Pavel K. Baev
The effect of the ongoing conflict in the Persian Gulf on Russia’s war against Ukraine grows more complex as the parties of both conflicts experience attrition of various kinds. Russian commentators tend to exaggerate Iran’s capacity to withstand air assaults, but also suggest that the U.S. leadership cannot accept anything less than a convincing victory (Rossiiskaya gazeta, March 24; TopWar.ru, March 28). Such an outcome can only be secured by a high-risk land operation, while some pundits speculate about the possibility of an Israeli nuclear strike (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 24; RIAC, March 27). Russia’s ability to benefit from the reduction in U.S. pressure on Moscow’s deadlocked and destructive war against Ukraine makes a peace deal is far from certain.
The spike in oil prices grants the most obvious benefit for Russia. The volume of additional revenues, however, cannot be calculated by simply multiplying an increase in exports by the new benchmark price (Carnegie Politika, March 27). For once, Russia’s oil and gas production cannot be increased measurably because the industry is severely affected by sanctions and underinvestment (Neftegaz.ru, March 25). Some sanctions relaxation could generate additional profits, provided Russia’s “shadow fleet” tankers operate without restrictions (Riddle, March 24). Ukraine, however, is firmly set to deny Moscow any windfall of petro-revenues and delivered a series of airstrikes at the end of March on the Primorsk and Ust-Luga oil terminals in the Gulf of Finland (The Insider, March 27; Fontanka.ru, March 29).
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