Indian Strategic Studies

9 February 2015

Japan Wades Into South China Sea Issue

By Mina Pollmann

February 06, 2015

In the 1970s, when Japan first sought to craft a foreign policy identity independent of the U.S., it turned to Southeast Asia. Though Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s 1974 trip was greeted with protests, relations quickly improved with the 1977 promulgation of the Fukuda Doctrine, which promised that Japan would never again become a military power. Since then, Japan has been seen positively in Southeast Asia as a mentor and constructive partner.

However, despite this reservoir of soft power and major economic clout in the region, Japan has only been able to exercise marginal influence and has had difficulty being taken seriously. Part of the reason is that the U.S. remains the ultimate guarantor of security and stability in the region. And while the overall U.S. role will not change any time soon, regional dynamics are in flux as Japan develops a more robust foreign policy that seeks to promote Japanese interests and project influence abroad — starting in Southeast Asia, where disputes over islands in the South China Sea have attracted international attention.

Japan is interested in the South China Sea disputes gripping Southeast Asia for two main reasons. First, any tension in these waters could disrupt the free flow of traffic through critical sea lines, which are vital for resource-poor Japan’s economy and survival. Second, Japanese officials are closely monitoring how China handles these island disputes to try to discern how China might try to deal with Japan in their ongoing dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.

The interconnectedness of these two issues is evident in the rife speculation that China might unilaterally declare an Air Defense Identification Zone in the South China Sea after it did so in the East China Sea in November 2013 (speculation which China has consistently denied). Such interconnectedness also leads to concerns that a negative outcome – a resolution of a dispute through the use or threat of the use of force – could set a precedent that affects other disputes. By supporting front-line states in the South China Sea, Japan sees itself as defending its own interests by upholding the norm of peaceful resolution, ironically, through military deterrence.

Deny the Islamic State the overreaction that it wants

By Fareed Zakaria

February 5

Once again, an Islamic State killing leads to fears that it is winning and calls to do more. Fox News’s Bret Baier captured the mood when he said of the latest video: “Horrific and barbaric, as well as calculating and skilled at high-tech propaganda.” The general feeling is that the Islamic State is gaining ground with its brutal and diabolical methods.

But is it really? Let’s examine the sequence of events that led to this latest gruesome video. The Islamic State took as hostages two Japanese men — an odd choice, given that Japan is utterly tangential to the Middle East. The terrorists asked Tokyo for a staggering $200 million ransom. This suggests that the much-vaunted moneymaking machine of the Islamic State might not be working as well as many believe.

Tokyo refused to pay, so the terrorists were left with hostages who had no value. They executed one and then offered to release the other if the Jordanian government would set free a terrorist, Sajida al-Rishawi. This was a double head-scratcher. Japan does not have any great influence over Jordan. And Rishawi was a largely forgotten, would-be suicide bomber from an episode nine years ago — before the Islamic State even existed. The proposal suggested a last-minute scramble to manufacture a new demand when the main one was denied. Jordan considered making its captured pilot, Lt. Muath al-Kaseasbeh, part of the bargain, and the Islamic Stateappeared to play along. Yet Jordanian officials now believe the pilot had actually been killed weeks earlier.

The video of the pilot being burned to death may be a fancy cover to mask an operation that had gone awry. Certainly, the Islamic State could not have imagined the response it has triggered in the Middle East, with Jordanians united against it, clerics across the region loudly and unequivocally condemning the immolation and Japan ready to provide more aid and support against the terrorist group.

Does the barbarism have a logic?

By Charles Krauthammer

February 5

Why did they do it? What did the Islamic State think it could possibly gain by burning alive a captured Jordanian pilot?

I wouldn’t underestimate the absence of logic, the sheer depraved thrill of a triumphant cult reveling in its barbarism. But I wouldn’t overestimate it either. You don’t overrun much of Syria and Iraq without having deployed keen tactical and strategic reasoning.

So what’s the objective? To destabilize Jordan by drawing it deeply into the conflict.

At first glance, this seems to make no sense. The savage execution has mobilized Jordan against the Islamic State and given it solidarity and unity of purpose.

Yes, for now. But what about six months hence? Solidarity and purpose fade quickly. Think about how post-9/11 American fervor dissipated over the years of inconclusive conflict, yielding the war fatigue of today. Or how the beheading of U.S. journalists galvanized the country against the Islamic State, yet less than five months later, the frustrating nature of that fight is creating divisions at home.

Jordan is a more vulnerable target because, unlike the U.S., it can be destabilized. For nearly a century Jordan has been a miracle of stability — an artificial geographic creation led by a British-imposed monarchy, it has enjoyed relative domestic peace and successful political transitions with just four rulers over four generations.

Compared to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, similarly created, Jordan is a wonder. But a fragile one. Its front-line troops and special forces are largely Bedouin. The Bedouin are the backbone of the Hashemite monarchy, but they are a minority. Most of the population is non-indigenous Palestinians, to which have now been added 1.3 million Syrian refugees, creating major social and economic strains.

Escape Artist: How a Legendary Hezbollah Terrorist Eluded the CIA

2/6/15

Beirut, 2003: The trap was set. U.S. counterterror operatives were ready to move. The plan called for a Lebaneser CIA asset to lure Imad Mugniyah, the terrorist kingpin of Hezbollah, to a place where he would be captured and flown to a U.S. Navy ship in the Mediterranean. From there he would be flown to a U.S. courtroom, where he would eventually stand trial for the murder of hundreds of Americans in Lebanon two decades earlier.

But something went wrong. According to a former top U.S. counterterrorism official, the Lebanese go-between was murdered. The wily Mugniyah, variously known as “the fox” and “the father of smoke” (for his ability to disappear like a wisp after one of his spectacular terrorist attacks), had foiled yet another plot to capture him. The U.S. plan, the former counterterrorism official suspected, had leaked.

“We had him!” the official said, still exasperated years later about the failure to capture Mugniyah. Upon investigating, the official concluded that idle chit-chat by a careless U.S. intelligence official at a small party attended by Americans and Lebanese in Beirut on the eve of the operation had foiled the plot.

“Some guy was shooting the shit an embassy social event,” he told Newsweekon condition of anonymity “We had the whole network set up. Everything was done, everything was in place. And then this guy runs his mouth.”

In February 2008, however, the CIA, working hand in glove with Israeli intelligence, finally caught up to Mugniyah. The details of how they assassinated Mugniyah with a car bomb, as reported by Newsweek and The Washington Post in independently sourced stories last weekend, remain a deeply held secret at the CIA.

Why Arming the Ukrainians is a Bad Idea

Jeremy Shapiro

February 3, 2015

Steve Pifer is a good friend and a treasured colleague. And Strobe Talbott is my boss—so it goes without saying that I greatly admire his work. But as important as friendship and job security are to me, I still can only conclude that their proposal to arm Ukrainians will lead only to further violence and instability, and possibly a dangerous confrontation with Russia.

Steve and Strobe’s article (and the supporting report with several other prominent authors) rings with fury at Russian actions. And Russian actions are indeed outrageous. But moral indignation, no matter how righteous and satisfying, is not a strategy. A strategy needs to describe just how provision of American arms would make the situation better.

Rather than such a description, the article suggests that a just cause and the Ukrainian need and desire for weapons are enough to justify their provision. But it is hardly surprising that the Ukrainians want American arms in their war against Russia and Russian-backed separatists—they face the possibility of territorial dismemberment and would run any risk to preserve their state intact.

The Ukrainian calculus is one of immediate desperation. But the United States needs to think for the longer-term. And if U.S.-provided weapons fail to induce a Russian retreat in Ukraine and instead cause an escalation of the war, the net result will not be peace and compromise. There has recently been much escalation in Ukraine, but it could go much further. As horrible as it is, the Ukrainian civil war still looks rather tame by the standards of Bosnia, Chechnya or Syria. Further escalation will mean much more violence, suffering and death in Ukraine.

The report authors counter that if the United States does not stand up to Russia in Ukraine, the Putin regime will be emboldened to make similar mischief all over Europe and beyond. This is the familiar credibility argument that gave us the war in Vietnam, among other misadventures. In fact, U.S. credibility is not enhanced by making bluffs that we will not ultimately fulfill or by embarking on wasting wars that we do not need.

Ukraine needs America’s help

By Steven Pifer and Strobe Talbott

Steven Pifer is a senior fellow at the Brookings Insitution and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine. Strobe Talbott is the president of the Brookings Institution. He served as deputy U.S. secretary of state from 1994 to 2001.

The new year has brought more misery to Ukraine. Separatist fighters, supported by Russian troops, have launched attacks in Donetsk and Luhansk. Diplomatic efforts have made no progress toward a settlement — or even toward firming up a cease-fire that has all but collapsed. The West, including the United States, needs to get serious about assisting Ukraine if it does not wish to see the situation deteriorate further. That means committing real money now to aid Ukraine’s defense.

Following the intervention by regular Russian army units in eastern Ukraine in August, a cease-fire was hammered out in Minsk on Sept. 5. Observance of the cease-fire terms has been piecemeal at best, with regular shelling across the line of contact.

After a December lull, fighting picked up again this month. The leader of the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic recently said he will take all of Donetsk. The next day, separatists, possibly augmented by Russian troops,rocketed the city of Mariupol, killing some 30 civilians.

Moscow has done nothing to promote a peaceful settlement. It did not withdraw its weapons, nor did it secure the Ukraine-Russia border, as it agreed to do in Minsk. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to deny that his forces fight in Ukraine — even as Russian television shows soldiers in action wearing Russian insignia.

Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do

Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James Stavridis, Strobe Talbott and Charles Wald

We face a critical juncture in Ukraine. There is no real ceasefire; indeed, there was a significant increase in fighting along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine in mid-January, with Russian/separatist forces launching attacks on the Donetsk airport and other areas. Instead of a political settlement, Moscow currently seeks to create a frozen conflict in eastern Ukraine as a means to pressure and destabilize the Ukrainian government. Russians continue to be present in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts in substantial numbers and have introduced significant amounts of heavy weapons. This could be preparation for another major Russian/ separatist offensive.

Russian success would fatally undermine Ukraine’s stability and embolden the Kremlin to further challenge the security order in Europe. It might tempt President Putin to use his doctrine of protecting ethnic Russians and Russian speakers in seeking territorial changes elsewhere in the neighborhood, including in the Baltic States, provoking a direct challenge to NATO. Maintaining Western sanctions are critical but not by themselves sufficient. The West needs to bolster deterrence in Ukraine by raising the risks and costs to Russia of any renewed major offensive.

That requires providing direct military assistance—in far larger amounts than provided to date and including lethal defensive arms—so that Ukraine is better able to defend itself. The U.S. government should provide Ukraine $1 billion in military assistance as soon as possible in 2015, followed by additional tranches of $1 billion in FY 2016 and FY 2017.... More

Russia’s Third Front: Mounting Anxiety Over Afghanistan

By: Stephen Blank

February 6, 2015

With most of the military forces of the United States and the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) having departed Afghanistan, Russia has grown increasingly anxious about a possible deterioration of the regional security situation. As 2014 ended, Moscow flatly called NATO’s Afghanistan policy a failure (Pajhwok Afghan News, December 31, 2014). Yet, at the same time, Russia insists that the North Atlantic Alliance retains responsibility for Afghan security even though its mission has ended. This paradox is a basic attribute of the essential ambivalence that dogs Russian security policy in the wider Central Asian region (Xinhua, December 31, 2014). So while Russia “has a stake in Afghanistan,” it wants others as much as possible to defend that stake. Moscow, itself, is neither prepared to send troops to Afghanistan, nor even to the border with Tajikistan (Indiaexpress.com, December 8, 2014; Interfax, December 29, 2014).

Central Asian leaders, like Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov, have warned that Afghanistan risks becoming another Syria or Iraq, and Vladimir Putin concurred with this assessment (Interfax, December 10, 2014). Meanwhile, Russia’s presidential representative in Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, likewise claims that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan know of and share Russia’s assessment of an imminent Islamic State–led invasion of Central Asia. Though, many Western analysts consider that assessment of the radical militant group’s capabilities, especially in this theater, as overhyped (Interfax, December 29, 2014). Similarly, Russia’s General Staff also expects the Afghan situation to deteriorate, and Kabulov anticipates the rise of Islamist fighters and an expansion of their operations to the borders with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan—if not beyond—by spring 2015 (ITAR-TASS, December 10, 2014; Interfax, December 29, 2014). Obviously, this assessment leaves Russia with few if any options, let alone good ones.

Indeed, the Taliban already reached that border by the end of 2014 (TOL Newsline, January 3, 2015), and some analysts assert that the Taliban is currently present and active in northern Tajikistan (1News TV, December 15, 2014). In his end-of-year interview, Kabulov went farther, claiming that about 100 Islamic State fighters have been deployed from Syria and Iraq to Afghanistan to prepare an attack on Central Asia. Specifically, he warned that they had created beachheads on the border with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan (Interfax, December 29, 2014).

The Lowdown on Obama's New National Security Strategy

Julianne Smith

February 5, 2015

A little less than a year ago, my colleague Jacob Stokes and I wrote a piece for Politico Magazine highlighting some of the challenges facing those drafting the next National Security Strategy (NSS), which at the time was supposedly just weeks away from release.

How would they address the rebalancing to Asia question? How to acknowledge counterterrorism victories, but also the fact that the terrorism threat has in many ways worsened? Would democracy and human rights play such a prevalent role as they did in the 2010 version? What would they say about rising powers, particularly those that are showing an interest in replacing the U.S.-led order? How might the NSS set a comprehensive cyber agenda that could reestablish trust with skeptical allies, a skittish business community and an increasingly worried U.S. public? Finally, we asked, what would the administration say about leadership, knowing a common critique of this team is that its failure to exert U.S. leadership has left the country weaker than ever before?

Despite that rather long list of substantive challenges, it appears the biggest challenge for the drafters was simply getting a final version out the door. Initially, the administration thought it might release the NSS in 2013, four years after the last version was rolled out. As is often the case, though, high-level meetings on the crisis of the week took precedence over those aimed at examining broader strategic questions. With Syria heating up, Russia annexing Crimea and China announcing an air defense zone and bullying its neighbors, no one felt like they could afford the luxury of a lengthy interagency debate on grand strategy. Furthermore, given the speed with which events were moving, senior policy makers worried that anything they drafted would become OBE—overtaken by events—within weeks, if not days. So the process languished for another two years.

What Really Drives Obama’s Military Strategy?

BY PETER D. FEAVER

FEBRUARY 4, 2015

Is President Barack Obama casualty-phobic? That is the question raised by an intriguing think-piece by Greg Jaffe in the Feb. 1 edition of the Washington Post. Though Jaffe does not use that term, I suspect that he was wondering the same thing when he sat down to explore President Obama’s curious ambivalence and hesitancy regarding the military missions Obama has ordered the U.S. military to execute — and the equally odd messaging coming from the administration on these military operations.

First, let’s define some terms. As I and my co-authors have explained elsewhere, most Americans — and certainly every president — are casualty sensitive, meaning that they view the human toll of war as a negative cost that must be weighed against any possible positive benefit from military action. If told we can achieve the same military objective but at a lower level of casualties (and with no other compensating costs), then every president would pick that course over one that promised no additional benefits but significantly higher casualties. By a similar logic, if told the human costs of an operation are going to be high, then every president will demand that the expected benefits of that operation be high as well. Degrees of casualty sensitivity can vary by the person and by the geopolitical era, and the technology of war clearly plays a role: because of advances in technology and our military prowess, it is reasonable to expect that the U.S. military can achieve certain battlefield objectives at much lower levels of combat deaths than was possible in other eras. Conversely, battle tolls associated with successful missions in an earlier era would be deemed unacceptable and signs of military failure today; as many Americans died in the successful D-Day landing in Normandy as have died in the entire Afghanistan war. So modern presidents rightly expect lower combat deaths from military operations today than earlier presidents did.

It is not really interesting to note that President Obama is casualty sensitive in this sense of the word.

Rice Pudding

BY DAVID ROTHKOPF

FEBRUARY 6, 2015

How you read U.S. President Barack Obama’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) will depend mostly on how you feel about the administration’s foreign policy to date. If you are an Obama admirer, you will see it as a reaffirmation of all the reasons you appreciate the president: his restraint, his prioritization of domestic issues, his sense of the limitations of American power, his desire to make fiascos like the Bush wars in Iraq and Afghanistan less likely on his watch. If you are a critic, you will see it as a confirmation of everything you feared: From its doctrine of “strategic patience” to its absolute absence of anything that actually resembles a real strategy, you’ll see it as the written embodiment of the attitudes and muddle-headedness that have diminished America’s standing internationally and contributed to deteriorating situations on the ground, from Ukraine to Syria, from Libya to Afghanistan. Or perhaps, if you are a critic of the president’s from the left, you will see it as dripping with hypocrisy, talking about a values-driven foreign policy that ignores, sidesteps, or whitewashes the president’s ratcheting up of drone strikes and NSA surveillance (before he began to criticize them), his failure to close Guantánamo, his reluctance to pursue real global financial reform, and his relative inaction on issues like immigration and climate until after his re-election for a second term.

Of course, if you are like most Americans, you won’t ever read it at all. Which is just as well. Along with being devoid of strategy, the document is also devoid of surprises or new ideas. That could be because its focus is not, as would be the case in a real strategic planning document, the future. Instead, it is the past. This document is really a brief filed by the president in defense of his record to date.

Obama's National Security Strategy: A Policy of ‘Sustainment’

Jacob Stokes

February 6, 2015

Perhaps the most important function of any National Security Strategy (NSS) comes in articulating an administration’s worldview, rather than detailing a specific to-do list. The 2015 NSS, rolled out by National Security Advisor Susan Rice on Friday, offers the most complete explication of the Obama administration’s worldview yet.

The document includes all the now-standard (and true) language about the indispensable nature of U.S. leadership and how America is a global force for good. But it also asks the right question, one that is now familiar to those who follow administration statements on U.S. strategy: “The question is never whether America should lead, but how we lead.”

The answer, as described in the NSS, tracks very closely to what Robert Wright dubbed “progressive realism” in 2006. Some are already calling it “strategic patience,” a term used in the president’s intro letter but nowhere else in the Strategy itself. But “sustainment” is probably a better term because sustainment does not imply simply trying to wait out threats and challenges but rather building strength and remaining firm in the face of them. Senator Tim Kaine (D-VA)once characterized Obama's approach, which the NSS builds out, as: “defend ourselves unilaterally, and promote our values multilaterally.” The new NSS reflects much of that logic as well.

However it’s categorized, the new NSS focuses heavily on managing strategic risks, noting specifically, “we will prioritize efforts that address the top strategic risks to our interests.” The document shows an administration trying to gain a realistic picture of those risks without overhyping them, and then devoting resources to areas where they can be most effective in mitigating risk. A tough-minded approach to risk assessment should not be construed as a justification for disengagement from the world. The NSS makes an unequivocal case for sustained global engagement, asserting bluntly “our obligations do not end at our borders.”

It goes on to say: “We embrace our responsibilities for underwriting international security because it serves our interests, upholds our commitments to allies and partners, and addresses threats that are truly global.” No precipitous casting aside of global burdens here. Later, responding specifically to assertions that increased U.S. production of oil and gas can insulate America from world affairs, the document calls for “an expanded view of energy security that recognizes the collective needs of the United States, our allies, and trading partners as well as the importance of competitive energy markets.”

The Postmodern Autocrat's Handbook

By Robert D. Kaplan

The concept of dictatorship is badly in need of revision. The old model of remote tyrants inflicting arbitrary, often eccentric, edicts on their cowed or indoctrinated subjects, with few constraints on their behavior and few threats to their survival, no longer applies. North Korea's Kim Jong Un and Syria's Bashar al-Assad are two of the few remaining exceptions to a positive trend that stretches from the rubble of the Reichstag and the Berlin Wall to the drainage culvert that was the last redoubt of Libya's Muammar Qaddafi. Yet large and critical swaths of the earth still feature dictatorial rulers, for whom we need a new model.

This new model must be based on a clear understanding about the rise of public opinion, which now matters more to dictators than it does even to democrats. Democratic rulers have only elections to lose if they miscalculate public opinion. Today's autocrats, on the other hand, risk their lives, their power structures, families, assets and loyal advisers if they don't satisfy their publics.

Poor information once led to self-justifying delusions on the part of dictators, who tended to assume exaggerated levels of popular support. Today, thanks to the refinement of scientific polling and the ubiquitous penetration of social media and digital devices, public mood need not be assumed; it can be known, by the day, if not by the hour. Moreover, after witnessing the fall of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring, 21st-century autocrats know all too well that they can be replaced. That combination of hard truths can be a powerful constraint on dictatorial behavior.

This dilution of authoritarianism is part of a global transition to more democracy, one that will take time. Yet there are dangers to the rise of public opinion in autocracies as well. Publics (as well as media) can be more nationalistic and more populist than those who govern them. Wars may start because of how publics push nonelected rulers to act based on nationalism and militarism, even if it is self-defeating.

Just look, for instance, at China.

Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping must contend with social media and a policy elite that are fiercely nationalistic about depredations against China by the West and Japan in the late-19th and 20th centuries. This widespread, deep-seated feeling of grievance encourages more aggressive posturing in disputes over territories in the South and East China seas.

Coffee, Wi-Fi And The Moon

By Nikolas Katsimpras

The following story by Nikolas Katsimpras was the winner of the Art of Future Warfare project “Great War” war-art challenge that called for a front-page style dispatch from the outbreak of the next major global conflict.

CLICK! CLACK! DING! After more than 40 years, the vintage thumping sound of dusty Underwood, Olivetti and Remington typewriters filled, once again, the New York Gazette editorial room. Looking down the rows of desks, the gloomy floor is filled with the flickering light of hundreds of candles bouncing off the lifeless, pitch-black computer screens.

Today is the 24th day of continuous blackouts in New York, Washington DC, Moscow and hundreds more cities worldwide. It is considered to be only the beginning of a spiraling conflict. Who could have imagined though, that the greatest escalation of the 21st century might have started with a single cup of coffee?

On that fateful morning of May 4th, Russian President Vladimir Putin passed with his entourage in front of the Starbucks located at Ohotnyy Ryad Street, just walking distance from Kremlin. Putin’s fourth term could eventually have broken the twenty year presidency mark, had he not died the minute he stepped foot inside the store. For the first time in weeks, new information has emerged shedding light to the burning questions of what has transpired since.

The initial estimations of the cause of death involved complications due to Putin’s heart operation at the Moscow Cardiological Center in 2019, about a year after the elections. However, GRU, Russia’s Main Intelligence Directorate, almost instantly accused the US of having interfered with Putin’s pacemaker.

STRATCOM CHIEF: US MUST MAINTAIN SPACE DOMINANCE

By Jim Garamone

FEBRUARY 7, 2015

The space domain is changing, and the U.S. military must remain ahead of these changes to maintain the nation’s military dominance, the commander of U.S. Strategic Command said.

Navy Adm. Cecil D. Haney spoke at a Peter Huessy Breakfast Series seminar sponsored by the Air Force Association, the Reserve Officers Association and the National Defense Industrial Association.

The playing field in space is changing, and not always to the advantage of nations that are peaceful and have democratic governments, Haney said. “Today, our nation is dealing with a global security environment that is more complex, dynamic and volatile than at any time in our history,” he added.

The security environment features multiple actors operating across all domains. Many actors challenge U.S. democratic values in many ways, the admiral said.

Tensions With Nation States, Ungoverned Environments

“In addition to significant tensions involving nation states,” Haney told the audience, “we are in an environment that is flanked with numerous ungoverned or ineffectively governed areas that are breeding grounds for bad actors and violent extremist organizations.” These groups, he added, also use space and cyberspace to recruit and spread propaganda — including misinformation — in support of their causes.

“Perhaps of greater concern, however, is the proliferation of these emerging strategic capabilities attempting to limit our decision and maneuver space that ultimately impacts strategic stability,” Haney said.

Social mobility barely exists but let’s not give up on equality

by David Cameron

4 February 2015

We live surrounded by inequality. Some have wealth, health, education, satisfying occupations. Others get poverty, ill-health and drudgery. The Conservative reaction, personified , is to promote social mobility and meritocracy.

History shows this will fail to increase mobility rates. Given that social mobility rates are immutable, it is better to reduce the gains people make from having high status, and the penalties from low status. The Swedish model of compressed inequality is a realistic option, the American dream of rapid mobility an illusion.

How do we know we cannot change the rate of social mobility? One piece of evidence is what happened to social mobility rates as England moved from the pre-industrial world of squire and servant, to the modern noisy meritocracy of the rude boys of finance. What happened as the political franchise was extended in the early 19th century? What happened as mass public education was introduced later in the century? What happened as education, healthcare and pensions for the poor were financed by taxation of the incomes of the wealthier? The answer is that social mobility remained at its slow pre-industrial pace. Tracking the status of rare surnames across generations we can measure social mobility rates for wealth and education in England from 1670 to 2012. The descendants of earlier elites only become average after about 10 generations, or 300 years. Status persists as strongly in the Cameron meritocracy as in pre-industrial England. Lineage is destiny. At birth, most of your social outcome is predictable from your family history.

An illustration of the power of lineage even in modern England comes even from the first names children receive at birth. Naming your daughter Jade means she has one hundredth the chance of attending Oxford as a girl whose parents chose for her Eleanor. Similarly for Bradley versus Peter.

Is this just the survival of sclerotic olde England, where the dead hand of the past exercises an especially powerful grip? No. The modern US has rates of social mobility that are no higher than those of England. Elites and underclasses endure just as strongly as in the UK.

Moving From Axis to Access of Evil

07/02/2015

LONDON -- In the fall of 2012, aboard a retired aircraft carrier permanently docked on the west side of Manhattan, I listened as then-United States Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta delivered one of the most chilling speeches I have ever heard. To a roomful of leading CEOs and military leaders, Panetta spoke about the new cyber threats faced by civilized society and the many ways in which America's adversaries could use computer networks to spread panic, paralyze the country and inflict mass casualties.

"Let me explain how this could unfold," he said. "An aggressor nation or extremist group could use these kinds of cyber tools to gain control of critical switches. They could, for example, derail passenger trains or, even more dangerous, trains loaded with lethal chemicals. They could contaminate the water supply in major cities or shut down the power grid across large parts of the country.

"The most destructive scenarios," he continued, "involve cyber actors launching several attacks on our critical infrastructure at one time, in combination with a physical attack on our country. ... The collective result of these kinds of attacks could be a cyber-Pearl Harbor, an attack that would cause physical destruction and loss of life. In fact, it would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense of vulnerability."

Those words echoed again for me with today's news that a mammoth breach of data occurred last month at America's second-largest health insurer, Anthem. The attack, which authorities have linked to Chinese hackers, reportedly pilfered the birthdays, Social Security numbers, email addresses and home addresses of 80 million customers and employees. This comes on the heels of a series of cybercrimes that have recently ricocheted through headlines -- from the vicious attack that sought to destroy Sony's computer network to the more benign hacking of the YouTube and Twitter accounts of the U.S Central Command by somebody claiming links to the Islamic State.

While Panetta's fears have thankfully not yet been realized, it's time to acknowledge that cyberwar is a greater threat to the U.S. today than more traditional forms of terrorism. If the first 15 years of the 21st century were defined by the so-called Axis of Evil -- the phrase George W. Bush applied to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea in the days after 9/11 for their support of terrorists -- the next 15 years will likely be defined by the Access of Evil, as state and non-state cyberterrorists use technology to bypass our defenses in ways that damage businesses, lives, and nations.

Is Unrestricted Internet Access a Modern Human Right?

BY DAVID ROTHKOPF

FEBRUARY 2, 2015

National constitutions are supposed to enshrine fundamental rights for everyone — and for generations. Such documents are also products of moments in time and reflect perceptions of life in those moments. That’s why the best of them, like the U.S. Constitution, contain the seeds of their own reinvention. Indeed, the secret to a sustainable constitution is that it both captures what is enduring and anticipates the need to change.

Over the years, the U.S. Constitution has been amended 27 times — the first 10 being the Bill of Rights, of course — to ensure that it stays current with prevailing views of what is fundamental or best for the United States. Among the finest examples of the Constitution’s adaptability to shifting and maturing norms are the 13th Amendment, which ended slavery, and the 15thand 19th amendments, which guaranteed voting rights for everyone, regardless of race or gender, respectively.

Because it is meant to be malleable, the original Constitution included references to very few technologies. In fact,  America’s founders were so sure that technologies would evolve over time that they even included protection of the rights of innovators in Article 1, Section 8 (the Copyright Clause). The technologies that were mentioned were ones that by the late 1700s had become so ingrained in day-to-day life that they were seen as natural to the course of human existence, or at least critical to the functioning of government: money, for instance, and a military. In at least two cases in the Bill of Rights, the unfettered use of technologies was seen as necessary for citizens’ freedom — those technologies being the press and arms. The press was more than three centuries old when the Constitution enshrined the right to freedom of expression. Meanwhile, the arms referenced were not specified, but no doubt included the firearms of the day that were essential to the upkeep of a militia, which was the express rationale (even if today it is generally overlooked) for the right to bear arms in the first place.

12 Tips For Surviving A Pentagon Post

Jake Turner

February 6, 2015

Here are the 12 biggest takeaways from an Army major's experience on how military members can thrive in a Pentagon post.

After nearly a year on the Joint Staff, I finally feel comfortable in my job. It took longer than I thought. The transition from tactical to strategic is quite the leap. Truth be told, it’s a chasm. The Pentagon can be a daunting place for Army majors. You are the junior officer in every room. Everyone is more experienced and senior to you. However, the experience is a great opportunity, not simply a difficult challenge to overcome. Here are the 12 biggest takeaways from my experience on how military members can thrive in a Pentagon post.

1. The system is slow. Accept it, move on, and find peace.

Everyone complains about how long it takes decisions to be made in the Pentagon. Tough. The sooner you accept things move slow, the sooner you will stop banging your head against the wall. The bottom line: Strategic-level decisions should take time. Accept the bureaucracy and find peace.

2. Civilians are the continuity.

Civilians in the Pentagon are the continuity much like senior noncommissioned officers are at the tactical level. They have been around awhile and seen it all. Green suiters come and go, but the civilians remain. Use them, ask them for advice, and avoid the big mistakes.

3. Learn the vernacular. Fast.

Words matter, words have meaning. A chop and an input are different. We don’t “dig into things” on the Joint Staff, we “pull the string.” Minimize your daily “Hooahs.” The sooner you sound like everyone else, the sooner you get taken seriously.

The Future of War

By Earl Tilford

Feb. 6, 2015

“We have tried since the birth of our nation to promote our love of peace by a display of weakness. This course has failed us utterly.” –Gen. George C. Marshall, 1945

War remains, as a Prussian general defined it nearly two centuries ago, the use of force to compel the enemy to do your will. Strategy connects ways and means to achieve an objective. The basics of strategy apply to war whether regular, irregular, guerrilla warfare, nuclear war, or insurgency. Terrorism is a tool. It can underlay strategy but it also involves applying ways and means to achieve a goal. The same can be said for counter-terrorism. Victory depends on strategy. An inappropriate strategy cannot be redeemed by heroism, effusive bloodletting, or abundant force.

Since the American Civil War, the United States has excelled at warfare by bringing overwhelming power to bear in clearly defined campaigns where strategy reflects and implements policy. More complicated conflicts such as Vietnam and the current “war on terror” are troublesome because our enormous technological and material advantages seemingly obviate the need for in-depth strategic analysis. Additionally, the separation of policymakers from military leaders discourages the dialogue needed to obtain what President Ronald Reagan brought to fruition by clearly identifying the “Evil Empire” and corralling Congress to fund a military buildup the Soviets could not match.

In the 21st century the United States must prepare for three kinds of warfare: Standoff war, Hands-on war, and Cyber war. Each presents unique challenges but the strategic approach of tying policy to desired outcome generally applies. Get that wrong and we lose.

Standoff war involves major powers. Armies, air forces, and navies will clash. Controlling space matters. The threat of nuclear holocaust is real. Losers will pay a heavy price. Deterrence is key but that requires strategic acumen as well as heavy economic investment. The challenge for the United States is to upgrade its nuclear arsenal, invest in missile defense, and maintain air, sea and land forces second to none.

WEEKEND READING: FEBRUARY 6-8

February 6, 2015

This time of year, the weekend means hibernating under lots of blankets, with a bottle of good bourbon, and some good reading. Here is one of those three things to get you started.

Why we shouldn’t mess with Russia. Over at the Brookings blog “Up Front,” Jeremy Shapiro poses the question, “what will the Russians do in response to America’s provision of arms to its enemy?” in response to aWashington Post op-ed arguing that the U.S. should provide Ukraine “lethal assistance” against Russia. Ultimately, Shapiro concludes that the “Russian regime has defined the struggle in Ukraine as part of an existential battle against American imperialism, in which the United States eventually seeks to impose its will on Russia itself. American provision of arms would lend credence to that view and increase the Russian government’s freedom of action at home.” In other words, it’s not worth it.

Want more? At War on the Rocks, Sean Kay argues that while what Russia has done to Ukraine is unacceptable, now is not the time for the United States to take the lead in escalating the situation through military force.

Women rising. This week, five women out of 26 passed the Ranger Assessment Training Course at Fort Benning, Georgia — the prerequisite course to go to Ranger School — leading up to the Army’s planned gender assessment in April. The Truman Project and Center for National Policy has launched a campaign called “No Exceptions” to build support for full combat inclusion. Follow the Facebook page for updates on how you can help.

Where are the Hemingways and Orwells of the 21st century? Cicero magazine has a great piece that on one hand celebrates the rise of veterans who are writing about their military experiences and sharing their war stories, such as Phil Klay, but on the other hand, laments the lack of fictional literature generated out of the last 14 years of war. While out of wars of previous eras came great works such as Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse Five, Sarah Stodola writes, “The relative lack of literary interest in Iraq reflects a culture that does not come up against the topic in any direct way very often. Writers write what they know, and today most Americans, writers included, do not know this war very well.”

For China, Army Has New Troops. But No Funds

Nitin Gokhale

India's Mountain Strike Corps, announced with much fanfare in late 2013 to augment the army's strength along the border with China, is in trouble, thanks to a 'sanction' that was not really a sanction under the UPA II government.

According to sequence of events pieced together by this writer after talking to sources in the know, the Manmohan Singh government sanctioned the raising of new Corps -40,000 soldiers- meant as a deterrent against China along the northern frontier without catering for its funding.

The Corps, which was on the drawing board for some years, apparently acquired a momentum in the summer of 2013 after Chinese PLA troops intruded deep into Indian territory in the Depsang plains of Ladakh and camped there for more than a fortnight, exposing the gaps in India's defences along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

The intrusion crisis was resolved after hectic diplomacy but the political leadership, under pressure of hostile public opinion, sought a remedy from the Army.

Sensing the chance to get the long-standing proposal to strengthen India's defences along the LAC cleared, the then army Chief Gen Bikram Singh personally pushed for creation of the Mountain Strike Corps. The proposal included integral air assets and necessary armoured and artillery elements.

According to the proposal, the new Corps would have 40,000 troops and would cost more than Rs. 64,000 crores to be spent over a seven or eight year period. It was expected that the new Corps would augment India's defence along the LAC stretching from Arunachal Pradesh in the east to Ladakh in northwest.

As the proposal gathered steam, two notes were prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), India's highest-decision making body on matters of security. One file contained details of the overall concept and justification for raising the Mountain Strike Corps and the other, file sought additional funding, over and above the sanctioned defence budget to equip the new Corps.

In an inexplicable move, the CCS under UPA II gave its approval for raising the Mountain Strike Corps but withheld clearance for additional or specific funding!

It is not clear what assurances were given about funds to be made available at a later stage, but the Army went ahead and 'raised' or announced or inaugurated the Corps at the temporary Head Quarters at Ranchi on January 1, 2014.

Morality and leadership: Balance is required

Thomas E. Ricks

February 5, 2015

Reading Tom Ricks’ blog post titled “Against Morality Equaling Leadership” has provoked me to think hard about its implications.

From my childhood I was taught by my parents to be a person of character and this was done by a strong Christian upbringing. This transfer of Christian teaching and parental character training was reinforced by my drill instructors during Marine Corps boot camp, where they imparted upon me the core values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. It is my belief that in order to be a good leader it is important also to be morally grounded. Easy to say but much harder to live out. Should our personal conduct matter to others?

I am of the belief that personal conduct should matter, especially in the military, where personal example is placed rather firmly on a high pedestal. If a military member is not morally grounded in their personal life the chances of character flaws surfacing at work become exponentially higher.

Tom Ricks gives two examples to spur critical thinking amongst his readership. First, he provides a quick comparison of two former presidents; George W. Bush and Bill Clinton where the first is considered to be the more moral man of the two while the latter is considered to have been the better president overall. If economics trumps morality in this particular case then I can fully understand why Clinton would get the approval of so many even in spite of his moral failings. I only wish we did not have to make such a choice. Tom Ricks raises the question of what we as a society should tolerate in personal behaviors of our politicians. This very topic should be debated long and hard. It should be a very frank conversation. In the military we are instilled with values that must be upheld in order to maintain the discipline and cohesiveness required of a professional military. The civilian leaders should in my opinion be held to a similar standard of conduct in order to set a strong example for society to follow. Taking this theme even further,

Green Beret officer's Silver Star revoked as Army cites investigation

By Dan Lamothe

February 4, 2015

WASHINGTON — Capt. Mathew L. Golsteyn was leading a Special Forces team in Afghanistan in 2010 when an 80-man mission he assembled to hunt insurgent snipers went awry. One of their five vehicles sunk into mud, a gunshot incapacitated an Afghan soldier fighting alongside the Americans, and insurgents maneuvered around them to rake the soggy fields with machine-gun fire.

Golsteyn, already a decorated Green Beret officer, responded with calm resolve and braved enemy fire repeatedly that day, according to an Army summary of his actions. He received the Silver Star for valor for his actions on Feb. 20, 2010, during a 2011 ceremony at Fort Bragg, N.C. Top Army officials later approved him for an upgrade to the prestigious Distinguished Service Cross, second only to the Medal of Honor in honoring heroism in combat by U.S. soldiers.

In a rare reversal, however, Golsteyn, now a major, no longer has either award. The Special Forces officer was later investigated for an undisclosed violation of the military's rules of engagement in combat for killing a known enemy fighter and bombmaker, according to officials familiar with the case. The investigation closed last year without Golsteyn being charged with any crime, but Army Secretary John McHugh decided to not only deny him the Distinguished Service Cross, but to revoke his Silver Star, too.

McHugh cited a provision in Army regulations that state that if facts become known that would have prevented a medal from being awarded, it can be revoked. The Silver Star was approved by a top commander in Afghanistan — Gen. David Rodriguez, then the three-star deputy commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan — according to Golsteyn's lawyer, Phil Stackhouse.

"I firmly believe that had he known about the derogatory information that was founded by the aforementioned investigation, he would have never awarded Major Golsteyn the Silver Star," McHugh said in a Nov. 17 letter to Rep. Duncan D. Hunter, R.-Calif., who has advocated on Golsteyn's behalf. "Accordingly, I have decided to revoke the interim Silver Star that Major Golsteyn received for this action."

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