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23 December 2016

Peeping into a secret world

Amitava Chakraborty

The role of the army in Pakistan has baffled analysts across the world. The army has not only failed to maintain the territorial integrity of the nation but also continues to play a crucial role in sustaining violence in the subcontinent. The civil-military relationship in Pakistan is different from that of its neighbours. Although the army does not take over the seat of power, it retaliates with signals of a coup, thereby, forcing democratic institutions to back down. The Inter-Service-Intelligence is the military's intelligence wing. The ISI is known for its overseas covert strike capabilities as well as its interference in domestic matters.

Hein G. Kiessling lived in Pakistan between 1989 and 2002 as a representative of the German Political Foundation. During his stay, he built close relationships with the top-ranking military and intelligence officers. The book provides an insight into the functioning of the organization and the generals who ran the show since its inception. The ISI was created in 1948 to gather intelligence and protect national interests from a hostile India and an expansionist Russia. During the Cold War, the ISI moved towards the United States of America to counter Soviet and Indian influence in Afghanistan and Kashmir respectively.

According to the author, matters relating to Afghanistan and Kashmir since that time have been solely decided by the ISI. The broad policy of the institution is simple. Any change in the foreign relationship between India and Pakistan should not put the latter's army in a position of disadvantage. Therefore, any prime minister who strays from the established foreign policy doctrine to develop friendly relations with India runs the risk of being deposed.

The book sheds light on the Kargil war of 1999. Political analysts still remain unsure of the differences between Pervez Musharraf, army chief between 1998 and 2007, and Nawaz Sharif that led to the war. What had forced Musharraf to overthrow Sharif, who had hand-picked him although the general was third in line to become the chief of army staff? The former army chief, in his autobiography, claims that Sharif did not allow his aeroplane to land in Pakistan when he was returning from Colombo, thereby, forcing the pilot to divert from the route. Kiessling offers a different reason. Sharif had appointed a lieutenant general, Khawaja Ziauddin, as ISI chief in October 1998 bypassing Musharraf. This did not go down well with the chief, who forced Sharif to flee the country.

Reading the book one gets a sense that the ISI has now become indispensable. This may be because of the collusion between politicians and the military. It was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto who could have disbanded the organization after the 1971 defeat. But the leader expanded the ISI's functioning by establishing the internal political cell in 1975. Popularly elected leaders, instead of enforcing democratic values, have established a tacit understanding with the army to remain in power. The book will be of help for students of subcontinental politics.

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