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25 June 2018

The Escalating Conflict with Hezbollah in Syria

Hezbollah and Iran have accumulated a substantial amount of weapons and fighters in Syria that pose a threat to the United States and its allies in the region. In response, Israel has conducted a growing number of strikes against Iranian, Hezbollah and other targets in Syria. An escalating war has the potential to cause significant economic damage, lead to high numbers of civilian casualties and internally displaced persons, and involve more countries in the region than did the 2006 Lebanon War. The stakes are high, making it critical for Washington to help prevent such an escalation. 

Over the past several years, Hezbollah has amassed significant capabilities in Syria with the help of its close ally, Iran, and today poses a growing asymmetric threat to the United States, Israel, Jordan, and other countries in the region. Hezbollah forces in Syria have improved their operational and tactical combat skills, trained and equipped thousands of militants as part of its growing network of Shi’a militias, and stockpiled an impressive arsenal of standoff weapons like Fateh-110/M-600 guided missiles, Karrar unmanned armed drones, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank missiles, and possibly chemical weapons. In addition, much of Hezbollah’s arms are shipped through, or potentially manufactured in, Syria—making the country a critical transit hub. Hezbollah is perhaps the best-trained, best-equipped, and most capable terrorist organization in the world, and these developments have raised the prospects of a wider conflict in the Middle East

Israeli leaders are already on a war footing because of the actions of Hezbollah and its ally, Iran. For the past several years, Israel has regularly conducted attacks against Hezbollah, Iranian, and Syrian targets in Syria. What is new, however, is Israel’s decision to step up attacks to deter Iran and Hezbollah from future expansion in Syria—and perhaps to deter Syria from allowing Iran and Hezbollah to undertake this expansion. “I know one thing for certain,” said Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman recently. “We will not allow the Iranians to base themselves in Syria and there will be a price for that. We have no other choice. To agree to an Iranian presence in Syria, it’s agreeing to the fact that the Iranians will put a noose around your neck.”1 Israel has conducted over 100 strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian war.2 Of the 101 Israeli airstrikes analyzed by CSIS, over two-thirds were against missile-related targets.3Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Lebanese and regional politics, including the expansion of seats in Lebanon’s Parliament by Hezbollah and its political allies in the May 2018 elections, suggest that a future war involving Israel, Hezbollah, and even Iranian forces could be more violent and expansive than the 2006 Lebanon War.

These recent developments raise several questions. What are Hezbollah and Iranian long-term goals in Syria? What are Hezbollah’s capabilities, how have these capabilities been transformed, and what threat does Hezbollah pose? Finally, what are the implications for the United States and its allies? To answer these questions, this CSIS Brief compiles a range of data—including new information—about the location of Hezbollah, Iranian, and allied militias in Syria; Israeli airstrikes in Syria; and satellite imagery of military bases and other targets. The brief is organized into four sections. The first analyzes Hezbollah and Iran’s political and military objectives in Syria. The second section assesses Hezbollah’s capabilities and actions. The third examines the broader strategic threat from Hezbollah. And the fourth section outlines potential challenges and opportunities for the United States and its allies. In addition, an appendix provides examples of Hezbollah weapons and systems in Syria.

Hezbollah and Iranian Goals in Syria

Hezbollah’s objectives in Syria are closely tied to Tehran’s broader national security goals. Since Hezbollah’s creation, Iran has played a significant role in training, supplying, and funding the group. Iranian leaders seek to expand their security, economic, cultural, and religious interests regionally, and to ensure the survival of the regime domestically.4 The 1979 revolution—and the global reaction to the revolution—significantly impacted the views and politics of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. Iranian leaders seek to expand Iran’s network of influence through regional allies and buffer zones, including through Hezbollah.5

Israel has conducted over 100 strikes against Hezbollah and Iranian targets in Syria since the beginning of the Syrian war.

Since the Syrian war began in 2011, Iran has provided an unprecedented level of political, financial, cyber, and military support to the Syrian government to prevent the overthrow of the Assad regime and to balance against Iran’s main adversaries, including the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Tehran has deployed as many as 2,500 soldiers on the ground—from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) operatives to regular Iranian forces—and utilizes locations like Tiyas air field (or T-4) in Homs, Al-Shayrat airfield in Homs, and Al-Kiswah base south of Damascus.6 Iran has also supported Hezbollah and other militias in Syria, including perhaps 8,000 to 12,000 Shi’a foreign fighters from countries like Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq.7 The external operations department of the IRGC-Quds Force, a special forces unit of the IRGC responsible for extraterritorial operations, has been critical in organizing these militias.

Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah remarked, “I will tell you that if the whole world comes together to force us to leave Syria, they will not be able to evict us.”

Hezbollah retains a close relationship with Iran, though it operates as its own political-military organization. Hezbollah’s objectives in Syria can be divided into two broad categories: political and military.

Political goals: Hezbollah’s political objectives in Syria include ensuring the survival of the Assad regime; protecting—and expanding—Hezbollah’s political power and influence; balancing against Israel and the United States; stemming the spread of Sunni Salafi-jihadist and other “takfiri” groups; and defending Shi’a communities.8 As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah warned, “Should Syria fall into the hands of the Americans, the Israelis, the takfiri groups and America’s representatives in the region which call themselves regional states, the resistance will be besieged and Israel would reenter Lebanon, impose its conditions on Lebanon, and renew its greed and projects in it.”9 The overthrow of the Assad regime by Sunni rebels or countries like the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel would pose a severe threat to Hezbollah and could lead to Hezbollah’s encirclement in Lebanon. Consequently, Hezbollah leaders remain committed to operations in Syria as long as Bashar al-Assad wants them there. In June 2018, Hassan Nasrallah remarked, “I will tell you that if the whole world comes together to force us to leave Syria, they will not be able to evict us,” and continued on to state that Hezbollah would only leave Syria "when the Syrian authorities demand it."10 Hezbollah’s broad political goals have long been to protect Shi’a Islam and spread Shi'a activism, particularly in Lebanon, and to balance against—and eventually to destroy—Israel.11

The Syria conflict has improved Hezbollah’s urban warfare capabilities, provided real-world battlefield coordination with Iran and Russia, and augmented its collaboration with less-sophisticated Iranian battlefield proxies from Afghanistan and other countries.

Hezbollah has orchestrated a sophisticated information campaign in Syria to support its political and military objectives, using television, radio, print media, the Internet, and social media to bolster its narrative. Its media outlets collaborate with Iranian state media on broader messaging, while simultaneously addressing local grievances. Hezbollah has used an intensive propaganda and media campaign to portray itself as the self-proclaimed protector of Shi’a communities that straddle the Lebanese-Syrian border. From the outset of the Syrian war, Hezbollah has helped protect Shi’a populations near the western Syrian city of al-Qusayr and other areas in Syria near Hezbollah’s stronghold in Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.12 Hezbollah has also vowed to protect Shi’a holy sites around Damascus, even producing video games that allow players to fight as Hezbollah militants. One of the most recent video games, titled “The Holy Defense: Protecting the Homeland and the Holy Sites,” was released in February 2018. It allows players to defend Shi’a holy sites, such as the Sayeda Zeinab in southern Damascus, against Islamic State attackers.13

Figure 1: An Image for the Hezbollah Video Game “Holy Defense”14

Military goals: While increasingly unlikely, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria would represent a significant setback for Hezbollah, since it receives most of its arms through Syria. Other neighbors, such as Turkey, have cracked down on Hezbollah shipments through their territory. Consequently, an important military objective includes preserving—and potentially expanding—the use of Syrian territory as a logistical route for transporting Iranian missile parts and other material. Hezbollah also seeks to strengthen its own military capabilities in case of a possible war with Israel. Hezbollah leaders have used the conflict in Syria to expand their footprint in the country to increase their influence and surround Israel. The next section provides more details about Hezbollah’s military power and operations.

Hezbollah’s Capabilities and Actions in Syria

To achieve its political and military goals, Hezbollah has redirected significant personnel, capabilities, and resources from Lebanon to Syria.15 The Syria conflict has improved Hezbollah’s urban warfare capabilities, provided real-world battlefield coordination with Iran and Russia, and augmented its collaboration with less-sophisticated Iranian battlefield proxies from Afghanistan and other countries. In the early stages of the Syrian war, Hezbollah’s support for the Assad regime was limited to small numbers of trainers and advisers. Hezbollah leaders didn’t confirm their activities in Syria until 2013, when Hasan Nasrallah defiantly announced that he was sending fighters to aid the Syrian government, adding: “I have always promised you victory, and I promise victory again.”16 Today, Hezbollah has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in Syria, its largest deployment anywhere in the world outside of Lebanon.17

Hezbollah forces have amassed a range of weapons and systems in Syria, such as the Fateh-110/M-600 short-range ballistic missile, Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 short-range ballistic missiles, Toophan anti-tank guided missiles, Kornet man-portable anti-tank guided missiles, M113 armored personnel carriers, T-72 main battle tanks, Karrar unmanned combat aerial vehicles, and Katyusha rockets.18 The appendix provides more details about these weapons and systems. Hezbollah’s armed drone capabilities are among the most advanced of any terrorist group in the world, and it has destroyed Islamic State targets in Syria using Karrar armed drones.19 In addition, Hezbollah may have stockpiled chemical weapons in Syria, including chlorine.20 We found no evidence in Syria that Hezbollah has stockpiled or used explosively formed penetrators (EFPs), which are shaped charges designed to penetrate armor. But this could change. Iran, Hezbollah, and other proxies have used EFPs in other countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yemen.21 Still, Hezbollah’s capabilities—particularly its standoff missiles—present a threat to the region.

Today, Hezbollah has between 7,000 and 10,000 fighters in Syria.

Hezbollah has used these capabilities in support of operations in Syria and Lebanon. It has defended or retaken Druze, Shi'a, Alawite, Sunni, and Christian villages around the Syrian city al-Qusayr, as well as several Shi’a-majority suburbs of Damascus like Sayyida Zeinab.22In August 2014, in a rare instance of cooperation, Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusrah militants launched a joint offensive and briefly held the Lebanese town of Arsal. They eventually retreated to positions in the mountains along the Lebanese-Syrian border following military operations by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). In May 2015, Hezbollah militants were involved in heavy fighting in the Qalamoun region of Syria, near the Lebanese border. In July 2017, Hezbollah launched an offensive against al-Nusrah positions around Baalbek, Lebanon, near the Syrian border, as highlighted in Figure 2.23 Hezbollah used the operation to rally domestic Lebanese support around its campaign in Syria, trying to bolster its image as the protector of Shi’a communities against Sunni militancy.24 As Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah remarked in response to those who questioned Hezbollah’s involvement in Syria, “Ask the people of Hermel. Continue on to the villages around Hermel, to the Bekaa . . . and to Baalbek . . . then answer your own question.”25Nasrallah was apparently referring to towns cleared of al-Nusrah control or influence.

Figure 2: Hezbollah and Syrian Government Offensive along Lebanese-Syrian Border, January 2014-Spetember 201726


Hezbollah has also trained, advised, and assisted Shi’a and other proxies in Syria. Collectively known as Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi Suria, or “the Islamic Resistance in Syria,” the militias are similar to those trained by Hezbollah Commander Ali Musa Daqduq in Iraq, known as the Asaib Ahl al-Haq units. Examples of Hezbollah-trained militias in Syria include: 

Quwat al Ridha (or Ridha Forces), which have operated in such Syrian governorates as Homs; 

Al-Ghaliboun: Saraya al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi Suria (or The Victors: The Companies of the Islamic Resistance in Syria), which have been active in governorates like Daraa and Quneitra; 

Liwa al-Imam al-Baqir (or Baqir Brigade), which has deployed to such governorates as Aleppo.27

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