Indian Strategic Studies

18 August 2025

The UN’s Permanent Process on Cybersecurity Faces an Uphill Battle

Pavlina Pavlova, Christopher Painter

In July, the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) reached consensus on a permanent mechanism to address responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Following six rounds of time-bound groups of governmental experts (GGEs) and two open-ended working groups (OEWGs), this new process under the First Committee—addressing disarmament and international security—will commence in March 2026 with an organizational session at the UN headquarters in New York.

The single-track “Global Mechanism” was agreed upon with relative ease after no delegation broke consensus on the third draft presented by the chair as a compromise package. The swift decision reached in the morning of July 11 stood in sharp contrast to several years of last-minute suspense preceding each interim report, created by Iran and Russia’s insistence that their views be featured more prominently.

At first glance, multilateralism defied the odds on the cybersecurity issue amid a challenging geopolitical situation. The surprise agreement recalled a similar moment less than a year ago, in which the Ad Hoc Committee successfully negotiated the first UN cybercrime convention.

Consensus agreements, though, come at a price. The underlying friction, caused by two competing proposals—the Programme of Action, led by France, and Russia’s call for a binding cybersecurity treaty—was largely left unresolved. The official name of the permanent mechanism is the “Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs”—a mouthful even for senior diplomats. Similarly, the UN Convention against Cybercrime has an addition to its name: “strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of ICT systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crime.” These verbose titles are not accidental. Today, consensus-based decision-making at the UN arises not from a shared vision or reasonable compromise but, rather, from the accommodation of opposing views—often reflected in lengthy titles—that make the implementation of agreed commitments difficult, if not impossible.

Europe: spending defence euros and dollars

Ester Sabatino

In the last three and a half years, the EU has stepped up efforts to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, aiming to ensure its members can meet their defence requirements. The mantra of EU defence cooperation has been to spend more, better, together, and to reduce dependencies on third countries. But are countries ready to reduce reliance on the US?

Europe is ready to take on greater responsibility for its defence, and it recognises the ‘right and reason’ for the United States to shift its strategic priorities, according to European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, speaking on a recent visit to the US. The commissioner noted that the European Union is not in a position to direct member states’ acquisitions and suggested that Europe’s increased defence spending will not necessarily reduce cooperation with the US.

EU mechanisms to sustain the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) include conditions on the involvement of third countries and third-country entities. This is the case not only for older frameworks, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, but also for the latest instruments, such as the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which was established in May 2025.

For non-EU actors, these requirements can be unappealing or unworkable, particularly in cases where external players have long-standing cooperative partnerships with EU states and have a well-developed and capable defence-industrial sector. Indeed, EU activities are often considered, particularly by the US, to discourage third-party involvement. This is partly due to the requirements that Washington’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations places on export recipients of US-manufactured defence materiel.

Many European countries have and continue to rely on the US for key defence platforms. This reliance, however, risks running counter to the effort to bolster the continent’s defence-industrial base.

The geo-economics of Russia’s bad harvest

Peter Frankopan

Russia’s ability to export grain and fertiliser has remained one of its few sources of economic strength and international leverage since its invasion of Ukraine. Unlike hydrocarbons, these exports have been spared Western sanctions, providing the Kremlin with critical revenue and soft power reach. But an increasingly erratic climate is now threatening this advantage. Russia’s bad 2025 harvest is more than a weather event: it reveals the structural fragility of Russia’s war economy and the growing risks to a system built on fiscal buffers and fossil fuels.

Strength in declineDuring the Cold War, the Soviet Union could not feed itself. It depended on grain imports, primarily from the United States. This gave Washington a lever of geopolitical influence during the era of detente by offering access to food on the condition of restraint in foreign policy.

A Soviet weakness became a Russian strength. The post-Soviet transition to private land ownership and heavy state investment transformed Russia into an agricultural powerhouse. This gave it the confidence to ban Western food imports in 2014 in retaliation against sanctions imposed after Russia annexed Crimea and parts of Donbas. By 2016, Russia had become the world’s largest exporter of wheat and a leading exporter of fertiliser. These exports brought not just foreign currency, but influence – especially among buyers in Africa and the Middle East.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western sanctions have sought to isolate the Russian economy. These have largely exempted agricultural exports to protect global food security, particularly in developing countries. For the Kremlin, this omission has become a secure stream of foreign earnings and influence that have helped stabilise the economy and support the war effort. But nature, indifferent to political constraints, may now be doing what Western policymakers have declined to do.

The Fundamental Truth About U.S. Strategy That Putin Knows and Trump Ignores

M. Gessen

Donald Trump wants the war in Ukraine to end. Volodymyr Zelensky wants the war in Ukraine to end. Many other presidents and prime ministers want the war to end. Vladimir Putin is not one of those presidents. The war in Ukraine has become the political, psychological and economic center of Putin’s regime.

That basic asymmetry would seem to doom any attempt at a negotiated peace — it is, in fact, the main reason no meaningful peace negotiations have occurred in the three and a half years since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trump thinks he has a solution, though. He says he intends to use his negotiating prowess and keep ratcheting up economic pressure until Putin has no choice but to stop the fighting.

Between the bombastic social media posts, the shifting deadlines, the erratic announcements — one day a White House official says Trump will meet with Putin only after Putin meets with Zelensky, another day Trump drops the requirement — it’s easy to overlook the fact that Trump’s policy toward Russia largely follows the same failed strategy employed by the Biden administration, the first Trump administration and the Obama administration before that. For more than a decade, the United States has responded to Russian aggression by threatening and gradually imposing economic sanctions. That some of Trump’s sanctions take the form of tariffs doesn’t alter the nature of the policy.

The conventional theory behind sanctions is that economic pressure destabilizes regimes, possibly forcing the leader to change course. In one scenario, widespread hardship — unemployment, inflation, shortages — leads to popular discontent, even unrest. In another, a shrinking economy and loss of access to foreign markets anger the elites, who stage a palace coup or at least compel the leader to change direction.

How NATO nations need to sell the 5 percent spending hike to their own people

Kristen Taylor

At the NATO Summit earlier this summer, NATO allies agreed to raise their defense spending target to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 — with 3.5 percent focused on hard security and 1.5 allocated to defense-enablers like critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The move, pushed by the White House, represents a much-needed increase in spending to match mounting challenges to international security. Allies are already signaling considerable progress toward this goal. Following the Summit announcement, Berlin unveiled an ambitious plan to double its military spending by the end of a decade—a welcome, albeit delayed, commitment from Europe’s largest economy.

But the 5 percent figure belies the true cost. The gross domestic product of allied countries dwarfs annual national expenditures. So, while a rise from 2 to 5 percent of GDP may not seem like much on face value, but as a share of national expenditure, it is a massive ask, and one the people could begin to feel, sooner rather than later.

To understand the scale of the new spending request, look to Berlin. In 2024, Germany spent 2.12 percent of its GDP on defense, allocating a little over $97 billion in defense spending. In the same year, Germany spent approximately $485 billion on total national expenditures. In total, as a share of national outlays, this accounts for approximately 20 percent of Germany’s national expenditures. All else equal, if Germany were to increase defense spending to the newly agreed target, more than 47 percent of Germany’s total budgetary expenditures would go toward defense. Some allies, particularly laggard spenders who do not meet the 2 percent goal currently, face even sharper projections.

Now, this is an imperfect metric. These pledges have a time horizon over a decade; GDP certainly will not remain stagnant for allies over this time; economic conditions and tax demands will fluctuate; countries may be able to count already-planned infrastructure development toward the 1.5 percent for defense enablers; and governments and their constituencies will adjust spending based on the state of the international security environment balanced with domestic priorities.

Getting It Wrong: The EU and the War for Israel’s Surviva

Todd Huizinga

Vatican Steps In Where Others Can’t: Bridging Russia and the West

Both sides understand that renewing Russian-European dialogue is essential to ensuring the continent’s stability.

A Vassal’s Bargain: How Europe Signed Away Its Autonomy

Ursula von der Leyen’s tariff deal with Washington marks the clearest admission yet of Europe’s diminished status in the transatlantic order.

How Trump Could Cause a European Financial Crisis

Pressure from the U.S. president to cut interest rates could spark a chain reaction, pushing Europe to follow—and creating a potential equity market bubble.

Everyone knows it is possible for different groups of people to look at the same reality, see and acknowledge the same events, and still come to diametrically opposed conclusions. Since the Hamas terror attacks on Israel of October 7, 2023, we’ve seen this happening between Israel and many of its enemies in the West—on campuses and streets all over North America and Europe.

What is truly shocking, however, is to see this happening among leading officials of Israel on the one hand and the European Union on the other. These are not exuberant twenty-somethings stirred up by left-wing troublemakers; These are the adults in the room. They supposedly uphold a common Western democratic order, and lead a common civilization that shares the values of peace, tolerance, freedom, human rights, and human dignity.

As important as the question of the war between Israel and its enemies is, there is a more fundamental issue at stake: our so-called shared Western values seem to be failing us amid a worldview clash so sharp, stark, and consequential as to constitute a complete break, one that appears unbridgeable unless one side or the other profoundly changes its worldview.

Parallel realities?

Behind Wall Street’s Abrupt Flip on Crypto

Rob Copeland

Not long ago, bank executives would compete with one another to be the loudest critic of cryptocurrencies.

Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, once compared Bitcoin to a pet rock and said the whole crypto industry should be banned. Bank of America’s Brian Moynihan described the space as an “untraceable tool for money laundering,” while HSBC’s chief executive proclaimed bluntly: “We are not into Bitcoin.”

Now big banks can’t stop talking about crypto.

In investor calls, public presentations and meetings with Washington regulators, financial executives are tripping over one another to unveil new plans — including the development of fresh cryptocurrencies under bank umbrellas and loans tied to digital assets.

There’s no small mix of political opportunism at play, given that President Trump and his family are vociferous crypto boosters and investors. And of course there is a degree of old-fashioned jealousy among the traditional finance set at the riches earned by onetime fringe companies and investors as Bitcoin more than doubled over the past year to blow past $100,000.

But behind the scenes at major financial institutions — and in stark contrast to the public showboating among chief executives — fear is also rising that the rush into crypto may risk the safety of personal bank accounts in ways that Wall Street and Washington are just beginning to understand.

In maps: The war-ravaged Ukrainian territories at the heart of the Trump-Putin summit

Paul Adams

Speculation has swirled over whether the Trump-Putin summit will result in the map of Ukraine being forcibly – and fundamentally – altered.

Russia has laid claim to vast parts of Ukraine since 2014, when President Vladimir Putin made his first move.

At the time, in the space of a short few months, Moscow carried out the relatively bloodless occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

But that was followed by a Russian-backed separatist movement in the eastern Donbas region – specifically the two regions, or "oblasts", known as Donetsk and Luhansk.

Ukraine after 2014 and before the start of the 2022 full-scale invasion

Ukraine lost around 14,000 soldiers and civilians during this period.

But in February 2022, Putin launched his full-scale invasion. Russian troops quickly reached the outskirts of Kyiv and seized huge swathes of the south, including big chunks of two more oblasts, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

The war has ebbed and flowed ever since. Russia now controls rather less territory - down from about 27% in the spring of 2022 to around 20% now. In the east, Russian forces are advancing, but very slowly and at great cost.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine says an unconditional ceasefire is needed now. European allies also insist on a halt in fighting. US President Donald Trump says that is what he has been trying to achieve.

But in the run-up to his Alaska summit with Putin, Trump has talked instead about territorial swaps. That has sent shockwaves across Kyiv and Europe.

Elon Musk and Sam Altman’s AI Feud Gets Nasty

Rebecca Schneid

Along-running feud between Elon Musk and Sam Altman spilled out into the open this week as the AI billionaire heavyweights publicly fought over their rival companies.

The latest round in the battle between the X CEO and the CEO of OpenAI began when Musk claimed that Apple had been favoring Altman’s AI app over his own in the Apple Store rankings.

“Apple is behaving in a manner that makes it impossible for any AI company besides OpenAI to reach #1 in the App Store, which is an unequivocal antitrust violation,” Musk said on X on Monday evening. “xAI will take immediate legal action,” he added, referring to the AI company he leads.

Earlier in the day, Musk called out Apple for not putting his X app or its generative AI chatbot system, Grok, on its recommended lists:

“Hey @Apple App Store, why do you refuse to put either X or Grok in your ‘Must Have’ section when X is the #1 news app in the world and Grok is #5 among all apps?” he asked. “Are you playing politics?”

Apple said in an earlier statement that the “App Store is designed to be fair and free of bias.”

Altman, who founded OpenAI with Musk in 2015 before Musk left the company, responded on X: “This is a remarkable claim given what I have heard alleged that Elon does to manipulate X to benefit himself and his own companies and harm his competitors and people he doesn't like.”

Altman included a link to a Platformer News article, which claimed that Musk had manipulated the X algorithm so that his tweets would be displayed more prominently to users and favor his interests.

Golden Dome Development Is Supposed to Be Kept Under Wraps. Details Keep Leaking

Chad de Guzman

Since Donald Trump formally announced plans for the shield in May—after ordering the “Iron Dome for America” a week into his second term—the Pentagon has tried to keep discussion of its development under wraps, including by reportedly banning officials from discussing it at a military-industrial conference earlier this month and asking organizers to keep it off the general agenda, according to Politico. Organizers said they were told to keep discussion of the Golden Dome to a specific, closed-to-the-press summit on the sidelines of the main conference.

The Atlantic’s Tom Nichols, who expressed doubts over the viability of the Golden Dome, described the choice to “go silent” on the ambitious and expensive undertaking, at the 2025 Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Ala., which “is exactly the kind of place where the government can tell its story and get science, industry, and the military on the same page,” as “strange.”

Even former military officials have been baffled by the clamp down. “We gotta be able to talk about it,” Ret. Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler, who served as commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command from 2019-2024, told the Washington Times.

“We have to be able to share with the American public what we are intending to do with Golden Dome for America. We gotta share with the industry what the architecture is going to look like. We have to share with the services what is going to be called upon for their forces,” said Karbler. “We have gotta do a good job at just communicating.”

A Defense Department official told media in a statement that “it would be imprudent for the Department to release further information on this program during these early stages,” citing “operational security.” The Washington Times theorized that the secrecy “could be explained by spying concerns,” particularly from geopolitical rivals like Russia and China.

National digital IDs in the age of artificial intelligence

Onur Kara

Digital IDs increasingly underpin state power, promising security and efficiency. But as AI models learn from leaked or stolen biometric data, these same systems are likely to create profound vulnerabilities for governments, industries and citizens.

In the United Kingdom, it seems the government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer is considering the rollout of national digital IDs – a potential move that sits at the crossroads of immigration policy, the newly implemented Online Safety Act and a fresh inquiry launched by the Home Affairs Committee to examine the potential risks and rewards of state-issued digital identification.

The news from the UK points towards a global trend. Since Finland introduced the first ‘electronic identity card’ in 1999, digital identity systems have played key roles in service provision and public security more than 130 countries. The COVID-19 pandemic was a major driver of adoption, since it heightened governments’ awareness of the benefits of using population-wide datasets for public-health responses. According to the United Nations, by 2024, 78% of member states had enacted legislation or issued policy documents for digital IDs enabling access to public services. Just in the last three months, China has rolled out a new biometric ID programme for online services and Ethiopia has launched its Fayda digital ID, while Armenia has announced plans to roll out a new biometric ID card system in 2026.

Approaches to citizen dataAlthough the introduction of digital ID systems holds significant promise, implementation remains a formidable task. At the heart of the challenge lies the personal data of millions of individuals, which powers each national ID system. The need to maintain comprehensive records of entire populations prompted some countries, particularly early adopters with large populations, to create centralised repositories. India’s Aadhaar programme, operational since 2010, is the most prominent example, hosting the world's largest biometric database, with records of over 1.2 billion citizens. Likewise, Turkiye integrated its population register with residency records in 2007; the resulting MERNIS system has become fundamental to the provision of public services.

Report to Congress on Hypersonic Weapons

U.S. Naval Institute Staff

The following is the August 12, 2025, Congressional Research Service report, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, it has focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide vehicles and fielded an operational capability.

Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin has testified to Congress that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”

Although the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY 2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational system before FY 2027. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

5 workplace habits from the military that you should keep doing forever

Blake Stilwell

No matter what branch we served in in the U.S. military, there are a few things that are universal. All veterans have this innate need to show up 15 minutes early to everything. Many of us can still eat Thanksgiving dinner within two minutes (including dessert). Many veterans would also be lying if they aren’t a little proud of themselves when their pee is clear (if you know, you know).

While those are fun but forcibly instilled personality quirks, there are a few things that will turn out to be pretty handy over the course of a veteran’s life and career that our service has provided us. These are things that aren’t just good to know, they’re good to keep. Here are five of those habits you learned from the military that you should keep doing in the workplace forever.

1. Praise in Public; Criticize in Private

It’s seldom a good idea to embarrass or belittle a subordinate in front of the entire unit. The same can be said for working in a civilian job. If we have to chew someone out, we don’t do it in front of all their coworkers.

Veterans know that a public ass-chewing doesn’t do the group any good, will hurt the group’s respect for you, and impact their performance. A good subordinate will know they messed up, no matter how loud you get. We all know discipline in private saves face and doesn’t hurt the unit as a whole.

2. Integrity First

Lies only force the teller to create more lies to support the original lie. Honesty is important in every aspect of everyone’s life, and dishonesty can hurt your relationships with everyone around you. The reason every branch of the military insists on integrity is because that’s how critical it is.

Once anyone is caught in a lie, it destroys the trust between two or more people. Faith in each other’s integrity allows us all to operate with full support and confidence in each other and our surroundings.

3. There is no such thing as “I can’t”

17 August 2025

How much is Trump pocketing off the Presidency?

David D. Kirkpatrick

At a press conference on January 11, 2017, President-elect Donald Trump explained for the first time how he would handle the many conflicts of interest that his business empire posed for his new role. His company, the Trump Organisation, collected money from all over the world for luxury condos, hotel rentals, development projects, and club memberships, and he had made deals that put his name on everything from mail-order steaks to get-rich-quick courses. Could citizens trust him to put the common good ahead of personal profit? How would he assure Americans that payments to his business weren’t doubling as payoffs?

A journalist asked Trump if he would release his tax returns, as Presidents had done for decades. Trump said no, and then explained just how unconstrained he felt by such conventions. He’d recently learned that the President, being beholden only to the voters, is subject to none of the regulations that restrict subordinate officials from conducting private business on the side. He called the loophole “a no-conflict-of-interest provision,” as if it were a perk of his employment contract.

To illustrate just how glaring a conflict the law allowed him, Trump volunteered that, during the transition, he’d entertained a two-billion-dollar offer “to do a deal in Dubai.” The offer had come from Hussain Sajwani, an Emirati real-estate tycoon with close ties to his country’s rulers. Trump emphasised that he “didn’t have to turn it down.” Nevertheless, he’d passed, because he didn’t “want to take advantage of something”; he disliked “the way that looks.” Therefore, he continued, his eldest sons, Donald, Jr., and Eric, would assume daily management of his businesses until he left office

The Dawn of Automated Warfare

Eric Schmidt and Greg Grant

Artificial Intelligence Will Be the Key to Victory in Ukraine—and Elsewhere RIC SCHMIDT is CEO and Chair of Relativity Space and Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project. He previously served as CEO and Chair of Google and is a co-author, with Henry Kissinger and Craig Mundie, of Genesis: Artificial Intelligence, Hope, and the Human Spirit.

GREG GRANT is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defence Bob Work, and as a speechwriter for Secretaries of Defence Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel

When Russia first launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict drew comparisons to wars of the twentieth century. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery dominated the battlefield, and both sides’ infantry were dug into trenches. We witnessed this old-school style of war when we made our first visit to Ukraine in September 2022. Since then, we have made regular trips to Ukraine, affording us firsthand insight into a monumental transformation: the beginning of a new kind of warfare.

Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems

Michael S. Chase, William Marcellino

In a relationship marked by strategic rivalry and mutual suspicion, the prospect of either the United States or the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—or both—achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to heighten tensions and could even increase the risk of competition spiralling into conflict. This is unsurprising, as AGI could reshape the global balance of power or yield “wonder weapons” capable of overwhelming intelligence systems, information ecosystems, and cyber defences (Mitre and Predd, 2025).

Yet the emergence of AGI could also create incentives for risk reduction and cooperation. We argue that both will not only be possible but essential. The United States and China will both want to avoid miscalculation and misunderstandings that could lead to an unwanted war. Neither will be able to manage alone the risks of AGI misuse—whether from rogue actors developing novel weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), autonomous agents triggering crises, or cascading disruptions that exceed state capacity. But such progress on risk reduction or on cooperation will not emerge organically. It will require a deliberate and carefully calibrated diplomatic effort to make it viable. In this paper, we offer some ideas for where to start, building on existing yet underdeveloped platforms and avenues for dialogue.

The PRC’s choices will be a principal factor in shaping the risks and opportunities that U.S. policymakers will face on the path to AGI, and, likewise, Chinese officials will likely view the United States as the most consequential external actor shaping AGI outcomes. At first glance, it might seem that the intensifying friction between Washington and Beijing over security, economic, and technology issues, along with each side’s extremely negative views of the other’s intentions, will drive relations between them in areas related to AGI.

The Militarization of Silicon Valley

Sheera Frenkel

In a ceremony in June at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall in Arlington, Va., four current and former executives from Meta, OpenAI and Palantir lined up onstage to swear an oath to support and defend the United States. The U.S. Army had just created a technical innovation unit for the executives, who were dressed in combat gear and boots. At the event, they were pronounced lieutenant colonels in the new unit, Detachment 201, which will advise the Army on new technologies for potential combat.

“We desperately need what they are good at,” Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll said of the tech executives, who have since undergone basic training. “It’s an understatement how grateful we are that they are taking this risk to come and try to build this out with us.” ImageAndrew Bosworth, Meta’s chief technology officer; Bob McGrew, an adviser at Thinking Machines Lab and OpenAI’s former chief research officer; Shyam Sankar, Palantir’s chief technology officer; and Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s chief product officer at a military ceremony in June.Credit...Staff Sgt. Leroy Council/United States Army

The military is not just courting Silicon Valley tech companies. In the age of President Trump, it has successfully recruited them. Over the past two years, Silicon Valley’s leaders and investors — many of whom had once forsworn involvement in weapons and war — have plunged headfirst into the military industrial complex. Meta, Google and OpenAI, which once had language in their corporate policies banning the use of artificial intelligence in weapons, have removed such wording. OpenAI is creating anti-drone technology, while Meta is making virtual reality glasses to train soldiers for battle.

So Long to Tech’s Dream Job

Kate Conger

When Rachel Grey started working at Google as a software engineer in 2007, it was a good time to be a Noogler, or what the search giant called new employees. At a two-week orientation at Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, Calif., Ms. Grey discovered a utopia of perks. The company’s cafeterias served steak and shrimp, kitchens were stocked with fresh juices and gyms offered free workout classes. Workers received stock grants on top of their salaries, a 50 per cent match on their retirement contributions and a Christmas bonus that came in the form of $1,000 tucked in an envelope.

What also made an impression on Ms. Grey during orientation was that Google revealed how many machines were in its data centres. “I saw how transparent things were in the company,” she said about the normally hush-hush information. Over the years, though, her experience changed as she became a software engineering manager. The Christmas bonus shrank. Employees were no longer provided a fire hose of corporate information. The company abandoned a pledge that its artificial intelligence would not be used for weapons. The budget for promotions dried up, pressuring Ms. Grey to lower performance ratings, which she said was “stunningly painful.” In April, just shy of 18 years, the 48-year-old quit what was once her dream job.

Life for workers at Silicon Valley’s biggest tech companies is different. Very different. Gone are the days when Google, Apple, Meta and Netflix were the dream destinations for tech workers, offering fat salaries, lush corporate campuses and say-anything, do-anything cultures. Now the behemoth firms have aged into large bureaucracies. While many of them still provide free food and pay well, they have little compunction cutting jobs, ordering mandatory office attendance and clamping down on employee debate.

Expanding China’s Geopolitical Influence through Peripheral Communication

Andrew Grant

The discourse of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and trio of global initiatives implies that the country’s geopolitical interests are firmly global. Nonetheless, in recent years Chinese scholars and intellectuals have increased their attention on the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For many PRC scholars, this is presented as a course-corrective to earlier efforts to improve China’s position and status in “far away” places around the globe—efforts that in Western countries have produced weak results or backfired. The turn to its periphery can also be understood as an effort by China to reimagine its borderlands as geopolitical spaces that will serve as natural stepping stones between the consolidation of domestic frontier territories and long-term goals of extending China’s great-power influence around the world. From this viewpoint, control of China’s periphery is seen as a testing ground for the country’s global power.

In October 2013 and April 2025, Xi Jinping convened special meetings on China’s periphery. In his 2025 speech at the Central Peripheral Work Conference, he emphasized the importance of creating a “peripheral community of a shared future” (周边命运共同体). While development and a large assortment of “mutual” projects are presented as key to the establishment of this community, there is also a strong emphasis on finding a basis in cultural commonalities expressed via terms such as “affinity” (亲) and “tolerance” (容). Such shared traits are seen as attributes of populations on either side of the border that must be cultivated to strengthen peripheral states’ ties to China. These attributes will then become the foundations of a peripheral community that will serve China’s geopolitical interests and is responsive to “China’s new era foreign discursive system,” which, in line with Xi’s calls for building Chinese-centered narrative and conceptual frameworks, ensures that positive stories about China and its benevolent deeds are told, heard, and further disseminated.1 Such a peripheral propaganda program can help counter Western influence, thereby helping establish China’s stepping stones to greater world influence. At the heart of this approach is the concept of “peripheral communication” (周边传播)—an emerging field of study and action pioneered by the Peking University scholar Lu Di that seeks to control the discourse about China in the countries proximate to its borders.

A.I. is fueling a “poverty of imagination.” Here’s how we can fix it.

Meher AhmadJessica Grose, and Tressie McMillan Cottom

Artificial intelligence is already showing up in the classroom, so how are colleges, professors and students adapting to it? The New York Times Opinion editor Meher Ahmad is joined by the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cottom to talk about how the humanities are charting a new course, and whether ChatGPT is comparable to SparkNotes.

A.I. Is Fueling a ‘Poverty of Imagination.’ Here’s How We Can Fix It.What bots are really doing in the classroom. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYT Audio app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. The transcript has been lightly edited for length and claritMeher Ahmad: I’m Meher Ahmad and I’m an editor for the New York Times Opinion section. Today I am joined by my colleagues the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cotto, to talk about artificial intelligence and education. Hi to both of you.

Jessica Grose: Thanks so much for having me.Tressie McMillan Cottom: Hello. Always a pleasure to be here. And hi, Jessica. Good to see you. Ahmad: So both of you have given this a lot of thought. Tressie, you’re in the classroom often as a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and have called generative A.I. “mid tech,” which we’ll get into. Jess, you’ve spent time interviewing parents, students and most recently educators across the humanities to write a series of pieces on A.I. and education for your newsletter.

Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion

Gabriel Honrada

Betting on stealth over speed, Taiwan is forging a long-range “carrier killer” to push back China’s carriers and toughen the First Island Chain—even as layered Chinese defences and shaky allied politics cloud the gambit. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defence analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China’s growing naval power, citing a defence ministry procurement list.

Under the Defence Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models. Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon’s development since 2021.

Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometres—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas. The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III’s 400-kilometre limit and the US-made Harpoon’s 200-kilometre reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) layered defences.

The Battle Inside Russia’s Elite

Kirill Shamiev

As Russia’s economic situation worsens and Ukrainian defences continue to hold, elite factions in Moscow are manoeuvring for position in an uncertain future. Their goal is twofold: to protect the profits and privileges gained during the war, and to deflect blame for its mounting human and financial costs. Russian President Vladimir Putin is concerned that the elite’s disunity and anxiety about the country’s future could undermine the cohesion of the Russian regime. To counteract this trend, the Kremlin has introduced unprecedented legal mechanisms for redistributing wealth under the banner of national security: from those suspected of even minimal disloyalty or Western ties, to individuals who may be less competent but demonstrably supportive of Putin. This puts the elites in a Russian-style prisoner’s dilemma, in which the safest strategy is to perform exaggerated loyalty while quietly undermining rivals to survive the conflict.

From the United States’ perspective, the challenge is to make sure these dynamics don’t become an obstacle to ending the Russia-Ukraine war. To do so, U.S. policy should continue making Russia’s government and industrial leadership feel anxious about the war’s costs and eventual settlement. Policymakers should signal that accountability for the invasion will be targeted rather than collective or indiscriminate. The war’s architects should continue to face sanctions, while elites who increasingly abstain from publicly backing the war effort should be led to expect more forgiving treatment.

Ukrainians have changed their minds on ending war

Brendan Cole

Brendan Cole is a Newsweek Senior News Reporter based in London, UK. His focus is Russia and Ukraine, in particular the war started by Moscow. He also covers other areas of geopolitics, including China. Brendan joined Newsweek in 2018 from the International Business Times and well knows English, knows Russian and French. You can get in touch with Brendan by emailing b.cole@newsweek.com or follow on him on his X account @brendanmarkcole.

Support among Ukrainians for continuing the fight against Russia has slumped, according to polling that shows most want to end the war through negotiations. The Gallup survey found that most Ukrainians backed ending the war with Russia through negotiations, as support for Kyiv fighting on until victory has dropped sharply since the early days of the conflict.

This is a reversal from 2022, the year the war started, when most favoured Ukraine fighting until victory, and only a fifth wanted a negotiated end as soon as possible. Gallup also found that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had an approval rating of 67 per cent, up seven percentage points from 2024. Benedict Vigers, a senior global news writer at Gallup, told Newsweek that since 2023, Gallup has observed "meaningful shifts in how Ukrainians feel about the war with Russia."

Trump and Putin Could Decide Others’ Fates, Echoing Yalta Summit

Steven Erlanger

The world’s superpowers met in 1945 in the Black Sea port of Yalta to divide up Europe after the defeat of Nazi Germany. They drew lines on the map that tore apart countries, effectively delivered Eastern Europe to Soviet occupation and dismembered Poland. And none of those countries were represented or had a say. As President Trump prepares to meet President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia on Friday in Alaska, there is more talk — and anxiety — among Ukrainians and Europeans about a second Yalta. They are not scheduled to be present, and Mr. Trump has said he plans to negotiate “land swaps” with Mr. Putin over Ukrainian territory.

“Yalta is a symbol of everything we fear,” said Peter Schneider, a German novelist who wrote “The Wall Jumper,” about the division of Berlin. At Yalta, the world itself was divided and “countries were handed to Stalin,” he said. “Now we see that Putin wants to reconstruct the world as it was at Yalta. For him, it begins with Ukraine, but that’s not his ending.” Yalta, itself in Russian-annexed Crimea, has become a symbol for how superpowers can decide the fates of other nations and peoples. “It’s a linchpin moment, when the European world is divided in two and the fate of Europeans in the East is locked in without any possible say,” said Ivan Vejvoda, a Serb political scientist with the Institute for Human Sciences, a research institution in Vienna.

Vladimir Putin Could Be Laying a Trap

Jonathan Lemire

Vladimir Putin has had a tough few months. His military’s much-feared summer offensive has made incremental gains in Ukraine but not nearly the advances he had hoped. His economy has sputtered. Donald Trump has grown fed up with Putin’s repeated defiance of his calls for a cease-fire and, for the first time, has targeted the Russian president with consistently harsh rhetoric. Last week, Trump slapped one of Russia’s major trading partners, India, with sanctions.

Putin needs to buy time to change the trajectory of the conflict. So the former KGB spymaster has given Trump something that the U.S. president has wanted for months: a one-on-one summit to discuss the end of the conflict. Trump leaped at the chance. But as the two men prepare to meet in Alaska on Friday, foreign-policy experts—and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky—are warning that Trump could be walking into a trap that the Russian leader is setting on American soil.

“Putin has already won. He is the leader of a rogue state, and he’ll get a picture on U.S. soil with the president of the United States,” John Bolton, one of Trump’s former national security advisers, told me. “Trump wants a deal. And if he can’t get one now, he may walk away from it entirely.” Putin has shown no sign of compromising his positions. His demands to reach an end to hostilities remain maximalist: He wants Russia to keep the territory it conquered, and Ukraine to forgo the security guarantees that could prevent Moscow from attacking again. Those terms are nonstarters for Ukraine and the European nations that have rallied to its defence.

China Is Winning the Cyberwar

Anne Neuberger

ANNE NEUBERGER is Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University and a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution. Before serving as Deputy National Security Adviser for Cyber and Emerging Technology on the U.S. National Security Council in the Biden administration, she spent over a decade in various roles at the U.S. National Security Agency.

American companies are world leaders in technology—be it innovative software, cloud services, artificial intelligence, or cybersecurity products. Yet beginning as many as three years ago, hackers believed to be backed by the Chinese government did something the United States, the tech powerhouse, could not adequately defend against: they gained and maintained access to major U.S. telecommunications networks, copying conversations and building the ability to track the movements of U.S. intelligence officers and law enforcement agents across the country. The attack, dubbed “Salt Typhoon,” constituted a large part of a global campaign against telecoms, and it penetrated systems at many U.S. carriers so thoroughly that officials will almost certainly never know the full scope of the capabilities China achieved to spy on Americans’ communications.

Salt Typhoon was more than a one-off intelligence success for China. It reflected a deeper, troubling reality. Mere decades after the widespread adoption of the Internet opened a new realm of geopolitical contestation, China is positioning itself to dominate the digital battle space. The United States has fallen behind, failing to secure a vast digital home front—and the physical assets that depend on it. Because cyberspace has no borders, the U.S. homeland is always in the fight. Every hospital, power grid, pipeline, water treatment plant, and telecommunications system is on the frontlines, and most of the United States’ critical infrastructure is unready for battle.

Exploring War Termination in the Russo-Ukrainian War

Jerry Landrum

During his 2024 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised that, if elected, he would end the Russo-Ukraine War within 24 hours by meeting personally with Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. Six months into his term, however, the war persists. This gap between political rhetoric and reality reflects not a deficiency in negotiation skills but the deeper dynamics that H.E. Goemans’ theory of war termination reveals about how battlefield outcomes reshape war aims, exacerbate commitment problems, and interact with domestic political constraints to prevent peace. Applying Goemans’ framework to the Russo-Ukraine War reveals why even sustained US pressure has failed to produce a settlement and why similar dynamics recur in protracted conflicts. Any future peace negotiations over the Russo-Ukraine War must successfully navigate the challenges highlighted within this theoretical framework.

Variance in War Aims

Goemans argues that bargaining space for war termination opens only when neither side demands more than the other can accept. Yet war aims vary based on battlefield outcomes. For Russia, the Kremlin’s illegal annexation of Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia marked a pivot from an early focus on capturing Kyiv to securing territorial control in the east and south. Putin’s rhetoric, however, continues to invoke a vision of a culturally unified Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, suggesting that if conditions allowed, the Kremlin would once again pursue control over all of Ukraine. At the 2025 St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, Putin reiterated that he considers “Ukraine and Russian peoples to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours. We have a rule. Wherever a Russian soldier sets foot is ours.”

The Collapse of Iran’s Proxy Strategy Exposes the Limits of Asymmetric Warfare

Rufat Ahmadzada

With the conclusion of Operation Rising Lion, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu iterated that Israel has accomplished its strategic operational goals, in particular, rolling back the Iranian threat in terms of both its nuclear weapons program and ballistic missiles. The accuracy of the conduct of the military operation by the Israeli air force, military intelligence, and Mossad, and the intense focus in the opening stage of the operation, particularly the decapitation of the Iranian military chain of command, inflicted a strategic and humiliating defeat on Iran. The Israeli air force flew more than 1,000 sorties from a distance of more than 1,500km and struck Iranian nuclear sites Natanz and Isfahan, as well as ballistic missile sites and launchers in western Iran. In doing so, the Israelis disabled the Iranian air defence systems, thereby establishing complete air superiority, including over the capital Tehran, and attacked regime power structures such as the Basij paramilitary, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Ministry of Defence, and police. Likewise, the targeted assassinations of Iran’s nuclear scientists, a vital group of people with know-how for the nuclear weapons program, were also a strategic action, eliminating or setting back Iran’s nuclear program. The US’s operation, codenamed Midnight Hammer, dealt the final blow against the nuclear program with strikes on nuclear enrichment sites Natanz, Isfahan, and the Fordow uranium enrichment site, buried deep underground. This operation essentially paved the way for a ceasefire after 12 days of confrontation.

Israel and the US’s direct confrontation with Iran marks the total collapse of Tehran’s asymmetric warfare strategy. It is timely, therefore, to analyse the concept of proxy war and the limits of proxy war strategy. More importantly, Operation Rising Lion and Midnight Hammer raise questions about Iran’s proxy war strategy and whether that strategy has been successful or has finally failed. In looking at Iranian strategy, it is thus important to examine the following questions: What is proxy warfare? Why do states use it, and why are proxy groups unreliable? What is Iran’s proxy war strategy, and why has it failed?

Israel Announces "Final Plan" to Occupy Gaza

Simplicius

Aug 12Netanyahu has announced plans for the “final” takeover of Gaza, which he’s instead billing as a “liberation” from Hamas: It’s interesting how, given Netanyahu’s above infographic, Israel’s objectives in Gaza can be superficially compared to the Russian SMO. The difference is, Russia is following international law, whereas Israel is breaking it. It was the UN itself which established the known precedent that a people have the right to self-determination when it came to Serbia being pressured to recognise Kosovo’s independence. But in Donbass or even Gaza, no such right to self-determination and official recognition apparently exists. In Ukraine, Russia is only enforcing the UN’s very own standards on self-determination, while in Gaza, Israel is breaking it.

To further highlight the hypocrisy, listen to JD Vance’s latest statement, wherein he so confidently describes taking military control over Gaza as being “up to Israel”—but the same privilege is for some reason not afforded to Russia in taking over Donbass—why is that? There are mounting issues for Bibi, who seeks as swift an operation as possible to mitigate the growing disaster. Echoes of brewing civil war have erupted in Israeli society over growing exhaustion and the issue of Haredi military ‘exceptionalism’:

A year after ouster, where is Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina?

FP Explainers

On August 5, 2024, Sheikh Hasina, then prime minister of Bangladesh, boarded a military aircraft and landed at the Hindon Airbase in India’s Ghaziabad along with her younger sister Rehana. This moment marked the end of her 15-year rule in the neighbouring country. Now, a year later, Bangladesh is under an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus. The country continues to battle political and economic instability with a growing number of voices demanding for elections to be held by the end of this year.

Hasina’s hasty departure from Bangladesh

Last August, Hasina resigned from her position and fled to India following weeks of unrest. Her exit came after crowds broke a curfew and stormed the prime minister’s residence in the capital Dhaka, following weeks of bloody protest. As she exited, Bangladesh army General Waker-uz-Zaman announced that the military had taken control of the government; parliament had been dissolved, and the government was formulating a plan for fresh elections. “The country is going through a revolutionary period,” Zaman said in a national television address. “We request you to have faith in the army of the country. Please don’t go back to the path of violence and please return to nonviolent and peaceful ways.”

How India's hollowed-out hills have become extremely dangerous

India Today News Desk

Uttarkashi, Wayanad, Kedarnath, Chamoli, Kinnaur, and Joshimath are just a few names from a much longer list. Landslides and sinking human settlements have become grim realities in India, with cities and villages in several hilly areas succumbing to nature's fury. But what mostly seem like natural calamities are, in fact, man-made disasters. The latest disaster in this series struck Uttarakhand on Tuesday. Cloudburst-induced landslides and flash floods struck Uttarkashi and claimed at least four lives. Over 50 people are still missing. The financial cost of the calamity hasn't even been ascertained yet, but it's bound to be as high as in past tragedies.

These horrifying incidents of loss of lives, destruction of property worth hundreds of crores, and damage to the environment and ecology stem from a dangerous cocktail of unchecked construction (including government projects) in high-risk zones, riverbed encroachments, apathy towards climate change, failure to anticipate erratic weather patterns, and widespread environmental degradation. All of it, enabled by the usual culprit: corruption, turning hollowed-out hills into ticking time bombs.

However, people and governments are deaf to the alarm bells that are ringing out loud and clear in India. Waking up to the scary reality would be the first step to fixing these discrepancies, adaptability concerns and loopholes. As climate activist Harjeet Singh from the Satat Sampada Climate Foundation puts it, "This tragedy is a deadly cocktail... This devastating loss must be our final wake-up call."

China's ‘Super Dam' isn't a threat to Brahmaputra flow, analysis finds

Bidisha Saha

Chief ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam strongly disagree on whether China's "Super Dam" will affect the Brahmaputra River's flow in India. While Pema Khandu has called it a "ticking water bomb", Himanta Biswa Sarma downplays the fear. Who is right? While the mega dam will undoubtedly give China the capability of weaponising the water of Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in China), it is unlikely to make any consequential alteration to the river flow, according to an analysis by India Today's Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) team.

BRAHMAPUTRA'S SUPPORT SYSTEM

Brahmaputra is a complex river system, consisting of several tributaries. Its mainstream traverses a total distance of 2880 km. Out of which, 56 per cent falls in Tibet, 43 per cent in India and 337 km in Bangladesh. The majority (nearly 50.5 per cent) of the Brahmaputra River's catchment area falls in China. A river's flow is sustained by mountain springs, glacial melt, upland wetlands or peat bogs, aquifers, and perennial tributaries. Though most of these sources of water fall in China-controlled Tibet, the Brahmaputra get an estimated 70 per cent of its water from rainfall.

As with many major rivers, Yarlung Tsangpo appears as a stream at its point of origin near Mount Kailash but continues to grow in size further downstream. It becomes the mighty Brahmaputra after absorbing three tributaries, Luhit and Dibang, near Assam's Sadiya.

JAS 39 Gripen vs. China’s J-20 Mighty Dragon: Who Wins in 4 Words

Isaac Seitz

J-20 vs. JAS 39 Gripen: A Duel in the Sky?

The Chinese J-20 is the most advanced fighter jet in service with the PLAAF. It was designed to compete with American fighters, such as the F-22 and F-35, and provide deterrence against its neighbors. Meanwhile, the JAS 39 Gripen is a Swedish fourth-generation fighter that has been gaining traction in the international market. With countries like Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries acquiring the Gripen, there is a non-zero chance that the J-20 may one day meet the JAS 39 in the skies. The Chengdu J-20, also known as the “Mighty Dragon,” is China’s premier fifth-generation stealth fighter.

Chengdu Aerospace Corporation developed it and first flew in 2011. The J-20 is designed primarily for air superiority and long-range interception missions, with a strong emphasis on stealth, sensor fusion, and advanced avionics. It is a large twin-engine aircraft with internal weapons bays, radar-absorbent materials, and a shape optimized for low radar cross-section. These features allow it to penetrate deep into contested airspace and engage high-value targets while remaining difficult to detect.

Our Best Look At China’s New J-15DT Carrier-Based Electronic Warfare Jet

Thomas Newdick

A new image provides our best view of the latest addition to China’s growing family of Shenyang J-15 carrier-based fighter series, the J-15DT electronic warfare version. There is also some indication that it may have entered operational service, or got very close to it. Crucially, this electronic attack Flanker is outfitted for operations aboard catapult-equipped aircraft carriers like the Fujian. Evidence emerged recently suggesting this carrier may have begun to host fixed-wing aircraft trials. Overall, progress with the J-15DT program points not only to the scope of China’s carrier aviation ambitions, but also the growing focus on catapult-assisted takeoff but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) operations, which offer many advantages.

The recently emerged photo, seen at the top of this story, shows an airborne J-15DT seen with at least three external electronic warfare pods, two on the pylons under the engine intake ducts and one (likely two) on the wingtips. It wears the low-visibility national and unit insignia and individual two-digit code number (in this case ‘23’) associated with operational J-15s, which suggests that the aircraft could be a part of the frontline People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) inventory. At the same time, we shouldn’t rule out the possibility of image manipulation by official sources or otherwise. Although the catapult launch bar is not visible, the aircraft can be confirmed as the CATOBAR version since it has gray tailfin caps and slightly different wingtip pods associated with this aircraft. Most likely, it also has a two-part front landing gear door. Some reports suggest the J-15DT also has the dorsal airbrake removed.

16 August 2025

India Paid the Price for Underestimating China’s PL-15 Missiles

China may have fresh ammunition in its war of words over the downing of an Indian Air Force Dassault Rafale this past spring. Diplomats from the People’s Republic of China, as well as open-source military analysts on social media, engaged in a campaign that put into question the capabilities and effectiveness of the French-made omnirole fighter.

Paris accused China of engaging in a disinformation campaign to sow doubts about the Rafale. However, the loss of the fighter jet by India may have been due to the Indian Air Force underestimating the capabilities of the Chinese-made PL-15 air-to-air missile. Reuters first reported that on the evening of May 7, 2025, a Pakistani Air Force Chengdu J-10C Vigorous Dragon (NATO reporting name “Firebird”) fired the PL-15 at the IAF Rafale at a range of 200 km (125 miles). That exceeded the IAF’s estimated capabilities of the ordnance, especially at night.

Pakistani officials have claimed that three French-made Dassault Rafales were shot down, a figure disputed by New Delhi, which has acknowledged that one of the aircraft was shot down. However, even the loss of one of the Rafale fighters was enough to signal alarms regarding the effectiveness of Western military platforms when facing what are largely untested Chinese systems. According to a report from Reuters, which cited two Indian officials as well as three of their Pakistani counterparts, the faulty intelligence about the PL-15 gave the Rafale pilots a “false sense of confidence,” and the aviators believed they were beyond the range of the Pakistani aircraft. IAF pilots were reportedly instructed that the export model of the PL-15 carried by the Chinese-made J-10C had a range of 150 kilometers (94 miles).

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