22 July 2016

Dragon Tamed In South China Sea: India’s Timid Response Needs To Change – OpEd

By Bhaswati Mukherjee 
JULY 20, 2016

In a powerful rebuke to China’s aggressive and militaristic push in the South China Sea, an international tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague on July 12, 2016, rejected most of China’s claims of sovereignty in this zone. Earlier, China’s aggressive territorial push had resulted in turning this busy international trade route into one of the most volatile spots in the world.

The Tribunal’s ruling that there was no historical or legal basis for almost 90% China’s claims, demarcated by the “nine-dash line” (NDL) on Chinese maps, came as a surprise to the Chinese who had confidently expected a nuanced verdict. Chinese arrogance with regard to the case brought by the Philippines along with no compelling evidence, either historical or legal or based on the parameters laid down in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to which it is a ‘State Party’, made for a very weak case. The Tribunal noted that the Chinese construction of artificial islands has caused “irreparable harm” to the marine environment, and has also threatened shipping, tourism as well as fishing and oil exploration there. With regard to the construction by China of a military airstrip and naval berths on an atoll named “Mischief Reef,” the Tribunal noted that this was within Philippines territorial waters in accordance with UNCLOS.

South China Sea: Is Taiwan On The Right Path? – Analysis

By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
JULY 19, 2016

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) came out with its ruling on South China Sea. The verdict was that China’s nine-dash line and its claims based on historical rights are null and void. As expected, China has rejected the ruling as invalid. This is clearly a victory for the Philippines which had taken the case to the PCA. Invalidation of China’s historical claims to the South China Sea is also a big boost for other claimants, including Brunei, Malaysia and Vietnam. Taiwan, the other claimant, and China have claimed almost 90 percent of the South China Sea territories, whereas the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei each have claimed sovereignty over different islands and reefs in this area. The claimant countries have also laid claims to exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles around each island, as per UNCLOS regulations. Even as the South China Sea has been contested for decades, the recent legal battle became unavoidable in the face of China forcibly taking control of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 over fishing disputes, leaving the weaker Philippines little choice but to take the case to the PCA in February 2013.

Taiwan’s position on the South China Sea and the East China Sea is similar to that of China. It must also be noted that Taiwan controls Itu Aba/Taiping Island, the largest naturally formed island in the Spratly group of islands in the South China Sea. However, until recently, it appeared that Taiwan had made a political call not to assert those claims or talk about them openly. In the run-up to and following the PCA verdict, Taiwan has taken a more active position on these conflicts. In January 2016, then President Ma Ying-jeou visited Taiping Island, possibly illustrating its long-standing claim and sovereignty over the island. Even though previous leaders have also visited the island, a visit so close to the South China Sea verdict was seen as sending a message about its own historical claims. The question is whether Taiwan is departing from its earlier policy and if so, whether it is pragmatic to do so?

China Says It Will Conduct Regular Air Patrols Over Disputed Islands in South China Sea

Richard D Fisher Jr and Gabriel Dominguez
July 20 2016

China to conduct ‘regular combat air patrols’ over South China Sea

The Chinese air force recently sent H-6K bombers (one of which is seen here flying near Scarborough Shoal) and other aircraft to patrol islands and reefs in the disputed South China Sea, according to a Chinese air force spokesperson. Source: Xinhua via News.cn

China’s People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has conducted a “combat air patrol” over the South China Sea (SCS), which will become a “regular practice” in the future, a PLAAF spokesperson was quoted by Xinhua news agency as saying on 18 July.

The PLAAF recently sent H-6K strategic bombers and other aircraft, including fighters, scouts, and tankers to patrol the islands and reefs in the disputed waters, including Scarborough Shoal, spokesperson Shen Jinke was quoted as saying.

The PLAAF aims to “promote real combat training” over the SCS, improve combat abilities against various security threats and safeguard national sovereignty and security, according to the spokesperson. “To effectively fulfil its mission, the air force will continue to conduct combat patrols on a regular basis in the South China Sea,” said Shen.

While the exact date of the air patrol was not revealed, analysts said the move likely took place after the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled on 12 July that Beijing’s claim to 'historic rights’ within most of the disputed waters has no legal basis: a decision that angered China and sparked fears Beijing may accelerate its effort to establish de facto control over the area through land reclamation and military deployments.

The international tribunal decided on a case brought by the Philippines, which argued that Chinese activity in the region was violating international law. China boycotted the legal proceedings, arguing the panel had “no jurisdiction” and saying it would not abide by the court’s decision. While the ruling is binding, the tribunal has no powers of enforcement.

FINDINGS OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF ARBITRATION: A Major Diplomatic Setback to China

Author: R N Ganesh

July 14, 2016

China’s claims in the South China Sea are based on its “9-dash line”, which claims virtually the whole of the South China Sea. The 9-dash line is itself based on an ‘11-dash line” published by the Republic of China in 1947, (i.e., before the creation of the Peoples’ Republic of China), which has no valid historic, logical or legal basis. This claim predates the UNCLOS by several decades, and most of the countries of the SE Asian region were not even independent states at the time. China claims sovereignty over the South China Sea and has used military force to interfere with legitimate fishing and oil exploration activity by regional coastal states. From 1970 the PRC reiterated its demands more aggressively when the Philippines began oil exploration off its coast. The Philippines began oil production in 1984, and today its offshore oil meets nearly 15% of its national requirement.

UNCLOS: Scope of Authority

The UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea, to which the parties to the disputes in the South China Sea are signatories, lays down the principles based on which the living and non-living resources of the sea bed may be exploited by coastal state. As modified by the lay of the continental shelf and various other factors, it prescribes a limit of 200 nautical miles (approximately 360 kms), as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the coastal state. The Scarborough Shoal, the Spratley islands and the Paracels lie well outside this limit from China. In any case, where the EEZs of two coastal states overlap, they have to be negotiated and agreed based on certain formulae.

The UNCLOS does not rule on issues of sovereignty or national or territorial borders. Rather, it prescribes methods for use of the sea and the exploitation of the resources in and under it, outside of national boundaries. It also lays down how the limits of the EEZ are to be defined and the use and limits for the exploitation of the Continental shelf by coastal states. An important law in the Convention is that rocks and features that cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf. This is an issue that is particularly relevant in the case of the South China Sea.

South China Sea Disputes & the Case of Philippines

Why Iran needs to fight Saudi Arabia to forge peace

July 18, 2016

Members of the Iranian army march past President Hassan Rouhani (C top) and military commanders during a parade marking the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), in Tehran, Sept. 22, 2015. (photo by REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi/TIMA)

TEHRAN, Iran — Turki al-Faisal Al Saud’s call for regime change in Tehran, let alone his mere participation at the July 9 Mujahedeen-e-Khalq’s (MEK) annual conference in Paris, is an unprecedented move against Iran by a high-ranking Saudi royal.
Summary⎙ Print Despite all the challenges it poses for Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional policy and strategic behavior is still not perceived as a threat in Tehran — but could failing to respond be a mistake?

Prior to Faisal’s statements at the MEK convention, the Saudi deputy crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, paid a 10-day visit that started on June 14 toWashington and then Paris, during which he stressed the necessity to counter the "Iranian threat.” Meanwhile, as has been the norm during his tenure so far, Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir, who accompanied Mohammed, went even further in his criticism of Iran's regional policy, demanding that Tehran stop “exporting its revolution.”

This situation has in fact been prevalent ever since King Salman bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud was crowned in January 2015. As such, one can assume that there has been a paradigm shift in Riyadh's regional policy, which encompasses relations with Tehran. At this point, Saudi Arabia has crossed so many unwritten rules in its dealings with Iran that some observers anticipate a war between the two nations.

Why the Failed Turkish Coup is Very Bad News for the War on ISIS

07.20.16 

The bloody putsch came closer to bringing down President Erdogan than many at first believed. Now, how can the U.S. count on a key NATO ally at war with itself?

Four days after Turkey’s failed coup, which left 300 dead and more than 1,400 injured, new details have emerged to suggest the putsch came closer to a successful overthrow of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan than many observers thought—and the operation could have a major impact on U.S.-Turkish military cooperation in the war against the so-called Islamic State just across Turkey’s borders in Syria and Iraq.

Aaron Stein at the Atlantic Council nails the core problem when he asks, “How can we credibly go to war with a NATO ally in coalition operations when that ally’s army is at war with itself?”

Turkey, remember, has the second biggest army in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, after the United States. In the Cold War years, its borders with the Soviet Union were vital to Western strategy. In the age of jihad, the fact that its territory abuts not only ISIS-land, but Iran, gives it enormous geopolitical importance.

The putschists, it now appears, relied heavily on a key NATO installation to carry out the aerial component of their daring plot, which was spearheaded by officers in the Turkish air force. And the enormous post-coup dragnet of suspected traitors already has snared high-ranking military officials who had been responsible for securing Turkey’s frontiers and carrying out coalition policy in Syria.

Iraq's Silver Bullet in the ISIS Fight

July 20, 2016

“The reason for the collapse of Nuri al-Maliki’s army and the conquest of Mosul in 2014 and other Sunni areas by Daesh [Islamic State] was the failure of the Iraqi government regarding Sunnis,” says Gen. Sa’adi al-Obaidi. Sitting in a small air conditioned caravan in the middle of a military base around thirteen miles east of Mosul, the general and several of his senior officers gathered around a table on July 15 to explain why they have joined Hashd al-Watani, or the National Mobilization Force. The unit of several thousand men has been training for two years to retake Iraq’s second largest city from ISIS, alongside Kurdish peshmerga forces in northern Iraq.

On July 9, the Iraqi army captured an airbase next to Qayyarah, forty miles south of Mosul. This offensive, led by the central government in Baghdad, has been closely coordinated with Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve. On July 11, U.S. defense secretary Ash Carter said 560 more Americans were on the way to Iraq to “support Iraqi security forces as they move forward with the Mosul operation.”

However the operation to retake Mosul is hampered by the fact that many Sunnis fear the role of Iranian influence and Shia militias. Cities such as Fallujah and Ramadi were subjected to mass destruction in the house-to-house fighting used to clear them from ISIS. The key to the liberation of this large city will be the role of Sunni Arabs, as well as the Kurdish peshmerga whose front line in Bashiqa is only ten miles from Mosul city. There are an estimated 1.7 million refugees in the Kurdish region, many of them minorities such as Yazidis and Christians from around Mosul, and Sunni Arabs from areas of Iraq.

INSIDE A FAILED COUP AND TURKEY’S FRAGMENTED MILITARY

JULY 20, 2016

The recent coup attempt in Turkey revealed profound political cleavages in the Turkish armed forces. The coup pitted a minority — but nevertheless significant — faction of the Turkish military against the majority of the country’s armed forces, which remained loyal to their commander in chief, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The coup nearly succeeded in achieving what, in retrospect, appears to have been its primary objective: the killing or capture of Erdogan, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, and Hakan Fidan, the chief of the country’s intelligence agency, MIT. The plotters, using a number of well-placed insiders, did manage to take the chief of the general staff, Hulusi Akar, hostage. The clashes resulted in 240 deaths. Turkish government officials allege that the plot was hatched by followers of Fetullah Gulen, a self-exiled Turkish cleric, currently living in Pennsylvania.

The following account remains incomplete and relies on a Whatsapp conversation between some of the coup plotters, open source data, compiled by blogs like The Aviationist, as well as discussions I have had with Turkey based journalists and colleagues, all whom prefer to remain anonymous. I relied on pro-government sources, including state-owned and government aligned media outlets, but sought to compensate for their biases in my analysis. The complete story has yet to be told and all of the details have yet to be released publicly.

BLOODY RAMADAN: HOW THE ISLAMIC STATE COORDINATED A GLOBAL TERRORIST CAMPAIGN

JULY 20, 2016

ISIS-Terrorist-RifleIn late May 2016, the Islamic State (ISIL) released an audio statement featuring Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the group’s chief spokesman, celebrating the upcoming lunar month of Ramadan. Adnani exhorted ISIL’s supporters to make Ramadan “a month of calamity everywhere for the non-believers” and urged everyone considering migrating to the caliphate to instead carry out attacks in their home countries. Adnani’s statement proved to be an ugly portent of things to come. Militants acting in ISIL’s name struck in over 10 countries during the group’s Ramadan offensive. Highly visible attacks in Istanbul, Dhaka, Orlando, and Baghdad together left hundreds of civilians dead as operatives targeted airports, restaurants, night clubs, and shopping centers.

While almost all of these attacks were claimed by ISIL, observers have expressed skepticism about the extent of the organization’s involvement. Some argued that ISIL’s role in most attacks during Ramadan was limited to providing ideological inspiration and encouragement to so-called lone wolves or wolf packs, who may have mobilized in response to Adnani’s call to arms but did not coordinate with ISIL operatives.

Yet, a growing body of evidence suggests that the Ramadan offensive was largely a coordinated and deliberate ISIL campaign. Though some militants may have acted of their own accord, it is probable that ISIL as an organization played a pivotal role in organizing and directing the majority of attacks that occurred during Ramadan. Some attacks, such as the Istanbul and Baghdad bombings, were centrally directed by ISIL attack networks, with the organization deploying trained operatives. Other operations were the product of collaboration between local networks and ISIL operatives based in Syria and Iraq, who helped to organize and coordinate the attacks remotely. Through this combination of both central and virtual planning, ISIL mounted an unprecedented wave of attacks.

This is a model that ISIL is likely to replicate in the future.

The Tip of the Spear

How The Lone Wolf Syndrome Is A Black Swan In Terrorism Predictive Analysis – OpEd

JULY 20, 2016

The recent attacks across the world have seen a twist in the modus operandi of terrorists making prediction and prevention of terrorism extremely difficult for law enforcement agencies. So called ‘Lone Wolves’, operatives working in ones or twos, without any ostensible connection to known terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State or any prior known record of such activities suddenly seem to crawl out of the woodwork and create new and unique mayhem, adding to the list of terrorist actions which were not on the radar of any agency. The sheer lack of anticipation, or improbability, or both push these acts (increasingly so) in the category of Black Swan events, which by their very definition are deviations from the normal.

As a result, and due to the very audacity of the act, they create ruptures in the development of defence strategy against such acts in future. These unconventional strategic shocks have been classified as ‘Known Unknowns’ by veteran Lieutenant Colonel Nathan Freier of the United States Army. In our ongoing analysis of these terrorist acts whether in Paris or Orlando or Istanbul or Medina, and most recently in Nice in France, it becomes critical to dwell upon certain underlying factors for accurate prediction and prevention of such acts in the future.
Why They Do It

Though the reasons may be multifarious, they share a common thread- fanatical or jihadist Islam. This in itself is a thought provoking term, since learned Muslims differ on the meaning attributed to jihad by those who choose extremist means; a growing section within Islam itself feels that the term has been abused to suit their extremist purposes and tendencies. Also, recently a debate has been initiated as to whether the right description is radicalization of Islam or Islamisation of radicals. In itself, source for a stimulating debate, albeit the end result being the same.

Milestone: We’ve Just Dropped Our 50,000th Bomb On Islamic State – OpEd

BY DANIEL MCADAMS 
JULY 20, 2016

In August, 2014, the US-led “coalition” began bombing Iraq and Syria to, in the words of President Obama, “degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group known as ISIS.” For nearly two years — despite President Obama announcing last November that ISIS was “contained” — the bombing has continued unabated.

A milestone was reached this month, however, as the US coalition dropped its 50,000th bomb against Iraq and Syria. With each bomb costing on average somewhere around $50,000, those bombs have cost US (for the most part) taxpayers at least two and a half billion dollars. Factor in the cost of keeping the bombers in the air, the cost of training the pilots, maintenance, etc. and the cost skyrockets upward from there.

In fact, as of February of this year, the US “war on ISIS” has cost more than $6 billion, to the boundless delight of the Beltway defense contractors.

Is Turkey Becoming Unglued?

By:Jennifer Cafarella 
July 20, 2016

How Turkey Could Become the Next Pakistan

The U.S. must recognize the risk a NATO ally may become a safe haven for al Qaeda as Erdogan consolidates power.

The failed coup attempt by elements of the Turkish Armed Forces on July 15will enable President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to establish himself as an authoritarian ruler in Turkey. His priorities in the next few months will be to solidify the loyalty of the Turkish military establishment and complete the constitutional reform necessary to replace Turkey’s parliamentary democracy with an executive presidency, his longstanding goal. A post-coup Erdogan is much less likely to submit to American pressure without major returns. Erdogan immediately demanded the extradition of politicalrival Fethullah Gulen from the U.S., accusing Gulen of plotting the coup and condemning the U.S. for harboring him. Erdogan will likely deprioritize the fight against ISIS, undermining the counter-ISIS mission in Syria, as he focuses on consolidating power. He may even revoke past concessions to the U.S., including permission to use Turkey’s Incirlik airbase for counter-ISIS operations. 
Erdogan has more dangerous options now that his rule is secure, however. A partnership with al Qaeda could grant him a powerful proxy force to achieve national security objectives without relying on the Turkish Military. American policymakers must recognize the dangerous possibility Erdogan will knowingly transform Turkey into the next Pakistan in pursuit of his own interests. 

July 16

Erdogan may turn to non-state militants for security solutions while he lacks a strong military force behind him. Non-state militants can either supplement a Turkish military or serve as an interim partner while Erdogan rebuilds. Erdogan provided support to al Qaeda and associated groups in Syria even before the coup. He has allowed senior al Qaeda leaders to operate relatively freely in Turkey, although a small number of Turkish raids have targeted al Qaeda elements. He is also a primary patron of Ahrar al Sham, a Syrian Salafi-jihadi group with close links to al Qaeda. A closer partnership with these groups could enable him to:

Kasich Attacks Trump for Rejecting Failed GOP Foreign Policy

July 20, 2016

The Republican Party is heir to a failed foreign policy that it has never fully confronted. The man who forced a partial confrontation has just secured the party’s nomination. But the reaction of the party elite appears to be that the best approach is to return, as soon as possible, to the old doctrines and nostrums and that it best to focus, not on the current election, but on establishing the parameters for 2020.

How else to interpret Ohio Governor John Kasich’s speech on Tuesday afternoon implicitly decrying Donald Trump to the International Republican Institute? House Speaker Paul Ryan is bobbing and weaving when it comes to Trump, endorsing the general idea of his presidency but attacking the particulars. By contrast, Kasich is adopting a much tougher stand. He already had something of a score to settle as he spoke to the GOP grandees on Tuesday. 

Robert Draper reports in the New York Times that in May Donald Trump Jr. had apparently offered the vice presidency to Kasich and said that he would wield unprecedented influence on foreign and domestic policy, while Trump's role would be to “make America great again.” Kasich refused. There matters appeared to rest. Then, on Monday Paul Manafort, Trump’s campaign adviser, scoffed at Kasich for refusing to support Trump: “He’s embarrassing his party in Ohio.” Today, Kasich, a former member of the House Armed Services Committee, fired back in the form of decrying Trump’s approach to foreign affairs.

Russia's MiG-29 Fulcrum: A Super Fighter or Super Failure?

July 20, 2016

The MiG-29 Fulcrum was the first Russian fourth-generation jet fighter, marked by its sleek and deadly appearance in contrast to earlier Soviet fighters. The fast and agile Fulcrum could outturn any NATO fighter, and it was armed with cutting-edge missiles. But, alas, it was held back by its old-fashioned electronics, short service life and limited range.

In a sense, the MiG-29 combined fourth generation engineering with third generation hardware. It’s relatively low price meant it initially attracted extensive sales to developing countries, but it would swiftly become overshadowed by the more modern Su-27. The Fulcrum will remain in service for some time, however, as recent upgraded versions partially redress some of its shortcomings.

Characteristics

The MiG-29 began development in 1974, intended to be an advanced lightweight multirole fighter that would operate from primitive airfields at the frontlines of the Cold War, while smaller numbers of heavier Su-27s (also then in development) would handle longer-range missions. This paralleled the light–heavy force structure of F-16s and F-15s being developed for the U.S. Air Force.

The first MiG-29s became operational in 1982 and were codenamed “Fulcrums” by NATO—a name which caught on with some Russian pilots as well. The Fulcrum had a fearsome reputation in the West, and even got its owncomputer game. By the 1990s, Western pilots had ample opportunity to fly MiG-29s as the German Air Force incorporated the MiG-29s of East Germany. Later, the United States even bought twenty-one from Moldova.

It was discovered that the Fulcrums were very hot rides—but they also had significant downsides.

How Iran Ruined Nuclear Deals for Everyone

July 20, 2016

Last summer’s Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,declares that it does not set “precedents for any other state.” Yet given the decade-long centrality of the Iran nuclear issue to international nonproliferation, the agreement will certainly influence future debates over nuclear nonproliferation and verification. Despite the deal’s clauses limiting Tehran’s ability to produce and stockpile fissile material, it sets a poor precedent for future agreements, and the manner in which it was negotiated sends the wrong message to would-be proliferators.

At best, the JCPOA temporarily freezes or restricts the uranium-related elements of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. These temporary restrictions, known as the agreement’s “sunset clauses,” are the product of a combination of lack of Western resolve and Iran’s own determination to withstand Western pressure to get a deal on it terms.

The agreement establishes four larger lessons for potentially problematic nuclear actors. The first is that steadfastness and even intransigence can lead the international community to accept domestic enrichment. Numerous United Nations Security Council sanctions resolutions against Iran’s nuclear program highlightTehran’s “breach of its obligations to suspend all enrichment-related activities.” Yet the JCPOA does not require the Iranian leadership to temporarily, even symbolically, suspend low-level enrichment.

ARE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STORED IN TURKEY UNDER THREAT?

JULY 20, 2016

Some tens of American nuclear weapons are stored at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey as part of Turkey’s NATO obligation. The base is operated by the Turkish Air Force. U.S. Air Force units are stationed there and have recently been carrying out airstrikes in Syria. American nuclear weapons are also stored at bases in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. The presence of nuclear weapons at these bases is a carryover from the Cold War, but they also are symbolic of NATO’s defense of Europe, a concern revived by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and invasion of Ukraine.

As the coup broke out and was eventually suppressed, concerns popped up on social media about the surety of U.S. nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, especially when electricity was cut off to the base. There were two concerns: First, that coup plotters or another malign actor would take advantage of the confusion to steal these nuclear weapons. Second, that forces loyal to the Turkish government, portions of which initially blamed the coup attempt on the United States, would overrun the portions of Incirlik Air Base where the nuclear weapons are stored and turn Turkey into an angry, nuclear-armed state overnight.

In this article, I will tackle the first concern: that of malign actors trying to steal nuclear weapons in the midst of the confusion generated by the coup attempt. Portions of the article are also relevant to the second scenario, but it is impossible for me to fully address that scenario here, both for reasons of classification and the limits of my knowledge of Incirlik. I have no special knowledge of Incirlik, but I do know something about U.S. nuclear weapons security and assume similar measures are in place.

New Dimensions of Swarm Warfare

By Sanatan Kulshrestha
20 Jul , 2016

“They were coming at us like bees”. “We would kill one lot and then more would appear. It was the most amazing thing.” – Lt Col Twitty, Commander 3rd Battalion 15th Infantry, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq, 2003. 

Swarms in nature have always intrigued humans because individually the animals or the insects do not appear to have intelligence but in a swarm, they are able to move as a cohesive intelligent formation capable of taking actions befitting an intelligent life form. Some of the world’s largest swarms in animal kingdom include mosquitoes, Argentine Ants, Christmas Island Crabs, krill, springbok, and locusts. Peter Miller, in Swarm Theory[1] brings out that swarm intelligence works because of ‘simple creatures following simple rules, each one acting on local information’ and also that, a smart swarm is a group of individuals who respond to one another and to their environment in uncertainty, complexity, and change.

The use of swarms in warfare has been observed for over 2000 years, some examples include:
Battle of Alexandria Eschate, 329 BC Scythians – mounted Archers,
Battle of Carrhae, 53 BC Parthians – mounted Archers
Battle of Khambula, 1879 Zulus – Dismounted light infantry armed with spears
Battle of Britain, 1940 – Air Battle of Sept 15, 1940 British single-seat Spitfire and Hurricane fighter Aircraft
Battles for Objectives Moe, Larry, and Curley, Baghdad, Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003 Iraqi and Syrian light infantry.

The Rise of Militant Jihadism Among Young Middle Eastern Refugees in Europe

Ruth Bender
July 20, 2016

German Train Attack Highlights Risk of Extremism Among Migrant Youths

BERLIN—A 17-year-old asylum seeker’s rampage on a German train has thrown the spotlight on a subset of migrants seen as particularly susceptible to crime or radical extremism: unaccompanied minors.

Investigators on Tuesday were still piecing together what drove the teenager identified as an Afghan refugee to stage the ax attack that injured five people the night before. The young man, who arrived in Germany on his own and sought asylum more than a year ago, appeared to have radicalized rapidly and only recently, authorities said.

But the attacker’s age hits directly at concerns recently voiced by German officials and youth workers: that lone-traveling teenagers are especially prone to extremist ideology or recruitment by criminal gangs or fanatics.

“Someone who fled bombs back home is under immense emotional pressure to finally reach a stable situation. We know there are people who try to use this,” said Ulrike Schwarz, who works at the Federal Association for Unaccompanied Minor Refugees. “It’s a very vulnerable group.”

Germany is grappling with the mammoth task of integrating the more than 1 million migrants who poured into the country last year alone. But with minors, the situation is especially complex. Under law, they must be given a legal guardian before they can even apply for asylum. The process can take months as authorities—short-staffed and overwhelmed by the deluge of cases—often need to verify the age of the teenagers, few of whom carry documents.

There’s No Such Thing as an Illegal War

BY GEORGE FRIEDMAN
JULY 12, 2016

The Chilcot report harshly criticized Tony Blair and, by extension, George W. Bush and the United States. Many reading the report—and others before the report was published—concluded that the invasion of Iraq was illegal under international law.

I don’t intend to discuss Iraq here. Everyone knows now that we should either have not gone to war or gone with greater force. Most people today agree that the execution of the Iraq war was deeply flawed—even those who forgot to say so or endorsed it at the time. 

All wars are subject to withering scrutiny after the fact, and there is little I can add on that subject.

What the UN Charter Says about War

Rather than rehashing Iraq, I think it is more important to consider the notion of legal and illegal wars. The question of legality is based on the United Nations Charter, which all member nations have agreed to by treaty. That treaty is legally binding.

Articles 39, 42, 46, and 51 explain the way in which the Security Council decides whether war is legal or illegal. These clauses are important. (See sidebar.)

According to the charter, all war-making power (except the immediate defense of a country under attack) is in the hands of the UN Security Council. It must oversee pre-war negotiations, impose sanctions, or take military action, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

This committee is made up of the chiefs of staff of the council’s permanent members: the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.

Smallest Hard Disk To Date Writes Information Atom By Atom

JULY 20, 2016
Source Link

Every day, modern society creates more than a billion gigabytes of new data. To store all this data, it is increasingly important that each single bit occupies as little space as possible. A team of scientists at the Kavli Institute of Nanoscience at Delft University managed to bring this reduction to the ultimate limit: they built a memory of 1 kilobyte (8,000 bits), where each bit is represented by the position of one single chlorine atom.

“In theory, this storage density would allow all books ever created by humans to be written on a single post stamp”, said lead-scientist Sander Otte. They reached a storage density of 500 Terabits per square inch (Tbpsi), 500 times better than the best commercial hard disk currently available. His team reports on this memory in Nature Nanotechnology on Monday July 18.

In 1959, physicist Richard Feynman challenged his colleagues to engineer the world at the smallest possible scale. In his famous lecture There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom, he speculated that if we had a platform allowing us to arrange individual atoms in an exact orderly pattern, it would be possible to store one piece of information per atom. To honor the visionary Feynman, Otte and his team now coded a section of Feynman’s lecture on an area 100 nanometers wide.
Sliding puzzle

The team used a scanning tunneling microscope (STM), in which a sharp needle probes the atoms of a surface, one by one. With these probes scientists cannot only see the atoms but they can also use them to push the atoms around. “You could compare it to a sliding puzzle”, Otte explained. “Every bit consists of two positions on a surface of copper atoms, and one chlorine atom that we can slide back and forth between these two positions. If the chlorine atom is in the top position, there is a hole beneath it — we call this a 1. If the hole is in the top position and the chlorine atom is therefore on the bottom, then the bit is a 0.”

Spies, Big Data and the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence

Cortney Weinbaum
July 20, 2016

The ethics of artificial intelligence in intelligence agencies

Some of society’s brightest minds have warned that artificial intelligence (AI) may lead to dangerous unintended consequences, yet leaders of the U.S. intelligence community—with its vast budgets and profound capabilities—have yet to decide who within these organizations is responsible for the ethics of their AI creations.

When a new capability is conceived or developed, the intelligence community does not assign anyone responsibility for anticipating how a new AI algorithm may go awry. If scenario-based exercises were conducted, the intelligence community provides no guidelines for deciding when a risk is too great and a system should not be built and assigns no authority to make such decisions.

Intelligence agencies use advanced algorithms to interpret the meaning of intercepted communications, identify persons of interest and anticipate major events within troves of data too large for humans to analyze. If artificial intelligence is the ability of computers to create intelligence that humans alone could not have achieved, then the U.S. intelligence community invests in machines with such capabilities.

To understand the ethical dangers of AI, consider the speed-trading algorithms commonly used in the stock market—an example of the employment of AI in a highly competitive, yet non-lethal, environment. A computer algorithm issues orders to buy a stock and floods the market with hundreds or thousands of apparently separate orders to buy the same stock. Other algorithms take note of this sudden demand and start raising their buy and sell offers, confident that the market is demanding a higher price. The first algorithm registers this response and sells its shares of stock for the newly higher price, making a tidy profit. The algorithm then cancels all of its buy orders, which it never planned to complete anyway.

‘You Don’t Have to Wear a Military Uniform to Serve Your Country’


In 1838, a 28-year-old Abraham Lincoln declared that the greatest threat facing America comes not from a foreign invader:

If it ever reach us it must spring up amongst us; it cannot come from abroad. If destruction be our lot we must ourselves be its author and finisher. As a nation of freemen we must live through all time, or die by suicide.

The thought that Americans, themselves, may destroy the ideals for which so many have sacrificed is sobering. Trust among Americans is at its lowest levels in generations, and stereotyping and prejudice have become substitutes for knowing and understanding one another as individuals.

How Americans restore trust may be an existential question for their country, then, but it’s ultimately a practical one: What U.S. society needs to answer it in the coming years aren’t lamentations but practical measures, especially among the emerging generations that will define America’s future.

Service may be at the heart of the answer. A year of service has the power to bring young people together from different races, ethnicities, incomes, faiths, and political backgrounds to work on pressing problems facing U.S. society today. In the process, they can build empathy by getting to know each other around something positive—the shared work of participating in a democracy—as they shape their views of their country and the world.

The danger of inaction should be clear. Tensions and violence in cities across America are reminders of how quickly communities can erupt with an absence of social trust. Dallas, St. Paul, Baton Rouge, and Orlando, following on the heels of Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago illustrate a disheartening reality.

LESSONS FROM THE WINTER WAR: FROZEN GRIT AND FINLAND’S FABIAN DEFENSE

JULY 20, 2016

Whether on the soccer pitch or the field of battle, humans have a natural tendency to root for the underdog. Oursacred texts, medieval ballads, and regimental histories are filled with gut-wrenching tales of desperate men facing overwhelming odds. From the battle of Thermopylae to the siege of the Alamo, from the gunfight at Camaron to the clash at Rorke’s Drift, there is something about such lopsided contests that continues to exert a powerful sway over our collective imagination.

All too often, however, it is certain climactic battles-or flashes in the pan of martial history that capture our interest, rather than the more protracted and less cinematic struggles between two unevenly matched armies. An exception might be the campaigns of Quintus Fabius Maximus during the Second Punic War. The redoubtable Roman’s efforts have bequeathed to us something of an awkward nomenclature — the adjective Fabian — now used to designate nationally driven scorched-earth tactics or strategies of delay and progressive attrition.

There are countless other fascinating examples of Fabian warfare that could and should be drawn upon by contemporary strategists. Alfred the Great’s hit-and-run campaign against the marauding Danes, launched from his swampy sanctuary deep in the Somerset Marshes, provides one such example, as do the less fortunate attempts of Hereward the Wake (the Northern English Lord who inspired the legend of Robin Hood) to coordinate a region-wide resistance against the brutal occupation of William the Conqueror. The Duke of Wellington’s fostering of a Spanish “ulcer” during the Napoleonic Wars and Josip Tito’s war against Axis forces during World War II are both equally rife with lessons.

21 July 2016

*** George Friedman: There’s No Such Thing as an Illegal War

BY GEORGE FRIEDMAN
JULY 12, 2016

The Chilcot report harshly criticized Tony Blair and, by extension, George W. Bush and the United States. Many reading the report—and others before the report was published—concluded that the invasion of Iraq was illegal under international law.

I don’t intend to discuss Iraq here. Everyone knows now that we should either have not gone to war or gone with greater force. Most people today agree that the execution of the Iraq war was deeply flawed—even those who forgot to say so or endorsed it at the time. 

All wars are subject to withering scrutiny after the fact, and there is little I can add on that subject.
What the UN Charter Says about War

Rather than rehashing Iraq, I think it is more important to consider the notion of legal and illegal wars. The question of legality is based on the United Nations Charter, which all member nations have agreed to by treaty. That treaty is legally binding.

Articles 39, 42, 46, and 51 explain the way in which the Security Council decides whether war is legal or illegal. These clauses are important. (See sidebar.)

According to the charter, all war-making power (except the immediate defense of a country under attack) is in the hands of the UN Security Council. It must oversee pre-war negotiations, impose sanctions, or take military action, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

This committee is made up of the chiefs of staff of the council’s permanent members: the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.

From the US point of view, the constitution makes the president Commander in Chief of the armed forces. All constitutions make clear which office has control of military forces.

*** George Friedman: There’s No Such Thing as an Illegal War

BY GEORGE FRIEDMAN
JULY 12, 2016

The Chilcot report harshly criticized Tony Blair and, by extension, George W. Bush and the United States. Many reading the report—and others before the report was published—concluded that the invasion of Iraq was illegal under international law.

I don’t intend to discuss Iraq here. Everyone knows now that we should either have not gone to war or gone with greater force. Most people today agree that the execution of the Iraq war was deeply flawed—even those who forgot to say so or endorsed it at the time. 

All wars are subject to withering scrutiny after the fact, and there is little I can add on that subject.
What the UN Charter Says about War

Rather than rehashing Iraq, I think it is more important to consider the notion of legal and illegal wars. The question of legality is based on the United Nations Charter, which all member nations have agreed to by treaty. That treaty is legally binding.

Articles 39, 42, 46, and 51 explain the way in which the Security Council decides whether war is legal or illegal. These clauses are important. (See sidebar.)

According to the charter, all war-making power (except the immediate defense of a country under attack) is in the hands of the UN Security Council. It must oversee pre-war negotiations, impose sanctions, or take military action, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

This committee is made up of the chiefs of staff of the council’s permanent members: the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.

From the US point of view, the constitution makes the president Commander in Chief of the armed forces. All constitutions make clear which office has control of military forces.

Under the UN Charter, since only the UN can authorize war, the US president’s constitutional power is subordinate to the Security Council and its Military Advisory Committee.