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11 July 2015

The Third Iraq War

By Lisa Beyer 
Jul 7, 2015

After sending its soldiers to fight in Iraq twice in 20 years, a war-weary U.S. withdrew the last of its troops there in 2011. Three years later, it returned after big chunks of Iraq and Syria fell to the jihadists of Islamic State. No one in authority calls it America’s Third Iraq War, but Operation Inherent Resolve, a 62-nation campaign of airstrikes coupled with the strengthening of Iraqi military and Syrian rebel forces, is led and mostly conducted by the U.S. While President Barack Obama and his critics disagree over whether the effort can defeat Islamic State, others question whether another Iraq war can serve U.S. interests at all.

The Situation


The operation’s results are mixed. Pentagon officials in mid-April said Islamic State had lost as much as 30 percent of the territory it once held. Yet strategic victories have been few and hard-won. U.S. officials estimate that thousands of Islamic State fighters have been killed, but it’s not clear that the group is hurting for personnel given its success at recruiting. Islamic State remains capable of taking the offensive, as evidenced by its capture of the Iraqi city of Ramadi in mid-May. The addition of 450 personnel Obama authorized in June will bring to about 3,550 the number of U.S. troops deployed in Iraq to gather intelligence, secure U.S. facilities and advise and equip Iraqi soldiers — many of whom fled Islamic State’s initial advances. In June, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter acknowledged that U.S. efforts to train Iraqi forces were behind schedule because too few recruits had signed up. In May, the U.S. military began training and equipping Syrian opposition fighters it considers moderate, but at a much slower pace than expected. Syrian rebels have been supported by the CIA covertly and by Gulf Arab states.SOURCE: INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR
The Background

In the first war in 1991, the U.S. and allies including Syria and the Soviet Union defeated Iraq in six weeks after its invasion of Kuwait imperiledoil markets. A narrower U.S.-led coalition launched the second war in 2003 to oust the dictator Saddam Hussein and destroy his presumed nuclear, chemical and biological arsenal; no such arms were found. Islamic State was established as the Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda the next year in response to the invasion. Like al-Qaeda, the group’s goal is to create a purified Islamic society, but its methods differ. It openly targets Muslim civilians, especially Shiites, whom it considers heretics, but also fellow Sunnis who oppose it. Weakened in 2007 by a surge in U.S. troops combined with an organized Sunni backlash, Islamic State revived with the 2011 departure of coalition forces. It honed its combat skills in the Syrian civil war that began the same year. In 2014, al-Qaedasevered relations when Islamic State’s leader rejected its authority. The group began conquering Iraqi and Syrian cities that same year and declared a caliphate, a vision of Islamic governance. Many secular Sunnis in Iraq fought alongside the group or welcomed it initially as a way of opposing the Shiite-dominated central government and its record of oppressing other ethnic and religious factions.
The Argument

The danger to the U.S. and Europe posed by Islamic State is in dispute. Its leaders have occasionally threatened to attack but it’s hard to tell whether they are serious. U.S. and European officials worry that itsrecruits will return home to commit terrorist attacks. Specialists who have studied the record of returning jihadists from Iraq and Syria tend to argue that these fears are overblown. Homegrown terrorists inspired by jihadist groups present another danger. Opponents of Operation Inherent Resolve say that the threat posed by Islamic State doesn’t justify the operation and that countries increase the risk of attacks by taking part. Supporters reply that it’s better to combat Islamic State before it grows more dangerous. But how? Obama’s defenders say he’s appropriately minimized U.S. casualties by ruling out the deployment of combat troops. Critics say he’s not doing enough to win. The Institute for the Study of War estimates that 25,000 U.S. troops are needed for the job. Its scholars are among those who contend that Islamic State can be uprooted only if Sunnis again rise upto fight the group alongside foreign forces. Atrocities committed by Shiite militias on which the Iraqi army has heavily relied to fight Islamic State only stoke the ethnic tensions that led to the group’s rise.
THE REFERENCE SHELF
A paper by the Institute for the Study of War proposes an alternative strategy to defeat Islamic State.
A Congressional Research Service report details U.S. policy toward Islamic State.

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