Indian Strategic Studies

13 May 2025

PERSUASION AND ITS LIMITS A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SOFT POWER

JENNA GIBSON

In his groundbreaking 2004 book on soft power, Joseph Nye described the concept of soft power in a deceptively simple way: “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries—admiring values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness—want to follow it.” At first glance, the idea that a country can get what it wants in the world without resorting to the costly and dangerous realm of more traditional, “hard” power, is incredibly appealing. However, in the decades since, scholars and policymakers alike have realized that the concept is more complicated than it first appears. What are the “outcomes” that a state might want to achieve through soft power? What values and examples do they want to share, and who is open to those same values? Who is persuadable, and under what circumstances?

Because of its nebulous nature, those who study soft power, as well as those who want to wield it, run the risk of losing track of the actual goals and potential outcomes at play. This commentary will focus on four practical considerations for thinking about when, and how, to implement a strategy to cultivate soft power. I then conclude with a discussion of how these considerations have at times facilitated, and at other times frustrated, soft-power diplomacy between the United States and South Korea.

Joseph Nye Was the Champion of a World That No Longer Exists

Suzanne Nossel

It is poignant yet perhaps fitting to mourn Joseph Nye, the distinguished international relations scholar, just as his life’s work championing U.S. leadership and liberal internationalism has run aground in U.S. President Donald Trump’s second term.

Nye, who coined the term “soft power,” died at the age of 88 on Tuesday. His intellectual leadership, teaching, policy guidance, and diplomatic efforts shaped five decades of U.S. foreign policy. His thinking also molded the U.S. foreign-policy establishment—the collective of scholars, think tankers, officials, and civil society leaders that Ben Rhodes, a former advisor to President Barack Obama, once derisively labeled “the Blob.”

Economists warn Trump's research cuts could have dire consequences for GDP

Geoff Brumfiel

The International Space Station serves as an orbiting scientific laboratory where astronauts conduct experiments. The Trump administration has proposed cutting its budget by roughly $500 million and reducing research at the outpost.AP/Roscosmos Space Agency Press Service

When Casey Dreier saw President Trump's proposed budget for NASA, he couldn't believe the numbers.

"This is the worst NASA budget I've seen in my lifetime," says Dreier, the chief of space policy for the Planetary Society, a nonprofit that advocates for space exploration.

The budget proposes deep cuts for NASA's Science Mission Directorate, which oversees everything from telescopes peering deep into space to robotic probes exploring planets like Mars. Many of these projects cost billions of dollars to build and launch, but the budget cuts are so deep "that it will require NASA to turn off active spacecraft that are producing good science for pennies on the dollar for what the U.S. taxpayer paid for them," Dreier says.

It's not just spacecraft — Trump's proposed budget for the federal government would switch off huge swaths of America's scientific enterprise. The National Science Foundation (NSF) would be slashed in half. The National Institutes of Health would lose $17 billion in funding. Other agencies like the Energy Department, the U.S. Geological Survey and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration would all see deep cuts totaling billions of dollars.

Neocentaur: A Model for Cognitive Evolution Across the Levels of War

William J. Barry and Blair Wilcox

The US Army is at an inflection point. Geostrategic and technological shifts are requiring rapid adaptation. On May 1, the secretary of the Army and the Army chief of staff published a letter to the force recognizing several initiatives to deliver warfighting capabilities, optimize force structure, and eliminate waste. Among the guidance to increase warfighting lethality, the Army’s seniormost civilian and uniformed leaders noted the requirement to shift toward capability-based portfolios that integrate AI into command-and-control nodes to accelerate decision-making and preserve the initiative. At the US Army War College, new approaches to AI capabilities are both a concept and a reality. The neocentaur model, which describes human-hybrid intelligence across the levels of war, has been tested in the classroom and in strategic wargaming. Furthermore, our ongoing research presents a technical solution, presenting deterministic AI capabilities that are more suitable for military use when lives are on the line. To maintain military superiority, the United States must adopt a human-hybrid approach—the neocentaur model—that leverages deterministic models, rather than purely generative, to mitigate the risks of cognitive atrophy and formulaic decision-making.

Indo-Pacific Chessboard: Strategic Importance Of Indo-Pacific, Quad Alliance, And Maritime Power Plays – Analysis

Murray Hunter

The Indo-Pacific is generally regarded as a US construct covering the Indian Ocean from the African Coast, the western and central Pacific Ocean, to the seas and straits connecting the two oceans. As such, the Indo-Pacific includes nations such as Korea and Japan, down to Australia, south-east Asia, India, Pakistan, and the Persian and Arabian Gulfs. China features in the centre of the Indo-Pacific, and as such the Indo-Pacific paradigm is used as a template to view contested primacy. Former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s speech in 2007, around the time when the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) began. The term became commonly used during the Trump 1.0 presidency.

US foreign and defence policy within the Indo-Pacific has been based upon the perception of US primacy within the region, in tandem with its allies including Japan, South Korea, and Australia. It’s only in this generation that US primacy is challenged by the rise of China into the South China Sea. This began in 2013, when the Tianjing dredger was sent to Cuarteron Reef to reclaim land to build a military base. A number have been built since around the Spratly Islands, and surrounding reefs, reflecting the Nine-Dash-Line protruding as far south as the coast of northern Borneo, that is seen by China as within their sphere of influence.

Are the U.S. and Europe Digital Allies or Adversaries?

Paul J. Saunders

As the global economy pivots toward digital innovation and AI supremacy, tensions are mounting not just between rivals like the U.S. and China, but also among traditional allies. In a panel discussion hosted by The National Interest on May 8, policy experts unpacked both the growing friction and potential cooperation between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union over tech policy.

The panel featured Yaël Ossowski of the Consumer Choice Center and Paul Steidler of the Lexington Institute. Moderated by Paul Saunders, president of the Center for the National Interest, the conversation provided a candid picture of a fragmented but interdependent transatlantic tech landscape.

Ossowski opened the discussion with a blunt assessment of U.S.-EU digital friction. While Europe advances sweeping tech regulations like the Digital Services Act and Digital Markets Act, American firms such as Google, Apple, and Meta are finding themselves hit with growing compliance costs and regulatory penalties. “We have fines that have now been issued against most of the major American tech companies,” Ossowski explained. “At the same time, Trump is using the stick of trade relationships to protect American companies.”

The Twilight of Bretton Woods

GIANCARLO CORSETTI

This year’s annual spring meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank began with quiet fears that US President Donald Trump’s administration would seek to fatally undermine them. They ended with both institutions being sternly rebuked by US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent for their increasing concern with climate change and diversity, but also with a sigh of relief that they had survived to fight for development another day.

Unwitting Pawns: Companies Are on the Front Lines of a New Global Conflict

Zev Faintuch

Today’s security landscape reflects threat convergence — a reality where no catastrophe remains localized and the lines between physical and cyber threats and war and peace blur. The result is a cascade of globally interconnected crises, accelerated by the splintering of the American-led order that has dominated geopolitics since 1945. A shipping disruption in the Suez, a pathogen outbreak in Eastern China, a terrorist attack in Southern Israel or even a policy U-turn in Washington — any of these events, once contained by geography or bureaucratic inertia, can now trigger sector-wide disruptions and boardroom emergencies. Conflict now extends beyond governments and nation-states, placing businesses of every size on the front lines.

Pawns of grand strategy

Using companies for mercantilist or geopolitical ends is nothing new. From colonial-era trade monopolies to Cold War-era technology embargoes, states have historically leveraged corporations as instruments of economic warfare. However, today’s efforts to undermine other nations do not stop with overt economic methods. A rising number of insidious attacks have recently taken place using tools such as arson, sabotage, ransomware, hacking or damaging infrastructure and even assassination. These irregular warfare tactics have blurred the distinction between war and peace, placing the boardroom on the front line of conflict.

What Is Strategy in War?

John Spencer & Liam Collins

In both popular discourse and professional military circles, few terms are more misused than “strategy.” It is invoked to describe everything from battlefield maneuvers to national policy, often without clarity or consistency. As military historian Hew Strachan warned in The Lost Meaning of Strategy, the word has become so elastic that it risks losing all analytical value. Too often, strategy is confused with a plan, a clever idea, or even just decisive action. But in war, strategy is something far more foundational—and far more consequential. It is not about how militaries fight, but why they fight, what they aim to achieve, and how armed force serves political purpose.

In the civilian world, “strategy” is often used interchangeably with planning—marketing strategies, business strategies, campaign strategies. But in the realm of statecraft and war, this understanding is far too narrow. Despite Strachan’s call for conceptual precision, even within the field of strategic studies, no universally accepted definition exists. Consider some of the leading definitions cited in Strategy in the Contemporary World:

“(is) the use of engagements for the object of war.” — Carl von Clausewitz
“the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.” — Basil Liddell Hart
“a process, a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate.” — Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley

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Kashmir’s forgotten war goes global

Suzanne Raine

Of all the misnomers, ‘frozen conflict’ signally falls short as a description of the situation in Kashmir since the partition of India in 1947. The UK, which bears historic responsibility for the unresolved division, is also uniquely close to the conflict since a significant number of Pakistani Kashmiris are UK citizens or dual nationals. This latest outbreak of hostilities was always going to happen; until a resolution is found, Kashmir will continue to inspire and foster terrorist acts and remain one of the core grievances in the Islamist narrative. It will define and disrupt not only the relationship between Pakistan and India but also between the other states of South Asia.

Shortly after 1am on the morning of Wednesday 7 May, India launched strikes on Bahawalpur and Muridke in Pakistani Punjab and on Kotli, Bagh and Muzaffarabad in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). Indian military statements have said they targeted bases linked to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Hizb ul-Mujahideen (HuM), in response to the 22 April terrorist attack by five armed militants on tourists in Pahalgam which killed 26, and has been attributed to the Resistance Front, considered to be associated with LeT. It is worth looking in more detail at why these locations were chosen by India.

Under the Nuclear Shadow: India and Pakistan in Open Conflict

Fabian Hoffmann

On May 10, at approximately 14:00 CET, Donald Trump announced via social media that Pakistan and India had agreed to an immediate ceasefire, bringing a halt — at least temporarily — to a dangerously escalating conflict in South Asia.

Major hostilities began on 7 May when India launched a series of airstrikes — code-named Operation Sindoor — in retaliation for terrorist attacks the previous month that killed 26 people (see my assessment of the operation here). In the days that followed, India and Pakistan exchanged fire, including further airstrikes and drone attacks on military infrastructure. Targets included ground-based air defense systems, likely with the aim of suppressing enemy air defenses to pave the way for a broader air campaign.

On the night of 10 May, India carried out a larger wave of strikes on Pakistani military infrastructure, hitting three air bases: Nur Khan (near Islamabad), Murid, and Shorkot. In response, Pakistan initiated Operation Bunyan Ul Marsoos, striking Indian military targets including airbases in Pathankot and Udhampur, as well as what Pakistani officials described as a missile storage facility for Indian BrahMos cruise missiles. Both sides appear to have employed drones and cruise missiles in these attacks; imagery suggests that Pakistan also used Fateh-1 short-range ballistic missiles. In the early hours of 10 May, reports emerged that Pakistan had convened the National Command Authority, which is responsible for operational decisions regarding its nuclear arsenal. The Pakistani defense minister later denied these reports.

Indian Defense Firm Says It Did Not Resell U.K. Technology to Russia

Jane Bradley

An Indian defense company says that it did not resell sensitive technology to Russia that was supplied by one of the biggest corporate donors to the populist Reform U.K. party.

The New York Times reported in March that, according to 2023 and 2024 shipping records, the British aerospace manufacturer H.R. Smith Group exported equipment to India that had been flagged as critical to Russian weapon systems. That included transmitters, cockpit equipment and antennas.

The Indian company, Hindustan Aeronautics, is the biggest trading partner of the Russian arms agency Rosoboronexport.

Hindustan Aeronautics did not respond to repeated requests for comment, but a lawyer for H.R. Smith recently provided The Times with a statement from Hindustan Aeronautics staying that the British equipment was not sold to Russia. The statement was dated a week after the Times article was published and received coverage in India.

That aligns with the account of H.R. Smith Group, which said that its sales were lawful and that the equipment was used in an Indian search-and-rescue network. The parts “support lifesaving operations” and are “not designed for military use,” said Nick Watson, a lawyer for the company.

India’s missile attack shows that managing an India-Pakistan crisis is easier said than done

Syed Ali Zia Jaffery

A day after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions following the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, US Vice President JD Vance said the “hope here is that India responds to this terrorist attack in a way that doesn’t lead to a broader regional conflict.” Vance also said he hoped “that Pakistan, to the extent that they are responsible, cooperates with India to make sure that the terrorists sometimes operating in their territory are hunted down and dealt with.”

But on Tuesday, in what it code-named Operation Sindoor, India fired missiles at multiple sites in Pakistan, claiming that those sites were “terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed.” According to a report in The Guardian newspaper, no Pakistani military sites were targeted.

Before the missile attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave full operational freedom to the Indian military to avenge the Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 people in the portion of Kashmir controlled by India. In a statement, India’s armed forces claimed they had “demonstrated considerable restraint” in Tuesday’s missile attack, but Pakistan has vowed to give a befitting response to any Indian aggression. After India’s missile attack, Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper cited Pakistani Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry as saying: “Let me say it unequivocally: Pakistan will respond to this at a time and place of its own choosing. This heinous provocation will not go unanswered.”

How India and Pakistan Can Pull Back From the Brink

Ravi Agrawal

India and Pakistan are once again at each other’s throats. Following a terrorist attack in Indian-administered Kashmir on April 22, New Delhi launched coordinated attacks this week that struck deeper into Pakistani territory than at any point in the last five decades. Islamabad is now threatening to retaliate. An optimistic reading of the situation could be that this has all happened before: The two rivals fought full-scale wars in 1947-48, 1965, and 1971 and have engaged in several major skirmishes since the 1990s, when they declared themselves as nuclear powers. In each case, and especially since enjoying the shield of a nuclear deterrent, the two nations found ways to eventually pull back and accept a stalemate over the disputed territory of Kashmir.

There is a more worrying prospect this time around. The world in 2025 looks very different than it did before: The United States appears disinterested in new foreign wars, major powers are tied up in conflicts on other continents, and multilateral organizations such as the United Nations have seen their credibility erode. As a result, international mediation that was instrumental in years past now seems less meaningful. India and Pakistan have also followed sharply different trajectories since their last serious conflict in 1999. At the turn of the millennium, India’s GDP was about five times that of Pakistan. Today, it is nearly 11 times larger. Greater economic clout has not led to a commensurate military advantage for India, but it has fanned a heady confidence among its citizens, along with a clamor for action. Israel’s overwhelming response to the Oct. 7, 2023, attack led by Hamas has also strengthened New Delhi’s assessment that other powers can’t—or won’t—stop it from exercising its right to defend itself. In Pakistan, meanwhile, the usually quiet army chief, Asim Munir, has become increasingly public-facing, suggesting a military climbdown may be more difficult to accomplish.

A Tale of Four Fighter Jets - Analysis

Rishi Iyengar

A terrorist attack takes place in Indian-administered Kashmir. India blames Pakistan and vows to retaliate. A few days later, India conducts airstrikes in Pakistani territory, the two sides exchange fire, and one side claims it shot down the other’s fighter jets.

That could either be describing events that took place in 2019, or events that took place this week.

Why Gulf States, More Than the U.S., Are Key to Prevent War Between India and Pakistan

Charlie Campbell

The crisis embroiling India and Pakistan continues to spiral. Pakistan’s military claims to have killed 40 to 50 Indian troops along their de facto border in Kashmir and downed 29 Indian drones during Thursday night and Friday morning, in response to India striking multiple locations in Pakistan on Wednesday that it claimed were “terrorist camps.”

The current unrest was sparked by last month’s deadly terrorist attack on tourists in the India-controlled part of the restive region of Kashmir, which left 25 Indians and one Nepali national dead. New Delhi has pinned the bloodshed on Islamabad, which denies complicity and called for an independent investigation. But with both sides blaming the other for every escalation, full blown war appears worryingly close.

On Thursday, Pakistani Army Chief General Asim Munir stood atop a tank during a military exercise to address his troops. “Let there be no ambiguity,” he said. “Any military misadventure by India will be met with a swift, resolute, and notch-up response.”

For Bharat Karnad, an emeritus professor in national security studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, everything rests on Munir, who’s “something of a hot head,” he says. “He’s a Quranic literalist, one of the true believers, who’s spoken about Ghazwa-e-Hind,” referring to a holy war against India mentioned in the Hadith.

Orders for Pahalgam satellite images from US firm peaked two months before attack

Soumya Pillai

Two months before terrorists killed 26 people in Kashmir, a top US-based space tech company saw an unprecedented spike in orders for high-resolution satellite images of Pahalgam and its surrounding areas. Between 2 and 22 February 2025, at least 12 orders—double the usual number—were placed with Maxar Technologies, whose roster of clients includes government and defence agencies across the world. Orders for Pahalgam satellite images started appearing on the portal in June 2024, just months after Maxar acquired a new partner: A Pakistan-based geo-spatial company linked to federal crimes in the US.

The data does not show whether the orders for Pahalgam satellite images were placed by the Pakistani firm, Business Systems International Pvt Ltd (BSI). But defence analysts and experts as well as scientists that ThePrint spoke to said the coincidence cannot be dismissed given the track record of the company’s founder, Obaidullah Syed.

The Pakistani-American businessman was found guilty and sentenced to a year in prison by a US federal court for illegally exporting high-performance computer equipment and software application solutions from America to the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) — the agency that designs and tests high explosives and nuclear weapon parts, and develops solid-fuelled ballistic missiles.

Xi shows he wants to be close to Putin - but not too close

Laura Bicker

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin make it look like they're the best of friends.

Xi took his place at the right-hand side of Putin, the position of a steadfast ally, as their troops marched together on Red Square as part of Moscow's Victory Day parade.

Hours earlier, Xi described the bond between the two countries as "unbreakable" and added that Russia and China should be "friends of steel".

This is Xi's 11th visit to Russia since becoming president in 2013 and the two leaders have met on more than 40 occasions.

Putin has already announced plans to visit China in the autumn and the two leaders have even, in the past, shared a rare public hug.

But there is more to this relationship than meets the eye.

"We see a lot of exchanges between the two men and patriotic displays of togetherness," said Mathieu Boulegue, from the Center for European Policy Analysis.

China’s exploitation of overseas ports and bases

Thomas X. Hammes

Introduction

This paper examines the potential for the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to exploit its growing network of overseas ports and bases to challenge control of the seas in a conventional war with the United States. Security concerns with Chinese ownership of overseas ports fall into three main categories. First, China collects vast amounts of intelligence via its port network. Second, it could use that intelligence and its control of key ports and piers to disrupt US shipments during wartime. Finally, China could leverage these ports to pre-position weapons, ammunition, and equipment to resupply its warships and armed merchants or rapidly establish anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) nodes near major maritime choke points. In short, China could exploit this network to challenge the sea control essential to US success in an armed conflict.

This paper does not speculate on why the United States and China might enter a global conflict. In fact, current Chinese writings indicate China does not seek a global confrontation. Rather, Chinese strategic literature reflects a preference for winning without fighting and, if forced to fight, fighting one local enemy at a time after politically isolating that enemy.

As with all future papers, this one starts with assumptions. It then examines China’s current network of overseas ports and its expansion of that network. The rationale behind China’s pursuit of overseas ports is explored through an analysis of Chinese strategic vulnerabilities. This paper considers three potential applications for these bases, including an improbable worst-case scenario, to assess how China may exploit this advantage.

Trump Is Undermining 3 Key US Advantages Over China

Gabriele Manca

In recent decades, China has changed at an extraordinary pace, so quickly that many have struggled to keep up with its transformation. Many people, especially those over 50, often cling to an outdated perception of China. If you ask them what they think of the country, they will likely mention cheap, low-quality products produced by millions of factory workers. In their eyes, China is still the world’s toy workshop, the land of copycat products and low-end manufacturing. That may still be true in part, but it is now only a small fragment of a much larger picture.

China continues to be the factory of the world, as its near-trillion-dollar trade surplus in 2024 attests. But it is also a technological superpower, leading the world in strategic sectors that define both the present and the future: batteries, electric vehicles, green technology, 5G, advanced nuclear reactors, and more. It now produces more active patents and top-cited scientific publications each year than the United States. China indeed remains behind the U.S. when it comes to “zero-to-one” innovation – creating something entirely new from scratch. But it has become extraordinarily effective at advancing innovation, refining and scaling ideas that originate elsewhere. To describe China today merely as a country that copies the West is not just inaccurate; it is dangerously simplistic. China is now a powerhouse in manufacturing, technology, and innovation.

China-US AI Technology Competition: Who’s Winning in Key Inputs?

Sara Hsu

After China revealed its own homegrown large-language model, DeepSeek, in January 2025, the artificial intelligence (AI) competition intensified. Much of the conversation on this new technology has focused on semiconductors or model speeds, but the race is very much dependent on several upstream factors: energy, rare earth elements, and talent. These critical inputs into the AI industry face vastly different structures in the two countries and may determine the pace and scale of AI innovation.

Energy: Powering the AI Revolution

AI models use massive amounts of energy to power their computations. Ensuring a consistent and growing energy supply to power data centers and cool servers is now an essential part of national AI strategies. The United States and China have different energy ecosystems, with alternative methods of pricing, regulating, and sustaining energy for AI endeavors.

Due to increasing investment in electricity generation, the energy requirements of AI data centers have placed a great amount of pressure on local power grids. A notable incident occurred in July 2024, when 60 data centers in Northern Virginia were disconnected from the grid due to a surge protector failure. This incident forced operators to rapidly reduce power generation to prevent widespread outages, and demonstrated the challenges that utilities face in providing data centers with growing amounts of power.

Europe cannot remain on the sidelines in Gaza

Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff

Sven Kühn von Burgsdorff is the former EU ambassador to the Palestinian Territory.

Since Hamas’ brutal Oct. 7 attack on Israel, and the devastating war in Gaza that’s followed, tens of thousands of Palestinians have been killed and much of the Strip now lies in ruin.

EU leaders have issued countless calls to respect international law and pursue a two-state solution — but when it comes to action, the bloc has been largely absent. A “paper tiger” loud in rhetoric but toothless in practice, it wasn’t even invited to ceasefire or hostage negotiations.

And Europe’s failure to step up carries serious geopolitical costs.

The bloc’s marginalization on Gaza is partly self-inflicted, as it settled for being a payer of aid rather than a diplomatic player. It poured billions into assistance for Palestine and offered routine support for a two-state solution, while shying away from putting political pressure on Israel.

Meanwhile, Brussels gave Israel unfettered access to its market without seeking to leverage to push for the end of Israel’s occupation of Palestine and sustainable peace.

Simply put, aid and trade became Europe’s default instead of hard diplomacy — a far cry from the geopolitical role trumpeted in the Lisbon Treaty.

Ukrainian soldier says ground robots are great for attacks because they carry far more explosive power than flying drones

Sinéad Baker

Ukrainian soldiers use ground robots to blow up Russian troops and equipment. These carry a far heavier explosive payload than drones that fly.

Operators control these uncrewed ground vehicles, or UGVs, remotely. The UGVs can travel close to Russian positions, assuming they're not spotted, and detonate. And Ukraine's soldiers can stay safe and far from the action. They are a lot like flying drones, but the systems pack a greater punch because they don't take flight.

Oleksandr Yabchanka, the head of the robotic systems for Ukraine's Da Vinci Wolves Battalion, told Business Insider that Ukraine's soldiers attach bombs and explosives to ground robots, "turning that system into a kamikaze one."

The UGV actions mirror what has been done with aerial drones in Russia's invasion of Ukraine, where the flying drones explode and drop grenades.

"A crucial difference between aerial and on-the-ground unmanned systems is the mass that they can carry," Yabchanka said. He said Ukraine needs to "always be one step, half a step ahead of the enemy in terms of the powers of destruction." That's where these ground drones come into play.

Try and try again! Ukraine’s AI drones defeat Russian electronic warfare in new Kursk offensive

David Axe

Inside Ukraine’s new surprise offensive in Russia’s Kursk Oblast, an unassuming plywood drone is going after another Russian howitzer. Don’t let its simplicity fool you—this German-made HF-1 packs sophisticated AI that finds and strikes targets even when Russian jammers block radio signals.

It’s the third attempt to hit this particular Msta-S self-propelled howitzer’s hatch, with two previous 11-kg, AI-steered drones already lying destroyed beside the 47-ton vehicle.

The Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces’ 413th Battalion posted this remarkable footage Tuesday, showing a series of precision strikes on Russian military equipment in Kursk Oblast in western Russia.

One particularly strategic hit by the battalion’s HF-1 drones targeted the hatch of a Msta-S self-propelled howitzer, a potential weak point on the mobile artillery system.

It was a tricky maneuver, as made clear by the remains of two other HF-1s lying beside the howitzer—and visible in the third drone’s forward-facing camera in the moment before that drone struck.

Both Xi and Trump Want the Other to Call Them First - Analysis

Bob Davis

As if U.S.-China relations weren’t complicated enough, the two sides are also squaring off over which side will lose face in their trade battle. In the United States, the Chinese concern about saving face is usually dismissed as pride—but U.S. President Donald Trump has made a career out of insisting that he get the upper hand in relations.

That’s a very Western form of face, according to scholars, who characterize it as the need for “honor” or individual triumph at the expense of someone else.

Why Netanyahu Might Be on a Collision Course With Trump - Analysis

Shalom Lipner

Benjamin Netanyahu was optimistic that Israel’s fate would be different. While much of the world braced for the impact of Donald Trump’s encore in the Oval Office—and the fallout from his repeated vows to stop the world from “ripping us off”—Israel’s prime minister was buoyant at the repeat prospect of playing tag team with a U.S. president who prides himself on being “Israel’s best friend.” Just over 100 days into the second Trump administration, however, Netanyahu appears to be lamenting the emerging gap between what Trump says on Israel and what he’s actually willing to do.

Things started out well enough. Just two weeks after Trump’s inauguration, Netanyahu was welcomed to Washington as the first foreign leader to visit the White House during the president’s second term. Door prizes awaiting Netanyahu included an executive order halting U.S. involvement with the United Nations Human Rights Council and blocking all U.S. funding for UNRWA, the U.N. aid agency for Palestinian refugees—two entities with which Israel’s interactions have been famously acrimonious—and a presidential memorandum restoring “maximum pressure” on Iran’s government. Trump then said in a White House press conference that the United States “will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it, too.” The prime minister returned to Jerusalem in triumphant spirits.

DOGE Has Its Sights on the Defense Department

Gil Barndollar and Matthew C. Mai

After dealing with lower-hanging fruit, Elon Musk’s U.S. Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) now has its sights on a bigger target: the Defense Department and its projected $1 trillion new budget. One cost-saving idea that both military officials and external analysts have suggested is to close or consolidate dozens of U.S. military bases.

The idea is attractive at first glance: streamline the military’s footprint, sell off unused real estate, and save the taxpayer billions. But another round of base closures—on top of five such rounds since 1988—could severely undermine the United States’ ability to mobilize for a major war. It would also deepen the recruiting crisis that threatens the all-volunteer force.

The Actual Math Behind DOGE’s Cuts

Jessica Riedl

In November, when Donald Trump first announced his plan to place Elon Musk in charge of a new Department of Government Efficiency, the idea was widely written off as a joke. Then Trump took office, and DOGE began its very real stampede through the government. As an effort to meaningfully reduce federal spending, however, DOGE remains wholly unserious.

Musk initially promised that he would eliminate $2 trillion of the $7 trillion federal budget, before scaling back his ambitions to $1 trillion, and then $150 billion. Even that revised target is highly improbable.

Precisely measuring the budgetary effects of the Musk experiment remains difficult, but we can begin by looking at the claims made by DOGE itself. In late February, its website claimed to have achieved $55 billion in annual-spending reductions. However, its “wall of receipts” detailed only $16.5 billion of this total. Half of that figure came from a typo claiming $8 billion in savings from terminating an $8 million contract. As The New York Times has reported, that was far from the only accounting error. Once such mistakes as false contract cancellations, triple counts of the same reform, and the inclusion of contracts that expired decades ago were fixed, verified budget savings stood at just $2 billion.

Hurdle or catalyst for a peace deal in Ukraine?

Henry Sokolski

In all the peace proposals the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have made public, one item always shows up: the reopening of the damaged six-reactor Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant—Europe’s largest. The United States wants to rebuild and operate it. Russia insists the plant is theirs. And Ukraine says that it must remain Ukrainian. But lost in this contest over who will control the plant—which sits at the frontline of the war between Russia and Ukraine—is just how difficult, or even worthwhile, it will be to repair and restart the plant.

Given how costly and technically challenging bringing Zaporizhzhia back online will be, it is unclear if any of these parties are up to the task. Russia insists it can get at least one of the reactors up and running within several months. The United States has put no timestamp on revitalizing Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine says, if there is a solid peace and Ukraine has total control over the plant, getting all six reactors back online would still take up to two years.

It could take considerably longer to reopen Zaporizhzhia. And no one has ventured how much it would cost.

Russia’s Fracturing Economy

One of the weakest points in the survivability of President Vladimir Putin’s regime is the Russian economy. On April 24, Putin assured Russian business leaders that the country’s economic challenges are part of a planned “soft-landing” to curb inflation. The Consumer Price Index (CPI) in Russia has skyrocketed, up to 9.65 percent year on year in March. Putin admits that inflation, now at over 10 percent, is too high. This comes as Russia’s 1.9 percent annual GDP growth for January to February of this year is down from 4.3 percent last year. Moreover, non-seasonally adjusted GDP may have declined for the first time since the second quarter of 2022, after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Russia’s wartime economy is undergoing reverse industrialization. High-tech sectors are giving way to labor-intensive, low-productivity industries as civilian sectors are stagnating, and defense-related production is prioritized. Russia is experiencing persistent labor shortages, especially for skilled workers in technical fields. The Kremlin’s reforms of the education system to fill defense-sector vacancies have caused public concern over fairness and quality. Meanwhile, dependence on energy exports has become a liability as Western sanctions and infrastructural shortcomings have severely reduced revenues from oil and gas.

Russia’s war against Ukraine currently serves as a justification and a diversion for Putin in explaining the poor economic situation. Putin claims that the West is “seeking to fight us on the economic front” and “shutter [the Russian] economy.” In December last year, Putin claimed that the Russian economy was “growing despite everything, despite external threats and attempts to influence us.” Conversely, Putin has stated that Russia’s national defense should be top priority without “destroy[ing] our own economy” and that the “Russian economy has prevailed over the risks it faced” as “we had to respond literally on the fly, dealing with issues as they emerged.”

Trump’s moment to reform the US intelligence community

Charlie Edwards

In his confirmation hearing on 15 January 2025, CIA Director John Ratcliffe was clear: China presents a ‘once-in-a-generation challenge’. This call to arms was reinforced just a few months later by Tulsi Gabbard, the new director of national intelligence (DNI), when she set out the intelligence community’s assessment that ‘China is our most capable strategic competitor’.

Ratcliffe’s appointment as director of the CIA, Gabbard as the DNI and Kash Patel as director of the FBI are seen by some as evidence of United States President Donald Trump’s fraught history with what he has called the ‘deep state’. These traditionally non-partisan posts are now held by individuals who share Trump’s view that government insiders have allegedly conspired against him. Notably, however, the appointments also provide Trump with an opportunity to make China the ‘organising principle’ for intelligence, and they signal an intention to impose a reorganisation of the intelligence community from the top down.

The impetus for reform

The demand for intelligence reform – something Republicans, Democrats and intelligence practitioners largely agree is overdue – is driven by the perception that the current structure, established over the past two decades and influenced by post-9/11 needs, is not equipped to effectively address the rapidly evolving threats of today, particularly from nation-state adversaries and in the cyber domain. This is compounded by internal bureaucratic challenges (such as requiring that approved National Intelligence Program funds be directed to priority areas) and resource challenges (such as managing personnel within multi-agency mission centres).

Do You Really Have to Stop Using Windows 10?

Justin Pot

The end is nigh—at least, it is for Windows 10. Microsoft will stop supporting the decade-old operating system on October 14, 2025.

There's one hiccup, though: Even though Windows 11 is a free update, more people still use Windows 10 than Windows 11, according to statcounter.com, a site that tracks operating system usage worldwide.

Plenty of people, it seems, either don't want to upgrade to Windows 11 or are using devices that aren't supported. This means millions of people could be using an operating system that’s no longer receiving security updates.

If you're one of them, it makes sense to learn what happens to your computer in October—and what you should do about it. Here's a summary of what's happening with Windows 10 and four options you have to replace it.

Windows 10 Will Keep Working (But It Will Be Less Secure)

Nothing in particular is going to happen on October 14, the day updates stop. Your computer will keep working the way it has, and you're unlikely to run into issues. That doesn't mean it's a great idea to keep using Windows 10, though.

Don’t Offshore American AI to the Middle East

Alasdair Phillips-Robins and Sam Winter-Levy

In 1867, Tsar Alexander II of Russia agreed to sell the territory of Alaska to the United States for a mere $7.2 million—approximately 2 cents per acre. At the time, Secretary of State William Seward, the architect of the deal, was ridiculed for the acquisition; critics called it “Seward’s Folly.” But since geologists struck oil in the region in 1902, Alaska has provided the United States with a strategic resource that helped bankroll its rise over the 20th century.

Alaskan oil production has generated more than $180 billion in revenue for the state—a return orders of magnitude greater than the original purchase price. Meanwhile, Russia’s Alaska sale has gone down as a strategic blunder.

The myth of the Bad War

Tim Black

It is 80 years since Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allied powers. In his speech broadcast from Downing Street on 8 May 1945 – otherwise known as Victory in Europe Day – Britain’s prime minister, Winston Churchill, struck a suitably triumphant note. ‘My dear friends, this is your hour’, he declared. ‘This is not victory of a party or of any class. It’s a victory of the great British nation as a whole.’

Since VE Day, Britain’s role in the greatest and most lethal war in human history has changed and grown in stature. It has become key to our sense of national identity. It has given us the metaphors we reach for to give shape to our national character, our supposed Blitz Spirit, our ‘Keep calm and carry on’ stoicism. It has provided the heroic reference points, from ‘our finest hour’ in the skies above Britain to the collective pluck of the evacuation of Dunkirk. And, in the fight against fascism, it has gifted Britain a moral legacy and future purpose. Invoking the war has become the last semi-acceptable form of patriotism.

There is, of course, a strong element of elite myth-making around Britain’s role in the Second World War. We really were not ‘all in it together’ during the Blitz, as the urban working classes huddled in makeshift shelters and Tube stations, while the establishment retreated to the comfort and safety of their country houses. Britain was also guilty of many brutal acts during the war, from the bombing of Dresden to the Bengal famine, in which three million were allowed to starve to death, in order to sell vital rice supplies to the US and feed British forces stationed in Burma.

12 May 2025

Can India and Pakistan Walk Back from the Brink of War?

Peter Suciu

Regional rivals India and Pakistan have fought four border conflicts, as well as a series of regional skirmishes and military standoffs.

The roots of the animosity go back before the 1947 Partition of India, which divided the country in half. Inter-communal violence between Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims will likely ensure that lasting peace in the region remains elusive.

As India launched missiles into Pakistani-controlled territory on Tuesday, the countries inched closer to full-blown war, a worrisome trend as both are nuclear powers.

“It is often said that India and Pakistan know the dance of escalation better than most nations on Earth. They have rehearsed it for decades: a terrorist attack occurs, New Delhi blames Islamabad, airstrikes or artillery fire follow, and the world holds its breath while diplomats scramble to contain the crisis,” geopolitical analyst Irina Tsukerman, president of threat assessment firm Scarab Rising, told The National Interest.

“Then, almost as suddenly, the temperature drops. Statements are walked back. The Line of Control (LoC) simmers but doesn’t boil. The script resets.”

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