorial integrity, all the while being fully aware that its existential, strategic security is inextricably linked to its relationship with the West and the United States (US).

An attempted assassination and the conspiratorial disinformation that followed

John Mecklin

The attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump will at least temporarily soften the political campaigns of both Trump and the Democratic presidential nominee, whether that be (as seems most likely) President Joe Biden or someone else. And actually, it already has done so, with the Biden campaign reportedly taking down anti-Trump campaign advertising and Trump campaign managers telling staff not to comment publicly or engage in “dangerous rhetoric on social media.” In his initial remarks after the assassination attempt, Biden said the shooting was “sick” and called on the country to unite. Even Trump’s wife Melania, who has largely remained in the background during the 2024 campaign, joined in the calls from both camps to tone down political rhetoric.

All the same, as with previous attacks on US presidents, conspiracy theories quickly blossomed, and they were anything but genteel. The information environment of 2024 is radically different than what existed during earlier US assassinations and assassination attempts. The shooting of Trump was quickly followed by an enormous barrage of speculation and outright invention across social media platforms, from smaller outlets firmly planted in the far-right side of the US political spectrum—including Gab, Parler, and Trump’s own Truth Social—to Elon Musk’s X (nee Twitter) and other larger sites.

The assassination attempt was still under investigation on Sunday, and many basic facts—including the would-be assassin’s motives—remained unknown or had at least not been made public. The shooter was identified as Thomas Matthew Crooks, a 20-year-old resident of Bethel Park, a Pittsburgh suburb located about an hour from the site of the Butler, Pennsylvania political rally where Trump was shot. A Secret Service sharpshooter reportedly killed Crooks shortly after he used an assault rifle to fire multiple shots from a rooftop outside the site of the rally; one of the shots struck Trump’s ear. Beyond the ear wound, the ex-president was apparently uninjured. A firefighter attending the rally was killed and two other attendees wounded in the fusillade.

RUSSIA ATTACKS HOSPITALS IN UKRAINE. ISRAEL DOES THE SAME IN GAZA. THE U.S. RESPONSE COULDN’T BE MORE DIFFERENT.

Jonah Valdez

DURING A UNITED NATIONS Security Council meeting this week, U.S. Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield launched a full-throated condemnation of Russia’s bombing of Ukraine’s largest children’s hospital on Monday. The attack was a part of a Russian bombing campaign that killed more than 30 Ukrainian civilians.

“We’re here today because Russia … attacked a children’s hospital,” Thomas-Greenfield said. “Even uttering that phrase sends a chill down my spine.”

Thomas-Greenfield went on to list a string of Russian attacks on other Ukrainian hospitals throughout the war. She described Russia’s aggression as a “campaign of terror” and labeled its attacks on civilian infrastructure as violations of international law. Representatives of other countries, such as the United Kingdom and France, echoed Thomas-Greenfield’s denunciations. (Russia’s ambassador denied responsibility for the Monday bombing.)

The moral clarity of her comments was striking to observers and experts of international law, who contrasted it to U.S. rhetoric and actions concerning Israel. The U.S. has stood by Israel militarily and diplomatically as it has consistently attacked civilian infrastructure, such as hospitals and schools, in Gaza since October 7, in a brutal campaign that the International Court of Justice has deemed a plausible genocide.

History, Learning, and International Relations

Richard Ned Lebow and Feng Zhang

International Relations scholars have documented the importance of so-called historical lessons for foreign policy decision making. They often frame the context in which those decisions are made. They help determine what constitutes a threat or a problem and how to respond. There has been less research on why certain lessons are learned and others not, and why some of these lessons become deeply embedded in a political culture. Once this happens, these lessons not only influence foreign policy but help shape the way people see the world. By doing so, they make policymakers more receptive to some kinds of lessons and less so to others. We address the first of questions: why some lessons appeal and others not. We offer seven propositions in this connection, drawn from psychology and political science. We offer reasons for our propositions and examples that illustrate them. We conclude with some thought about how historical lessons enter political life.

Historical Lessons

Margaret MacMillan (2022, p. 8) wryly observes that “Even when people think they are striking out in new directions their models often come from the past.” Political actors draw their own conclusions about the outcomes of their behavior and the reasons for its success and failure. Cognitive psychologists find that people are more likely to attribute success to their character and failure to circumstances beyond their control (Heider, 1958, p. 322; Kelley, 1967; Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). When successful they are also motivated to downplay the role of luck and exaggerate that of skill (Frank, 2016, pp. xiv, 11). Historical learning is almost always about other people and situations they faced, sometimes at some temporal remove. Political actors can draw their own conclusions from these past events, but more often it is mediated by political commentators and historians, and almost certainly so if those events occurred at some temporal remove. International relations scholars have documented the extent to which these lessons reflect cognitive biases (Jervis, 2017 [1976]).

Great Power Rivalry and Israeli Selective Neutrality: ‘Walking Between the Drops’

Liudmila Samarskaia

The concept of neutrality is not new in international relations, though its definition has always been situational. Israel, however, was never considered a neutral state during the Cold War period. It was involved in great power rivalry in the Middle East on the side of the West, most prominently the United States or France, in order to pursue its own security and policy goals. This alignment was more a function of the Soviet Union’s support for Arab states, particularly Egypt and Syria. Israel’s policies were always about Israeli security. The fall of the USSR, however, changed the strategic situation. Though the process of normalisation with Arab states began in the 1970s, the 1990s changed the balance of forces in the Middle East and gave temporary hope that the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts could be resolved. While the latter remains unsettled, the former has been in many ways achieved. Such a realignment of forces changed the strategic positions of the State of Israel. This helped the Jewish state break international isolation and made cooperation with countries for which it used to be ‘untouchable’ possible.

Supporting Palestine Helped the Left Win in France and Britain. Will Democrats Learn From It?

Natasha Lennard

IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE surprise victory of left party coalition New Popular Front in France’s parliamentary elections last week, Jean-Luc Mélenchon — the leftist leader of the bloc’s largest party, France Unbowed — vowed to see France “recognize the Palestinian state as soon as possible.”

France’s far-right National Rally party, alongside conservative centrists, had spent weeks painting the left’s support of Palestine as an electoral poisoned pill. In attacks all too familiar in the U.S., they conflated anti-Zionism with antisemitism, slamming Israel’s critics as antisemites. Israeli officials explicitly backed the far-right party. In this last election, at least, it didn’t work to prevent left-wing success.

In Britain, too, the centrist Labour Party’s landslide victory was tempered in five constituencies, where independent candidates with pro-Palestinian platforms defeated Labour candidates. Labour’s former leader, Jeremy Corbyn, won his North Islington, London, seat with ease; Corbyn was famously ousted from Labour when the party’s conservative wing and British media weaponized charges of antisemitism against the party’s left flank.

Russian Jamming Is Wreaking Havoc on GPS in Eastern Europe. But Is It Hybrid Warfare?

Shaun Waterman

Amid unprecedented amounts of electronic warfare in Russia’s war on Ukraine, there is no doubt that the Russians are jamming GPS and other satellite-based navigation systems around the Baltic Sea. Earlier this year, the interference forced the closure of a major civilian airport after flights had to be diverted enroute.

“We know that Russia has been jamming GPS signals,” Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna said, explaining why Tartu, the country’s second largest airport, had to close. The jamming has affected not just Estonia, but parts of neighboring Latvia and Lithuania, sites in Finland and Sweden across the Baltic Sea, and as far afield as Poland and Germany, according to publicly reported data from commercial aircraft.

It is also pretty clear how Russia is doing the jamming, which involves simply broadcasting a more powerful signal on the same frequency used for GPS. Since the real GPS signals come from satellites 12,500 miles above the Earth’s surface, they are easily drowned out by much closer terrestrial broadcasts. According to experts, technical inferences from public data sources bear out Tsahkna’s claim that the jamming is coming from three ground-based locations in Russian territory, including the port enclave of Kaliningrad, sandwiched on the Baltic coast between Latvia and Poland.

Democrats back off Biden after Trump shooting, but clock still ticking

AMIE PARNES

For Democrats, the phrase of the day was “proceed with caution.”

A day after a gunman attempted to assassinate former President Trump at a campaign rally in Pennsylvania, and after the Democratic Party continued to debate whether or not President Biden should withdraw from the presidential election, the president’s allies and other party operatives were left quietly wondering how the latest plot twist in the campaign would ultimately play out.

For the time being, out of respect for Trump on the heels of the tragic events, Biden has paused any political activity, taking down even political advertising. But a flurry of questions still remained for Democrats: Would the moment give Biden a reprieve from the calls to withdraw? Would the image of Trump’s clenched fist, blood dripping down his face, portray him in a new light? And what would it all mean for Democrats as the Republican National Convention kicks off on Monday?

“There are more questions than answers right now,” one top Democratic strategist and a close Biden ally acknowledged. “I don’t think anyone knows how this will turn out, even this week. There are so many unknowns.”

U.S. Navy Aircraft Carrier John C. Stennis: 'Out of Action' for More Than 5 Years

Harrison Kass

Nimitz-Class Aircraft Carrier USS John C. Stennis Has a Problem

The U.S. Navy’s Fiscal Year 2025 budget revealed USS John C. Stennis’s overhaul and refueling will be delayed another 14 months. The ship’s overhaul began in 2021 and was supposed to be finished by August 2025, with Stennis ready to rejoin the fleet. But the budget report indicates Stennis will not be available until October 2026.

According to Rear Adm. Casey Morton, the extended rehaul time is a result of COVID-related workforce and material shortfalls. NAVSEA, meanwhile, says the delay is “due both to mandatory growth work following ship conditions assessments, as well as industrial base challenges.” So the Navy is being pretty vague about why Stennis will need an extra 14 months – and blaming COVID, which is becoming the default excuse across sectors.

Hopefully the Navy can apply lessons gleaned from USS George Washington’s delayed and exceedingly difficult overhaul as work on Stennis proceeds. George Washington underwent its RCOH (Refueling and Complex Overhaul) for six long years, during which the sailors worked at the shipyard in what a report would later find were extremely difficult conditions. The report was conducted after several George Washington sailors committed suicide during the overhaul.

Railgun Ammo-Firing Air Defense Artillery Cannon Plans Laid Out By Army

JOSEPH TREVITHICK

The U.S. Army hopes to start fielding a new air defense system based around a wheeled self-propelled 155mm howitzer, which could use ammunition originally developed for an abortive U.S. Navy electromagnetic railgun, before the end of the decade. The service is pursuing the Multi-Domain Artillery Cannon (MDAC) as a way to further expand its already growing air and missile defense capabilities, especially in expeditionary scenarios and when it comes to defending against increasing cruise missile threats. The goal with MDAC is also to offer a lower-cost alternative to traditional surface-to-air missiles.

The Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office (RCCTO) recently issued a request for information regarding plans to acquire complete MDAC prototypes.

“Responses must clearly demonstrate technical qualifications, capability, and experience to provide a prototype MDAC solution with battery-level prototype deliveries no later than Q4FY27 [fourth quarter Fiscal Year 2027] followed by an Operational Demonstration (OD) in FY28,” the RCCTO RFI says. “The MDAC OD in FY28 will be composed of prototypes delivered under this RCCTO effort combined with similar prototypes delivered under separate Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) Other Transaction Agreements (OTAs) developed for the Hypervelocity Gun Weapon System (HGWS).”

The West finally allowed Ukraine to strike back at Russia — and it seems to be working

Ivana Kottasová

Bankir and his men have been trying to fight off Russian attacks along the Ukrainian front lines for more than two years. But it’s only now that they are finally able to strike where it hurts: Inside Russia’s own territory.

The newly granted permission by the United States and other allies to use Western weapons to strike inside Russia has had a huge impact, Bankir said. “We have destroyed targets inside Russia, which allowed for several successful counteroffensives. The Russian military can no longer feel impunity and security,” the senior officer in Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) told CNN. For security reasons, he asked to be identified by his call sign only.

After many months on the back foot because of ammunition and manpower shortages, Kyiv is finally able to take full advantage of Western military aid that started to flow into the country last month, after months of delays.

Soldiers on the front lines say the deliveries are beginning to make a difference – especially since they can now use the arsenal to strike across the border.

“We can see the impact of the aid every day. Artillery, longer-range multiple launch rocket systems with various types of ammunition and submunitions… it’s affecting the overall battlefield picture,” Ivan, an officer with the 148th artillery brigade, told CNN. He also asked for his full name not to be published for security reasons.

With Ukraine short on battle tanks like the Abrams, US-made Bradley fighting vehicles are proving their worth

Jake Epstein,Chris Panella

NATO members have equipped Ukraine with plenty of highly capable armored vehicles to take into battle against Russia, giving Kyiv a firepower, survivability, and maneuverability upgrade over the aging Soviet-era systems with which it started its grueling fight.

Among the wartime additions to Ukraine's arsenal is the US-made Bradley fighting vehicle, a formidable asset that continues proving its worth on the battlefield several decades after it first saw combat.

There was tremendous hype around the arrival of the American-made M1 Abrams tank, but that's faded. However, the Bradley, despite suffering significantly more losses, has consistently been celebrated for its effectiveness, in some ways overshadowing the Abrams.

Kyiv didn't get very many Abrams, limiting their ability to make an impact on the battlefield and making the tanks more precious than the far more plentiful and more expendable Bradleys.

The Shooting of Donald Trump - OPINION

The assassination attempt against Donald Trump on Saturday evening is a horrific moment for America that could have been much worse. But we can’t say it comes as a complete surprise. Political hostility and hateful rhetoric have been rising to a decibel level that far too often in the American past has led to violence and attempted murder. Some of us still remember 1968 all too well.

It’s nothing short of miraculous that Mr. Trump avoided death by a literal inch. The former President can’t help but think that Providence played some role in sparing him, as Ronald Reagan is said to have thought after he was shot and survived in 1981. The country was spared, too, from what could have been a furious cycle of retribution.

Yet a man was killed and two others seriously wounded at a rally that was supposed to celebrate their political allegiance and democratic participation. The Secret Service killed the alleged assassin, but the obvious question is how he could have gained the high ground atop a building near enough to be able to take those shots at the former President. Mr. Trump’s rallies are severe security tests, but the Secret Service has had years to know how to protect him at these events.

Where Will the AI Super Cycle Lead?

DAMBISA MOYO

The current pace of advances in generative artificial intelligence makes it difficult to forecast how the technology will affect the economy, business, and society. Nonetheless, it already seems clear that the new AI applications will produce a narrow cohort of winners and lead to a smaller workforce, confronting governments with big policy challenges.

Consider how AI will affect the three key components of growth: capital, labor, and productivity. In terms of capital, the massive volume of investment required to power AI innovations ensures that there will be a smaller, more concentrated set of winners. Big Tech firms with monopolies in their respective markets are the only ones that can afford the enormous costs associated with developing, training, and powering large language models (LLMs).

Most of these costs come from running high-end graphics processing units (GPUs), and from powering and cooling enormous data centers. Sam Mugel, the chief technology officer of Multiverse, estimates that training the next generation of LLMs will soon cost at least $1 billion. In 2023 alone, the Magnificent Seven – the top technology companies in the United States –allocated a combined $370 billion to research and development. That is roughly equal to the European Union’s total R&D budget (counting both businesses and the public sector).

16 July 2024

India-Russia Ties Take A Quantum Leap In The Fog Of Ukraine War – OpEd

M.K. Bhadrakumar

The lodestar of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on July 8-9, it must be the disclosure by the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration in the Kremlin Maxim Oreshkin that the two leaders discussed the topic of cash payments with the use of cards of national payment systems as an important element of trade support infrastructure and interaction in general.

Oreshkin added that the two countries are also putting in place an arrangement on interaction between their central banks on the issue of accepting national payment card.

At one stroke, Modi electrified the forthcoming BRICS Summit in Kazan in October. Modi also informed Putin that he will be attending the summit meeting. It is no secret that the BRICS member states are seeking to improve the international monetary and financial system and are prioritising the creation of a platform that will enable them to conduct transactions in national currencies in mutual trade.

The Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had announced after a meeting of the economic bloc’s foreign ministers in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, last month that “Our agenda is extensive. It includes issues that will directly affect the future world order based on fair grounds.” Indeed, more and more countries are having doubts about SWIFT, after many Russian banks were cut off from the Belgium-based financial messaging system following the start of the Ukraine conflict in 2022.

The Manipur Conflict: Internal Discontent, Policy Gaps, and Regional Implications

Anuradha Oinam and Stanzin Lhaskyabs

Catholic Christians hold placards and participate in a peace rally against violence in the northeastern Manipur state, in Hyderabad, India, Friday, Aug. 25, 2023.Credit: AP Photo/Mahesh Kumar A.

On June 9, 2024, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his newly elected Union Council of Ministers took their oaths in New Delhi, violence erupted in Manipur’s Jiribam district. Homes were burned, and many people were displaced. The Manipur conflict, which marked its first anniversary in May 2024, continues unabated. A high-level meeting led by Home Minister Amit Shah on June 17, 2024, highlights the ongoing security crisis in the region.

A Perpetual Turmoil

May 3, 2023, marked a dark day in Manipur’s history when violence erupted between the Meitei and Kuki communities in the Churachandpur district. The conflict began after a peaceful protest march organized by the All Tribal Student Union of Manipur (ATSUM) against the Manipur High Court’s recommendation to recognize the Meitei as a Scheduled Tribe (ST). The violence escalated from burning the Anglo-Kuki War Memorial to destroying homes and killings, displacing about 5,000 people within 48 hours. Within two months, the number of displaced individuals soared to 60,000, the death toll reached 70, and over 1,700 buildings, including homes and religious structures, were reduced to ashes. Social media disinformation and misinformation fueled further violence, including the use of rape as a weapon. Additionally, the looting of about 3,000 arms and ammunition from police stations and state armories exacerbated the conflict.

Afghan Canal Project Affecting Not Only Central Asia but China and Russia Too

Paul Goble

Afghanistan is pushing ahead with the construction of the Qosh Tepa Canal to divert water that has been flowing into neighboring countries to slow the desertification of its own territory and the threat of starvation to its population. The impact of Kabul’s decision on Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan has attracted some attention (see EDM, March 7). Now, the project, launched in 2022 and slated to be completed by 2028, is having a far broader impact on more distant Kazakhstan as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which have long enjoyed the reputation of being “water surplus” countries that do not need water from others (Window on Eurasia, August 19, 2021; Cabar.asia, February 29; TASS, March 20; The Times of Central Asia, June 11). The canal is also affecting China and Russia’s influence as the two outside powers most heavily involved in regional geopolitics (see EDM, December 7, 2021; Radio Azatlyk, March 29, 2023; Forbes.kz, April 8). While the Taliban’s recent decision to self-finance the project will slow down construction, Kabul hopes to limit the leverage of other countries in the region to influence the canal’s completion and operation.

The Afghan canal is on its way to having a more serious impact on Tajikistan than any other place in Central Asia. Water shortages in the country are already raising the specter of widespread hunger, and, given Dushanbe’s reliance on hydropower, the Qosh Tepa Canal will lead to a reduction in electric power production (TASS, March 20). Those twin developments, in turn, threaten to amplify Tajikistan’s difficulties in controlling its enormous but sparsely populated Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region, a restive province bordering Afghanistan. China, Russia, and the United States have all tried to help Dushanbe stabilize the territory, lest the Taliban or other Islamist groups expand their influence northward (see EDM, June 22, November 3, 2022; ASIA-Plus, July 26, December 26, 2023; see Terrorism Monitor, October 31, 2023).

Geopolitical Tensions Complicate Proposed Kazakhstan–Turkmenistan–Afghanistan Transit Corridor

Syed Fazl-e-Haider

Astana has expedited efforts to establish a transport corridor through Afghanistan involving Turkmenistan. In May, Kazakhstan’s Trade Ministry announced plans to establish road and rail networks through Afghanistan to facilitate trade with South Asia and the Persian Gulf (Daryo, May 5, 6). Earlier, on April 27, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Afghanistan had agreed at a high-level meeting in Kabul on the construction of transit infrastructure in Afghanistan to open a new corridor connecting Central Asia with South and West Asia. The participants in the trilateral meeting included Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin, Turkmenistan’s Transport and Communications Agency Director General Mammetkhan Chakyev, and Afghan Minister of Commerce and Industry Nooruddin Azizi (Afghanistan Times, April 29). Azizi expressed hope that the new corridor will transform war-torn Afghanistan into a logistics hub for regional exports. While the project aims to capitalize on regional transit upheavals largely brought on by Russia’s war against Ukraine, geopolitical rivalries and security concerns, especially in Afghanistan, may complicate these goals’ realization.

Under the plan, a logistics center would be built at Herat in western Afghanistan to facilitate regional exports. Russian oil sent to South Asian countries, including Pakistan and India, will presumably flow through the transport corridor, which will provide better links with existing infrastructure, as no new pipelines were mentioned during the trilateral meeting. During the meeting, Zhumangarin emphasized the importance of “recalculating and reorienting traffic flows” to support infrastructure development. The corridor would allow for the passage of millions of tons of Russian oil, which is expected to be purchased in the coming years by South Asian countries (Kursiv Media, May 3). Astana, Ashgabat, and Kabul also agreed to form a working group to move forward and implement the agreed-upon plans (News on Projects, May 2).

Pakistan’s New Military Operation Alarms Pashtuns

Osama Ahmad

On June 25, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) launched a massive rally in the Khyber district. Thousands of people attended. The rally was called in response to the Pakistan federal government’s latest decision to launch a new military operation, named Azm-e-Istehkam, to counter the rising tide of terrorism in the country. The announcement came days after Chinese officials expressed displeasure over Pakistan’s deplorable security situation, and urged Islamabad to improve security for Chinese workers in Pakistan and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.

While the specific target area for the military operation is not yet known, the announcement has sent shockwaves across the Pashtun region in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, including the former tribal districts known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), prompting strong reactions from both nationalist and religious parties.

Pashtuns’ concerns are not unfounded, as they have endured significant suffering during past operations, leading to worries that the new operation could bring back that traumatic past.

Kaleem Dawar*, a 46-year-old fruit seller in the North Waziristan district, told The Diplomat, “We have seen enough wars, destruction, and bloodshed. We don’t want it anymore. Our memories hurt, and we don’t want to go back to the past again.” Dawar concluded with tears forming at the corners of his eyes, asking, “Who in the whole world would want continuous wars and bloodshed?”

Following Pakistan’s announcement of a new military operation, the Hafiz Gul Bahadur (HGB) group announced the launch of a counter-operation named Al-Fatah bi al-Nusratul Rehman, to oppose the security forces in North Waziristan. Additionally, the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also announced a counter-operation named Azm-e-Shariat in response to Pakistan’s military operation, aiming to increase its attacks in Pakistan.

It is feared that in the ensuing struggle between the militants and the military, average Pashtuns are likely to suffer the most.

Deportation of Afghan Migrants to Continue, Pakistan Government Says

Munir Ahmed

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi, left, meets with Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, in Islamabad, Pakistan, Tuesday, July 9, 2024.Credit: X/PMLN

Pakistan will consider a plan to expel hundreds of thousands more Afghans who have been living in the country for years, the foreign ministry said Thursday, the latest in a monthslong government clampdown on undocumented migrants.

The plan is still in the works, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mumtaz Zahra Baloch told reporters — and the government may ultimately reject it.

It would mark the “second phase” of the “Illegal Foreigners Repatriation Plan” and it would involve persons who had been given identification documents known as “Afghan citizen cards” to legalize their stay in Pakistan for a limited time.

“At this stage, I do not have a date to share with you,” she said at a weekly news briefing in the capital, Islamabad, adding that an announcement about the action would be made “at an appropriate time.”

Pakistan’s crackdown on undocumented migrants has drawn sweeping criticism from the United Nations, aid agencies and human rights groups.

Since the deportations started, an estimated 600,000 Afghans have gone back to Afghanistan. After forcing thousands back daily, the deportations slowed down and appeared to halt in recent months.

On Wednesday, following a visit by the U.N. refugee agency chief, Filippo Grandi, Islamabad announced it has extended the stay of 1.45 million Afghan refugees residing in the country.

During his visit, Grandi welcomed what he described as the Pakistan government’s suspension of the deportations.

Myanmar Insurgent Allies Capture Strategic Shan State Town From Junta

An alliance of insurgent forces battling to end army rule has captured a major town in northern Myanmar, a spokesperson for the main group told Radio Free Asia, in the latest setback for the junta that seized power in a 2021 military coup.

The Ta’ang National Liberation Army, or TNLA, and allied forces seized the last base in Shan state’s Nawnghkio town from junta troops on Wednesday, after two weeks of fighting, the spokesperson said.

“We were able to capture the junta’s missile battalion in Nawnghkio town at around 3 p.m.,” the spokesperson told RFA.

The junta has not released any information on the battle, and Shan state’s junta spokesperson, Khun Thein Maung, did not answer inquiries from RFA.

The TNLA, which is part of an alliance of three ethnic minority insurgent forces known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, ended a five-month ceasefire with the junta on June 25.

Since then, the group has been fighting for territory in Shan state’s Nawnghkio, Kyaukme, Mongmit and Hsipaw townships, as well as in Mandalay region’s Mogoke township. The alliance has since claimed to have captured at least 26 bases across the north.

The alliance launched an offensive last November, codenamed Operation 1027 for the date it began, and pushed back junta forces in several regions, including along northeastern Myanmar’s border with China.

Insurgent forces in other parts of the country have stepped up their attacks since then too, posing the biggest challenge the military has faced in years of conflict.

China, concerned about its economic interests, according to Myanmar sources, brokered peace talks in Shan state in January that brought a halt to the conflict there. But the truce collapsed late last month and fighting has surged since then.

PRC Use of Middlemen to Circumvent US Government Export Controls: The Case of Suzhou Rebes Electronic

Matthew Bruzzese

As strategic competition between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) increases, the US Government has become more vigilant in its attempts to prevent the illegal export of sensitive technology to the PRC. This has included the addition of more PRC institutions to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List, as well increased enforcement and legal action against individuals found to be violating export control measures (Federal Register, December 19, 2022; see Defense One, June 8, 2021). Despite this, sanctioned PRC entities have continued to find ways to circumvent these measures and acquire the critical foreign technologies they need to advance the PRC’s military modernization. This has included sanctioned PRC defense companies’ use of thinly veiled straw purchasers to acquire needed technology from the United States that would otherwise be off-limits to them. The recent indictment of two PRC nationals attempting to use a front company to purchase critical semiconductor manufacturing equipment on behalf of a blacklisted PRC entity shows that this continues to be a go-to method in the toolkit of any would-be smuggler hoping to circumvent US export control laws (US Department of Justice, April 25; Tencent, April 30).

In October 2022, a report in The Washington Post revealed that US technology was being used to advance the PRC’s hypersonic weapons program (Washington Post, October 17, 2022). The report put a spotlight on PRC use of middlemen, as the technology had apparently found its way from the United States to PRC missile research institutes via straw purchasers offering a very flimsy veneer of plausible deniability about the final destination for this technology.

What to expect at the Chinese Communist Party’s most important meeting of the year

Jeremy Mark

As China grapples with a property crisis, high youth unemployment, tumbling business and consumer confidence, and an ocean of local government debt, one might expect the government to put everything it has into plans to pull the country out of the economic doldrums. But a meeting of senior Chinese leaders this month is shaping up to offer a very different set of reforms.

Instead of focusing on China’s current problems, the Third Plenum of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central Committee—so-called because it is the third session of the committee’s five-year term—will prepare China for a confrontation with the United States by building industries powered by massive investments in cutting-edge technologies. This program is aimed at reinforcing the party’s hold on Chinese society and paying obeisance to paramount leader Xi Jinping, whose policy mistakes—ranging from zero-COVID-19 lockdowns to a crackdown on major online companies—have produced economic malaise. It will also underline China’s shift away from its longtime economic strategy of growth for growth’s sake.

Among the policies expected to be announced at the July 15-18 plenum (which was inexplicably delayed from late 2023) will be reforms restructuring tax and fiscal policies, as well as greater coordination of regional economic development. Both are policies that will reinforce the role of the central government in guiding development. There will probably also be declarations of support for China’s beleaguered private sector, which accounts for more than 60 percent of gross domestic product and over 80 percent of urban employment. But Xi and his subordinates have emphasized that the policy pendulum is swinging decidedly toward statist solutions.

NATO Sounds Alarm on China’s Advances in Space and Nuclear, Ties with Russia

Chris Gordon and Unshin Lee Harpley

NATO leaders gathered in Washington D.C. for the alliance’s 75th anniversary summit said they were alarmed by China’s ambitions and aggression in nuclear, space, and cyberspace on top of its deepening ties with Russia, calling on the People’s Republic of China to act more responsibly.

“The PRC continues to rapidly expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems,” the Washington Summit Declaration, released July 10, stated. “We urge the PRC to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and promote stability through transparency.”

The declaration also said allies were concerned about “developments in the PRC’s space capabilities and activities.”

China’s advancements in nuclear weapons and space in recent years have sparked widespread apprehension, with U.S. analysts and military leaders frequently highlighting Beijing’s extremely rapid progress. China currently operates nearly 500 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance satellites, forming a formidable “sensor-shooter kill web” that poses significant risks to U.S. forces, and the Pentagon estimates China could possess over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030, many of which will be deployed at heightened readiness levels, with plans for continued expansion.

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