Is India About to Abandon Its No-First Use Nuclear Doctrine?

The BJP election manifesto suggests that India may soon adopt a more aggressive stance on nuclear weapons. 

By Zachary Keck

April 09, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/is-india-about-to-abandon-its-no-first-use-nuclear-doctrine/

The presumed next Indian government could drop India’s no-first use (NFU) nuclear doctrine, if its new election manifesto is any guide. 

Ahead of the start of elections in India this week, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—which is widely expected to win a plurality of seats and form a government under Narendra Modi—released its 2014 election manifesto. 

In a section entitled, “Independent Strategic Nuclear Program,” the BJP promised that, if elected, it would “study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times.” It also stated that it would “maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities.” 

The BJP is a pro-Hindu, nationalistic political party that has generally taken a much more strident stance on nuclear issues relative to the Congress Party that is currently in power. It was under BJP Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee that India conducted its 1998 nuclear tests, formally declaring itself to be a nuclear weapons state. It is widely believed that Vajpayee had been planning on testing nuclear weapons during his previous 13 day stint as India’s premier in 1996, but was booted out of office before preparations were complete. 

By contrast, under the current Congress-led government, India has focused more on developing its civilian nuclear energy sector, including signing the historic U.S.-India civilian nuclear deal. Moreover, just last week Prime Minister Manmohan Singh called for a global convention in which each nuclear-armed country adopted a no-first use doctrine. This would allow nuclear weapons to be taken off hair-trigger alert and theoretically could reduce the potential for accidental launches. 

In the manifesto released on Monday, the BJP sought to reframe the nuclear debate by declaring: “BJP believes that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear program have been frittered away by the Congress. Our emphasis was, and remains on, beginning of a new thrust on framing policies that would serve India’s national interest in the 21st century. We will follow a two-pronged independent nuclear program, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes, especially as nuclear power is a major contributor to India’s energy sector.” 

Most news reports on the nuclear section of the manifesto said that the terminology was meant to signal that a BJP government would abandon India’s no-first use (NFU) nuclear doctrine if it prevails in the elections. In its 1999 draft nuclear doctrine, written by the BJP-led government that initiated the nuclear tests a year earlier, India adopted a no-first use nuclear doctrine and pledged to maintain a defense-oriented credible minimum deterrence. 

Situation Report: Pakistan

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Situation Report: Pakistan

Frederic Grare

OTHER PUBLICATIONS APRIL 9, 2014TONY BLAIR FAITH FOUNDATION 

SUMMARY

Religious conflict has been part of Pakistan since its inception. While the state can be said to be a victim of its own policies, it does not face any existential threat.

In our third offering to introduce the new website (find the Nigeria report hereand Thailand report here), Dr Frederic Grare of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace examines the situation in Pakistan, and finds that religious conflict has been part of the Pakistani state since its inception. Pakistan faces conflict on various fronts – those it created and those it did not: separatists, pro–regime jihadists, Islamist revolutionaries and sectarians. Fundamentally, the state can be said to be a victim of its own policies, but it does not face any existential threat.  Pakistan is not the victim of a single conflict, but rather a series of localised conflicts of different natures, which, due to the nature of the actors and the policy of the state, are unlikely ever to coalesce into a single threat. Moreover, violence is hugely variable across the country, and even within provinces.

As such, despite the deaths of over 50 000 people in the past decade[1] through political violence, much of it with religious dimensions, such violence does not pose a threat to the Pakistani state. Neither political violence nor its religious dimension is a new phenomenon. They were intrinsic to Pakistan's creation and independence. All four provinces and the Northern Territories have suffered, but in recent years the hardest hit have been Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, as well as the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Large areas of the country are unaffected, and poor governance makes it hard to identify the weakness of state institutions with violence. However, its persistence - exacerbated by the use of violent proxies by the security establishment - undermines the confidence of citizens in their government. 

As it has progressed, the religious causes of violence have become unclear, as loose religious ideologies serve as rallying points than drivers of violent action. This ambiguity is made more so by most Pakistani Islamist schools of thought sharing the aim of building an Islamic state by means of jihad. As such, the differentiation between Islamist groups lies in their pro- or anti-state leanings, in either case articulated on theological lines. 

DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS POLITICAL VIOLENCE 

Despite the increased level of violence observed after 9/11, the fullest development of religiously motivated political violence in Pakistan can be traced to the ideologically-charged atmosphere of the 1980s. 

The Islamic revolution in Iran, the Iran-Iraq War, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan all had an impact on the level of violence in Pakistan. Sunni and Shia extremist militant organisations started targeting members of the other sect, and Sunni militant organisations were used by the security establishment to carry out operations in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But these phenomena affected Pakistan mostly because of the Islamisation policies of Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, the military dictator who had seized power from Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. 

Point, Counter-Point: ‘Overlooking’ Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers

Point, Counter-Point: A Four Part Series

The Wisest Choice, by Abhijit Iyer-Mitra

Normalizing Nuclear Pakistan, by Rabia Akhtar

After the Euphoria? by Amina Afzal

Overlooking’ Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, by Aditi Malhotra and Sitakanta Mishra

Mark Fitzpatrick’s argument for “nuclear rehabilitation of Pakistan” in his bookOvercoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers reminds one of a scene from a famous Bollywood movie Sholey. Jai, one of the male protagonists goes to meet the female protagonist’s (Basanti) aunt (Mausi) to ask her consent for the marriage of Basanti and his friend Veeru. Upon enquiry by Mausi regarding Veeru’s character, Jai gives a very quirky response with numerous contradictions. He says that Veeru is a commendable person despite the fact that he does not win every time he gambles. Despite of this, Veeru will surely begin earning responsibly once his gets into a marital alliance. He adds that he is a nice guy but once he drinks he loses control; however if Basanti marries him, he will also stop such activities and would also put an end to his practice of going to brothel. Upon more enquiries regarding Veeru’s ancestral origin, Veeru says that he will inform her once he becomes aware of it. He periodically praises Veerudespite all bad habits he has. Mausi, shocked by the responds, retorts that it is surprising how Jai is appreciating his friend who seems to possess no great quality of a respectable groom. To this Veeru responds, “kya karu mausi, mera toh dil hi kuch aisa hai!” (What to do aunt, my heart is such).

Similarly, Fitzpatrick seems to acknowledge all the problems with nuclear Pakistan – track record of proliferation, a lowered nuclear threshold, command and control prone to human error, warheads not one-point safe, inability to control the terrorists – and still vouches for Pakistan to be recognised “as a normal nuclear state” especially when some may say that Pakistan itself is not a normal state. His compassion is discernible when he says “how long Pakistan must pay the price” for the Khan nuclear proliferation network – “a solitary event.” Drawing a parallel to India’s performance, Fitzpatrick argues that “the time has come to offer Pakistan a nuclear-cooperation deal akin to India’s”.

At the outset, his thesis suffers from the ‘India parity syndrome’, which has in fact drained Pakistan for more than six decades now. The author warns that preferentially accepting India’s NSG membership is “likely to drive Pakistan further away from the West”. However, he has overlooked the repercussions of rewarding Pakistan.

Most disturbing is how the author equates Pakistan’s proven nuclear proliferation record with baseless allegations against India’s without substantiating it with convincing facts. He further says, “India must realise that Pakistan does not control all groups that perpetrate terrorism”. In this context,an observation by George Perkovich is worth noting. He deftly states that in the larger context of deterrence stability, “a state cannot be a responsible possessor of nuclear weapons if it does not have sovereign control over organized perpetrators of international violence operating from its territory”.

Afghanistan Votes Against the Taliban

Afghanistan’s election results aren’t out yet but we know who certainly lost the election: the Taliban. 

By Sanjay Kumar

April 09, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/afghanistan-votes-against-the-taliban/

Six women were arguing with the security guards of Zarghuna High School in central Kabul to let them enter the compound for voting. The guards argued that it was already 5 p.m. and the women could not be let in as voting had closed. Still, the women insisted. The head of security came in and he too tried to drive in the point that the p.m. deadline had passed but the women contended that a few minutes here and there did not make much of a difference and if they missed the chance this time they would have a long wait ahead of them to vote, which they said they did not want to do. Seeing their determination, the chief relented and allowed them to enter the school and they were ushered into the last classroom where the ballot box was just about to be sealed. The women voted and left the school flashing their inked fingers. 

This was the mood in Afghanistan on Saturday when the country voted for in its first democratic transition of government; the country had never seen this kind of zeal to vote. According to initial estimates given by the Independent Election Commission, 7 out of twelve million registered voters cast their vote on April 5th, meaning close to 60 percent of eligible voters came out to exercise their democratic rights. The turnout is double what it was in the 2009 elections. It was higher than the first elections in 2004 as well. 

But elections cannot be confined to numbers only. One has to fathom the enthusiasm and excitement of the voters to quantify the electoral exercise in a country which is making a history by transferring power through democratic means, a feat Afghanistan has never accomplished in its history so far. 

“I was really keen to vote in these elections. I cannot pick up guns, but I have my vote to defeat the forces which have made our life hell and which have reduced such a great country to the margins of all parameters of social and economic development,” says Tahira, one of the six women who were the last ones to vote in Zarghuna elections. 

“You know, the killing of female journalists a few days ago jolted me and disturbed me a lot. How long can we allow the Taliban to treat women as a substandard human beings. We don’t want to see the return of extremist forces in this country again, those who made us refugees in our own country,” retorted Sajida, 49, after casting her vote late Saturday evening. A teacher by profession, she recalls the days lived under the Taliban regime between 1996 to 2001 as “the worst nightmare of my life.” 

Pakistan Unveils Anti - Terror Policy: Confusion or Clarity

09/04/2014 

Kamaleshwar Davar

E-Mail- kamal.davar8@gmail.com

http://www.claws.in/

Chickens have surely come home to roost in restive Pakistan with the scourge of terrorism - a cardinal of its state policy spearheading its strategy for neighbouring India and Afghanistan, now having assumed such dangerous proportions that Pakistan’s very existence remains under a grave threat. According to conservative estimates, terrorism, since the last decade has inflicted over 50 thousand casualties which includes nearly 19 thousand civilians, 26 thousand terrorists and nearly 6 thousand security personnel inside Pakistan. Besides, this plague had conferred on Pakistan the status of an international pariah and labeled it universally as an ‘epicentre of global terror’. 

An analysis of Pakistan’s counter terror strategy over the past few years reveals that not only it has been knee-jerk, flip-flop but lacking in a determined and coherent nationally unified approach. Pakistan’s attitude towards the terror groups both within Pakistan and outside has been more than selective. Pakistan had belatedly trained its guns on the Hakimullah Mehsud led Pakistan based Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan (TTP), but conveniently turned a blind eye to other terror groups like the Haqqani network, the Hafiz Gul Bahadar group in North Waziristan and the Maulvi Nazim group in South Waziristan, which it has been treating as its ‘strategic assets’ for targeting the US, the ISAF and the Karzai administration in Afghanistan. These terror groups have been unifying their agendas to promote their sinister activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They consider the Pakistani Constitution unIslamic and are zealously working for the rule of the ‘Sharia’ in Pakistan, including through the ‘madrassas’ and mosques. This needs to be seriously countered by Pakistan, especially its political leadership, the military, the youth and its dwindling civil society. At the recently concluded Lahore Literary Festival, which was attended by many Indian writers too, former Pakistani Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar courageously expressed Pakistan’s current agony by asserting that “the biggest threat to Pakistan’s existence were the non-state actors created by the state itself to fight its proxy wars.” 

Boiling Cauldron - Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan

07/04/2014 

Prakash Katoch

E-Mail- prakashkatoch7@gmail.com

http://www.claws.in/Boiling-Cauldron---Syria,-Iraq,-Afghanistan-Prakash-Katoch.html

Afghanistan and Iraq go for elections this month, while Syria plunges deeper into terror, killings and destruction.While the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has been extended until 17 March 2015 vide resolution 2145 (2014), it was acerbic on part of the UNSC to say that the people of Afghanistan should not allow “spoilers and terrorists” to undermine their democratic future, as if the people of Afghanistan are not nationalists and have any control over the terror flowing in from across the borders, besides the ‘great game’ that the region has been subjected to over the years, which is continuing. No doubt very few Pashtuns in the south and east Afghanistan turned up for the 2009 elections because of Taliban threat and the Taliban have again threatened death to anyone who takes part in the elections but voters have to be provided protection and not left to their fate.The 2014 exit declaration by US, inviting Taliban for talks without participation of Northern Alliance (who helped the US invasion succeed in the first place) and the soft US stance on Pakistan (the prime source of terrorism) have led Afghan’s to say that they are being subcontracted to Pakistan. If Hamid Karzai did not sign the BSA, perhaps the main reason was the underhand deal by the US being worked out that Pakistan Taliban entering Afghanistan would not be targeted as long as they were not operating conjointly with Al Qaeda. Obviously, US interests are to keep Afghanistan on the boil – checkmating China? So, what difference would the BSA make other than granting US troops immunity against Afghan law? As it is, the Taliban had declared that they would disrupt elections and terror attacks are taking place pan Afghanistanincluding in the West and North aside from Capital Kabul while south and east Afghanistan are perpetually violence ridden.An official Afghanistan statement this February put the total number of Afghan soldiers and police officers killed during the war at over 13,000 over and above 3,425 coalition soldiers killed during the 13-year conflict. The numbers also showed more clashes in past three years.With Afghanistan ranked 175 out of 187 countries on UN’s development index, whoever wins Afghanistan's 2014 presidential election will have his hands full with poverty, corruption, ethnic rivalries, terrorism and violent insurgency but the question also remains how the US and the West will continue to manipulate events in Afghanistan and the region, portents of which don’t look good. 

Iraq tops the global terror index. In 2013 alone, 8000 were killed in terrorist violence and over 18,000 injured. While terrorist attacks in the run up to elections would depend upon the degree of political influence wielded over terrorist groups, given the dynamics of the terrorist groups and the spate of incidents it is unlikely Iraq will be able to successfully separate the terrorists from the population and run a successful campaign in combating terrorism particularly with the state of sectarian strife despite the Sahwa movement since 2005 to establish anti-terrorism Awakening Councils against the ISIL, the most prominent terrorist organization. Apparently the terrorist groups cannot dislodge the central government but the latter too does not have the strength to decisively defeat them. ISIL poses the most serious terrorist and military threat, while the other groups primarily constitute a problem for the government to assert control in Sunni Arab areas. Then is the vital question of outside support to terrorism and political will within Iraq to finish terrorism. ISIL whose cadres were estimated at 2,500 by 2012 can undertake over 100 operations in a single month. Iraqi Kurdish recruits of ISIL are going to Syria to aid the rebels and there is also terrorist movement from Syria to Iraq. Despite the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq preceded by the Status of Forces Agreement and a Strategic Framework Agreement, strong suspicion remains of CIA funding terrorism in Iraq. 

Afghan Stability: New Equations

With the NATO drawdown, Afghanistan’s neighbors will have a growing role to play in the country’s stability. 

By SK Chatterji

April 09, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/afghan-stability-new-equations/

With Afghanistan’s presidential election likely heading for a second round, it may be some time before the result is known. One issue the new president will need to address, though, is the Bilateral Security Agreement with the U.S., which incumbent Hamid Karzai has resolutely refused to sign, despite considerable pressure from the U.S. and the looming pullout of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Karzai’s stance may seem baffling, especially since the BSA was endorsed by a Loya Jirga last November. But he may be making a pragmatic judgment as to Washington’s long-term ability to keep the peace in Afghanistan. 

The “zero option” that Washington has enunciated, if executed, will create a power vacuum in Afghanistan. Even if that option were avoided and a limited American force of approximately 3,000 were maintained, there would still be a steep drop in area dominance capabilities, with Afghan National Security Forces left almost entirely in charge. The Taliban would doubtless attempt to fill the vacuum. 

Equally certain, Afghanistan’s neighbours would not be comfortable with a radical Taliban exporting terror to their countries across porous borders. Even those that do not share borders with Afghanistan would be concerned. What role might these countries play in the wake of the NATO drawdown? 

Among Afghanistan’s more powerful neighbors is Iran. A Shia-majority nation, it feels a sense of responsibility for the considerable Shia population in Afghanistan. The two countries also share ethnic and linguistic overlaps. Iran’s concern for the Shia of Afghanistan is evidenced in its past responses. Following the 1979 Russian takeover and Afghan resistance, Iran provided support for the Persian-speaking Shia groups. When the Taliban came to power, Iranians supported the Northern Alliance partners. In 1998, when the Taliban overran Majar-e-Sharif and massacred thousands of Hazaras and 10 Iranians with diplomatic papers, Iran deployed its Army along its borders with Afghanistan. 

Iran also faces a serious drug problem, with Afghan opium smuggled across its borders. Moreover, it hosts more than two million Afghan refugees. 

Musharraf’s calculated return has achieved its objectives

Tom Hussain

April 8, 2014 Updated: April 8, 2014

These are historic days for Pakistan. For half of its 66-year history, Pakistan has been ruled by four military dictators, each of them convinced of his own moral and professional superiority over civilian politicians, particularly in the context of a country that’s been a geostrategic buffer state since the advent of the Cold War. During the several short bursts of democratic rule punctuating Pakistan’s political timeline, civilian attempts at reining in the military and its intelligence organisations had either been clumsy or inept, and ended in abject failure, leading to an administration’s downfall and, in due course, a resumption of direct military rule.

Thus the March 31 indictment of a former military president, retired general Pervez Musharraf, on charges of treason holds special significance, six years into a democratic dispensation under which the two top political parties, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Pakistan People’s Party, have adhered to a charter under which each promised to watch the other’s back to avert the perpetual conspiracies of the military’s spy arms. 

With Gen Musharraf indicted, it might be easy to conclude that Pakistan has attained “Arab Spring-plus” status.

Not exactly. Indicted or not, Gen Musharraf has succeeded in achieving many of his reasons for deciding to return to Pakistan in March last year. Sure, his attempt at contesting the May general election was shot down by the election commission, and he has since lived in confinement, whether at his plush farmhouse residence on the outskirts of Islamabad, or at the army-run cardiac hospital in neighbouring Rawalpindi. And now he faces trial for treason. 

However, by appearing in courts to answer four separate murder charges, including the December 2007 assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, he has succeeded both in obtaining bail and regaining his considerable wealth frozen by the courts during his absence overseas. Because of this, he has the money required to fight back against his many detractors.

Similarly, he has exposed the reality of relations between the military and the government. His successor as army chief, Gen Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, had pleaded with him not to return, because it would establish a precedent of accountability of the hitherto unaccountable. It would also serve as a reminder to the Pakistani public that, however poor the performance of democratic governments, at least they were accountable for their failures. 

However, the wily Gen Musharraf defied his erstwhile subordinates by accusing them of abandonment, a theme that played well to the internal audience of midcareer army officers who had been commissioned under his seven-year leadership. That translated into pressure on Gen Kayani and, in turn, the government’s decision not to proceed against Musharraf until Gen Kayani’s retirement last November, by which time the lack of substantial evidence against him in four murder cases had left the trial courts with no option but to grant him bail. 

As such, he was on the verge of becoming a free man, and well-placed to thumb his nose at prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whom he’d overthrown in October 1999, as well as at the judges he’d sacked in November 2007, who had since been reinstated and had established the judiciary as a powerful new lobby within Pakistan’s body politic. 

Mongolia: Activist and Ambitious

In the past year, Mongolia has experienced a vast proliferation of diplomatic contact with its region and the world. 

By Ankit Panda

April 08, 2014

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/mongolia-activist-and-ambitious/

Mongolia is fast becoming an ambitious country worth watching in the Asia-Pacific. Given its neighborhood, it is perhaps unsurprising that most attention is focused on its two (much) larger neighbors, but under the leadership of President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj the country’s foreign ambitions have grown considerably. 

Nations from the world over have experienced high-level contact with Mongolia in the past year. Part of Mongolia’s diplomatic explosion was driven by a poor foreign direct investment outlook in the beginning of 2013—as a resource rich country, Mongolia’s economic well-being is highly contingent on the health of its mining sector. A 43 percent decline in overall foreign investment, and a 32 percent decline in the mining sector, was thus cause for concern. Mongolia used the occasion of the 100th anniversary of its establishing a professional diplomatic service to pursue its activist foreign policy worldwide — it has set the goal of establishing bilateral diplomatic relations with all UN member states. At the same time, Mongolia, under Foreign Minister Lu Bold, has adopted a “one window” policy wherein its diplomats disseminate information globally about Mongolia as a hospitable destination for foreign direct investment. 

President Elbegdorj himself traveled across Asia and the world to improve Mongolia’s presence on the world stage. He traveled to Japan, North Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Vietnam, and Norway. The North Korea visit emphasized that Mongolia sought to play a great role in Asia by suggesting that it be incorporated into the Six Party Talks on North Korea’s nuclear program (should those ever resume). Mongolia’s desire to act as a mediator between North Korea and the rest of the world highlights its regional ambitions. 

World leaders returned the favor for Mongolia’s outreach efforts by making visits to the country in return. As The Diplomat reported recently, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel’s April Asia tour includes a stop in Ulaanbatar — the first visit by a U.S. Defense Secretary to the country in nine years. Hagel’s visit seemed to be a reward for Mongolia’s outreach efforts, highlighting a growing U.S. strategic interest in the country (which is located between two major U.S. rivals). That Vice President Joe Biden visited in August 2011 further highlights a growing interest in Mongolia in the United States. Apart from the U.S., Mongolia managed to draw leaders from far outside its region, including Poland and Canada. Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary William Hague visited the country on the occasion of 50 years of diplomatic relations between Britain and Mongolia. Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair is also serving as an adviser for the Mongolia government on a trove of newfound copper and gold wealth in the Gobi desert. 

U.S.-China Relations: Moving Beyond the Script

Paul Haenle

OP-ED APRIL 8, 2014

CHINA INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY REVIEW 

SUMMARY

China’s dramatic rise in economic power and international clout presents Beijing and Washington with the challenge of how to manage relations between a rising power and a status quo power.

INTRODUCTION 

At the historic U.S.-China Summit in Rancho Mirage, California in June 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping remarked, “At present, the China-U.S. relationship has reached a new historical starting point.”1 Indeed, China’s dramatic rise in economic power and international clout over the past forty years presents Beijing and Washington with the challenge of how to manage relations between a rising power and a status quo power, amid increasing bilateral interdependence, tension, and mistrust. 

Less than four decades ago, the architects of the U.S.-China relationship began building what they hoped would develop into a sustainable and constructive bilateral relationship, through “a handshake across the Pacific Ocean.”2 They could not have foreseen that in such short time, the U.S.-China relationship would become one of the most active, highest-profile, and important bilateral relationships in the world. Since formalizing bilateral relations in 1979, shared interests, strong vision and leadership in the U.S.-China relationship have persevered, delivering great benefits to the citizens of China, the United States, and beyond. 

Paul Haenle

DIRECTOR

CARNEGIE–TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY

The inflexion point of relations that both countries face today will be no less challenging or significant than the one in 1979. In fact, history predicts that efforts to avoid destabilizing competition will ultimately be unsuccessful. However, both sides understand the stakes that rest on a strong U.S.-China relationship, the most consequential of any in the twenty-first century.

This paper outlines the necessary elements of a new approach to U.S.-China relations that can carry both sides peacefully through their next stages of development. It argues that Xi’s proposed framework of a “new type of major country relationship” between the U.S. and China will require a new type of U.S.-China interaction—one that is open and candid; one that both presidents take ownership of; and one with a global agenda based on shared interests. 

U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS: A LOOK BACK 

Today, the media portrays the U.S.-China relationship as one mired in disagreement and destined for conflict. Narratives and issues are framed in zero-sum terms, in which any win for China is a loss for the United States, and vice versa. From Capitol Hill to the presidential campaign trail, the rise of China is described as a threat to U.S. predominance and its long-term objectives. In China, the United States’ strategic rebalancing to Asia is primarily understood as part of a larger effort to contain China’s rise. 

In order to accurately analyze the current state of U.S.-China relations, it is important to evaluate where the relationship between China and the United States originated. For over three decades after WWII, both countries had very little contact or exchange—whether in the context of business, academic, governmental, or otherwise. Until the period of Ping Pong Diplomacy and former U.S. president Richard Nixon’s first secret visit to China in 1972, the leadership of the United States and China were forced to communicate and send official messages through third-party countries, such as Pakistan. 

The Debt Surge Will Not Ruin China

The Debt Surge Will Not Ruin China

Yukon Huang, Canyon Bosler

OP-ED APRIL 8, 2014

WALL STREET JOURNAL 

SUMMARY

China will see a rise in banks’ nonperforming loans and increasingly frequent defaults in the bond and shadow banking markets. This process will be very messy but is unlikely to derail the economy.

The doomsday scenario is concerned with the total debt of Chinese households, firms and the government. This has grown sharply since 2008 to around 210% of GDP in 2013. The rate of increase is much higher than the 40-50 percentage point booms that occurred in the U.S. and United Kingdom before the global financial crisis, Korea before the Asian financial crisis, or Japan before its lost decade.

The more pessimistic analysts also expect China's debt to GDP ratio to continue rising, driving the interest burden of the debt to around 20% of GDP in 2017 from its current 12%. They believe that while the day of reckoning may not be tomorrow, it will likely arrive in a few years. 

More optimistic observers point out that China's debt of around 210% of GDP is not abnormally high. Its ratio is close to that of regional peers Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand and much lower than advanced economies, whose debt has averaged over 300% of GDP in recent years. But while the level of debt may not be a problem, the speed and extent of the rise are seen to create vulnerabilities. 

Even if that's correct, China differs from its predecessors. Its initial rise in debt was the result of a deliberate state-driven stimulus program in response to the global financial crisis, which successfully prevented a sharp downturn. 

In other crisis countries, a credit surge was due to the culmination of a long-term deterioration in financial indicators. This was brought on by excessive external borrowings, rising current account deficits and overvalued exchange rates or excessively leveraged housing markets exacerbated by chronic fiscal deficits. 

China's rise in debt after the stimulus was fed by a construction boom which many see as a property bubble. A more likely explanation for the sharp rise in housing prices is that the market is trying to establish appropriate values for assets previously hidden in a socialist system. 

China’s New Neighbourhood Strategy: Korean and Japnese Reactions

7 April 2014 

Source Link

East Asia Compass 

Sandip Kumar Mishra

Assistant Professor, University of Delhi and Visiting Fellow, IPCS 

It is interesting to track inter-state relations and equations in East Asia in the context of China’s policy of building a ‘Community of Common Destiny’ (CCD). China, after its first official announcement of the concept in 2007 to describe its special relations with Taiwan, has further expanded its use to describe its relations with Central Asian and ASEAN countries and its neighbourhood. Chinese President Xi Jinping has re-emphasised the concept to introduce a new Chinese contribution to inter-state relations in the region, along the lines of other catchphrases like China Dream, new type of great power relations, and peaceful neighbourhood. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on the concept could also be seen as a counter-balancing measure to US’ ‘return to Asia’ or ‘Asian pivot’.

The trajectory of China’s behaviour in Southeast and East Asian politics in the recent past does not suggest the spirit of the CDCD and might be therefore perceived as another Chinese effort to camouflage its aggressive strategic intents in the region. It seems that China uses the softest terms and language when it wants to pursue the most aggressive political and military intent. The CCD, rather than soothing neighbouring countries, creates a sense of suspicion in their minds. China is perceived as ambidextrous in its policy to create power dominance in regional politics and increase bilateral economic ties with the countries of the region. This basic contradiction in Chinese foreign policy makes all its catchphrases, including the CCD, meaningless, or at least doubtful about their real intentions and implications. 

Having said that, it would not be constructive to write-off the CCD as just a catchphrase and devoid of any serious meaning and intent. The current phase of inter-state relations in Asia and beyond could be characterised by huge networks of transnational interactions, and it is possible to move beyond archaic notions of the balance of power, anarchy, great power rivalry, power transition etc, which are basically products of 19th and 20th century European experiences. It does not mean that inter-state relations have transformed in the current era. It only means that the relations have become much more varied, complex and overlapping, and it is possible to inculcate common cooperative and inclusive security by bringing in non-military elements into the discourse. Since the current phase could be, at best, called transitory, it would be not be possible to abandon military and power dynamics altogether. However, it must be brought to a secondary level. Thus, China’s notion of the CCD is a welcome initiative and it must be appreciated. At the same timne, it must be communicated to China through collective mechanisms and bilateral interactions that its quest for power and dominance would be costly and it must refrain from such behaviour. 

After Crimea, It’s (Still) Good to Talk

8 April 2014

Heather Williams 

Source Link

(Editor’s note: This is a guest post by Heather Williams, a War Studies PhD candidate. Header image is copyright Maksymenko Oleksandr issued under a creative commons attribution license) 

Oscar Jonsson’s post posed the question, what would be the benefit for the West of a negotiated solution with Russia? At first I thought this was either rhetorical or designed to stir the pot. Seeing that it was not the former, I will assume it was the latter and provide the spoon for said pot stirring. 

First, why is the West in talks with Russia over Ukraine? Jonsson notes that the West ‘came running’ to negotiate with Putin and it’s ‘in the bone marrow.’ To quote the second most cliché of security studies phrases (Clausewitz obviously gets the first), ‘it is better to jaw jaw than to war war.’ Now before you cry out ‘Sudetanland’ or fall victim to the Godwin’s law, let’s not discard the notion of negotiation altogether. Generally speaking, the goal of negotiation is to communicate interest, identify areas of discord, and, hopefully, settle on areas of agreement. Negotiations also offer an opportunity for building personal contacts, relaying concerns in a private setting, and building trust, however limited that might be. Negotiations entail risk, to be sure, and there comes a time when it is best to walk away from the negotiating table. Has the West really reached that point with Russia, though? 

This doesn’t mean the West and Russia will be braiding each other’s hair on the weekends whilst watching Hunt for Red October. But any alternatives to dialogue point in the direction of misperception, miscommunication, and potential escalation. Taking a closer look at Western interests in negotiations reveal why this isn’t a massive waste of time. 

Stop Russian advances. In the midst of our ongoing analyses, we often forget the impact of these events on the ground, on people and families living with the stress of corrupt leaders, a collapsed government, and, now, a decapitated state. Keeping this in mind, the first priority must be to promote security within Ukraine, which means stopping Russian advances and facilitating a stable environment in which the Ukrainian people can rebuild. With that said, talking to the Russians is a much more desirable option than remaining silent or military escalation. Negotiation does not mean the West will concede to Russian positions, however. For example, the West will not recognize Crimea as part of Russia. As Jonsson points out, this would undermine the post-WWII system. But why should the West or Russia insist on this point in practice? Any negotiations towards federalization would have to be put to the Ukrainian people for a vote. Given all the fuss the West raised about the illegality of the referendum in Crimea, it would be blatantly hypocritical to then apply the same principles to the rest of Ukraine and undercut its attempts to rebuild a government. This is not Iraq circa 2003. 

Al Qaeda Reorganizes Itself for Syria

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Apr 9, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/al-qaeda-reorganizes-itself-syria-10214

April 9, 2014 

Charles E. Berger

According to testimony by CIA director John Brennan before a House panel last week, Al Qaeda recently deployed [3] mid-level planners from Pakistan to Syria. Intelligence officials fear these planners would be used to recruit some of the estimated 1,200 fighters from the United States and European and redirect them to attack the West. In addition to portending a higher likelihood of attacks on the West emanating from Syria, this development may represent efforts by Al Qaeda to shift its organization away from its current networked organization back to the more lethal structure it had before September 11, 2001. 

If Al Qaeda is already well established in Syria, as reported in the media, why would it send planners from Pakistan? Core Al Qaeda, the organization of Ayman al-Zawahri and the late Osama Bin Laden, is not the same organization as the jihadis currently fighting the Assad regime. As of about a month ago, there were two “Al Qaeda affiliates” in Syria. However, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was officially disenfranchised by Al Qaeda leadership. ISIS is now in open warfare with both the Assad regime and al Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s remaining affiliate in Syria. As I described in an earlier article [4], what some call the “Al Qaeda network” is not a unified organization, but actually a loose confederation of separate groups using the Al Qaeda brand. 

Why We Can Play the Long Game on Russia

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Apr 9, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/why-we-can-play-the-long-game-russia-10213

April 9, 2014 

James Clad [2], Robert A. Manning [3] 

With the benefit of hindsight, the Russian annexation of Crimea shouldn’t have been a great surprise: it has been obvious to those who chose to look that for most of the last twenty years, that Russian president Vladimir Putin never fully accepted the USSR’s demise. Now, as the West agonizes over another possible irredentist feint—possibly in Ukraine proper or in Transnistria—the United States and its allies need to take a deep breath and consider the long game. 

By the end of March, some accouterments of post-Soviet sovereignty had changed. The peninsula in dispute switched flags and currencies. But despite epochal foreboding, few lives had been lost; with Russian pride assuaged, the remainder of Ukraine was lurching into the European Union’s embrace—barring a Putin effort to destabilize it. The issue kicking off the crisis in the first place—Ukraine’s edging towards the EU—had now given Eurasia another tilt towards Mother Europe. 

Is it possible that over the long run, much of this might come out better than feared? Putin’s Ukraine gambit may yet prove a tactical success, but a strategic failure. Even there, if Putin seeks to dismantle Ukraine, he may yet face a Ukrainian military response. The shock annexation of Crimea, itself a product of a 1954 intra-Soviet land transfer, has had another salutary effect—jolting us into reluctant awareness of the downside cost of our intrusions into the Russian periphery over two decades. 

Israel and Palestine: There's Still Room at the Inn

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Apr 9, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/israel-palestine-theres-still-room-the-inn-10212

April 9, 2014 

Amitai Etzioni

Simon Schama’s new TV series and book The Story of the Jews [3] is particularly timely, although he’s covering well-ploughed ground. Schama shows, in fine detail, the ways the Jews tried, in any way they knew how and inventing new ones, to become accepted by societies in which they found themselves over the 1900 years that passed since they were exiled after the destruction of the first state of Israel. They tried to “assimilate” by praying on Sunday instead of on the Sabbath, by using the local language instead of Hebrew, by playing an organ instead of the shofar—and so on. They zealously served the rulers of their host countries and contributed richly to their cultures and commerce. However, as Schama shows, again and again and one more time Jews were (a) never fully accepted and (b) sooner or later kicked out in the most violent ways. They found new host countries, only to have their bitter fate repeated. 

After one of these rounds, when a young reporter witnessed the degradation of a Jewish French officer, Alfred Dreyfus, the reporter wrote a book that argued that the Jews had no choice but form their own homeland if they ever wanted to be safe. And Zion was the place to go. His name was Theodor Herzl—the father of Zionism. 

Critics of Zionism do not necessarily agree with this narrative. They tend to hold—as does Ari Shavit’s recent popular book My Promised Land: The Triumph and Tragedy of Israel—that Zionism made a critical mistake when it chose Palestine as the place to erect this Jewish homeland. The reason, as has been observed scores of times to the point it has become a cliché, is that Zionists thought that the Jews were a people without a land, and that Palestine was a land without people, and hence it was a match made in heaven. “They did not see the Arabs”, as Shavit puts it. This argument makes it sound that if the Zionist Jews knew that there were Arabs in Palestine, they would have looked for another parking place, one not taken. After all, if what they were mainly after was to find an empty land, they could have pitched their tents, say, somewhere between Kenya and Uganda, or in Argentina, as some suggested. (Never mind that none of these places were empty either.) The main Zionist thesis, though—the one its critics are seeking to ignore or debunk—was and is that Palestine was the place for the Jewish homeland, because this is where Jewish identity had been developed, because it is the place an Israeli state had existed before it was destroyed, because Jews yearned to return to it through their history. From their viewpoint, Palestine was a place they never really left. (Critics argue that much of this national narrative is constructed; but so is the Palestinian one. Until at least 1918 they all were merely Arabs, citizens of the Ottoman Empire.) 

Moreover, as I recently pointed out [4] in the Jerusalem Post, critics of Zionism make it sound like Palestine was a small home that was taken. Hence the way to build the state of Israel entailed driving out the Arabs. True, some Arabs were driven out—just as a similar number of Jews were driven out of Arab lands. And too many died at each other’s hands. However, data show, beyond doubt, that there was enough room for both people. At the end of 1946, just before the United Nations declaration that led to foundation of Israel, there were 1,267,037 Arabs and 543,000 Jews in Palestine. By the end of 2012 there were 1,647,200 Arabs in Israel (and nearly six million Jews). That is, since 1946 many more Jews and Arabs have found a home in this blessed land. 

How to Calm Asia's History Wars

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Apr 9, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/how-calm-asias-history-wars-10216

April 9, 2014 

Mike Mochizuki, Michael O'Hanlon

As President Obama prepares for his trip to Asia in two weeks, tensions are remarkably high in a part of the world that was supposed to be smart enough to focus on getting rich even as the Middle East remained bogged down in conflict. Although much of the problem originates in China, American allies sometimes play a role too—including the government of Shinzo Abe in Japan. His visits to the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo are one big reason. Mr. Obama, like other American officials, will probably ask him to desist from future visits when the two heads of government meet in Tokyo. But in fact, Obama should concentrate on a more realistic agenda—asking Abe to redefine and transform the shrine, rather than stop visiting it. 

The wounds of history are profound in East Asia. Simple repetition of the official Japanese apology first articulated [4] by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in August 1995 will not suffice to promote historical reconciliation. And as Abe demonstrated by his visit to Yasukuni in December 2013, Japanese political leaders like their counterparts in other countries naturally feel compelled to honor their country’s war dead. The Yasukuni Shrine memorializes millions of rank-and-file Japanese soldiers who died for their country, not just the fourteen Japanese leaders who were convicted [5] of “Class A” war crimes. 

If Prime Minister Abe or his successors want to visit Yasukuni in the future, it should be a transformed shrine. The Yasukuni grounds currently contain a military museum that downplays Japanese aggression and ignores Japan’s war responsibility. An exhibition with such a distorted view of Japan’s past does not belong at a solemn shrine that should be primarily about remembering the sacrifice of ordinary Japanese soldiers. In addition to closing down this military museum, the Yasukuni Shrine should find a creative way to remove the names of the Class A war criminals from among the millions who are memorialized. This option was indeed proposed by a leading political patron of Yasukuni in 2007 and even by then prime minister Yasuhiro Nakasone after his controversial visit to the shrine in 1985. When Emperor Hirohito learned of the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals in 1978, he was reportedly so angry that he refused to visit Yasukuni again. If Japanese patriots want to honor their war dead, the best way to do so is to transform Yasukuni so that the Japanese emperor can once again visit the shrine, as was frequently done before 1978, without stirring international controversy. 

As contentious as Yasukuni is, this shrine is far from the only issue preventing the healing of historical wounds. Many matters require attention, from the issue of “comfort women,” to the name of the Sea of Japan (which Korean Americans in Virginia are now contesting), to the way Chinese and Koreans teach their own people about the Japanese (verging at times on demonization, despite Japan's peaceful foreign policy after World War II and its efforts to atone for its militarist past). 

America also a winner in Afghan elections

Source Link

By Amir Taheri

April 7, 2014

Modal Trigger

It will be weeks before the final results of Afghanistan’s presidential election, held Saturday, are announced. And the winner won’t take office until June. Nevertheless, the voting, the third of its kind since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, has already provided a new and exciting political snapshot of a country emerging from four decades of turmoil. 

The first feature of this snapshot is that a majority of Afghans have adopted elections as the best means of choosing and changing governments. On Saturday, more than 7 million went to the polls — almost 60 percent of registered voters — a turnout about twice the level of four years ago. 

Second, the appeal of elections cuts across ethnic, regional, sectarian and gender boundaries. Turnout was heavier in the six provinces where ethnic Uzbeks, Tajiks and Hazara form a majority — but it was also high in provinces where the majority is Pushtun, the country’s largest ethnic group. In some towns and villages, Pushtuns went to the polls for the first time ever. Even in areas partly under Taliban influence, the number of voters was up at least 30 percent. 

Women’s turnout was also impressive, registering a 40 percent gain over the last time. (And the number of female election monitors was up 70 percent.) 

Book Review: Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy by Rahul Sagar

Published by Princeton University Press (2013) 

Reviewed by Steven Aftergood 

Thursday, April 3, 2014

Leaks of classified information have probably never been as prominent and as influential in public discourse as they are today. So Rahul Sagar’s book Secrets and Leaks is exquisitely timed to help readers to think through the conundrums of government secrecy in a democracy and to consider the role of unauthorized disclosures.

This is of course not a new topic. The literature on government secrecy, and even the subset on leaks, is quite voluminous and is perennially renewed. Much of it, truth be told, is tendentious and predictable.

But Sagar makes a fresh, original and provocative contribution to the field. Our problems with secrecy, he says, are not simply attributable to official venality or mismanagement (or to the Espionage Act or the Manhattan Project) but instead are rooted in our constitutional structure. And leaks of classified information are not necessarily a lamentable deviation from good government but are — within certain limits — an essential safeguard that should be defended and encouraged.

There are important “silences” in the Constitution, Sagar says, about the authority of the executive branch to withhold secret information, and about the conditions under which Congress and the public may gain access to such information.

The Framers authorized the president to employ secrecy in the public interest, but did not fully explain how citizens and lawmakers could know whether the president is in fact exercising this power responsibly.

By withholding guidance on how to resolve conflicts over the proper boundaries of official secrecy, these constitutional silences generated growing tensions that by the twentieth century demanded some type of solution. But, Sagar says, none of the resulting solutions — involving various forms of congressional or judicial oversight — have provided a fully satisfactory solution to the challenges of executive branch secrecy.

Contemporary efforts have arrived at an impasse. The regulatory mechanisms that have been championed in recent decades — the Freedom of Information Act and the establishment of congressional oversight committees in particular — have proven ineffective at exposing wrongdoing.

Only leaks, he argues, have the potential to overcome the otherwise unresolved tensions over disclosure of national security information that are the legacy of our constitutional design.

This is not an obvious conclusion. Even some confirmed critics of government secrecy have resisted it. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, for example, said “There must be zero tolerance for permitting such information to be released through unauthorized channels.”

Senior officers who send troops to their deaths using faulty kit will be jailed:

Soldiers' families praise new rules as top brass warn of being 'hung out to dry'

Duty Holder Concept rules now cover all conflicts involving British forces
Senior officers will face courts-martial if safety warnings are ignored
But former colonel warns new rules will increase burdens on commanders

By MARK NICOL

PUBLISHED: 22:36 GMT, 5 April 2014 |

http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2597881/Senior-officers-send-troops-deaths-using-faulty-kit-jailed-Soldiers-families-praise-new-rules-brass-warn-hung-dry.html

Senior Army officers, including generals, will be court-martialled and jailed if they send troops into battle with inadequate equipment, The Mail on Sunday can reveal.

Rules introduced last week mean that – for the first time in Army history – commanders will be held legally responsible for deaths in a war zone caused by faulty kit.

Last night, as troops’ families welcomed the move, top brass warned that combat operations could grind to a halt as officers fear being singled out for blame.

New rules: Royal Marines from Fire Support Troop, Charlie Company, 40 Commando, fire a Javelin missile as they attack a Taliban position on the frontline near Kajaki in Afghanistan's Helmand province

The Duty Holder Concept (DHC) regulations will cover all remaining British military operations in Afghanistan, which are scheduled to end in December, and any future conflicts involving UK Forces.


Their introduction follows huge public outcry over the hundreds of deaths linked to the use of shoddy equipment in Iraq and Afghanistan, including faulty radios and vehicles lacking armoured protection.

The move also comes after the UK Supreme Court ruled that the Government owes a duty of care to soldiers and that their families can sue the Ministry of Defence if equipment failures lead to deaths.

Under DHC, senior officers will face charges if safety warnings are ignored – without an operational imperative to do so.

The rules may also cover high-tech pieces of equipment, such as computers intended to protect helicopters from surface-to-air missiles, or if officers are found to have dismissed concerns raised by an armoured vehicle crew that – due to a mechanical fault – it was likely to tip over, trapping personnel inside.

The rules are being introduced to prevent senior officers escaping justice if they are considered to be responsible for soldiers’ deaths.


New era of accountability: Rules introduced last week mean that - for the first time in Army history - commanders will be held legally responsible for deaths in a war zone caused by faulty kit

The Emerging Arctic

A CFR InfoGuide Presentation

The northern reaches of the planet are melting at a pace few nations can afford to ignore, yielding potentially lucrative returns in energy, minerals, and shipping. But debate is mounting over whether the Arctic can be developed sustainably and peaceably.

The remote latitudes of the Arctic have long been a province of natural beauty, high adventure, and untold riches. For centuries, mariners risked their lives plying the frigid waters and frozen expanses in search of new territory, trade routes, and treasure for king and country. Where a few, like Norwegian polar explorer Roald Amundsen, triumphed over uncommon challenges, many others, like British rear admiral Sir John Franklin, suffered tragedy and defeat. With rare exception, much of the promise of the Arctic remained out of reach, encrusted in the polar ice.

In the twenty-first century, many experts believe that climate change, technological advances, and rising global demand for resources may at last unlock the considerable economic potential of the Circumpolar North. The melting of Arctic sea ice to record lows in recent years has prompted many nations, principally those with Arctic Ocean coastlines—the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland)—to reassess their commitments and interests in the icy reaches atop the globe.

Many forecast Arctic summers will be free of ice in a matter of decades, potentially opening the region up to hundreds of billions of dollars in investment, including energy production, shipping, and fishing. The thaw will also pose new security demands as greater human activity induces states to increase their military and constabulary presence. While most experts dismiss the prospects for armed aggression in the Arctic, some defense analysts and academics assert that territorial disputes and a competition for resources have primed the Arctic for a new Cold War.