6 April 2026

Flip the Script in the Strait: How a Unilateral Ceasefire Could Pressure Tehran to Restore Navigation

Peter Slezkine • Jennifer Kavanagh

When the United States and Israel commenced their joint military operation in Iran on February 28, Donald Trump and his closest advisors expected a quick and easy victory. After two weeks of fighting, the war shows no sign of abating. Although the Trump administration has claimed to have achieved several key objectives, including the elimination of much of Iran’s senior leadership and the destruction of significant portions of Iran’s military capability, it has yet to find a solution to a far-reaching and apparently unforeseen challenge: reopening the Strait of Hormuz and restoring global energy supplies.

Trump’s continued ambiguity about the objectives of his military “excursion” allows him a degree of discretion when it comes to deciding when the campaign has been successfully completed. Indeed, he has already made multiple declarations of mission mostly accomplished. But while regime decapitation and military degradation are flexible metrics, the continued obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz is not fungible and carries direct and measurable cost to the United States. Unfortunately, no American military action, US-led international coalition, or near-term US-Iran diplomatic agreement is likely to resolve the issue. In fact, pursuing these options may only exacerbate the situation. Trump has only one alternative: walking away, restraining Israel, and shifting the pressure of reopening the strait onto Iran’s closest partners and Tehran itself.

Any attempt to open the strait through military measures is likely to fail and may come at huge cost. Trump has floated the idea of naval escorts, but this would strain U.S. capacity and place U.S. navy warships at risk. Military analysts suggest that 10 U.S. destroyers — about 20% of the U.S. deployable fleet of these vessels — plus supporting aircraft would be needed to escort a dozen or so tankers per day through the strait. This would cap tanker traffic at less than 10% of its pre-war capacity. Naval escorts themselves would also be vulnerable during such operations and could be targeted by sea and air drones or the hidden threat posed by naval mines (which even minesweeping could not fully eliminate).

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