6 May 2026

Hitting Where it Hurts: Deep Strikes, Oil Infrastructure, and Kyiv’s Theory of Victory

Jefferson Burges and John Nagl

With the Russian-Ukrainian War now well into its fifth year, the ground war remains characteristically intense. Both sides have experienced significant losses in personnel and equipment. And yet, the front line has seen relatively minor adjustments. In November 2023, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, then serving as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, described how the war had become a positional-centric form of warfare. The war’s new character, including a host of unmanned systems, has limited the ability to execute large-scale maneuver. And attritional warfare based on limited maneuver and fought along a relatively static line of contact tends to favor the side with more resources—in this case, Russia.

Recent estimates put total Russian casualties for the year 2025 at 416,570. Despite these losses, Russia has continued to regenerate its combat power. Through 2025, Russia could still recruit 35,000 people per month, principally through financial incentives of around 2 million rubles ($24,612). Ukraine’s capability to inflict significant casualties is impressive, but it has resulted in no change to the Russian will or ability to wage war.

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