The Collapse of Syria Has Begun

Ted Galen Carpenter

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Violence is accelerating under Syria’s new Islamist government, as is the persecution of ethnic and religious minorities. This tragedy was entirely predictable. As far back as Barack Obama’s first term, critics warned that Washington’s flirtation with and assistance to Sunni Arab radicals would turn out badly. Nevertheless, Joe Biden’s administration persisted in that approach in an effort to overthrow the secular government of Bashar al-Assad. 

From the standpoint of US policymakers, Assad had committed two unpardonable sins. He transformed his country into Iran’s closest regional ally, and he forged closer ties with Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Indeed, Russian air power played an important role in 2016 in enabling Syrian government forces to rout the predominantly Sunni insurgency and regain control of key portions of Syria.The ability of Tehran and Moscow to prop up Assad’s government gradually faded as the years passed, however.

Moscow’s assistance, especially, became less reliable as the Kremlin changed its principal strategic focus to the conflict in Ukraine. During the final year of Biden’s administration, a de facto alliance consisting of the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey redoubled its efforts to bring Syria’s insurgents to power.That move finally succeeded. In December 2024, a Sunni Islamist coalition led by the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) movement—once an affiliate of Al Qaeda—successfully ousted the Assad government. Washington and its allies had worked diligently for that goal since 2011, even though the effort triggered a civil war that had produced more than 600,000 fatalities and over 13 million people displaced.

Biden administration officials, as well as the always reliable pro-imperial mouthpieces in the establishment news media, predictably portrayed the rebel victory as the “liberation” of the oppressed Syrian people. The lead segment on the December 15, 2024, edition of the CBS program “60 Minutes” was typical. Such propaganda continued a long, dishonorable tradition of portraying even Washington’s most corrupt and vicious authoritarian clients as proponents of freedom and democracy.

These wargames explored drone attacks on US military bases

Michael Peck

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in March 2024. (Sgt. Gianna Chiavarone/U.S. Army)In March 2025, the U.S. government conducted a wargame on how to defend military bases in the United States from drone attacks.Just three months later, what had seemed a theoretical possibility became frighteningly close to reality. In June 2025 came Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb. Ukrainian agents had spent months smuggling hundreds of drones deep inside Russia. In a coordinated strike, more than 100 small drones destroyed 20 to 40 Russian warplanes on five airbases scattered from Moscow to Siberia.

The damage extended to more than Russian airpower or the Kremlin’s pride. The drone’s-eye videos of burning bombers sent a chilling signal to nations around the world. If this could happen to Russia, then it could happen to any country — including the United States.Since 2022, the U.S. Army’s Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office, or JCO, and the RAND Corp. think tank have held six wargames on how to mitigate the drone threat.

“We are trying to understand the policies and authorities we have in place to prevent us from contending with a scenario like Operation Spiderweb,” said Paul Lushenko, an assistant professor at the U.S. Army War College who helped run the drone wargame.Many of the details of these wargames are classified, but one key finding is that protecting domestic U.S. bases can’t be just the military’s job.

“The tabletop exercise emphasized the need for a framework to integrate, enable, and synchronize state, local, tribal, and territorial authorities into counter-drone operations at or near military bases,” noted an essay by the game’s designers. But this, in turn, raises a slew of jurisdictional and communication issues.This image, taken from video released June 1, 2025, by a source in the Ukrainian Security Service, shows a Ukrainian drone striking Russian planes deep in Russia's territory during Operation Spiderweb. (Ukrainian Security Service via AP)

America Should Assume the Worst About AI

Matan Chorev

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National security leaders rarely get to choose what to care about and how much to care about it. They are more often subjects of circumstances beyond their control. The September 11 attacks reversed the George W. Bush administration’s plan to reduce the United States’ global commitments and responsibilities. Revolutions across the Arab world pushed President Barack Obama back into the Middle East just as he was trying to pull the United States out. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended the Biden administration’s goal of establishing “stable and predictable” relations with Moscow so that it could focus on strategic competition with China.

Policymakers could foresee many of the underlying forces and trends driving these agenda-shaping events. Yet for the most part, they failed to plan for the most challenging manifestations of where these forces would lead. They had to scramble to reconceptualise and recalibrate their strategies to respond to unfolding events.The rapid advance of artificial intelligence—and the possible emergence of artificial general intelligence—promises to present policymakers with even greater disruption.

Indicators of a coming powerful change are everywhere. Beijing and Washington have made global AI leadership a strategic imperative, and leading U.S. and Chinese companies are racing to achieve AGI. News coverage features near-daily announcements of technical breakthroughs, discussions of AI-driven job loss, and fears of catastrophic global risks such as the AI-enabled engineering of a deadly pandemic.There is no way of knowing with certainty the exact trajectory along which AI will develop or precisely how it will transform national security. 

Policymakers should therefore assess and debate the merits of competing AI strategies with humility and caution. Whether one is bullish or bearish about AI’s prospects, though, national security leaders need to be ready to adapt their strategic plans to respond to events that could impose themselves on decision-makers this decade, if not during this presidential term. Washington must prepare for potential policy tradeoffs and geopolitical shifts, and identify practical steps it can take today to mitigate risks and turbocharge U.S. competitiveness. Some ideas and initiatives that today may seem infeasible or unnecessary will seem urgent and self-evident with the benefit of hindsight.

United States Navy Force Structure

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The author of this report addresses the mismatch between the challenges that the U.S. Navy is likely to face in the international arena over the next decade and beyond and the Navy’s likely force structure. Over several decades, the Navy’s force structure has gotten smaller, although the overall capabilities of its ships and submarines have improved and expanded. In this report, the author considers potential force structure shortfalls and suggests possible adjustments that can be made to how the Navy approaches force structure development. The author recommends that particular emphasis be placed on platforms that are capable of being deployed in sufficient numbers to provide a persistent presence before crises develop.

The findings discussed in this report are based on research conducted from October 2023 to October 2024. Previously, the author spent several years researching the U.S. Navy and its interactions with potential adversaries, particularly the forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this report, the author applied this previous work to what is viewed as a significantly changed set of circumstances from those that drove the development of Navy force structure up to this point in history. This was an exploratory project intended as a roadmap for future study.

The U.S. Navy’s historical missions included presence and crisis response below the level of general war. These historical missions have provided options for decision-makers throughout the Navy’s history. The PRC invested in maritime military and paramilitary forces that allow it to coerce without resorting to high-end force. The Navy’s force structure is purportedly optimised for a major conventional battle, but military exercise results have cast doubt on the actual relevance of much of its force for such a campaign.

Small surface combatants may have significant value in crisis response and presence. However, the industrial base is not well positioned to produce them. The requirements process that the Navy employs is consensus-based and does not account for capabilities that lack significant community sponsorship. The force has insufficient capacity to meet either worldwide presence or crisis response requirements.The Navy is unable to meet the sustainment demands associated with a large and dispersed force structure.

Opportunities After Midnight: Hammer

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We are in a period of momentous change in the Middle East. The successes of Operation Midnight Hammer and the military activities leading up to it not only set back Iran’s nuclear program but also shattered the illusion that Iran is a reliable or capable protector for its proxies. Iran failed to assist Hamas in any meaningful way, with the civilians of Gaza suffering the terrible consequences of the war. In Lebanon, Hezbollah has been weakened, with the Lebanese state working towards reestablishing authority in the country. In Syria, while stability is fragile, a new government is in place. The United States has lifted sanctions to allow Syria a chance at recovery and reintegration into the region and, more broadly, the international community. 

Iraq, too, stands at a turning point, with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) defeated five years ago and with upcoming elections that could further challenge Iranian influence and allow the country to chart a more independent path. The common thread is clear: Iran is no longer able to project disruptive power across the region to the extent it once did. Yet Iran is down, not out. History has handed us an opening. There is a strategic opportunity to set a new course for the Middle East, helping its people improve their lives, improving global stability, and realigning the war-torn countries of the region toward the United States. 

But this opportunity cannot be secured 1 The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. 2 RAND is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s mission is enabled through its core values of quality and objectivity and its commitment to integrity and ethical behavior. 

RAND subjects its research publications to a robust and exacting quality-assurance process; avoids financial and other conflicts of interest through staff training.project screening, and a policy of mandatory disclosure.and pursues transparency through the open publication of research findings and recommendations, disclosure of the source of funding of published research, and policies to ensure intellectual independence. 

Netanyahu Is Spoiling Trump’s Chance for Peace

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Following the Israeli and U.S. attacks on Iranian nuclear sites and the subsequent Iranian-Israeli cease-fire, another agreement seemed to be close at hand, this time in Gaza. Late last week, however, both the United States and Israel halted their participation in the negotiations, accusing Hamas of a lack of coordination and good faith. Hamas, the Islamist organization and de facto authority in the Gaza Strip, wants the United States to guarantee that the cease-fire will become permanent, Israel to withdraw its military, and the UN and other aid providers to surge humanitarian assistance to Palestinians who are facing mass starvation.

U.S. President Donald Trump’s continued deference to Israel and his withdrawal from the talks are a huge mistake. Unless a deal can be made, Trump’s desire to preside over a broader regional peace that includes the normalization of diplomatic ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia will be dead in the water. Such a comprehensive regional agreement is desperately needed after 21 months of death and destruction in Gaza and persistent conflict between Israel and much of the Middle East.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ultranationalist governing coalition, however, have not shown any signs that they are ready to prioritize a durable peace. Even if the remaining Israeli hostages held by Hamas since October 2023 are released, Netanyahu has emphasized that an end to the war in Gaza is impossible until Hamas is completely disarmed and its leaders exiled. And even then, he wants Israel to maintain security control over Gaza and the West Bank indefinitely. Meanwhile, as Egyptian, Qatari, and U.S. 

mediators were shuttling back and forth between the Palestinian and Israeli negotiators, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz advanced a plan for relocating Gaza’s population into a so-called humanitarian city—what former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert refers to as a “concentration camp”—built on the ruins of Rafah near the enclave’s southern edge. Under Katz’s proposal, over two million Palestinians would be held in an area a third the size of Washington, D.C., until they can be resettled abroad.

Pentagon unit seeks Ukraine-like conditions for drone testing

Courtney Albon

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For most of the firms that participated in a late June drone trial staged by the Defence Innovation Unit in remote Alaska, it was the first time their systems had flown outside of a lab setting. The five companies brought drones and radio prototypes to a range near the U.S. Army’s Fort Wainwright to see how they’d fare against simulated electronic warfare systems looking to jam their navigation and command-and-control capabilities. DIU was assessing whether any of them were ready to transition to the military services for further development or fielding.

With a few exceptions, the lack of field testing showed. While several companies made progress by the end of the four-day test event, they struggled initially to maintain targets and navigate flight routes. Some of that was due to jamming and some of it was because their technology wasn’t as mature as expected. That outcome is not unusual for a prototype demonstration, DIU officials told Defence News during the event. 

In fact, the government team in Alaska wanted to see how the companies responded when the systems failed and whether they could iterate and come back the next day with a better solution. That process is vital for both the DOD and the companies, but most small, commercial firms don’t have access to test space where they can learn and refine their products under the types of conditions they might face in the field. That’s a problem for the Defence Department, whose leaders want to field technology — and drones in particular — from a broader pool of companies and at faster rates. 

DIU’s Trent Emeneker, who leads several autonomy projects for the organization and helped facilitate the Alaska testing, said in order to field systems that meet the needs of troops on the ground, DOD needs to change the way it tests in two key ways — by providing more opportunities for small tech companies to wring out their systems, and staging those tests in the field with military operators. If we want to succeed, we have to embed engineers with warfighters, and we have to be out in the field testing,” he said. “We have to do it all the time.” Commercial accessHelping DOD get to that “all-the-time” testing cadence is a rising priority for DIU.

The U.S. Fired 25% of Its Best Missile Interceptors in Just 12 Days. It Will Take a Decade to Replace Them.

Jack Buckby

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Key Points and Summary – The recent 12-day war between Israel and Iran exposed a “critical supply gap” in America’s most advanced missile defences. The U.S. reportedly fired between 100 and 150 THAAD interceptors—costing nearly $2 billion—to help defend Israel, depleting as much as a quarter of its entire stockpile. The crisis is magnified by the fact that the U.S. only produces about 12 of these interceptors per year, meaning it would take over a decade to replace what was used.

-This unsustainable burn rate helps explain President Trump’s hesitancy to send similar advanced systems to Ukraine. U.S. Missile Interceptor Supply Gap Exposed After Iran Strikes. The United States reportedly used as much as one quarter of its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) interceptor missiles to help down missiles launched at Israel by Iran during the 12-day war.

Between 100 and 150 THAAD rockets, part of the United States’ most advanced and strategically important missile defence system, were used at a cost of roughly $12.7 million each – or almost $2 billion in total. The news comes from reports by CNN and The Wall Street Journal, citing sources familiar with the cooperation. The revelation exposes a critical supply gap at a time when the White House is not only working to modernise its own forces, but also resuming arms shipments to Ukraine following a brief pause.

Reports suggest that the United States provided the rockets after learning that Israel was short on Arrow interceptors, with officials concerned that the country was only weeks away from running out. Israel, however, denied the reports. The THAAD ballistic missile defense system, designed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin, has been in service since 2008. The system is designed to intercept short- and medium-range ballistic missiles in their descent or reentry phase. Its missiles do not carry a warhead, instead relying on kinetic energy to destroy missiles before they reach their intended targets.

Stop Them Cold’: Gen. Petraeus Issues Stark Warning on Path to Ukraine Peace

Alex Raufoglu 

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WASHINGTON DC – Retired Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded US and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, said Monday that a ceasefire in Ukraine is unlikely until Western aid allows Kyiv to dramatically shift the battlefield dynamic.His comments came as President Donald Trump announced a drastically shortened deadline for Russia to agree to a truce. Speaking at a Hudson Institute event in Washington DC, Petraeus, also a former CIA director, emphasized that Ukraine needs substantial assistance to make Russian President Vladimir Putin realize he cannot achieve further gains at an acceptable cost.

“I don’t foresee a ceasefire deal between Russia and Ukraine until the US, European and other Western countries provide so much assistance to Ukraine that they can change the dynamic on the battlefield,” said Petraeus, now a chairman of the KKR Global Institute.He pointed to Putin’s high tolerance for casualties, noting Russia has sustained “one million killed and wounded,” with more than 500,000 unable to return to the front lines.

“That’s the kind of cost he’s been willing to bear. So you would have to do something very dramatic. You have to stop them cold on the battlefield,” he said.Petraeus, reflecting on his own experiences writing condolence letters during his combat commands, expressed difficulty comprehending the scale of losses in Ukraine. He also suggested that Russian commanders, such as Yevgeny Prigozhin, the late leader of the Wagner mercenary group, may have become “somewhat crazed” from witnessing so many deaths.

For Putin to consider a realistic settlement, Petraeus said, Ukraine must be able to “stop them cold, perhaps even push them back a bit.”He dismissed Russia’s current demands – including the replacement of President Volodymyr Zelensky, the demilitarization of Ukraine, and a ban on NATO membership – as “obviously unacceptable to President Zelensky and really to the Ukrainian people.”Meanwhile, President Trump on Monday dramatically tightened his deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine, reducing it to less than two weeks from the 50 days he initially announced.

Did the West Provoke Putin’s War on Ukraine?

Andrew Goodman 

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Abstract: A number of prominent scholars, journalists, and politicians have advanced the thesis that the West provoked Putin into attacking Ukraine by enlarging NATO into Central and Eastern Europe and by declaring in 2008 that Ukraine would become a member as well. The dubious assumptions on which this thesis is based are contradicted by my personal experiences at NATO and with Vladimir Putin, which show, first, that the Russian Government has always known that NATO’s 2008 declaration was essentially hollow; and second, that well before he became Russian President, Putin saw the West as an adversary and believed Ukraine naturally belonged to Russia’s sphere of influence. 

Putin’s war against Ukraine is best seen, therefore, as Putin’s last-ditch effort to stifle Ukrainian efforts to escape from Russia’s orbit rather than the result of Great Power competition.I would argue that attributing responsibility to the West for provoking Putin ignores that he has long been on a quest to return Russia to a position of dominance over Ukraine and other countries in Eastern Europe. During his politically formative years in the 1980s and 90s, Putin served as a KGB operative in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and then as a city official in St. Petersburg. 

His words and deeds over these years demonstrate that his original and enduring goal has been to return Russia to great power status with all the trappings that accompany such a position, including the domination of neighbouring states. From this perspective, the war in Ukraine would primarily be the result of Putin’s desire to end Ukraine’s persistent efforts to escape the Russian orbit. Rather than try to explain the war in Ukraine as a consequence of great power competition, it seems to me more likely that the war is the outcome of great power/lesser power dynamics.

The current debate over responsibility for the war in Ukraine effectively began with an article written by John Mearsheimer in 2014, which argued that the West was at fault for the events leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Mearsheimer sees the ongoing conflict in Ukraine as a consequence of NATO’s 2008 declaration that Ukraine would (someday) become a member of the Alliance. On several occasions since the war began in February 2022, Mearsheimer has reiterated his view that NATO’s engagement with Ukraine sparked Putin’s decision to take military action.

Why has the Russian ruble performed so well this year?

Justin Klawans

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While Russia's economy has faced significant turmoil due to heavy war-related sanctions, the country's currency has not suffered. The Russian ruble has grown significantly and is up 45% against the U.S. dollar in 2025. And interest rates on ruble deposits have similarly seen widespread growth, helping to attract investment savers. But according to financial analysts, the spike in the ruble's value may end up doing more harm than good to Russia's economy.

What did the commentators say?

The ruble has become the "best-performing global currency, posting this year's strongest gains against the dollar," said Bloomberg. It has even outperformed generally safe commodities like gold and silver, as well as typically strong European currencies like the Swedish krona and Swiss franc.The spike in the ruble, as shown by data from the Bank of Russia, has been "driven primarily by the central bank's tight monetary policy and optimism" that the war in Ukraine could end, said Reuters. 

The Russian bank's handling of China's currency, the yuan, has also played a role, as Russia has been "selling the Chinese yuan, its only major intervention tool, to support the ruble." As a result, when the ruble "strengthens against the yuan, its rate against the dollar strengthens as well to avoid arbitrage." This has made China's currency more valuable in Russia than the U.S. dollar, and in "2024, 95% of Russia's trade with China was settled in yuan and rubles."

The "strength of the ruble has less to do with a sudden jump in foreign investors' confidence than with capital controls and policy tightening," said CNBC. Russia's central bank has "maintained a restrictive stance to curtail high inflation," and there has also been a "decline in foreign currency demand from local importers" due to the shrinking U.S. dollar, Andrei Melaschenko, an economist at Renaissance Capital, said to CNBC. The decline in the dollar has "given the ruble a boost as banks don't need to sell rubles to buy the dollar or yuan."

What next?

Missile Systems in Homeopathic Doses

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In mid-July 2025, Germany submitted an official Letter of Request for the Typhon missile system, also known as the “Strategic Mid-Range Fires System.” While the Letter of Request does not imply that a procurement decision has been finalised — the German parliament would still need to allocate funding in any case — it signals a strong interest on Germany’s part. This post examines the request and offers insights into how quickly a Typhon purchase could help close Germany’s capability gap in the deep strike segment.

Thanks for reading Missile Matters — with Fabian Hoffmann! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work. For about a year now, Germany has publicly emphasised its intention to acquire a deep precision-strike capability, capable of engaging targets far behind the frontline. Germany has been a founding member of the European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) program, announced in July 2024, which seeks to develop a European ground-launched conventional missile system with a range between 1,000 km and 2,000 km.

Additionally, in October 2024, Germany and the United Kingdom signed the Trinity House Agreement, under which Germany committed to developing a new long-range strike capability with a range exceeding 2,000 km in partnership with the United Kingdom. This commitment was recently reaffirmed. Beyond aspirational programs and conceptual work, Germany’s actual missile procurement has remained limited, however, despite the demonstrated importance of missile systems in Ukraine and repeated affirmations by German officials of the value of systems like the Taurus KEPD 350.

In 2023, Germany likely ordered 75 AGM-158B JASSM-ER cruise missiles (1,000 km range), the maximum number it was authorised to buy, alongside its 35 F-35A Lightning II aircraft. In June 2025, Germany placed an order for an unspecified number of Joint Strike Missiles (500+ km range), valued at approximately $645 million. Assuming a per-unit cost of $3–3.5 million, this corresponds to roughly 180 to 215 missiles.At best, these acquisitions can be described as “homoeopathic” in scale. Moreover, the deep strike segment — if defined as a range significantly exceeding 1,000 kilometres — has remained unaddressed.

Israel’s Zones of Denial

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On June 13th, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched the first in a series of attacks that his military and intelligence establishments had been preparing for more than a decade, striking at the heart of Ayatollah Khamenei’s nuclear program.Photo illustration by Cristiana Couceiro; Source photographs from GettyOne night, not long after a ceasefire between Israel and Iran took hold, I was sitting at the bar of a crowded restaurant north of Tel Aviv, a place buzzing with high-spirited talk and laughter, jokes shouted over bottles of wine. All at once, every phone in the room lit up with alerts. One read:

BREAKING: The I.D.F. has identified a ballistic missile launch from Yemen toward Israeli territory. The Israeli Air Force is operating to intercept the threat, the I.D.F. said.The news came with a map scarred with a blob of angry red, covering nearly all of central Israel—including, as far as I could tell, the bar where I sat with a burger and a beer. For a moment, everything seemed to pause.

Starting on June 13th, with the onset of Israel’s prolonged bombardment of Iran’s nuclear facilities and the aerial assassinations of many of its military and intelligence chiefs and nuclear scientists, Israelis had regularly been warned by wailing sirens and bulletins on their phones that ballistic missiles and drones of retaliation were headed their way. They had just a few minutes to clamber out of bed, wake the kids, and get to municipal bomb shelters or to a mamad, a safe room equipped with steel doors, reinforced concrete, and blast-resistant windows. Through twelve days of war, schools and most businesses closed. The streets were nearly abandoned.

In the early days of the war, the Israel Defense Forces estimated that between eight hundred and four thousand Israelis would be killed. In the end, the number of dead was twenty-eight. Physical damage, to be sure, was widespread. Windows were blown out at the headquarters of Mossad. Missiles had hit the Soroka hospital, in Beersheba; several buildings in central Tel Aviv close to the Kirya, the country’s military nerve center; the Bazan oil refinery, in Haifa; the Weizmann Institute of Science, in Rehovot; the Tel Nof airbase; the Zipporit armor-and-weapons-production base; and a ten-story building in Bat Yam, where nine people were killed, including five members of a Ukrainian family. 

Putin Tries to Build Himself a Position of Strength

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The July 23 Russian-Ukrainian talks in Istanbul yielded no diplomatic progress, as both sides remain entrenched in incompatible positions. Both sides, however, found it important to demonstrate readiness for further communication and to continue the exchange of prisoners. Both Ukraine and Russia appear to be seeking to make an impression on the U.S. administration with their diplomatic maneuvers, and Moscow commentators say that the U.S. position is what ultimately determines the outcome of the conflict.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has doubled down on nuclear signaling to project strength abroad amid economic strain and sanctions. While Russia expands its submarine forces, cracks in its naval capacity and economic system mar the facade of strategic dominance. Expectations for the third round of Russian-Ukrainian negotiations in Istanbul on July 23 had been very low, and the forty-minute-long talks delivered exactly that. Neither side showed any flexibility in their incompatible positions on the frameworks of a peace deal outlined in memos presented at the previous meeting on June 2 (RBC, July 22). 

Both sides, nevertheless, found it important to show readiness for further communications and to continue the exchange of prisoners, relaxing the principle of equal numbers for the wounded and sick (Interfax, July 23). Ukraine sought to strengthen its proposition for an immediate, unconditional ceasefire by suggesting a meeting between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Russian President Vladimir Putin in August, and the Turkish mediators appear eager to facilitate it (The Moscow Times, July 26). The Kremlin rejected this idea outright, despite U.S. President Donald Trump’s opinion on this meeting as “possible” being published in official media (RIA Novosti, July 25).

Both parties appear to be seeking to make an impression on the U.S. administration with their diplomatic maneuvers, and Moscow commentators emphasize particularly that Trump did not appear irked by the poor outcome of the Istanbul talks (Nezavisimaya gazeta, July 24). The prevailing opinion is that Zelenskyy merely amplifies the stance of key European states, primarily Germany and the United Kingdom, which are firmly set on continuing the war, so speaking with him makes little sense (RIAC, July 18). Commentators argue that the U.S.

Trump’s New Two‑Week Ultimatum for Putin: Will This Attempt at High Speed Diplomacy Work?

Guy D. McCardle

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In a charged summer escalation, President Donald Trump announced today that he is slashing the 50‑day window he previously gave Russian President Vladimir Putin to negotiate a peace deal or ceasefire in Ukraine—cutting it down to just 10 to 12 days, aiming for progress by roughly August 7–9, 2025.

How do you think that is going to work out? Putin isn’t exactly the kind of guy who likes being told what to do. Stay tuned.Barely two weeks ago, Trump unveiled a 50‑day ultimatum, warning Putin of “very severe tariffs” —possibly up to 100 percent—and secondary sanctions targeting third‑party economies unless a ceasefire or peace deal was secured. That deadline would have expired in early September.

But the conflict has refused to cool. Russia’s missile and drone strikes have continued to rain death and destruction on Kyiv and other urban centres, even after the ultimatum was issued. Trump declared his disappointment bluntly:I’m not so interested in talking [to Putin] anymore. He talks. We have such nice conversations … and then people die the following night in a missile strike. Every time I think it’s going to end, he kills people.”

Infanteering in the Drone Age

Benjamin Reed

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When I went to military police One Station Unit Training at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, in the summer of 2006, I remember my drill instructor looking at a training schedule; we were supposed to learn how to dig foxholes. He waved it off and said, “We’ll skip this. If you ever find yourself needing to dig a foxhole or a trench, something is seriously wrong.” He wasn’t wrong; for that era, doctrine didn’t prioritise field fortifications. That lack of training, combined with herniated discs, left me struggling when I had to dig trenches in the southern Donbas. Learning early 20th-century infantry operations became a baptism by fire. I managed to earn my stripes as a proper grunt nonetheless; this being my third war after Iraq and Afghanistan.

Much of the combat I experienced in Ukraine occurred during the static phase of 2022, where neither side launched significant offensives in the areas where I was deployed. I often felt futile in my role, reduced to praying artillery wouldn’t reduce us to pink mist. So I decided to enhance my capabilities. I started working with the local drone team of the Ukrainian Volunteer Army before transitioning to the International Legion, where I served as both a rifleman and drone operator. 

There was no dedicated drone unit at the time; my duties were ad hoc. Still, having ISR drone capabilities at the squad level was a game-changer. But it came with new responsibilities: I had to become a field technician. Hobbyist drones malfunction, and support was limited. This added stress contributed to my burnout, and I left in August 2022. But being a war junkie, I came back a year later. The war had evolved. FPV drones were everywhere. 

I enrolled in a Ukrainian suicide FPV drone course outside Kyiv to learn a new skill set. Again, with this skill came technical troubleshooting duties. But I never got to apply them operationally; during training, I jumped from a Humvee, and my back and knee flared up. An MRI revealed I needed a knee replacement, along with four herniated discs. That effectively ended my ability to continue. Since then, FPV proliferation has only increased. These drones now account for as much, if not more, lethality than artillery, traditionally responsible for 70% of battlefield deaths. 

The European Humiliation By Trump Is Ultimately Europe's Fault

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I’m going to start this post by describing two almost identical powers that existed one century apart. One of these powers had reached its relative position in 1900 and the other in 2000. These powers were both continent-spanning, with large populations, access to natural resources, excellent universities, and were scientifically and technologically advanced, They both had great deal of hope for their future developments and it was widely believed that they would both grow strongly in the coming decades.

In statistical and military terms they were also eerily similar. The 1900 power possessed around 18% of world GDP and the 2000 power either 20.2% (according to PPP) or 21.2% (at current prices). Moreover, one had the fourth largest population groupings in the world in 1900 and the other had the third largest global population.

The 1900 power actually had, relatively speaking, a less effective military, with one of the numerically smallest armies in the western world, certainly if measured by population, and either the 4th or 5th largest navy. The 2000 power would have had the second strongest military in the world in comparison—though with major weaknesses. Both of these militaries were technologically advanced for the time, with professional personnel well trained for their different eras, though with serious limitations on where and how they could deploy.

I’m sure many of you guessed right away who I am talking about—the 1900 power is the United States of America and the 2000 power is the European Union. Sometimes its forgotten how strong the European Union was seen to be in 2000, not just a secondary power to the USA, but potentially even a rival. Richard Haas, writing for the Brookings Institute, in late 1999 summarized the uneven state of the US-European relationship as:

Trump Is Pushing India to Submit to China

Sushant Singh

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By any historical measure, India is reluctant to bow to coercion. Jawaharlal Nehru, the country’s first prime minister, championed the cause of nonalignment, and his successors have sworn by variants of strategic autonomy. Yet recently India has swallowed more provocations and offered more concessions to China than at any point since the two countries’ 1962 border war.

In the last six months, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar have all visited China. Each trip culminated in a pledge to normalize relations, even amid Chinese provocations. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is preparing for his own trip to China in September, seemingly completing a progression of Indian officials accepting Chinese terms.

Opinion – ASEAN Centrality in Indian Discourse: Rhetoric or Realpolitik?

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Over the years, Indian leaders have frequently reaffirmed their commitment to ‘ASEAN centrality’ in regional affairs. In fact, as per the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) website, since Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at Shangri-La Dialogue in 2018, where India’s vision for the Indo-Pacific region was articulated for the first time, New Delhi has invoked ASEAN Centrality in official speeches and statements with predictable regularity—at least 30 times. 

As a principle, ASEAN centrality refers to the notion that ASEAN should remain at the core of the region’s diplomatic architecture. This includes a network of summits and dialogue platforms such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asia Summit (EAS), and ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). 

For India, ASEAN centrality has been a consistent element of its ‘Act East Policy,’ which builds on the earlier ‘Look East Policy,’ and forms an integral part of its broader vision for the Indo-Pacific. Within this framework, ASEAN is regarded as a key partner in fostering economic integration, enhancing connectivity, and promoting security cooperation.

India’s engagement with ASEAN is driven by geographic proximity, economic prospects, shared security interests, and enduring cultural ties. The northeastern states of India serve as an interface between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, forming a natural land bridge. On the economic front, ASEAN constitutes a vital market, with bilateral trade reaching US$131.57 billion in 2023.

India’s Northeast Identified as Promising Area for Rare Earth Elements and Critical Minerals

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

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India’s border region of the Northeast has been identified as an area with “promising” deposits of rare earth elements and critical minerals essential for digital and defense manufacturing, and clean energy transition.After years of research and exploration, the state-owned Geological Survey of India (GSI) has concluded that “the states of Arunachal Pradesh and Assam have emerged as promising zones for graphite, vanadium, REEs, base metals, gold, coal and limestone, while Meghalaya and Nagaland hold extensive resources of limestone, coal, and minor strategic metals.”

The 63-page report by GSI added that the country’s growing demand for such resources underlines “the need to identify and develop domestic sources, particularly in geologically promising regions such as the northeast.”The rare earth elements (REE) are a set of 17 metallic elements grouped into light and heavy categories. They are necessary for the production of more than 200 consumer products, such as cellular telephones, computer hard drives, electric and hybrid vehicles, and televisions. Defense applications include guidance systems, lasers, electronic displays, and radar and sonar systems.

India’s northeastern states, especially the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, have been known for their hydrocarbon reserves since the colonial era. Rich deposits of uranium have also been discovered in Meghalaya, but extraction of these deposits has been opposed by local organizations.The GSI report identified Lodoso village in Arunachal Pradesh’s Papum Pare district as having 2.15 million tons of REE-bearing ferruginous phyllite, a type of metamorphic rock. 

In Assam, the concentrations of REE ranged from 1,000 to 5,000 parts per million, while it was between 3,646 and 5,100 parts in Meghalaya.The GSI’s estimate of REE deposits in the Northeast is part of the total of 482.6 metric tons of various cut-off grades in 34 exploration projects in the country. The Atomic Minerals Directorate for Exploration and Research (AMD) has identified around 7.23 million tons across the states of Andhra Pradesh, Odisha, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Gujarat, and Maharashtra.

Afghanistan: Taliban Bans Chess In Crackdown On Sports, Pastimes – Analysis

RFE RL

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The circumstances of Naveed Ahmad’s life have imposed many restrictions on the impoverished Afghan teenager. He can’t travel abroad, pursue his dream of getting a university degree, or even afford to eat out with friends.But the one thing the19-year-old never lost access to was his favorite sport and pastime: Chess.Among the dozens of restrictions the Taliban have imposed on its citizens, the recent adoption of a measure banning chess due to “religious considerations.”

As someone who loves playing chess, I was very, very upset that chess has been banned in Afghanistan,” said Ahmad, speaking by phone from his native province of Kunduz in the country’s north.I have always dreamt of taking part in chess tournaments and hoped that at least I would travel to various provinces to play chess,” said Ahmad, who has played chess since the age of 10.

The Taliban’s sports directorate said it was suspending chess until the further notice over concerns that the sport encourages gambling, which is banned in Islam.The state agency’s spokesman Atal Mashwani told reporters in mid-May that chess would remain suspended across Afghanistan “until these considerations are addressed, the sport of chess is suspended in Afghanistan.”

Nearly three months on, the Taliban authorities have not announced if they have come to a final decision.RFE/RL contacted Mashwani for comment, but he did not respond to the requests.The Taliban first outlawed chess during its previous stint in power that ended in 2001.The chess suspension adds to a long list of bans and restrictions that the Taliban has imposed on sports, arts, and other activities since returning to power in August 2021.

Anatomy of an Insurgency: Balochistan’s Crisis and Pakistan’s Failures

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Balochistan is Pakistan’s largest province, comprising 44 percent of the country’s territory, yet it has a relatively small population of approximately 14.8 million. Of this population, only 5.9 million are ethnic Baloch, with Pashtuns forming the other significant demographic group.The province has been engulfed in an insurgency since 2006, but the conflict has recently undergone a dramatic transformation. What began as a tribal resistance movement has evolved into a formidable insurgency with separatist ambitions, complemented by a broader peaceful political movement. Recent escalations demonstrate both the insurgents’ growing operational capabilities and the Pakistani state’s persistent reliance on heavy-handed military responses that continue to alienate Baloch society.

The roots of contemporary unrest, according to Baloch nationalists, trace back to Pakistan’s founding when in 1948 the State of Kalat was forcibly incorporated into the federation despite local resistance. However, the current insurgency was catalyzed by then-President General Pervez Musharraf’s unilateral decision to construct Gwadar Port, bypassing constitutional structures including the National Assembly, Council of Common Interest, and the Balochistan Provincial government. This decision came despite ongoing negotiations through a Senate Committee led by Senator Mushahid Hussain, then the secretary general of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League (Q), that had nearly achieved consensus.

Akbar Bugti – a veteran political leader and Tumandar of the Bugti tribe who had served as chief minister, governor, and federal minister of state – had opposed the Gwadar project due to concerns about demographic changes from nationwide migration and the lack of guarantees that locals would benefit from development. Musharraf’s handling of political disagreements with Baloch leaders was marked by intimidation, and when security forces initiated operations against protests surrounding the port’s construction, Bugti and his supporters retreated to the mountains where military forces killed him in August 2006. 

Bugti’s death transformed him from a collaborator with Islamabad into a nationalist hero, reinvigorating independence demands that had largely lain dormant since General Zia-ul-Haq’s rapprochement with Baloch dissidents in the 1980s. Bugti’s death became a rallying point for the insurgency. The August 2024 surge in insurgent violence coincided with his death anniversary, demonstrating the enduring symbolic power of the event.

As Philippine Province Declared Free of Abu Sayyaf, Counterterrorism in Southeast Asia Moves Online

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The Philippines’ restive island of Basilan was officially declared to be free of Abu Sayyaf on June 10. The announcement comes 10 years after the group, known for being Islamic State’s Philippine branch, launched its first major attack there, where a Moroccan suicide bomber killed 11 people (GMA News Online [The Philippines], August 1, 2018). Secretary Carlito Galvez Jr. of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation and Unity stated that Abu Sayyaf’s demise was “a turning point for [Basilan] province from a place once tainted by bloodshed to one filled with peace” (Philippine News Agency, June 10). 

Abu Sayyaf’s defeat in Basilan may be more complete than in other parts of the southern Philippines, where the group once operated with near-impunity. The removal of Abu Sayyaf from Basilan is the latest progress in the battle against the group’s low-level but intractable insurgency, itself representative of the decline of violent Islamism in Southeast Asia. Prior to the Presidential Peace Adviser announcing Abu Sayyaf’s demise from Basilan, there were many signs that Abu Sayyaf was on its last legs. 

One Abu Sayyaf member who was involved in the Dos Palmas kidnappings in Lantawan township on Basilan in the early 2000s was arrested in March, having spent the last two decades on the run (GMA News Online [The Philippines], March 31). The Dos Palmas (also called the Golden Harvest) kidnappings were a thirteen-month crisis that involved Abu Sayyaf capturing more than 100 civilians, at least 20 of whom were killed. Ever since, Dos Palmas kidnappings have been at the forefront of Philippine counterterrorism efforts, with authorities still conducting arrests in 2019 and 2021 (The Philippine Star, March 12, 2019; Benar News, September 15, 2021). 

While it was originally reported that an American was abducted and killed by Abu Sayyaf in Basilan last October, it appears that the motive of the armed men behind the crime was financial and/or personal, with no direct connection with jihadism or Abu Sayyaf being identified (Minda News, October 19, 2024; Manilla Bulletin, October 21, 2024; Medium/@Crime Desk, January 11). The nearby island of Jolo in the province of Sulu is also putting its notoriety as a previous hotbed of Abu Sayyaf activity behind it. Jolo is currently enjoying economic rejuvenation as the island transitions from “terrorism to tourism,” with night markets and entertainment becoming hallmarks of the territory (South China Morning Post, December 2, 2024). 

China’s Joint Patrols on the Mekong River: Much Less Than Meets the Eye

Amy Sinnenberg

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On October 5, 2011, thirteen Chinese sailors were found bound, blindfolded, and executed, their bodies dumped in the Mekong River near northern Thailand. The scene was grisly. Two Chinese cargo ships, the Hua Ping and Yu Xing 8, were later discovered with nearly a million methamphetamine tablets onboard.

Within days, Chinese authorities blamed the massacre on Naw Kham, a drug lord operating in the Golden Triangle, launching a full-scale manhunt. Authorities captured Kham, brought him to China, tried him, and then executed him by lethal injection in 2013. The state broadcast the execution on national television.

A murkier truth is buried under that official story. Thai investigators – and eventually, Chinese ones, too – uncovered that nine Thai soldiers from an elite anti-narcotics unit carried out the killings. They orchestrated the massacre after a protection racket went sideways, then allegedly tried to frame Kham by planting the drugs. And yet the Thai soldiers faced no charges. They walked free. The Chinese public got the closure of televised justice, but the men who pulled the triggers? Nothing.

Following the murders, China halted all shipping on the Mekong and scrambled to reassert control. Within weeks, it convened an emergency summit with Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar (the three countries touching the Golden Triangle) and rolled out a bold new initiative: joint river patrols. The plan, as Beijing envisioned it, would have Chinese boats and personnel operating across borders, patrolling shoulder-to-shoulder with forces from neighboring countries. However, that did not happen.

Maritime Militia: China’s Hybrid War Strategy in the Indian Ocea

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Europe depends on open waters for trade, energy, and security. However, lurking within the waves of international waters is a hidden danger: Chinese fishing trawlers that serve as extensions of Beijing’s maritime intelligence operations. Ostensibly commercial, these ships are integral to China’s “maritime militia.” They are outfitted with sophisticated sensors, satellite communications, and small arms, posing as deep-sea fishermen while gathering sensitive information. 

Their increasing presence across the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal, and beyond has caused two interconnected issues: damaging the livelihoods of local fishermen and supplying critical intelligence to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). This was particularly apparent during India’s military operation Sindoor, targeting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan in May 2025, when seemingly benign fishing vessels trailed India’s navy, transmitting movements to both China and Pakistan.

According to the London-based think tank Overseas Development Institute (ODI), China’s distant-water trawler fleet is estimated to number around 17,000 vessels worldwide. Their purpose is not merely to pursue squid or tuna. A report by Andrew S. Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College, indicates that a significant portion of these vessels are part of the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM), a state-sponsored entity that bolsters the PLAN and Coast Guard under the guise of civilian cover.

These ships are equipped with automatic identification system (AIS) transponders, satellite communication equipment, and high-intensity LED lights for nocturnal fishing, which is frequently done utilizing purse seines and gill nets. Some are armed with non-lethal devices such as water cannons or lasers—tools that are effective for ‘grey-zone’ harassment rather than legitimate fishing.Some specialized naval-design vessels are constructed for dual purposes: 

China’s ‘Over Capacity’: Boon Or Bane – OpEd

Lim Teck Ghee

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“Western hostility towards China reflects the grudging realization that the West may not be the pinnacle of achievement after all. Rather than possibly learning from China’s successes, westerners have chosen resentment borne of a sense of frustrated superiority”. — “Why the West’s resentment of China is so misguided”As China’s higher value industrial and manufacturing exports carve an increasingly larger share of markets around the world, the United States (US) and European Union (EU) countries have undertaken separate but in reality complementary policies aimed at beating back this unprecedented threat to Western dominance of the international trading and economic order.

The criticisms levelled by Washington and Brussels to counter the Chinese exports impacting their domestic producers for now emphasize that China’s state-led and subsidized export-driven economic model has created excess manufacturing capacity, flooding their markets with cheap goods.Apart from the over-capacity charge refrain, also commonly featured in the media pronouncements are accusations of unfair trade practices, intellectual piracy, market disruption and national security concerns as the flood of Chinese products – electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, wind turbines, ships, electronic devices and components, steel and aluminium products, and practically the entire range of everyday consumer and household products – gain a foothold in Western markets. 

This popularity – on account of their quality, pricing and superiority over domestic and other rivals – has driven the US and EU nations into record deficits in their accounting trade figures with China. An indication of how serious these concerns have become for Western governments and policymakers is that the issue of alleged Chinese over capacity is a key subject of negotiation in the ongoing US and China tariff meetings. It also emerged as the most prominent concern of the EU delegation visiting Beijing for a one day summit to mark the 50th anniversary of China-EU diplomatic relations.

What policy changes can arise from these negotiations and meetings remains to be seen.

Over Capacity: Bane for Some, Boon for Others The consensus amongst independent market analysts and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is that the charges levelled against China’s export success have little or no basis. This success has been hard earned and is due mainly to China’s huge disciplined work force and adherence rather than subversion or evasion of the market principles, norms and practices required of World Trade Organization (WTO) member countries.