Daniel Salisbury
The threat posed by Tehran’s nuclear programme has featured in US and Israeli efforts to justify their military operations against Iran. However, the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation seldom provides a solution to complex problems.
Iran’s nuclear programme has featured repeatedly in stated rationales from the United States for recent US–Israel-led military operations against the country. Beginning in late February 2026, the US military has repeatedly struck Iranian targets, killing the country’s political leadership as well as destroying Iran’s missile capability, navy and other military forces.
The latest campaign takes place after the Twelve-Day War in 2025, in which Israel struck military and nuclear targets, and the US struck three key nuclear sites – Natanz, Fordow and Esfahan – in Operation Midnight Hammer. The following eight months saw limited Iranian efforts to reconstitute its programme, suggesting some degree of military success in rolling back Iran’s capabilities.
However, the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation is not a new phenomenon. History shows a range of risks in kinetic approaches and suggests that the Iranian nuclear question will likely remain unresolved in the longer term.
The counter-proliferation mission
As US and Israeli military operations enter their fourth week, stopping Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear technology has featured among both states’ evolving explanations for their use of force. As the US military initiated major combat operations in Iran on 28 February 2026, US President Donald Trump stated the strikes would ‘ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon’.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated similar objectives, noting, ‘this murderous terrorist regime must not be allowed to arm itself with nuclear weapons that would enable it to threaten all of humanity’.
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