Paul Staniland
Over the past two decades, scholars and analysts have devoted much of their attention to democratic backsliding, illiberal democracy, and competitive authoritarianism—all processes through which elected leaders can threaten democracy by undermining democratic institutions and practices. Related to the rise of backsliding is the fact that military coups also declined sharply after the end of the Cold War. Many of the classical praetorian militaries of the Cold War era—those that seized power regularly or for long periods, whether in Brazil, Nigeria, Turkey, or Indonesia—were brought under civilian control. After the Cold War, the military coup seemed to have fallen out of favor; the key threats to democracy were from politicians, not generals.
In South Asia, concerns about democratic backsliding and competitive authoritarianism were often raised during the 2010s and 2020s in relation to the governments of Narendra Modi in India, Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, and Mahinda Rajapaksa and then Gotabaya Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka. Even though scholars and analysts often disagreed about how apt these labels were in particular cases, the “liberal democracy versus democratic backsliding” dichotomy came to dominate much of the debate about political trends in the region.
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