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26 February 2024

The Gulf region’s growing importance for India

Viraj Solanki

Growing strategic convergence between India and the Gulf region has resulted in deeper political, economic and defence ties, but the deteriorating security environment in the Middle East may hamper progress in some areas.

In one of his last foreign visits before India’s general election in April–May 2024, on 13–15 February India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, a move which signalled the growing importance of the Gulf region for India. Under Modi, the Gulf has become a foreign- and security-policy priority and an integral part of India’s ‘extended neighbourhood’ in which India has increasing interests and influence.

Since Modi assumed office in 2014, India has transformed its relationship with the Gulf states from one focused on energy, trade and Indian expatriates into a new framework encompassing political relations, investment, and defence and security cooperation. India’s priorities include attracting investments to increase economic growth, addressing regional security concerns (including in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf), and enhancing its regional presence and influence.

The timing of Modi’s visit highlights the importance of the UAE as New Delhi’s key regional partner. Indeed, the UAE is the only regional country that India engages with bilaterally, trilaterally (along with France) and, since 2021, in the I2U2 quadrilateral grouping with the United States and Israel.

Changing relations Modi’s visit to the UAE was his seventh since he came to power, demonstrating India’s growing focus on engaging the Gulf region. Indeed, Modi’s August 2015 visit was the first by an Indian prime minister to the UAE in 34 years. Meanwhile, his August 2019 visit to Bahrain was the first ever made by an Indian prime minister.

Energy, trade and ensuring the security of Indian expatriates have traditionally been the key components of the India–Gulf relationship. India has a large stake in Gulf stability given that approximately 8.8 million Indian nationals reside in the region.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is India’s largest regional-bloc trading partner. Trade with the GCC comprised 15.8% of India’s total trade in FY2022–23, compared to 11.6% of total trade with the European Union. The UAE has consistently been India’s principal trading partner within the Gulf and is India’s third-largest trading partner overall, with Saudi Arabia in fourth place. However, despite India and the GCC announcing their intent to resume negotiations for a free-trade agreement (FTA) in November 2022, a deal has not yet materialised.

India’s dependence on the Gulf for energy imports decreased following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with New Delhi importing discounted Russian oil. The Gulf region fulfilled 55.3% of India’s total crude oil demand in 2022–23, compared to 63.9% in 2021–22. However, oil imports from Russia have been declining in 2023–24, and there are signs that India’s decreasing dependence on Gulf oil is already reversing, with figures from mid-2023 indicating a recovery. Levels of Middle Eastern oil supplies to India are likely to rise in the medium term.

India’s need to sustain its economic growth has led it to seek a larger role in global energy governance, having applied to join the International Energy Agency as a full member in February 2024. Moreover, as part of its aim to increase its share of natural gas and transition to a predominantly gas-based economy, in early February New Delhi signed a US$78 billion agreement to extend imports from Qatar of 7.5 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas annually for an additional 20 years, starting in 2028.

Increased strategic convergence India’s growing strategic and economic interests in the Gulf region have resulted in a new framework for India–Gulf ties based on investment, political relations, and defence and security cooperation.

With India becoming an increasingly attractive economic market, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have announced ambitious investment targets of US$100bn and US$75bn, respectively. The UAE is the seventh-largest source of foreign direct investment in India, currently at US$15.3bn. Saudi Arabia had invested US$3.2bn as of March 2022, while Qatar invested over US$1.5bn in the last year. Major projects include the joint development by Indian, Saudi Arabian and Emirati oil companies of the US$44bn Ratnagiri Refinery and Petrochemicals project in Maharashtra.

In addition, India’s regional geo-economic focus has driven it to engage with the I2U2 grouping and to join the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). During Modi’s visit to the UAE, the two sides signed an inter-governmental framework agreement on IMEC. However, both initiatives risk being delayed by the Hamas–Israel war.

Personal relations between Modi and Gulf leaders, including with the UAE’s President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, have deepened India’s political relationships, building trust and a willingness to work together on sensitive issues. This has resulted in increased defence and security cooperation, including on counter-terrorism, maritime security and naval cooperation.

India’s main regional defence and security aim is ensuring sea lines of communication remain open and flowing. A small number of Indian ships are regularly deployed in the Indian Ocean region as part of the Indian Navy’s ‘mission-based deployments’, with a year-round presence in the Gulf of Aden, the Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. The Indian Navy increased its deployment to 12 ships in response to shipping attacks in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden in order to present itself as a reliable regional partner, despite not joining the US-led task force.

India has also established new military exercises with several Gulf countries to increase cooperation and interoperability as it seeks to become a ‘preferred security partner’ for the Gulf states. The Indian Navy established bilateral exercises with the UAE in 2018, with Qatar in 2019, and with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in 2021. The Indian Army held its first exercises with the UAE and Saudi Arabia in January and February 2024. The UAE is becoming India’s key regional defence partner; the UAE and Oman are the only regional countries with which India holds army, air force and navy exercises. As a sign of growing strategic trust, India and the UAE have started trilateral military cooperation with France, holding a maritime exercise in 2023 and an air-force exercise in 2024.

Challenges ahead India stands to gain much by broadening its relations with the Gulf, but it faces challenges in developing political and economic ties amid a deteriorating security environment.

The outbreak of the Hamas–Israel war and shipping attacks in the Red Sea directly impact India’s energy security and economic growth. Yet India remains reluctant to take an active role in the complex politics of the Middle East and is back to its long-standing balancing act between the Gulf, Iran and Israel. This could become more difficult if the war escalates further. The war has also impacted the I2U2 minilateral group, through the continued postponement of a senior-officials meeting since October 2023. India has called for economic initiatives such as I2U2 and IMEC to progress despite the conflict.

Other challenges include finalising the India–GCC FTA, which was initially delayed due to a change in the GCC’s chief trade negotiator. The key issue will be reaching an agreement that satisfies all GCC states.

Additionally, India must manage diplomatic relations carefully following Islamophobic comments made by Indian officials in May 2022. Any Islamophobic rhetoric from Indian nationals stands in contrast to the growing government-to-government display of religious tolerance between India and the Gulf. As part of his election efforts, Modi has utilised ‘temple diplomacy’ to engage with India’s expatriate community, opening a major Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi during his February visit.

The way forward Growing security challenges are sharpening the need for India to become a key ‘strategic partner’ of the Gulf states and to enlarge its regional presence and influence. Increased strategic convergence spanning political, economic and security interests has resulted in a new framework for India–Gulf relations, which, if successfully maintained, will enhance trust levels and enable cooperation to become more ambitious in scope.

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