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20 August 2015

The Unfruitful Talks of India and Pakistan

By Neha Kumar Tiwari
19 Aug , 2015

The National-Security Advisers of both India and Pakistan decide to meet each other in the midst of Gurudaspur attacks, which were later followed by several ceasefire violations across LOC. Indian government has faced lots of criticism for adopting ‘talks’ as a diplomatic tool to end the stalemate with Pakistan’s side.

The withdrawal of India’s ‘cold war doctrine’ clearly manifest that Pakistan’s policy of using terrorist attacks under a nuclear umbrella has worked against the favor of India.

It is important to remember here that it is not just the terrorist attacks or ceasefire violations but their linkages with the nuclear weapons of Pakistan, which has made such a kind of ‘talks’ as the only available alternative to Indian government. Since the nuclear tests of India and Pakistan, India has stood in a disadvantage position as it is facing terrorist attacks and constant ceasefire violations which it cannot escalate to the conventional or limited war because of the presence of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapons of Pakistan are further combined with the Policy of First Use (FU) which makes things complicated for India. The withdrawal of India’s ‘cold war doctrine’ clearly manifest that Pakistan’s policy of using terrorist attacks under a nuclear umbrella has worked against the favor of India.

Pakistan FU policy is further combined with its quest of its tactical nuclear weapons making it more difficult for India to strategically deal with the terrorist attacks. Tactical nuclear weapons are ‘battlefield’ or ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are distinct from a bigger and strategic variety of nuclear weapons. Pakistan is following the policy of the US while developing tactical nuclear weapons. The US has developed and deployed nuclear weapons to stop Soviet aggression in Western Europe. The Pakistan’s plutonium reactor of Kushab and missiles like Nasar with a short range of 37 km shows the determination of Pakistan to develop tactical nuclear weapons which can be used early in the conflict. Kidwai has also said in a conference at Carnegie Endowment of Peace that ‘a tactical weapon makes war less likely.’

If analysed in the present context, this makes the situation for India more complicated. It clearly shows that Pakistan will continue to orchestrate terrorist strikes against India while India is running short of military options to deal with Pakistan. Tactical Nuclear Weapons become more worrisome because of the civilian population that live in border areas of both India and Pakistan. Any use of tactical nuclear weapons would result in heavy casualties to civilian population. This has further complicated the position of India and shows its inability to deal with the terrorist strikes or ceasefire violations. Even if India decides to have tactical nuclear weapons, it would not be able to use it due to the presence of its No First Use (NFU) policy.

India needs to send proper deterrence messages showing its will and capability to carry out conventional attacks and to retaliate in case of nuclear attacks. So far, India has failed in this endeavor and has depicted itself as a ‘tolerant state.’

So this brings us to the other question-should India change its nuclear policy as the present Policy of NFU is putting it in a disadvantageous position? The answer is that it will be difficult for India to change its NFU policy. The first reason is that such policies are adopted by states which have complete confidence on their retaliatory capability. A turn away from NFU policy will show lack of confidence from the Indian side in its retaliatory capability. It can also provoke Pakistan to strike first in case of any conflict. Also, it will require India to keep its nuclear weapons at a high alert, making South Asia a dangerous region.

Secondly, a shift towards FU policy will degrade the international position of India as it is trying to depict itself as a responsible nuclear power. It is only due to its image of responsible nuclear power that India got a membership of NSG and also managed to secure a nuclear deal with the US. It is only on the basis of ‘responsible nuclear weapon state’ that India is trying to bid for the UNSC permanent membership. Therefore, it is not viable for India to adopt FU policy from the strategic and diplomatic viewpoint.

As a result, the stalemate situation continues as Pakistan continues to use its terrorist attacks under the framework of the nuclear deterrence and India has to seek suitable military and strategic options. Under such circumstances, there are two possible military solutions which India could take to strengthen its position. The first one is to strengthen its retaliatory capability so that Pakistan will be fearful to carry out nuclear attacks in case of a conventional strike. The steps have been taken by India in this direction by developing INS Arihant and Missile Defences. However, there is a long way to go.

India needs to send proper deterrence messages showing its will and capability to carry out conventional attacks and to retaliate in case of nuclear attacks. So far, India has failed in this endeavor and has depicted itself as a ‘tolerant state.’ Second, India should develop ‘smart conventional weapons’ on the line of the US which can be used in case of Pakistan’s tactical strike. The US has such a conventional weapons, which matches to nuclear weapons in case of lethality but does not emit harmful radiation. Such weapons will make Pakistan think twice before it launches its tactical weapons against India. As said, ‘talks are a process and not a solution’ and therefore, India should build its military capability to deal with the continuing terrorist threats from Pakistan.
© Copyright 2015 Indian Defence Review

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