25 March 2025

Pakistan’s ‘war on terror’ approach is dangerous

Obaidullah Baheer

On March 11, fighters from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) hijacked a Jaffar Express train travelling from Quetta to Peshawar. After a 36-hour standoff, the Pakistani security forces were able to kill the BLA operatives and release hundreds of hostages. According to the government, at least eight civilians lost their lives during the operation.

Pakistani officials were quick to blame Afghanistan and India for what they called a “terrorist incident”. This is the latest example of how the Pakistani authorities increasingly deflect responsibility and frame Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan in the language of “war on terror”.

Almost three months before the train hijacking, Pakistani fighter jets bombarded Afghanistan’s Khost and Paktika provinces, killing at least 46 people, including women and children. Many of the casualties were displaced people from Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.

Pakistan justified its violation of Afghan sovereignty and international law by claiming that it is targeting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters hiding on Afghan territory. Over the past two years, Islamabad has been accusing Kabul of harbouring “terrorists” who have carried out attacks on Pakistani territory.

Getting Out of Afghanistan’s Opium Quagmire

Maha Siddiqui

Following a ban on poppy cultivation in Afghanistan imposed by the de facto authorities, the Taliban, in April 2022, opium production plunged by an estimated 95 percent by 2023 from 6,200 tons in 2022 to 333 tons in 2023. Poppy fields were reduced from 233,000 hectares to 10,800 hectares.

However, three years since the Taliban’s ban, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), announced last week that the price of opium from Afghanistan has gone up tenfold – from $75 to $750 per kilogram. The price increase is not surprising. A classic economic model tells us that when demand is inelastic, supply-side reduction tends to make the commodity pricier. Hence, in the case of opium, many argue that a crackdown on the demand side would be more effective than one on the supply side alone.

A Paradoxical Problem: A Win in the Drug War, a Punishment for the Poor

However, the bigger fear that presents itself with a commodity becoming dearer is the collapse of the measure responsible for the shortage – in this case, the poppy cultivation ban. Amid the ban, small holdings farmers, including women, who were involved in the production of opium for the sake of their livelihood are suffering great distress in Afghanistan, while high-level traders and exporters in organized crime groups are making a killing, as per the UNODC’s admission.

Is Taiwan already at war with China? What will be Beijing's first step if it invades the island


Taiwan is already at war– not with bombs and bullets, but with an invisible, relentless campaign of cyberattacks and undersea sabotage. Every day, Taiwan faces 2.4 million cyberattacks, a figure that has doubled in just a year. These digital incursions, attributed to China, are not merely disruptions– they are part of a sustained strategy to weaken Taiwan’s institutions, destabilize its governance, and probe its defenses.

“We already have experienced a kind of war-like situation from China’s cyberattacks,” said I-Chung Lai, President of Taiwan’s Prospect Foundation, while speaking at Firstpost’s IdeasPod during the Raisina Dialogue 2025.

“Every day, 2.4 million cyberattacks target Taiwan. That’s double what we saw in 2023. Despite this, we have not seen major cyber incidents disrupting public infrastructure– hospitals remain open, government functions continue.”

While Taiwan has so far withstood the onslaught, the escalation is clear: China is testing Taiwan’s resilience, preparing for a moment when these attacks might escalate.

Cutting the cables: Taiwan’s digital lifeline at risk

Beyond the digital battlefield, another silent threat looms beneath the waves: Taiwan’s undersea cables. Since 2023, at least 11 undersea cables have been damaged—some connecting Taiwan to offshore islands, but others forming critical links between Taiwan and the rest of the world.

Thinking Through Protracted War with China

Joel B. Predd, Paul DeLuca, Scott Savitz, Edward Geist & Caitlin Lee

Introduction

As ample wargaming and analysis have shown, any war with China would be economically and strategically costly, as well as fraught with the risk of escalation to nuclear war. In addition, any U.S. China military conflict could very likely last longer than envisioned by traditional force planning scenarios, which often are designed around relatively limited objectives and call for U.S. forces and capabilities that could bring a war to a quick, decisive conclusion. 

This report describes a set of scenarios of such protracted conflicts and provides what could be a foundation for more-detailed planning or analysis. While these scenarios are by no means predictive, we formulated them to examine the above hypothesis and in the spirit of helping the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) imagine the unimaginable: The United States cannot deter what its policymakers and analysts cannot foresee. 

Research Approach 

We employ scenario development as a creative means of envisioning circumstances in which the United States and China could be called to war. To allow free creative scope for this process, we did not place a priori constraints on the meaning of “protracted,” and therefore, the resulting scenarios feature a variety of circumstances in which the United States and China could be required to sustain military operations on a potentially open-ended time frame. 

Pentagon Set Up Briefing for Musk on Potential War With China

Eric SchmittEric LiptonJulian E. BarnesRyan Mac and Maggie Haberman

The Pentagon was scheduled on Friday to brief Elon Musk on the U.S. military’s plan for any war that might break out with China, two U.S. officials said on Thursday.

Another official said the briefing would be China focused, without providing additional details. A fourth official confirmed Mr. Musk was to be at the Pentagon on Friday, but offered no details.

Hours after news of the planned meeting was published by The New York Times, Pentagon officials and President Trump denied that the session would be about military plans involving China. “China will not even be mentioned or discussed,” Mr. Trump said in a late-night social media post.

It was not clear if the briefing for Mr. Musk would go ahead as originally planned. But providing Mr. Musk access to some of the nation’s most closely guarded military secrets would be a dramatic expansion of his already extensive role as an adviser to Mr. Trump and leader of his effort to slash spending and purge the government of people and policies they oppose.


China Top Priority in Trump NATSEC Strategy, Says Panel

John Grady

China is the top priority in the Trump administration’s national security strategy, but that’s balanced with a sharpened focus on the Western Hemisphere, a panel of defense experts agreed Thursday.

Mackenzie Eaglen, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, said, “China first, full stop” sits atop the security concerns in an administration with a diverse global outlook.

Beijing’s investments in developing weapons systems like its hypersonic glide vehicle reinforce the point of placing China as the nation’s top security concern, she added.

Looking at the immediate threat of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, Michael O’Hanlon, director of Brookings’ Strobe Talbott Center, said he was “a little more hopeful” that such an attack would not any time happen soon. “I’m not saying deterrence is about to fail” when it comes to holding back Xi Jin ping’s ambitions to take control of the self-governing island by force if necessary.

O’Hanlon noted the steps taken by the United States and its Pacific allies to bolster their own defenses and readiness to respond to possible China aggression in the Indo-Pacific has been effective.

The AI Superpower Rivalry: A Zero-sum Game Between China and the United States?

Dingding Chen, Yingfan Chen, and Runyu Huang

On March 13, OpenAI released a proposal for the U.S. AI Action Plan. The report asserts that while the United States currently holds a leading position in the field of artificial intelligence, the success of China-based DeepSeek indicates that this advantage is not as significant as it appears and is gradually narrowing. The AI Action Plan is intended to ensure that AI innovation in the United States continues to outpace that of China, thereby securing U.S. leadership in the AI domain.

However, reducing the rivalry to a simplistic “who leads in AI” frame overlooks its complexity. The competition between the U.S. and China in the AI domain is not a zero-sum game. Rather, it is a multifaceted and complex rivalry, shaped by numerous factors such as geopolitical considerations, access to data, talent, regulatory environments, and technological infrastructure.

The competition between China and the United States in the field of artificial intelligence has driven the development of AI technologies to a more diversified and differentiated contest. The development of large artificial intelligence models exemplifies the evolving nature of this competition. OpenAI’s GPT-4.5, for instance, is specifically designed for complex, high-performance tasks, excelling at intricate text generation and understanding through massive computational resources. This specialization allows it to handle tasks that require a deep grasp of language, context, and nuance. On the other hand, DeepMind’s Perceiver takes a different approach, offering a Transformer variant that can process multimodal data – such as images, sounds, and video – making it versatile across a variety of input types.

Europe Scrambles to Find Strategy in Trump's World

Matthias Gebauer, Frank Hornig, Paul-Anton Krรผger, Steffen Lรผdke and Britta Sandberg

Even in dark times, there are dreamers. "United States of Europe NOW” was the motto of recent demonstrations in 20 Italian cities, with marchers waving EU flags. "We aren’t vassals,” called out a participant in Rome. In contrast to the "predators” Trump and Putin, Europe is a great continent, the demonstrator chanted. "We developed democracy.”

That same day, French President Emmanuel Macron flew in a Falcon jet across the English Channel to a crisis summit in London. Above the clouds, he showed a journalist flying with him a map on his phone from the French daily Le Figaro on which U.S. troops stationed in Europe were shown. "The Americans make up 30 percent of NATO,” Macron said. "It will take us 10 years to extricate ourselves from them.”

A strong, resilient Europe that is prepared to defend its liberal, cosmopolitan democracy without the protective power of America: Just a few months ago, this vision would have been dismissed as a pipe dream. These days, though, it is becoming the blueprint for Europe’s future, albeit a desperate one.




The Key to Ukraine’s Survival

Celeste A. Wallander

The United States’ sudden, although ultimately temporary, suspension of all security assistance to Ukraine in early March raised alarms about Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. A lasting suspension of the aid would certainly have changed the course of the war. But even a complete stop to U.S. assistance would not have reversed the progress that Ukrainians have made over the past three years. With its existing stocks and production, Ukraine would be able to sustain its defense for months on its own. Although U.S. aid is again flowing, at least for now, Ukraine does not need to surrender if Washington slows or pauses its support again.

But the pause in U.S. aid served as a dramatic wake-up call: the most crucial factor in determining how long and how effectively Ukraine will be able to defend against Russian attacks in the coming months will be the extent to which European powers step up to fill in any gaps.


The FBI Is Investigating Attacks on Tesla as ‘Domestic Terrorism.’ Here’s Why That Matters

Caroline Haskins

The US Federal Bureau of Investigation says it’s investigating a series of alleged incidents across the country in which “Tesla charging stations and dealerships were damaged.” On Thursday, Attorney General Pam Bondi highlighted charges against three people accused of throwing Molotov cocktails at Tesla vehicles and, in at least one alleged incident, writing “profane messages against President Trump” near Tesla charging stations, among other crimes.

“Let this be a warning: If you join this wave of domestic terrorism against Tesla properties, the Department of Justice will put you behind bars,” Bondi said in a news release detailing the arrests, which were made over the last several weeks in Oregon, Colorado, and South Carolina.

Civil liberties experts claim treating alleged attacks against Tesla cars and infrastructure as terrorist activity could give federal and local law enforcement broad authority to surveil people protesting Elon Musk’s role in the government. The terrorism designation could also allow Musk and other Tesla executives to access information authorities uncover in their investigations.

A Missile Jamming and Engagement Model

Brien Alkire, George Nacouzi, Jair Aguirre & Brian Dolan

Introduction

Background and Motivation 

There is broad consensus in the Department of Defense on the need to increase long-range strike capacity, and as a result, the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force are increasing the range, effectiveness, and capacity of their “kill chain” capabilities needed to find, fix, track, and attack targets over long ranges (that is, beyond line-of-sight of the shooter).2 Consider an air-launched cruise missile strike to a target over a long range. It may have been provided uncertain information about the target location, speed and heading. Also, the target may change its speed and heading. Errors in the targeting location of the target will accumulate over the flight time of the missile, so it may be advantageous to provide in-flight target updates (IFTU) to the missile from another platform such as an aircraft, or more likely a satellite. Also, the missile may be getting updates about its own position from an external source such as global positioning system (GPS). But an adversary might attempt to disrupt or deny3 GPS position updates and IFTU to the missile by jamming the receivers on the missile. Alternatively, an adversary might disrupt or deny those updates by kinetically or non-kinetically attacking the satellites or aircraft that are the sources of the information. The missile would then rely on other sources of information, such an inertial navigation system (INS), for estimating its own position. But the accuracy of an INS will degrade over time in absence of GPS, and uncertainties in the position of the target and missile itself will likely grow over time in absence of an IFTU. If the accumulated errors are sufficiently large, then the munition may fail to acquire and prosecute the target. 

Military Review, March-April 2025, v. 105, no. 2

Exploring Artificial Intelligence-Enhanced Cyber and Information Operations Integration

Lessons on Public-Facing Information Operations in Current Conflicts

Prioritizing Maintenance Restructuring and Resourcing for Autonomous Systems

Leveraging Data for Warehouse Distribution Success During Operation Allies Welcome: A 
Retrospective on Operationalizing Data

What Constitutes a Capability? Leveraging the Ukraine Experience to Define an Overused Term

Theater Armies: Complex Yet Indispensable to Multidomain Operations

Authorities and the Multidomain Task Force: Enabling Strategic Effect

Army Fires: Enabling Joint Convergence in a Maritime Environment

Invest in Battlefield Obscuration to Win During Large-Scale Combat Operations

What Can We Learn from Measuring Unit Culture? Preliminary Evidence from a Data-Centric 
Approach to Organizational Performance

Nine Narratives Destroying American Diplomacy and How to Counter Them

Sino-Vietnamese Defense Relations

The Army Civilian Corps’ Elusive Culture of Commitment

Terminological Terrain: How to Map and Navigate Jargon in Professional Writing

Vietnam Combat: Firefights and Writing History

Medal of Honor: Pvt. Philip G. Shadrach and Pvt. George D. Wilson, U.S. Civil War

China Brief, February 28, 2025, v. 25, no. 4

Multiple Multipoles: Distinguishing Definitions Between Beijing and the West

Energy and AI Coordination in the ‘Eastern Data Western Computing’ Plan

PRC Dominance Over Global Port Infrastructure

War Memorials put the Party Front and Center for 80th Anniversary

Xi Seeks to Woo Foreign and Domestic Business

Israel orders army to 'seize additional territories' in Gaza

Tiffany Wertheimer

Israel's defence minister has told the military to "seize additional areas in Gaza" and threatened to permanently occupy parts of it, if Hamas does not free all remaining hostages.

Israel Katz said that the military would continue its ground operation in Gaza "with increasing intensity" until all of the hostages "both living and dead" were returned.

It is thought 24 of the 59 hostages still held in Gaza are alive, but their fate remains in the balance after negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire deal failed to progress.

The fragile ceasefire that had been in place since January ended this week as Israel resumed its ground campaign and bombing of Gaza, killing hundreds of people.

The situation in the Strip has been described as "gravely, gravely concerning" with "absolutely desperate tragedies occurring all over Gaza" by Sam Rose from the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, Unrwa.

Israel and the US have accused Hamas of rejecting proposals to extend the ceasefire. Hamas has said it is "engaging with the mediators with full responsibility and seriousness".


Why Trump’s global transformation might just succeed

John P Ruehl

Since returning to office in January 2025, Donald Trump has aggressively pursued a radical reshaping of US foreign policy.

In early March, the State Department terminated foreign assistance programs supporting political opposition and regime change in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, deeming them no longer in the US “national interest.” Trump also reversed the Biden administration’s agreement with Cuba, after it released 553 prisoners, to ease sanctions on the country.

In February, the government issued an executive order dissolving the Inter-American Foundation, which had long promoted economic and community-led development in Latin America.

The African Development Foundation is also slated to be eliminated under the executive order, while AFRICOM, the US military command for Africa, could be next.

Trump’s sweeping cuts extend to global initiatives like the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the US Agency for Global Media, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and US support for political prisoners worldwide.

Increasing American Technological Independence Is a National Security Imperative

Paul Rosenzweig

The United States is engaged in an ongoing technological race with China. Rather than disabling American companies that compete with China, we should enable them. That’s why the new administration needs to rethink its technology policy — both domestically and internationally.

The scope of the technology challenge from China is comprehensive and global. Chinese hackers have infiltrated American email systems; its artificial intelligence program has borrowed from American ingenuity; and its efforts to dominate technological deployments globally are manifest. In short, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to spread its technological influence to every corner of the world — and that’s a threat to the United States.

But it isn’t one we have to take lying down. We can act thoughtfully to enable domestic industries and support their competition abroad. One case study of how this can be achieved is responding to the Chinese challenge concerning 5G deployment.

China currently dominates the 5G global industry. Huawei, a company accused by the U.S. government of having ties to the CCP and backdoors embedded within its technology, controls 30 percent of the global marketplace. By contrast, Cisco, Huawei's closest American competitor, has just a six percent share of the market.


Virtรน and the War on Hamas: A Machiavellian Reading of the Strategies Around the 2023 Israel-Hamas War

Prof. Manuel Lozano Rodrรญguez

Introduction

The effectual truth of Machiavelli is that he not only understood the modern world but created it.[i]

This paper aims to provide a Machiavellian analysis of the strategies employed in the 2023 War in Gaza between Israel and Hamas. By exploring the conflict through the lens of virtรน, the paper demonstrates how Machiavelli’s principles, particularly his emphasis on adaptability, deception, and the effective use of force, remain relevant in contemporary warfare. So, How do Machiavellian principles shape the strategies of both Israel and Hamas in the 2023 War in Gaza?

The core objective of this analysis is to offer readers a practical framework for understanding the strategic dynamics at play in Israel versus Hamas and other modern military conflicts. By drawing connections between Machiavellian thought and current military strategies, the paper seeks to illuminate the underlying logic that drives both sides’ military actions.

By the end of this paper, readers will have a clearer understanding of how Machiavelli’s concepts can be used to analyze the outcomes of modern conflicts and how classical strategic ideas are applied in real-world scenarios. This approach is not only intellectually stimulating but also practically useful for those involved in strategic planning and military studies, offering a timeless perspective on the complexities of warfare.

Nuclear experts pour cold water on US idea to restore and run Ukrainian power plant

Lauren Kent

Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, occupied by Russian forces since the early days of the war, could be restored and protected by US ownership – at least according to the Americans.

But it’s unclear how the operation would work in practice, experts say, especially as the plant is on the front line, in territory controlled by Russia.

As part of ongoing talks to inch toward a partial ceasefire, US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky “discussed Ukraine’s electrical supply and nuclear power plants” during a Wednesday phone call, according to the US readout of the call.

“(Trump) said that the United States could be very helpful in running those plants with its electricity and utility expertise. American ownership of those plants would be the best protection for that infrastructure and support for Ukrainian energy infrastructure,” the readout said.

On Thursday, Zelensky disputed that section, saying: “In terms of ownership, we definitely did not discuss this with President Trump.” Zelensky stressed that “all nuclear power belongs to the (Ukrainian) state, including the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia region.”

Timeless Lessons from Cannae to D-Day: Operational Art on the Sensor-Rich Battlefield of the Twenty-First Century

Mark Askew and Antonio Salinas

Among Carl von Clausewitz’s many timeless observations, one in particular stands out as a perpetual impediment to commanders and strategists. “War is the realm of uncertainty,” the Prussian strategist wrote. “Three quarters of the factors on which action is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty.” Throughout military history, commanders have attempted to pierce this fog of war with snippets of information, leveraging human runners, pigeons, and cavalry, and later, telegraphs, radio, and full-motion video. However, for the last thirty years, US forces have employed advanced technology in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms that have provided unprecedented visibility and awareness of battlefield developments. Now, with increasingly lower barriers to entry for use of commercial space-based capabilities and drones, this long-held asymmetric US advantage is eroding. Now that other militaries can use these technologies to approximate US sensing and strike capabilities, achieving operational and tactical surprise will be increasingly difficult.

However, all is not lost. The US military has dealt with symmetries in transparency before. Equally important, increased transparency does not always lead to improved understanding.

While sensor-rich environments make operational concealment harder, they also create opportunities to exploit adversaries’ cognitive biases. Commanders can combine advanced technology with human ingenuity to turn battlefield transparency into an advantage. Planners can do this by understanding adversaries’ information needs, shaping the data they rely on to inform those needs, and manipulating the enemy’s decision-making. This approach requires cross-domain planning and a deep understanding of how opponents process information.

BYD's 5-Minute EV Charging Sounds Great. But How Useful Is it?

Aarian Marshall

When surveys ask potential car buyers why they’re not going electric, the answer is consistent: It’s the charging. Drivers understand gas; plugging in, less so. They’re worried about waiting around for a charger, which, depending on its power, can take anywhere between 20 minutes and eight hours to fill up a battery.

So the hubbub around a surprise announcement from Chinese electric vehicle giant BYD makes sense. The automaker said this week that two new vehicles set to launch in April will be able to add 250 miles of range in just five minutes.

That’s twice as fast as even the next generation of Tesla Superchargers. (The day of BYD’s announcement, Tesla stock dropped by five percent.)

Topping up in five minutes makes for great ad copy, and could go a long way to alleviating drivers’ concerns about EVs. But practically speaking, experts say, it might not be the gigantic charging breakthrough it seems.

War-ready navigation: Lockheed Martin’s quantum INS to guide troops without GPS

Kapil Kajal

Lockheed Martin has secured a contract from the U.S. Department of Defense’s Innovation Unit (DIU) to develop a quantum-enabled Inertial Navigation System (INS) prototype.

This new technology, named QuINS, aims to redefine navigation capabilities for military operations by providing accurate location data even in areas where GPS signals are unreliable or unavailable.

QuINS employs quantum sensing technology to enhance navigation and positioning.

Quantum INS

Unlike traditional systems that rely on GPS or other external references, QuINS utilizes motion-sensitive quantum sensors to determine a platform’s position, velocity, and orientation through internal measurements.

This fundamental shift promises to make navigation more resilient, especially in challenging environments where conventional systems may fail.

Dr. Valerie Browning, Vice President of Research & Technology at Lockheed Martin, expressed optimism about the project’s potential.

AI FOR RISK-BASED SUPERVISION

Matei Dohotaru, Marin Prisacaru, Ji Ho Shin and Yasemin Palta

Main challenges faced by the financial sector supervisors

Over the last two decades, a primary goal of financial sector supervisory authorities around the world has been to effectively implement the riskbased supervision framework. An RBS approach is widely regarded as the most effective means to ensure the stability of the financial sector. This goal has transformed over time to become the main challenge for supervisory authorities. Yet despite significant resources allocated for the implementation of the RBS approach, in addition to often considerable technical assistance provided, many supervisors continue to struggle to implement an effective RBS regime.1 The reasons for the difficulties in implementing an effective RBS framework vary from country to country and encompass both internal and external factors.

The RBS framework can be disaggregated by different criteria, one of which disaggregates it into three main categories: A. Policies & Procedures, B. Capacity & Resources, and C. Tools & Technologies (Figure 1). We examined these three categories by looking at the assessments of compliance with Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) conducted during FSAPs. As part of this research, publicly available FSAP documents have been reviewed, including the Financial Sector Assessment (WB),2 the Financial System Stability Assessment (IMF),3 the Detailed Assessment of Observance as well as International Financial Institutions’ publications. It is important to note that the research was mainly focused on prudential supervision and compliance with BCP Principles.

Pentagon Fast-Tracks AI Into Drone Swarm Defense

Kris Osborn

Drone swarm attacks are designed to be essentially indefensible, as they overwhelm enemy radar, blanket areas with explosives and use simple redundancy and volume to defeat a wide array of integrated defenses. The threat has only continued to intensify at a staggering pace as warzone innovators integrate new levels of autonomy, guidance and weaponry into large, fast-moving and increasingly “coordinated” groups of attack drones.

Certainly the Pentagon and others have noticed the impact small drones are having upon the war in Ukraine, and it is by no means surprising that DoD is massively revving up its counter-drone effort. This involves formal partnerships with universities, industry partners and military innovators to help identify, fast-track and deploy cutting edge methods of defending fixed sites, Forward Operating Bases and even armored formations on the move.

The cutting edge of C-UAS, as it is called, is increasingly involving AI to exponentially increase the speed, efficiency and lethality with which drone swarms can be countered. By essentially bouncing incoming sensor data off of a vast data base, performing analytics and organize otherwise disconnected sets of data, an AI-enabled system can massively fast-track, streamline and optimize C-UAS.

Explaining Strategic Theory

M.L.R. Smith and John Stone

The term ‘strategy’ must be one of the most commonly used terms in public discourse. It is employed to refer to anything from state policy, business plans, to personal choices. Yet few appreciate what this term really means, and what it implies as an approach to the study of social phenomena.

The notion of Strategic Theory as a method of analysis has permeated into the wider domain of International Relations and Political Studies via the work of scholars like Bernard Brodie and Thomas Schelling, and has been increasingly employed as a tool to assist in the comprehension of decision-making, particularly with respect to the use of military power. One of the best statements of the utility of Strategic Theory is provided by Harry Yarger: ‘Strategic theory opens the mind to all the possibilities and forces at play, prompting us to consider the costs and risks of our decisions and weigh the consequences of those of our adversaries, allies, and others’.[i]

What, then, is Strategic Theory, and how does it help open the mind? Working from first principles, we aim to provide a concise understanding of what Strategic Theory encompasses in its essentials. As will be shown, to achieve this understanding it is important to appreciate what Strategic Theory is not, as much as what it is. In the process, we hope to show that Strategic Theory is a simple, parsimonious, yet elegant, way of clarifying complexity.

Drones are Changing the Face of War

Robert Bruce Adolph

Drones are here to stay. Their use is a heated topic of discussion in the U.S., and with good reason. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), otherwise known as drones, are fast becoming a major component of our nation’s military arsenal. However, such technology is spreading internationally. Several countries are in the process of either purchasing drones or learning how to manufacture them. Many soldiers, scientists and scholars claim that drones will revolutionize the way wars are conducted. They are not wrong. But how remains an open and pressing question.

The U.S. has used drones successfully for years for intelligence, target acquisition and offensive operations. Their technology continues to advance rapidly. The US RQ-4 Global Hawk is frankly the best aerial surveillance and reconnaissance platform ever devised. The MQ-9 Reaper, likewise, is a superb multi-purpose unmanned attack aircraft. Drones are now capable of carrying out a great variety of missions. They can cover hundreds of miles in short order and remain aloft for sustained periods, called loiter time. The American Switchblade drone is a munition that can literally fit in a backpack. Sometimes, smaller is better.

Drones have greatly increased the capabilities of the American military. Most importantly, they can be used for the accurate targeting of enemies without placing U.S. troops in harm’s way. Furthermore, they can offer a greater payload than traditional manned aircraft, with the ability to carry multiple precision-guided munitions.

24 March 2025

Pakistan, Balochistan and the India angle - Opinion

Vivek Katju

A week after the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA)’s attack on the Jaffar Express, Pakistan’s Parliamentary Committee on National Security met under the chairmanship of the country’s National Assembly’s Speaker, Sardar Ayaz Sadiq, on March 18. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, leading cabinet members, Chief Ministers, leaders of political parties and the Army brass led by its chief, Gen Asim Munir, took part in the Committee’s deliberations.

Significantly, former Prime Minister and currently in prison Imran Khan’s party—Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI)—leaders refused to attend the Committee meeting because their leader was in jail and they claimed that they were not allowed to fully consult him. This indicates that even as the country is in the midst of a grave security challenge posed by terrorist forces (ironically some it raised itself) Pakistan’s political class remains divided. In view of the constants of Pakistan’s political reality, its army is both the creator and sustainer of these divisions as well as its beneficiary.

Modern Slavery And Cyber Fraud: The Growing Crisis In Myanmar – Analysis

Windia Soe

The Explosive Rise of Cyber Scam Syndicates in Myanmar

In recent years, in 2021, China has intensified efforts to combat cybercrime by enacting the Personal Information Protection Law (PIPL) and Data Security Law (DSL) to reinforce China’s commitment to data security. Additionally, the Chinese government banned cryptocurrency trading, mining, and advertisements while implementing stricter anti-money laundering measures and crackdowns on telecom and online fraud. These regulatory shifts have made it increasingly difficult for cybercriminals to operate within China.

As a result, many cybercriminal syndicates adapted new methods and relocated their operations abroad to exploit stolen personal data for fraudulent schemes. Among their top destinations, Myanmar—already grappling with post-coup instability—emerged as a prime hub for cyber fraud and organized crime. Using lawlessness, economic turmoil, and the country’s strategic location, transnational crime syndicates have established large-scale scam operations. These operations not only cause significant financial damage but also involve human trafficking.

The Kokang Region and Myawaddy, located on Myanmar’s borders with China and Thailand, have historically been hotspots for illicit activities due to their strategic locations, ethnic armed conflicts, and weak central government control. From 1950-1990, Kokang was central to the Golden Triangle’s opium trade, while Myawaddy facilitated drug trafficking. By 2000-2020, both areas shifted toward gambling and underground financial schemes, fueled by cross-border investments and Special Economic Zones. Since 2020, they have become centers for large-scale online scams, supported by SEZ infrastructure and armed group protection.

Fujian’s Unveils Incentives for Militia Training for a Cross-Strait Campaign

Ryan D. Martinson

If the People’s Republic of China (PRC) decides to attack Taiwan, it will need to leverage the capabilities of all of its armed forces. This not only includes the land, sea, air, and rocket forces of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or the relevant units of the People’s Armed Police, such as the China Coast Guard. It also includes the third component of the country’s armed forces—its militia.

The PRC’s militia comprises part-time soldiers who, aside from their military duties, typically hold jobs in civilian industries. As members of the militia, they can be mobilized to conduct military operations in both war and peace. Militia members belong to units that are managed by local PLA entities called People’s Armed Forces Departments (ไบบๆฐ‘ๆญฆ่ฃ…้ƒจ). Individual militia units often specialize in a skill that is valuable to the PLA, such as cyber warfare or equipment repair.

Ensuring the competence of militia forces has always been a challenge. Militia members do not receive adequate compensation for their work, causing malaise and apathy on the training field and, ultimately, poor performance on the battlefield. This presents a serious risk for Beijing, which may need to rely on its militia forces in the event of a major conflict. In January 2025, Fujian Province, the province opposite Taiwan, took a significant step toward professionalizing its militia units by issuing a document called “Measures for Guaranteeing Militia Rights and Interests” (็ฆๅปบ็œๆฐ‘ๅ…ตๆƒ็›Šไฟ้šœๅŠžๆณ•) (Fujian Government, January 26). If faithfully implemented, it could help ensure that Fujian militia show up for a cross-strait campaign both willing and able to do their duty.

Securing Cyber and Space: How the United States Can Disrupt China’s Blockade Plans

Benjamin Jensen, Erica Lonergan, and Kathleen McInnis

Recent military exercises and doctrine suggest the leading war plan for Beijing to compel Taiwan is a joint blockade. This plan envisions operations ranging from gray zone quarantines to more traditional protracted blockades that isolate Taipei and shift the balance of risk to U.S. and Japanese forces while setting conditions for follow-on military operations ranging from coercive firepower strikes to full-scale invasion.

A critical element of China’s strategy will be implemented in the cyber and space domains in peacetime. This demands sustained U.S. efforts to constrain China’s ability to harness commercial cyber and space resources before conflict begins. By targeting these networks—both physical and virtual—on which China depends for intelligence, communications, and operational reach, the United States and its allies can blunt Beijing’s coercive potential before a crisis erupts through implementing a deterrence-by-denial strategy.

Cyber and Space Capabilities in a Joint Blockade

A blockade is an age-old military concept for coordinating operations in military domains with diplomacy and economic statecraft to strangle an adversary. We use the term blockade in a broad sense, rather than the international legal definition. By isolating the enemy, including disrupting supply chains needed to generate combat power, a state can shape the strategic environment before and during protracted conflict. 

The Increasing Insignificance of the Two Sessions

Arran Hope

On Tuesday, March 11, the “Two Sessions” (ไธคไผš) wrapped up in Beijing. These are the annual meetings of the National People’s Congress—the unicameral legislature of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) that comprises nearly 3,000 delegates from across the country—and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a political advisory body of a similar size. The headline event is the delivery and approval of the “Government Work Report” (ๆ”ฟๅบœๅทฅไฝœๆŠฅๅ‘Š), which summarizes the legislature’s work over the previous year and sets the agenda for the year ahead. The Two Sessions are also an opportunity for a host of other meetings. For instance, President Xi Jinping met with the delegation from Jiangsu Province, various government leaders held press conferences, and groups from different policy constituencies held plenary sessions (Xinhua, March 7, March 8).

Holes in the Process of Democracy

If this year’s keystone political event was notable for one thing, it was the absence, for the most part, of politics. The Two Sessions have long been characterized in Western media as a vehicle for “rubber stamping” the Chinese Communist Party’s agenda with a show of what the Party terms “whole process democracy” (ๅ…จ่ฟ‡็จ‹ไบบๆฐ‘ๆฐ‘ไธป). This label has been increasingly apposite in Xi’s so-called new era, leading to a waning in the importance of the Two Sessions. The meetings in Beijing have largely ceased to be a platform for major policy announcements, instead becoming avenues for confirming a pre-agreed trajectory. For instance, in this year’s government work report, Premier Li Qiang (ๆŽๅผบ) begins laying out economic plans for 2025 by encouraging officials to “comprehensively implement the spirit” (ๅ…จ้ข่ดฏๅฝป่ฝๅฎžๅ…š็š„ … ไธ‰ไธญๅ…จไผš็ฒพ็ฅž) of the Third Plenum last July and to deploy policies in accordance with December’s Central Economic Work Conference (GWR, March 11). In other words, to continue on the course outlined in previous months.

China is waging cognitive warfare. Fighting back starts by defining it.

JAKE BEBBER

War has shifted far beyond the realm of traditional kinetic operations. We now face an era defined by what experts call cognitive warfare, an insidious form of conflict aimed at influencing how people think and act, destabilizing the very bedrock of democratic institutions and national security.

Unlike information warfare, which manipulates what we think, cognitive warfare disrupts the way we think—rationality itself. It uses neuroscience, data analytics, and algorithm-based strategies to achieve strategic advantage. Developing a framework to counter this threat is not just essential; it is urgent.

Potential adversaries are working hard to extend their advantage in this relatively new domain. China’s military thinkers talk openly about the pursuit of “biological dominance” and “cognitive control.” They deploy sophisticated strategies that fuse their traditional information operations with cognitive warfare capabilities, all aimed at achieving strategic victories without direct conflict. Their integrated use of cyber tools, brain science, and algorithm-driven propaganda creates a toolkit designed to sow doubt, fracture cohesion within societies and alliances, and erode the U.S.’s strategic position. Meanwhile, Russia has a long history of using “active measures” and disinformation to disrupt democratic processes, refining its methods to incorporate the digital tools and tactics of modern cognitive warfare.

Russia is Looking to Increase Arms Exports After Ukraine War Ends

Peter Suciu

Russia has been seeking an “ironclad” guarantee that would permanently exclude Ukraine from NATO members and require Kyiv to maintain a policy of neutrality as peace talks continue.

“We will demand that ironclad security guarantees become part of this agreement,” Alexander Grushko told Russian media outlet Izvestia. These guarantees should include Ukraine’s neutral status and NATO countries’ refusal to accept it into the alliance.”

It is unclear and unlikely that Ukrainian officials will accept Russia’s terms. However, the Kremlin may be looking beyond the war and is set on regaining the second-to-top spot in global arms sales. The Moscow-based Center for Analysis of Global Arms Trade (TsAMTO) estimates that the annual Russian arms exports could grow to $17 billion once the conflict ends.

The “independent” defense analyst company estimates that current arms sales from Russia total around $13.75 billion.

“TsAMTO estimates that in four years after the end of the special military operation, the Russian military exports may reach $17 to 19 billion a year and maybe more. The forecast considers that all Russian weapons have been tested in battle and are adapted to the realities of modern highly technological war and have been modified and upgraded according to real combat experience of fighting modern arms supplied to Ukraine,” the Russian research firm said in a statement to Tass.

Ukraine’s Shrinking Foothold In Kursk – Analysis

Can KasapoฤŸlu

1. Battlefield Assessment

The Ukrainian Armed Forces have withdrawn from Sudzha, a town in the Russian region of Kursk. Thus far no open-source intelligence has indicated that Russian or North Korean units have enveloped Ukrainian formations. Still, this makes sustaining a presence in Kursk even more difficult for Ukraine.

A joint offensive by North Korean and Russian combat formations repelled Ukraine’s incursion. Evidence shows that fighters from the former Wagnerprivate military company also played a role in the Russian offensive. As Russian and North Korean troops breached Ukraine’s lines of defense, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited the Russian military headquarters for the Kursk region. After months of downplaying the significance of Ukraine’s incursion, the Kremlin capitalized on the moment to emphasize this operation as an important success.

Beyond being a defeat in the ongoing war for the narrative, losing Kursk could have three major consequences for Ukraine. First, with ceasefire negotiations looming, the loss would deprive Ukraine of precious diplomatic leverage in a territory swap. Second, removing Ukraine from Kursk could allow the Russian military to move the tens of thousands of troops it has fielded there to other fronts. Third, the loss of Kursk increases the likelihood that the Kremlin could invade Ukraine’s neighboring Sumy Oblast.

British Software Will Protect Ukrainian Drones From Cyber Attack

David Hambling

Cyber attacks are now targeting drones in Ukraine. British company Periphery, specializing in military-grade threat management for Internet of Things devices, is providing expertise and software to protect Ukrainian drones from such threats,

Drone software is constantly updated. “Firmware 1001” which enables DJI quadcopters to operate in war conditions has been through more than 40 versions in two years. Any update could contain dangerous malware for which there was previously no defence -- but Periphery have the technology to stop it.

Software Sabotage

“We provide an easy-to-install, military-grade, lightweight software agent that can be embedded before or after production,” Toby Wilmington, Cofounder and CEO of Periphery, told me.

The technology monitors, understands, and adapts to new and emerging threats, communicating with central servers.

“Our technology uses our proprietary machine learning models to detect suspicious or confirmed malicious activity happening within a device,” says Wilmington.

Trump Has Launched a Second American Revolution. This Time, It’s Against the World.

Stewart Patrick

Carnegie’s Global Order and Institutions Program identifies promising new multilateral initiatives and frameworks to realize a more peaceful, prosperous, just, and sustainable world. That mission has never been more important, or more challenging. Geopolitical competition, populist nationalism, economic inequality, technological innovation, and a planetary ecological emergency are testing the rules-based international order and complicating collective responses to shared threats. Our mission is to design global solutions to global problems.Learn More

Just two months into his second presidency, Donald Trump is revolutionizing U.S. foreign policy. His policies will upend world order by destabilizing and ultimately destroying established institutions and patterns of international cooperation. Since 1945, the United States has been the leading champion, underwriter, and guarantor of an open, rule-bound global system under international law. Now, it rejects the logic of multilateralism, including any self-restraints on the exercise of U.S. power and any responsibilities for global leadership and stability.