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8 August 2017

Competitive conflict in the Himalayas

Lt General H S Panag 

Nations in general and neighbouring nations, in particular, remain in a state of perpetual competitive conflict primarily to assert political and economic hegemony. While territory may have been the immediate casus belli for the Sino Indian War 1962, the aim was political – to teach India a lesson by inflicting a humiliating military defeat.

As highlighted in my last column, 1962 War gave us our de facto borders in the Himalayas – the Line of Actual Control (LAC). In the western sector, China had already seized what it wanted in the 50s and it marginally improved its position in the war based on its 1959 claim line. In the north eastern sector, the McMohan line was reluctantly accepted by China. The next 25 years saw relative peace on the borders with the 1967 flare up at Nathu La only reinforcing the status quo. China was going through internal turmoil and was chastened by the bloody nose it got from Vietnam in 1979. Indian economy stabilised and major military reforms post 1962 led to its sterling performance in 1971.

However, the Indian Army stayed away from the Himalayan border and the main defences were located 50-100 km from the LAC.

China began its economic and military modernisation in the 80s and this coincided with relative modernisation of the Indian Armed Forces. The Comprehensive National Power (CNP) was nearly at par, and competitive conflict between two resurgent nations was inevitable. 1986- 87 saw the Sumdrong Chu standoff which led to far reaching changes.

India physically reclaimed the territory upto the LAC and strengthened its military posture. China responded with reneging on its stand on the McMohan Line and laying claim to area upto Tawang. Diplomatic negotiations increased as also assertion on the LAC. However, peace and tranquility was maintained.

What then has led to the increased friction on the LAC with standoffs at Depsang in 2013, Chumar and Demchok in 2014 and now at Doklam, despite the agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2012 to manage the border? The reasons are not hard to find. The exceptional rise of China and its desire to be the centre of the world was bound to bring it into conflict with even the modest resurgence of India.

The principle reason is that India is the only country in the region that does not accept the political, economic and military hegemony of China. India directly threatens two Chinese vulnerabilities – Tibet and the strategic sea lanes of communications (SLOC) through the Indian Ocean. Tibetan Govt in Exile functions from Dharamshala and the Dalai Lama remains the driving force for Tibetan dissent. Not only the rapidly increasing qualitative and quantitative improvement of the Indian Navy threatens the SLOC, India’s opposition to the alternate – Belt and Road initiative through Pakistan and Myanmar – adds insult to the injury.

India’s strategic partnership with the USA and its expanding diplomatic/military relationship with Japan, Australia and Vietnam is also perceived as a direct threat.

China’s CNP is much higher than that of India and military power is the principle component of CNP. So long as we remain militarily the weaker state, China will continue to use the unsettled borders to embarrass us.

Militarily, vis a vis China, we can barely keep our heads above the water, and this is just not good enough to manage the current competitive conflict.

We need urgent holistic reforms with respect to our National security. The government needs to focus on reforms to higher defence management. The functioning of the National Security Council must be streamlined. National Security Strategy and Force Development strategy must be formalised. Government’s interaction with the Armed Forces must also be streamlined with the appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff. Tri-service theatre commands must be created. Structural and organisational reforms must be carried out in the armed forces and they must be modernised to establish a technological-military edge over Pakistan and at least parity with China. Resources must be earmarked for these reforms and timelines laid down.

Our border infrastructure is only 30% of what is desirable. The very fact that China allows foreign tourists to explore Aksai Chin and areas up to the LAC and we have a “restricted zone” of 30-40 km even for our own citizens, tells the whole story.

Sadly, over the last two decades, our governments have shown no urgency in respect of reforms to National Security, the Armed Forces and the border infrastructure. The bluff of rhetoric and extreme nationalism is easily called by the more powerful. The subdued tenor of our political, media and public discourse post the Doklam incident is in sharp contrast to the shrillness exhibited vis a vis Pakistan.

In affairs of nations, “power” indeed, “grows out of the barrel of a gun” as famously said by Mao Zedong. If in the next five years we cannot create matching military power and border infrastructure, then we will certainly come to repeated embarrassments if not abject grief!

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