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23 September 2014

WAR AGAINST ISLAMIC STATE: CAN INDIA PLAY A ROLE? – ANALYSIS


The national flag of India hoisted on the Red Fort in Delhi. Photo by Jasleen Kaur, Wikipedia Commons 

US President Barack Obama chose the eve of the 13th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks to unveil his strategy against the Islamic State (IS) in an address to the nation from the White House in Washington.

In what is seen by some analysts as a reversal, Obama authorised airstrikes inside Syria for the first time as well as expansion of strikes in Iraq as a part of the strategy to “degrade and ultimately destroy” the IS.

He ordered a broad military campaign in concert with a “coalition of the willing and capable” against the IS as it is seen to pose a risk to Americans and the interests of its allies in the region. In the past few weeks the US has been launching limited airstrikes against IS targets in Iraq in support of Iraqi and Kurdish resistance, and in response, the IS has released videos depicting the beheading of two American journalists in Syria.

There is speculation that India, in a departure from the past, may consider the option of being a part of this international effort; more as a “responsible” global actor than in response to any threat posed by the IS to the country. An issue US might take up in the forthcoming Obama-Modi meeting. The US State Department has indicated that more than 40 countries have already given or offered support of some kind to Iraq in dealing with the militants.
The Strategy

The US State Department briefing said the focus will be on “multiple lines of effort, including military support to our Iraqi partners, stopping the flow of foreign fighters, countering IS’ financing and funding, addressing humanitarian crises, and de-legitimising IS’ ideology”. Before Obama’s address the US Treasury Department indicated that it would, as a part of the strategy, step up efforts to undermine the IS’ finances by working with other countries, especially Gulf states, to cut off the group’s external funding networks and its access to the global financial system.

Obama’s declaration to destroy IS through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy comes with a few caveats; no putting American troops in combat roles on the ground in Iraq or Syria. He said US will not do for Iraqis what they must do for themselves. Second, US will not take the place of Arab partners in securing their region.

Obama also said that he was dispatching nearly 500 more US troops to Iraq to assist operations against the IS, while the White House in a separate statement said it was providing $25 million in immediate military assistance to the Iraqi government. The US administration has also sought and obtained authorization from the Congress for a Pentagon-led effort to train and arm more moderate elements of the Syrian opposition under a $500 million programme.
Coalition of the Willing and Capable

At the NATO summit in Wales in the first week of September, the US announced that it had formed a 10-nation “core coalition” to counter the IS threat which comprised of US, Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, Turkey, Italy, Poland and Denmark. The coalition announcement, possibly since it only referred to the “core”, consisted of NATO members, and did not include any Arab nation and only one of Iraq’s six neighbours, Turkey. It is also unclear what specific commitments the allies including the core members, have made within the two-pronged strategy of strengthening allies on the ground in Iraq and supporting them with airstrikes. The US and France, since then has escalated diplomatic efforts with allies in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere to help with efforts to degrade the terror group.

Saudi Arabia has reportedly offered to host the training missions and the Arab League has essentially agreed to become part of the coalition, announcing that its 22 members would take unspecified, yet urgent political, defensive, security and legal measures to combat extremists. 10 Arab states since then have come forward with more substantial commitments. Turkey, which shares a long border with both Iraq and Syria, has committed to intercepting foreign fighters en route to the conflict. Jordan is expected to provide intelligence support and help establish targets for the coalition airstrikes. Paradoxically, conspicuous by its absence from this coalition is Iran, the only local player which is willing to put boots on ground ( is doing so) against the IS.

US Senator John McCain, speaking at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington on Sep 9, outlined his visualisation of the contours of the desired India-US relationship which would support India’s rise as a more influential “global actor”. He outlined a strategic agenda which would contribute to a rules-based international order that would foster India-US relationship. One of the strategic priorities that he flagged within the agenda was a stable Middle East. To that end he remarked “imagine the signal India would send if it joined the emerging international coalition to confront the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.”

The question is would the Narendra Modi government make that quantum transition in its West Asia policy to accommodate such a notion? It has been reported that India is actively considering bolstering the capabilities of the Kurdish regional government in Irbil in this regard.
Indian Role

It is not insignificant that the coalition against the IS has, so far, few Arab countries standing up to be counted considering how major a threat IS has been perceived to be not only to the region but also the Islamic faith. The positions taken by some of these “local partners” (with most of whom India shares cordial diplomatic relations) is indicative of their disparate and diverse, and frequently conflicting, interests on key issues including the IS. Despite its barbaric acts, the IS is viewed by some sections as a manifestation of valid Sunni grievances in the region. These countries would like these grievances addressed concurrently with any action against the IS.

Turkey’s conditional acquiescence to the coalition membership would provide India a sense of the diplomatic and security challenges it could face. Turkey has reportedly indicated to the US that the power balance in the region should not be affected as a consequence of the international intervention; and in this context no weapons should be given to Shiites, who are strong in Baghdad and the Assad administration in Syria. On the issue of support to the Kurds, it felt that having unmonitored weapons in the area could post a threat to Turkey’s domestic security. The beleaguered Iraqi government too has reservations on the West dealing directly with Irbil as this is undermining its tenuous legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity of the Iraqi nation.

Besides historical and existing military and commercial ties, and the fact that the West considers the Peshmerga as the “finest” fighting force against the IS in the region, Kurds have received assistance from the US and EU nations simply because the West does want to be seen as supporting Shia groups in Iraq. The US and its allies are making concerted efforts to portray IS as a problem within Islam and more specifically between the Sunnis. However, the option to aid and strengthen the Iraqi Kurdish government may not be such a straightforward choice for India.

India would also watch keenly the support US garners at the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly session.

A recalibration of India’s West Asia policy is not going to be a mere case of shifting gears. As the Modi government moves to assert India’s position as a reckonable global player, the country’s stand on the declared strategy to counter the IS may prove to be its first major foreign policy challenge.

(Monish Gulati is a Senior Research Fellow with the Society for Policy Studies. He can be contacted at m_gulati_2001@yahoo.com)

This article appeared at South Asia Monitor.

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