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18 February 2014

Karachi: The Futile Operation



In the early hours of 13 February 2014, a bus carrying personnel of the Special Security Unit (SSU), an elite group of the Sindh Police that provides security to important personalities and installations was targeted by a car bomb outside the Police Training Centre in Karachi. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claimed the responsibility for the attack attributing it as a revenge for the killing of their companions by the police. The blast that killed 13 police commandoes and injured over 57 others made a mockery of the security forces’ claims of success in the ongoing operations in Karachi, the economic and financial hub of Pakistan. 

The city has been undergoing a major security operation for over five months to clean up the city of armed militants and other criminal groups. The operation led by the Pakistan Rangers was launched on 05 Sep 2013 to rid the city of endemic violence. Many alleged criminals and militants were killed in the operations and 13800 suspects had been arrested by the end of January. However, as is evident by the recent attack, it has failed to bring peace to Karachi, although the killings have reduced marginally. It does not appear as if Karachi is going to witness prolonged peace. In 2013, there were 2,507 cases of killings in Karachi, of these 1403 were killed in the first six months alone. Of these nearly 70 per cent were killed in target killings, where as others were victims of security operation, sectarian attacks, militants’ attack, gang wars and other acts of terrorism. In July and August the violence peaked resulting in the killings of 500 people. This resulted in a unique meeting of Pakistani Federal cabinet in Karachi, which gave the go ahead for the security operations to be led by the Pakistan Rangers. It was projected as a short swift and targeted operation, but it has turned out to be anything but that and has continued unabated for over five months without any signs of culmination. 

The operation did give some respite to the troubled city, as the killings came down slightly. In September 2013, when the operation was launched the killings dropped to 137 from 280 in the previous month. However, thereafter there has not been any significant drop in the killings. In October, 133 people were killed, followed by 165 in November and 169 in December, where as the number of those killed in the first month of 2014 was 144. It is therefore quite clear that there has been no relief for the troubled city despite such a massive operation having been underway for over five months. According to security agencies, two phases of the operation have already been completed and the final phase is underway. Unfortunately, the security environment in Karachi has not improved one bit and in fact some of the factors that have contributed to the violence have become more acute. 

The violence in Karachi is on account of various faultlines, which have aggravated with the passage of time. The first has been the intra-ethnic faultline, where in Bihari Mohajirs, who have supported Mohajir Qaumi Movement Haqiqi (MQM-H) group – a breakaway faction of MQM, allegedly propped up by the ubiquitous intelligence agencies, clash with other Mohajirs mainly from UP, Delhi and Gujrat. This conflict fortunately appears to be subsiding, as Haqiqis have been decimated and have not been able to make an impact even after their leader Afaq Ahmed was released after eight years of incarceration. 

The Second is the interethnic faultline between Mohajirs and Sindhi-Baloch-Pakhtoon ethnic groups. Different localities in Karachi are dominated by different ethnic groups and their boundaries are the most common battle grounds. Political parties like ANP, PPP and MQM respectively prop up armed cadres of Pakhtoon, Sindhi-Baloch and Mohajir communities to protect their political turf. The increasing influx of Pakhtoons in Karachi due to violent turbulence in Pakhtoon belt of Pakistan and lower growth rate of Mohajir population has altered the population dynamics in the city irrevocably. MQM, which represents most of the Mohajirs, believes the ongoing operation is aimed at ending their supremacy within the metropolis. 

The third faultline in Karachi is the sectarian cleavage between various sects and sub-sects. The city has seen targeted killing of Shias and Sunnis, as it houses major seminaries of both the sects. Hitherto, most of the Sunnis in Karachi, primarily, Mohajirs and the Sindhis adhered to tolerant Barelvi sect of sub-continental Sunni Islam and followed Sunni Tehrik, but it has changed in recent times. Rising influx of Pakhtoons has given rise to Deobandi and extremist Wahabi schools of thought. Consequently, militant Deobandi and Wahabi armed groups have not only been targeting Shias, but also the Barelvi Sunnis. Many Pakhtoon localities have now become the impregnable fortresses of Taliban, who have been actively participating in the sectarian carnage. After the ongoing operation started, the Rangers claimed arrest of many sectarian militants, who were waiting to strike. However, despite these tall claims, the sectarian faultline has worsened in recent times and various individuals belonging to different Shia sub-sects like Ithna Ashari, Dawoodi Bohra and Ismaili, as well as Sunnis of both Deobandi and Barelvi schools have been targeted. In fact the constant onslaught by the Taliban backed Deobandi and Wahabi militants has in the recent past brought together Barelvi Sunnis and Shias to forge a common front. 

Another faultline in Karachi is the rift between various criminal gangs. Drug, land and arms mafia have been fighting over the control of their turf and have often drawn support from their ethnic communities. The gang wars often result in targeted killings and pitched battles in different parts of Karachi and at times suck in innocent bystanders. In the past there were violent clashes in Lyari and other parts of Karachi between the gangs of Arshad Pappu and Rahman Dakait, who have since been killed. In recent times, gangsters belonging to Uzair Baloch and Baba Ladla gangs have clashed openly in the streets of Karachi, killing and injuring innocent bystanders. Both the gangsters were part of the PPP backed Rehman Dakait gang, but have since fallen out over the control of the gang. Recently, remnants of Arshad Pappu gang led by Ghaffar Zikri have joined hands with Baba Ladla to reclaim their lost territory in Lyari from Uzair Baloch, who controls one member of the national assembly and two members of the provincial assembly elected from this crime prone locality of Karachi. The violence in the past forced the Kutchi community comprising of migrants from Kutch, to migrate from Lyari and in recent times it has been the minorities who have been forced to relocate. Despite five months of operations, these criminal gangs, which enjoy political support, continue to fight pitched battles in the by lanes of Lyari. 

The failure of current operation in Karachi could be catastrophic for Pakistan, as its economy is going through a tough phase and the city is the financial hub of Pakistan. Karachi contributes over 46 per cent of direct taxes, 33 per cent of federal excise, 23 per cent of domestic sales tax, 79 per cent of sales tax on imports and 75 per cent of customs duty collected in entire Pakistan. The city alone contributes over a quarter of Pakistan’s revenue and over 30 per cent of all manufacturing activities. It contributes one fifth of nation’s GDP and is the nerve centre of Pakistan’s economy. Karachi-Bin Qasim port complex virtually handles all the maritime imports and exports of Pakistan. The city houses the largest stock exchange and has the headquarters of most multinational corporations operating in Pakistan, hence continuing turmoil in Karachi could be extremely grave for the country, which does not even have foreign exchange to pay for one month of import cover. Despite the criticality of peace in Karachi, the manner in which the operation is being conducted shows that its aims are political rather than ushering in lasting peace. 

All views expressed are personal. 

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