Seva Gunitsky
Time has a way of compressing history. The Hundred Years’ War was a series of three separate wars that must have felt as distinct to its contemporaries as the World Wars feel to us now. But those three wars were a long time ago, so we lump them together into one conflict. Besides, we are wise. We have seen the direction of History and know they were all fought over the unresolved question of England’s rivalry with France.
I suspect future historians will apply the same compression to the three Gulf Wars of the unipolar era. While 1991, 2003, and 2026 are distinct in many ways, they all revolve around repeated attempts by the hegemon to impose its order on a region that it appears to understand less and less each time.
Together, the three wars trace the arc of America’s unipolar moment, from its triumphant emergence in 1991 to its hubristic peak in 2003 to its current retreat. Each phase of the campaign is defined by deepening contempt for the rest of the world and increasing disconnect from its own national interest. In 1991, the United States had a reason to fight; in 2003 it manufactured one; in 2026 it didn’t bother. Maybe this time the bombing was “out of habit,” Trump explained recently, which, he added, is “not a good thing to do.”
The First Gulf War was the coronation of the new arrangement: a 34-nation coalition, UN authorization, Arab states fighting alongside NATO allies. The USSR stood by meekly, Gorbachev hoping for more loans for his tottering regime. The coalition liberated Kuwait and stopped. A miracle, the hegemon actually working within the rules it claimed to uphold. But Saddam remained in power, and the sanctions regime that followed was corrosive to American credibility. The first war’s restraint preserved the legitimacy of American primacy but also left unfinished business.
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