Nuclear deterrence in South Asia looks stable only on paper

Rameez Raja

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The nuclear trajectories of India and Pakistan are rooted in their historical rivalry, emerging from the contentious partition of British India and the disputes that followed. Since Independence, this rivalry has generated a persistent sense of insecurity and vulnerability, accompanied by the recurring possibility of conflict. Both countries have sought to outmanoeuvre each other through arms accumulation and alliance-building, reflecting the realist and neo-realist view that security remains the primary driver compelling states to acquire nuclear weapons.

Within neo-realist thought, scholars are divided into optimists and pessimists based on their understanding of deterrence. Deterrence optimists argue that nuclear weapons, whether limited or expansive, can ensure stability by raising the costs of conflict to unacceptable levels. Viewed from this perspective, India’s nuclear trajectory, often justified as peaceful, was shaped by strategic concerns, particularly China’s nuclear test in 1964. The subsequent Chinese hydrogen bomb test in 1967 further accelerated India’s nuclear ambitions, leading to weapons design efforts at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in Mumbai.