Air Superiority in the Twenty-First Century: Lessons from Iran and Ukraine

Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward

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Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine in more than three years of fighting, but Israel seized air superiority over Iran in less than four days. Despite the vastly different circumstances and strategic objectives facing each nation’s forces, this CSIS comparison of the two campaigns holds lessons for countries seeking to achieve air superiority in modern conflicts—or to deny it to their adversaries. Israel succeeded where Russia failed by building and equipping an organization that fit an offensive air superiority doctrine, preparing the battlefield with special operations forces, and taking full advantage of its intelligence edge. Ukraine succeeded where Iran failed in taking advantage of dispersion and mobility to prevent its suppressed air defenses from being destroyed.

Before Russia invaded Ukraine, its Aerospace Forces (VKS) and missile forces were considered likely to play a major role in forcing Ukraine’s rapid collapse.1 But as Russia’s offensive unraveled in early 2022, commentators declared Russia’s air force to be “missing” and its performance to be “perplexing.”2 In contrast, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) achieved air superiority over Iran in less than four days, an achievement made more impressive by the fact that Tehran is nearly 1,000 miles from Israel’s nearest airbase.