25 November 2022

What’s the Harm in Talking to Russia? A Lot, Actually.

Raphael S. Cohen and Gian Gentile

Give diplomacy a chance.” This phrase gets repeated in almost every conflict, and the war in Ukraine is no exception. A chorus of commentators, experts, and former policymakers have pushed for a negotiated peace at every turn on the battlefield: after the successful defense of Kyiv, once Russia withdrew to the east, during the summer of Russia’s plodding progress in the Donbas, after Russia’s rout in Kharkiv oblast, and now, in the aftermath of Russia’s retreat from Kherson. The better the Ukrainian military has done, the louder the calls for Ukraine to negotiate have become.

And today, it’s no longer just pundits pushing for a negotiated settlement. The U.S. House of Representatives’ progressive caucus penned a letter to President Joe Biden calling for a diplomatic solution, only to retract it a short time later. Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy has promised to scrutinize military aid to Ukraine and push for an end to the war. Even Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley has reportedly pushed for Ukraine to negotiate, although he subsequently made clear that the decision should be Kyiv’s alone.

THE GREATEST RISK IN MOBILE NUCLEAR POWER? FAILING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE DECISIVE EDGE IT OFFERS THE US MILITARY

Aaron Horwood, Andrew Thueme and Travis Knight

Liquid fuel logistics is both the lifeblood modern military operations and its tether. Without it, strategy is mere fantasy, as it enables everything a military force does. If a command of logistics is what separates professionals from amateurs, then liquid fuel logistics is where the battlefield most ruthlessly enforces this axiom.

But what if the US military can break free of that tether? The Strategic Capabilities Office’s Project Pele is an innovative, small, mobile nuclear reactor designed to provide assured energy to DoD’s most critical assets. The actual value of Project Pele is not just this single output, however. The project is a pathfinder for future larger mobile reactors and a catalyst enabling the development of synthetic liquid fuel production technology. Together these capabilities could free DoD from its traditional supply chains, fundamentally changing how it does logistics.

Unfortunately, specious claims in a report by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project (NPPP) out of the University of Texas at Austin by the career antinuclear activist Dr. Alan Kuperman (and during an accompanying press conference with Dr. Edwin Lyman), an article in War on the Rocks by Jake Hecla, and a report from the RAND Corporation by a 1st Lt. Kyle Haak have badly misinformed the public risk analysis debate on Pele. There is ample room for debate about the best way ahead for DoD in its quest to solve a range of energy problems. Indeed, such debate is crucial. But it must be grounded in demonstrable facts.

Canada Intensifies Sanctions on Iran, But Further Action Needed


Latest Developments

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service is investigating Iranian death threats against Canadians who have publicly criticized Tehran, the spy agency said last week. The announcement appears to reflect Ottawa’s increasing efforts to hold Iran accountable for its bloody suppression of anti-regime protests. Last Wednesday, Canada imposed its fifth round of sanctions this year against regime targets pursuant to the Special Economic Measures Act, bringing Ottawa’s total number of designations to 280. However, Ottawa has stopped short of perhaps the most impactful step it could take: designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization pursuant to Canada’s Criminal Code.

Expert Analysis

“If Canada’s goal is to have a real impact, to thwart the rampant human rights abuses of the Iranian people, to meaningfully deter threats from Iran’s Revolutionary Guards abroad, to stem the use of Canada for laundering money by regime cronies, and to begin to see cracks in the regime itself, sanctions need to have more teeth and be fully enforced.” – Toby Dershowitz, FDD Senior Vice President for Government Relations and Strategy

Iran Aids Russia’s Imperialist War Against Ukraine

 John Hardie

Tehran has agreed to help Moscow produce hundreds or even thousands of Iranian drones in Russia, according to new intelligence reports cited by The Washington Post and CNN. This agreement could boost Russia’s stocks of Iranian loitering munitions, commonly called “kamikaze drones,” which are helping Russian forces wreak havoc on Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, and exacerbating Kyiv’s shortage of air defense systems and interceptors.

The Russian-Iranian agreement, reportedly reached in early November, is just the latest form of Iranian support for the Kremlin’s imperialist war against Ukraine. Since August, the Islamic Republic has supplied Russia with multiple types of drones, along with Iranian advisors to train Russian operators, helping Moscow compensate for its limited drone production capacity and dwindling supply of cruise missiles.

Jihadis issue vague threats against World Cup

CALEB WEISS & JOE TRUZMAN

In online statements, both al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al Qaeda’s general command issued vague threats against the FIFA World Cup and its host Qatar. Islamic State supporters have additionally published their own call to arms against the small Arab state.

In all cases, however, the warnings serve as general rallying cries for supporters rather than any explicit threat against the football tournament.

Over the weekend, AQAP became the first jihadist group to issue a statement condemning the Qatari state for hosting the World Cup. In a brief communique, the al Qaeda branch chastised the Qatari state for “spreading obscenity and homosexuality” and promoting “infidels of all races” by hosting the games.

It goes on to say that “Qatar has panted for more than ten years to win this immoral and frivolous occasion, diverting efforts that could have been in the service of Islam, the issues of Muslims, or in service of its nation’s issues and problems.”

Fake Facebook and Instagram accounts promoting US interests had ties to US military, Meta says

Sean Lyngaas

People “associated with the US military” were likely behind a network of phony Facebook and Instagram accounts that promoted US interests abroad by targeting audiences in Afghanistan and Central Asia, Facebook parent firm Meta said Tuesday.

It’s a rare case of a US tech giant tying a coordinated online influence operation to Washington rather than a foreign government.

Meta said it removed roughly three-dozen Facebook accounts and two-dozen Instagram accounts that violated the platform’s policy against “coordinated inauthentic behavior.”

Meta did not tie the activity to a particular US military command. But the Pentagon opened a sweeping review in September into the units that engage in online influence operations, including US Central Command, The Washington Post previously reported.

Red line over Taiwan question reiterated in talks between Chinese, US defense chiefs

Liu Xuanzun

The defense chiefs of China and the US met face to face for the first time in Cambodia on Tuesday since US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's provocative visit to Taiwan island in early August, which was responded with large-scale military exercises around the island by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Chinese State Councilor and Defense Minister General Wei Fenghe drew the red line of the Taiwan question to US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin once again after Chinese President Xi Jinping had done so to US President Joe Biden at the G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, last week.

Aside from urging the US to honor the commitments made by Biden so that the China-US relations can resume healthy, stable development, the talks released a positive signal that would hopefully lower the risk of an unpredictable military confrontation and put the two countries' worsening military relations back on track, analysts said.

Tech war: US, Taiwan, Japan gallop ahead in advanced semiconductors while China remains stuck at mature-node chips

Che Pan

The chip technology gap between China and the West is likely to further widen as the US, Taiwan and Japan forge ahead with leading-edge projects while mainland Chinese foundries remain stuck at mature nodes due to US export controls, according to analysts.

The 5-nanometre Arizona plant developed by Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co (TSMC) is expected to hold an official opening ceremony next month and TSMC founder Morris Chang said this week that an expansion to the more advanced 3-nm process was planned for the Arizona site.

At home, TSMC’s next-generation 3-nm process is expected to begin mass production in Tainan, southern Taiwan, in the second half of this year.

TSMC is developing the more sophisticated 2-nm process in Hsinchu, where its headquarters are located, while early stated 1-nm development is focused on a facility in Taoyuan, northern Taiwan.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, NOVEMBER 22


The Kremlin appears to be setting information conditions for a false-flag attack in Belgorod Oblast, Russia, likely in an effort to regain public support for the war in Ukraine. Kremlin propagandists have begun hypothesizing that Ukrainian forces seek to invade Belgorod Oblast, and other Russian sources noted that Russian forces need to regain control over Kupyansk, Kharkiv Oblast, to minimize the threat of a Ukrainian attack.[1] These claims have long circulated within the milblogger community, which had criticized the Russian military command for abandoning buffer positions in Vovchansk in northeastern Kharkiv Oblast following the Russian withdrawal from the region in September.[2] Russian milbloggers have also intensified their calls for Russia to regain liberated territories in Kharkiv Oblast on November 22, stating that such preemptive measures will stop Ukrainians from carrying out assault operations in the Kupyansk and Vovchansk directions.[3] Belgorod Oblast Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov also published footage showcasing the construction of the Zasechnaya Line fortifications on the Ukraine-Belgorod Oblast border.[4] Wagner Group financier Yevgeniy Prigozhin clarified that Wagner is building the Zasechnaya Line after having changed its name from Wagner Line because “many people in [Russia] do not like the activity of private military company Wagner.”[5] Private military companies are illegal in Russia.

Confronting Iran Protests, Regime Uses Brute Force but Secretly Appeals to Moderates

Benoit Faucon and David S. Cloud

As antigovernment protests swept across Iran last month, its top leaders made a secret appeal to two of the Islamic Republic’s founding families, the moderate Rafsanjani and Khomeini clans that hard-liners had pushed out of power, said people familiar with the talks.

Iran’s national-security chief, Ali Shamkhani, asked representatives of the families to speak out publicly to calm the unrest. If that happened, he said, liberalizing measures sought by demonstrators could follow, the people said.

The families refused, the people said.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and his inner circle face a quandary after two months of nationwide protests. Their purges of prominent rivals and reformists from the government in recent years have narrowed their options for putting down one of the most serious internal challenges to their rule in the clerical regime’s 43-year history.

Russia’s New Cyberwarfare in Ukraine Is Fast, Dirty, and Relentless

ANDY GREENBERG

SINCE RUSSIA LAUNCHED its catastrophic full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February, the cyberwar that it has long waged against its neighbor has entered a new era too—one in which Russia has at times seemed to be trying to determine the role of its hacking operations in the midst of a brutal, physical ground war. Now, according to the findings of a team of cybersecurity analysts and first responders, at least one Russian intelligence agency seems to have settled into a new set of cyberwarfare tactics: ones that allow for quicker intrusions, often breaching the same target multiple times within just months, and sometimes even maintaining stealthy access to Ukrainian networks while destroying as many as possible of the computers within them.

At the CyberwarCon security conference in Arlington, Virginia, today, analysts from the security firm Mandiant laid out a new set of tools and techniques that they say Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency is using against targets in Ukraine, where the GRU’s hackers have for years carried out many of the most aggressive and destructive cyberattacks in history. According to Mandiant analysts Gabby Roncone and John Wolfram, who say their findings are based on months of Mandiant’s Ukrainian incident response cases, the GRU has shifted in particular to what they call “living on the edge.” Instead of the phishing attacks that GRU hackers typically used in the past to steal victims’ credentials or plant backdoors on unwitting users’ computers inside target organizations, they're now targeting “edge” devices like firewalls, routers, and email servers, often exploiting vulnerabilities in those machines that give them more immediate access.

Our military insiders’ views of the new National Defense Strategy


Last month, the US Department of Defense (DOD) released its 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS). This document outlines clear priorities for the department, namely: defense of the homeland; deterring strategic attacks on the United States, allies, and partners; deterring Chinese and Russian aggression while simultaneously maintaining readiness for conflict; and building a resilient Joint Force.

While the document’s strategic prioritization is clear, what remains uncertain is how this strategy will ultimately be implemented across DOD. Defense leadership recognizes this, as the document states that “this strategy will not be successful if we fail to resource its major initiatives or fail to make the hard choices to align available resources with the strategy’s level of ambition.”

How can DOD meet the strategic priorities laid out in the 2022 NDS? The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s military fellows—active-duty officers who are serving a one-year rotation at the Atlantic Council—weighed in, addressing potential gaps between budgets and strategy, force employment mechanisms, sustainment and logistics, and security partnerships. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied here are solely those of the authors and do not represent the views of DOD or any other US government agency.
Investing in security partnerships: The US should take larger risks to bolster Taiwan’s defense

The Freedom Academy An old idea resurfacing

Matt Armstrong

A quick note on the conference. It took place 11-12 January 2017. Four “western” presenter were paired with four Russian presenters. From the conference description:

The conference organizers had some interesting challenges as the Russians were all travelling from Russia and the UK FCO was hesitant to allow visas to at least some of the participants. You can listen to the conference on SoundCloud.

That’s all to say that I was chuffed when I saw

Asha Rangappa launched her substack entitled The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa. It’s not a coincidence her substack uses the Freedom Academy name as the FA was, she wrote, an inspiration for the project. Though I know at least my WOTR article and possibly my chapter made it to her through a mutual friend, if not through other channels, but I don’t know if these had any impact on her thinking. I do encourage you to subscribe – I did – to The Freedom Academy with Asha Rangappa. Also, I recommend reading

Russian Total War in Ukraine: Challenges and Opportunities

Oleksandr V. Danylyuk

The Russian aggression in Ukraine, which at first was conceived as a blitzkrieg and then in May turned into a war of attrition, has now moved into a stage of total war. The scale and forms of mass mobilisation in Russia indicate that the actual number of those mobilised may be significantly higher than the 300,000 people announced by Putin. According to Ukrainian intelligence, Russia is possibly attempting to mobilise between one and three million people. This is also indirectly indicated by the removal from preservation and transfer to troops of obsolete weapons and military equipment. It is obvious that Russia does not have the ability to provide such a large number of troops with modern equipment in such a short period of time.

Since May 2022, the Russians have been betting on absolute fire superiority due to a greater number of artillery systems and a practically unlimited amount of ammunition. Despite certain successes that the Russian troops were able to achieve thanks to this in Lysychansk and Severodonetsk, they failed to turn the tide of the war. The successful offensive by Ukrainian troops in the Kharkiv region in September was a clear indicator that without a significant change in strategy, the Russians could suffer a crushing defeat as early as next year. When planning its new strategy, the Russian leadership obviously focused on achieving a quantitative advantage in manpower. This decision was probably due to the fact that Russia – with a population of 144 million – has a greater mobilisation resource (25–27 million people) than Ukraine, with a population of about 40 million. A significant increase in the number of troops, as planned by the Russians, should strengthen the defence of the already captured territories, as well as allow them to carry out offensive operations from the north, including from the territory of Belarus.

Afghanistan opium cultivation in 2022 up by 32 percent: UNODC survey


The 2022 opium crop in Afghanistan is the most profitable in years with cultivation up by nearly one-third and prices soaring, even as the country is gripped by cascading humanitarian and economic crises, according to a new research brief from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

Opium cultivation in Afghanistan – latest findings and emerging threats is the first report on the illicit opium economy since the Taliban, which assumed power in August 2021, banned cultivation of opium poppy and all narcotics in April 2022. This year’s harvest was largely exempted from the decree, and farmers in Afghanistan must now decide on planting opium poppy for next year amid continued uncertainty about how the de facto authorities will enforce the ban. Sowing of the main 2023 opium crop must be done by early November 2022.

“Afghan farmers are trapped in the illicit opiate economy, while seizure events around Afghanistan suggest that opiate trafficking continues unabated,” said UNODC Executive Director Ghada Waly upon the survey’s launch.

Major semiconductor producing countries rely on each other for different types of chips

Gary Clyde Hufbauer  and Megan Hogan 


The global semiconductor production system is complex, integrated, and not easy to disentangle. Each of the five major global semiconductor producers—China, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States—is also a large chip importer. Not all chips are equal, and no producer specializes in every chip category, leaving even the largest exporters reliant on imports.

The need to preserve trade in semiconductors is evident in the disparities in average export prices per chip between the major source countries. US chip exports were the most expensive, fetching an average price of $2.16 per chip in 2021, reflecting advanced US chip production techniques and its specialization in more sophisticated chips. Unit values for chips imported by the United States from other producing countries are far lower, as the US manufacturing sector imports simpler, low-value chips that it does not produce itself.

Poland Is Building A Military Machine To Fight Russia (If It Has To)

Peter Suciu

The Polish government and its people have a lot of reasons to mistrust Russia. The two nations share a long and complicated relationship, with very little love between Warsaw and Moscow. While it was Poland that invaded Russian lands in the Middle Ages, by the 17th century, the tables turned, and the once mighty Poland was squeezed and partitioned by the powers of Prussia, the Habsburg monarchy, and the Russian Empire.

Much of Poland, including Warsaw, thus fell under Russian control for more than a century until the nation was restored following the First World War. Even then, Poland was forced to fight for its survival. The newly independent nation was invaded by the Bolshevik Red Army, which was only pushed back after the 1920 Battle of Warsaw, known today as the Miracle on the Vistula.

Poland and Russia: Two Very Different Peoples

There are cultural differences. Both nations speak Slavic languages, but there is only about a 38% lexical overlap – compared with 56% for English and German. As for religion, Poland is a Catholic nation, while Russia is predominantly Eastern Orthodox.

Formidable but Not Invincible Why the United States Should Not Overreact to China and Russia

Ali Wyne

Just 30 years after the end of the Cold War and 50 years after the U.S. opening to China, the United States’ two principal challengers seem to be on the march and dictating Washington’s foreign policy decisions. Russia defied many observers’ expectations by invading Ukraine, and it shows no sign of relenting nine months into its brutal campaign. Meanwhile, following a visit to Taiwan by U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi in August, China launched a spate of short-range conventional ballistic missiles—including, for the first time, over Taiwan—terminated its military dialogue with the United States, and stated that it would conduct regular patrols around Taiwan, raising anxiety that Beijing may soon move on Taipei.

Beyond the pressing concern that the United States could find itself in concurrent wars with two nuclear-armed powers, U.S. officials have a broader fear: that the global balance of power could be at a troubling inflection point. In the National Security Strategy that it released last month, the Biden administration warns that the “terms of geopolitical competition between the major powers will be set” over the coming decade. The administration is most concerned about “powers that layer authoritarian governance with a revisionist foreign policy,” particularly Russia and China.

Why Defense Budgets Will Stay High After the Ukraine War

PATRICK TUCKER

HALIFAX, Canada — Even after Russian forces retreat from Ukraine, Western governments should expect higher defense budgets, and to continue to contribute to Ukraine’s defensive capabilities to ward off another Russian invasion, military and government officials said at the recent Halifax International Security Forum. They should also invest more in renewable energy to blunt the economic impact of using less Russian oil and gas.

Sen. Chris Coons, D-Del., told Defense One that the United States will still need to deter a defeated Russia.

“A critical part of ending the war and beginning reconstruction is ensuring that we are providing for Ukraine’s security going forward,” Coons said. “If you look back at the example of the American Revolution, we signed a peace treaty in 1783. But we were back at war with Great Britain in less than 20 years. Every Ukrainian you talk to expresses his concern that even if the fighting stops, even if they reach a ceasefire, even if they reach a peace treaty, they will be concerned about the prospects that Putin will restart the war … I think they deserve investments in their future defense capabilities.”

24 November 2022

UKRAINE AND THE FUTURE OF OFFENSIVE MANEUVER

STEPHEN BIDDLE

For months, commentary on Ukraine focused on stalemate and the prospect that changing technology augured a looming age of defense dominance in warfare. Russia’s assault on Kyiv had failed. Its assault on Odessa had ground to a halt well short of the city. Its offensive in eastern Ukraine had stalled. Ukraine’s much-anticipated counteroffensive in the south had made limited early progress, and Ukraine’s defense minister had said that Ukraine lacked the materiel to take ground on any large scale. A spring and summer of intense combat had produced almost no meaningful change in territorial control.

Many saw this pattern as a harbinger of profound change in warfare. In this view, tanks, piloted aircraft, surface warships, and massed infantry formations were now just large, slow targets for small, cheap, precision weapons. As weapons have grown more accurate and lethal, the argument holds, concentrated formations operating in the open had become unable to survive long enough to overrun enemy positions. Surprise had become impossible in the face of long-range surveillance by drones and airborne radar. Breakthrough had thus become unachievable, and exploitation would be impossible even if breakthrough were not. In the 21st century, the kinds of sweeping, decisive offensive maneuver seen in the German conquest of France in 1940, or the Six Day War of 1967, or Operation Desert Storm in 1991 were thus a thing of the past, many claimed.

Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Dr. Pavel K. Baev

The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided.

On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities.

“Reunification” with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China

Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo

Speculation has increased over the past several years that Beijing is accelerating plans for an invasion of Taiwan. While there is little doubt that Beijing seeks to fully annex Taiwan into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) one day, questions remain about the timing and methods that China might use to achieve this goal.1

There are several reasons Beijing might undertake a military campaign against Taiwan:

1. Long-standing territorial and national identity aspirations

2. Xi’s own personal ambitions and sense of legacy

3. Addressing a perceived threat to its own security stemming from deepening U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation

4. Responding to perceived provocations from Taiwan, specifically a formal declaration of de jure and permanent independence from the PRC

While a great deal of commentary and analysis has explored how the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might undertake a military campaign to annex Taiwan, a critical—yet underemphasized—question remains regarding the types and magnitudes of costs Beijing would pay for such actions. Nearly all discussions of China’s potential invasion of Taiwan ignore the economic and diplomatic costs of such a move, make unrealistic assumptions about what China could achieve (including technological and economic gains), or otherwise minimize the challenges that China would face if an invasion of Taiwan were successful.

Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands


In this report, entitled “Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands,” ten military Combatant Commands provide overviews of the challenges they face in their respective areas of responsibility (AORs) and how they plan to ameliorate the risks and maximize the opportunities that these challenges present. The report provides the Commands a platform to articulate how they plan to manage the multiplicity of challenges they face. By doing so, it helps identify the types of capabilities and activities the Services must be able to plan for and field in defense of US interests in a competitive future international environment.

The bumpy road ahead in China for Germany's carmakers


1. Strategic alignment between Germany’s government and car industry is no longer a given

The deep entanglement of Germany’s automotive companies in China has long been a main driver of Berlin’s China policy. CEOs of German carmakers have been frequent participants in government-organized trips to China. All-cabinet government consultations were used to shape corridors for future cooperation, for instance, on autonomous driving.

Germany’s government has frequently lobbied on behalf of the country’s automotive industry and used foreign economic policy tools to create a supportive environment. The logic for this has long been that what is good for German carmakers in China is also good for Germany (and Europe). After all, in Germany the automotive sector accounts for nearly 10 percent of GDP, 40 percent of research and development (R&D) spending and employs 800,000 people in manufacturing.

However, the combination of a more assertive China and emerging Chinese competition create new risks for this long-standing symbiotic relationship. While there is a lot of uncertainty in their boardrooms, Germany’s carmakers still want to increase investment and deepen their R&D footprint in China. Meanwhile, many policymakers increasingly highlight growing economic dependencies, human rights, and geopolitical concerns, often with an undercurrent of fear that Europe could lose its industrial competitiveness.

Harsh winter looms as Russian attacks hobble Ukraine's power capacity

Pavel Polityuk

KYIV, Nov 22 (Reuters) - Ukraine's government on Tuesday urged people to conserve energy amid relentless Russian strikes that have halved the country's power capacity, as the United Nations health body warned of a humanitarian disaster in Ukraine this winter.

Authorities said millions of Ukrainians, including in the capital Kyiv, could face power cuts at least until the end of March due to the missile attacks, which Ukraine's national grid operator Ukrenergo said had wreaked "colossal" damage.

Temperatures have been unseasonably mild in Ukraine this autumn, but are starting to dip below zero and are expected to drop to -20 Celsius (-4 Fahrenheit) or even lower in some areas during the winter months.

Russia's attacks on Ukrainian energy facilities follow a series of battlefield setbacks that have included a pullout of Russian forces from the southern city of Kherson to the east bank of the mighty Dnipro River that bisects the country.

Ukraine confronts tougher fight in push to extend battlefield wins

Isabelle KhurshudyanPaul SonneLiz Sly and Kamila Hrabchuk

KIVSHARIVKA, Ukraine — Not far from this village on the east bank of the Oskil River, Ukrainian forces have hit a wall of Russian resistance as they try to extend a counteroffensive that just two months ago was sweeping across nearby lands at a stunning clip.

Andriy, a soldier with Ukraine’s 92nd Mechanized Brigade, was not sure what to say on a recent day, when a group of Ukrainian intelligence officers showed up and asked about his unit’s push toward Svatove, a small city in the Luhansk region occupied since March.

War in Ukraine: What you need to know

The latest: Russia fired at least 85 missiles on at least six major cities in Ukraine on November 15, in one of the most widespread attacks of the war so far. The strikes came just hours after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, speaking by video link, presented a 10-point peace plan to G-20 leaders at a summit in Indonesia. As in previous Russian missile attacks, critical civilian infrastructure appeared to be primary targets. Parts of several cities that were hit were left without electrical power on Tuesday afternoon.

A NEW THEORY OF AMERICAN POWER

George Packer

Anational mood disorder afflicts America, causing wild swings between mania and despair, superhuman exertion and bruised withdrawal. We overdo our foreign crusades, and then we overdo our retrenchments, never pausing in between, where an ordinary country would try to reach a fine balance. American exceptionalism has two faces, equally transfixed with a sense of specialness—one radiant with the nation’s unique beneficence, the other sunk in its unrivaled malignity. These extremes, confounding friends as well as enemies, are unrealistic and unsustainable.

Until the early hours of February 24, when Russian tank columns crossed the Ukrainian border and airborne troops targeted Kyiv, the United States was a chastened and declining superpower. The Biden administration seemed to have picked up where the Trump administration left off, accepting the harsh diagnosis of critics: After 20 years of failed wars, the age of intervention was over. Any thought of using force to transform other countries met the definition of insanity. A wave of recent books—Spencer Ackerman’s Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump, Andrew Bacevich’s After the Apocalypse: America’s Role in a World Transformed, Samuel Moyn’s Humane: How the United States Abandoned Peace and Reinvented War, Luke Mogelson’s The Storm Is Here: An American Crucible—portrays a country so warped by endless war, white supremacy, and violence that its very nature now drives it to dominate and destroy. Ackerman concludes that it is “increasingly difficult to see America as anything more than its War on Terror.”

The U.S. And China Are Now In An Economic War

Doug Bandow

The US is at economic war with China. No formal congressional declaration was necessary. However, the Biden administration has imposed draconian restrictions on Chinese access to semiconductor chips, while Congress has approved significant subsidies for the chip industry.

Unfortunately, this sort of “industrial policy,” a favorite of ambitious politicians worldwide, is unlikely to turn out well. Government-directed “investment” failed to spur Japan past the US decades ago. So far government-backed enterprises have not delivered chip superiority to China. Expanding US outlays for the industry is unlikely to achieve better results.

A half century ago the People’s Republic of China was isolated and impoverished, a threat to few people other than its own. Today the PRC has dramatically imposed itself on the world. Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions have expanded accordingly.

CIA, Spec Ops roles in Kabul’s collapse belie official versions

C. Tatum

America’s longest war, Afghanistan, has been called “the forgotten war,” which, for those who fought in it and are still suffering from it, is an insult added to its horrible end only a little over a year ago. Many questions, meanwhile, remain about its open-ended mission, such as why we stayed on a decade after killing the man responsible for the 9/11 attacks and dismantling his lethal networks. But it’s the chaotic ending of the conflict last year that’s about to get renewed attention at the hands of House Republicans, who, having won a narrow majority in the midterms, have declared their intent to launch a new investigation of President Biden’s botched evacuation and raise it to a boil by the 2024 election season. They will have plenty to work with.

C-17 photo from the unattributed video at The Aviationist

Such an inquiry will be sticky for the GOP, however, since President Trump’s 2020 Doha Agreement with the Taliban to end the U.S.-led war, which excluded the democratic government in Kabul from all negotiations and teed up the disaster of August 2021. Republicans will also struggle to escape the fact that Trump’s anti-immigrant policies the previous year also meant that less than 2,000 Special Immigrant Visas—a quarter of the annual allotment—were approved for Afghans, leaving a backlog of 18,000 applications of interpreters and other contractors by the time the Taliban took Kabul, thus creating the urgent need for the “largest U.S. military airlift in history.”


If they desire a credible inquiry, House investigators should also consider scrutinizing the role the U.S. intelligence community played in the final outcome of the war—the good, the bad and the ugly—when their efforts cost some lives while saving others.

They might begin with the untold story behind the defining image of the ignominious ending, the sight of that behemoth U.S. Air Force cargo plane taking off from Hamid Karzai International Airport with desperate Afghans plummeting from its massive fuselage and wheel coverings onto the runway and through Kabul rooftops. (Human remains were found in the wheel wells when the C-17 landed in Qatar.) The world watched, aghast, as the viral video spread across Twitter and TV.

Secrets of the C-17

Why the C-17 Globemaster III took off with so many civilians clinging to it remains officially unanswered. An Air Force spokesperson at the time said an investigation had been initiated but also offered spin: “Faced with a rapidly deteriorating security situation around the aircraft, the C-17 crew decided to depart the airfield as quickly as possible.”

But the real reason, according to a new book on the chaotic August 2021 evacuation, was that the plane held an MH-47G Special Operations helicopter stocked with sensitive and classified systems for flying clandestine, low-altitude night sorties for special mission units like the Army’s Delta Force. According to accounts gathered together by retired Green Beret Lt. Col. Scott Mann for his book Operation Pineapple Express, the top U.S. military commander at the airport, a Navy SEAL admiral, feared the twin-rotary chopper, a modified version of the venerable Chinook and flown by the Army’s elite 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, would fall into the hands of the marauding Taliban. So off they went.

The horrifying sight of bodies falling from the C-17 was just one of several incidents in which U.S. clandestine services’ priorities during the hasty Noncombatant Evacuation Operation, or NEO, were often placed above all else—particularly human life. President Joe Biden had promised Americans that the Kabul evacuation would not have a “Saigon moment,” like the one captured in the indelible photograph of Americans scrambling aboard a helicopter from a rooftop as communist troops descended on the South Vietnamese capital in 1975.

There was “zero” comparison between Afghanistan teetering on the edge, Biden assured nervous Americans, and Saigon’s shocking collapse, in which thousands of Vietnamese who had worked with U.S. forces, including the CIA, were abandoned.

“There’s going to be no circumstance where you see people being lifted off the roof of a [sic] embassy in the — of the United States from Afghanistan. It is not at all comparable,” Biden told a press conference on July 7, 2021.


In mid-August the entire U.S. diplomatic and security contingent at the embassy in the Kabul Green Zone was hastily evacuated by helicopters—not from the embassy’s rooftop, to be sure, but from an adjacent soccer field. Some 1,800 Americans were flown two miles away to HKIA by the morning of August 16. Diplomatic Security agents involved in the embassy evacuation and NEO were recently decorated for heroism.

How similar was it to Saigon? The answer is a “walking contradiction, partly truth and partly fiction,” as Kris Kristofferson might say. Whatever, the end was a rout, recorded in countless hours of deeply shocking and saddening photos and videos that are certain to be resurrected come the 2024 presidential election season, shredding Biden’s boasts about evacuating an astonishing 124,000 people the last two weeks of August.

Fact: The C-17 Globemaster III was on an intelligence mission to ferry a highly advanced special operations chopper for use in last-minute clandestine rescue missions in Afghanistan. But it landed on a concrete sea of chaos. The huge runway was being overrun by 10,000 or more civilians who soon forced all air ops to halt. Rather than unload the sensitive cargo, the crisis forced the top commander at the airfield, U.S. Navy SEAL Rear Adm. Peter Vasely, to order the C-17 back in the air, even as other planes remained parked. Why? It was to protect the chopper in its belly from capture or its classified systems from being pilfered by the Taliban or the crowds, according to author Scott Mann.

The decision was confirmed in the transcript of an interview Vasely later gave to U.S. Central Command investigators: “Late morning [August] 16th, the mass of civilians on HKIA slowly began moving north across the runway, overwhelming the U.S. security forces aligned to attempt to contain the crowd. I ordered the one C-17 and two C-130s to leave.”

Unsaid was whether Vasely knew that civilians had piled onto the retractable wheel covers (called humps) of the massive cargo plane as it taxied to take off on the single runway. Apache AH-64 attack helicopters were hovering low over the asphalt using their rotor wash to blow civilians out of the plane’s path. He likely did not know about the civilians until the plane was long gone.

And yet the killing of innocent civilians around the airfield didn’t stop there. It was more deliberate and committed more often by “friendlies” than Taliban, who were busy outside beating those clustered around the airport with rubber batons and rifle butts.

During the mad scramble by the U.S. to exit Afghanistan after the stunningly rapid collapse of the U.S.-supported government, U.S. military senior commanders and diplomats made deals with numerous devils to exit without further calamities. The airport was the only place left to evacuate U.S. citizens and Afghan green card holders, legal permanent residents and “special interest” persons after the controversial decision to close Bagram Airfield north of the capital and desert it overnight on July 2.

Another consequential decision by American commanders inside HKIA was to accept a CIA offer on August 16, as revealed in Operation Pineapple Express, to clear up to 10,000 civilians from the runway and ramps by using the spy agency’s large Afghan paramilitary “surrogate” force, hardline fighters who had carried out the Agency’s capture/kill ops. The airport crowds had forced air ops to cease after the infamous C-17 was wheels up that sunny Monday morning.

That group of seasoned Afghan militiamen were known as National Strike Units (NSU), a notorious outfit that had to change its name from “Counter-Terrorist Pursuit Teams” after years of human rights abuses came to light. The price demanded for clearing HKIA of the civilian crowds was a guarantee that the U.S. military would airlift the CIA’s surrogate forces and their families out of Kabul.

Almost immediately it became clear that the price paid was much higher.

Bridge Too Far

The 82nd Airborne Division failed at its fundamental mission of securing the airfield, insiders note, because they could not get enough paratroopers on the ground when the crowds flooding the runway forced a stop to air operations the day after Kabul fell. But the CIA’s NSU paramilitaries—ironically, all clad in retro Vietnam tiger stripe camouflage fatigues—quickly cleared the airfield of the civilians with help from the Army’s Delta Force, a smattering of 82nd Airborne paratroopers, and Taliban teams, with U.S. Marines creating a buffer between the once warring parties. “Within two hours, [they] had 400 [Afghan paramilitary] guards protecting the south side,” one U.S. official told CENTCOM’s investigators.

“The Afghan unit that was there, the way they got people off [the airfield], to the point, was just running everyone over and shooting them,” Marine Lt. Col. Chris Richardella, a battalion commander, said in the film.

“They killed them,” another Marine officer bluntly told the filmmakers. A third Marine officer in the documentary said he witnessed “people being executed on the airfield.”

Richardella said it was after dark and he observed civilians dying in the headlights of the NSU paramilitaries’ trucks as they plowed into the crowds—but, he added, the brutal tactics succeeded. By 10:30 that night, the airfield was once again secured and planes were landing and taking off again just after midnight.

The brutality of the four NSU teams, known as units 01, 02, 03 and 04, didn’t end there. Their violence was often directed at Afghan Special Operations soldiers on the run from the Taliban. Call it a violent twist on the “crabs-in-a-barrel” cultural phenomenon—the CIA surrogate forces were now inside HKIA and a nearby CIA base, and the Afghan government forces simply were not.


At North, East and Abbey Gates, CIA’s tiger-striped paramilitaries were often more violent toward their countrymen than the Taliban outside the coils of concertina wire, who were trying to control the teeming masses of civilians and partner forces, such as Commandos, Special Forces and others, attempting to flee the country. This is evidenced in photos, video and by eyewitnesses beaten by the surrogate forces or who witnessed them kill fellow Afghans in cold blood.

“When I stood outside North Gate, one CIA paramilitary came and beat me on my back with his AK-47 stock, striking on my shoulder. He hurt me really badly,” Zahir, a former interpreter for U.S. special operations who remains in hiding in Kabul, told SpyTalk.

Others I’ve spoken to witnessed NSU men firing into the crowds or suffered themselves from Kalashnikov butt strokes, like Zahir. This brutality by NSU fighters is on display in the opening scenes of another forthcoming documentary, NatGeo's Retrograde.

Once Army Maj. Gen. Chris Donahue, a former Delta operator and the 82nd Airborne’s commanding general, arrived at HKIA on August 18, he began to have daily face-to-face meetings in the South Terminal with the commander of the Taliban’s Red Unit to discuss securing HKIA from ISIS attacks and facilitate the exodus of Americans and Afghan allies, according to soldiers from his paratroop division and the CENTCOM report.

To that end, Biden even did something extraordinary, as CENTCOM’s report explained. “POTUS directed … the sharing of intelligence for force protection threats with the Taliban (en extremis),” which were on paper handed to the Red Unit commander. “This intelligence sharing built trust and opened critical lines of communication with the Taliban commander,” the CENTCOM report added.

Few trusted the Taliban to allow evacuees to pass unharmed.

CIA operatives did many good things, too. They acted swiftly to help secure the airfield, even bribing individual Taliban commanders securing the enormous perimeter as the race was on to evacuate at-risk Afghans and Americans, according to one officer there at the time. CIA officers also helped some Afghan special operators gain access to the base and guided American citizens and “special-interest Afghans” into HKIA using a secret entrance named Liberty Gate on the north side of the airfield.

Top military and Biden administration officials have boasted of evacuating 124,000 people during the NEO airlift, but have skillfully avoided questions about how those evacuees navigated the world’s most dangerous airport commute in order to get on a plane, or who helped get them safely to the entry control points.

In reality, it was not the United States government. Most got inside HKIA with their own perseverance and luck or with the help of ad hoc veterans groups located in the U.S. who used encrypted app group chats, such as Operation Dunkirk, Task Force Pineapple, Allied Airlift and others, to communicate with their Afghan brothers.

When an AP story revealed that special operations forces had choppered 169 Americans to HKIA from the Baron Hotel on August 21—a compound that overlooks the airport’s Abbey Gate—CNN quoted Pentagon spokesperson John Kirby as confirming that the mission was approved by the ground commander. “He executed a mission that he believed was in the best interest of helping these Americans, and he did,” Kirby said.

But, few if any among those 169 people were Americans. They were British, and the mission was flown by the 82nd Airborne’s pilots, not special ops, at the request of Her Majesty’s armed forces, senior military sources have told me.

That incident and other rumors of SAS “rescue missions” of British nationals perpetuated a myth during the evacuation that American special operators were also rounding up U.S. citizens and at-risk Afghan allies throughout Kabul or even outside the capital.

On Their Own

Those wishing to leave had to get to the last U.S. outpost on their own, with the exception of 3,000 U.S. embassy Afghan staff and their families who were brought into HKIA aboard chartered buses.

Delta Force operators were only permitted by senior U.S. military and political leaders to execute a few rescue missions outside the wire of HKIA or from the CIA’s nearby Eagle Base, retrieving only a few dozen at-risk people—a statistical drop in the bucket, as thousands of frightened U.S. citizens and partner forces in Afghanistan desperately tried to find a way out. The SAS rumors, incidentally, were also untrue.

Why weren’t special mission units allowed to rescue more people? It was Washington’s chronic aversion to risk, senior officers have told me, citing fears of a disastrous “Blackhawk Down”-style urban street fight with the Taliban.

As a result, planeloads of U.S. citizens were left behind in Kabul, along with tens of thousands of Afghan Special Operations soldiers, while the CIA evacuated almost all of its surrogate forces. At least 600 Americans made it out months later on Qatar-organized flights with the aid of volunteer groups such as Project Dynamo.

But in the utter chaos of August 2021, Americans waving blue passports were beaten by Taliban outside HKIA— even while Pentagon spokesman John Kirby was shrugging off such reports in his daily televised briefings.

America and all its military might could not help its own citizens.

Abandoned en masse among Afghan forces were two groups most at risk of Taliban retribution after America had cut its losses and retreated from the war. Most of the 18,000 Afghans—mostly former interpreters—who were awaiting processing of their special immigrant visas were not evacuated, as well as most of the 18,000 Afghan Special Operations soldiers who had fought side-by-side with American Green Berets, SEALs, Marine Raiders and Rangers for two decades.

(NatGeo's Retrograde takes you inside a 10th Special Forces Group team room at Fort Carson, Colorado, where Green Berets discuss the Taliban's sudden victory over Kabul and how to leverage the volunteer groups to get their Afghan brothers stateside. The active-duty soldiers used those non-government resources successfully, and avoided the Afghans' capture and Taliban interrogation about those Germany-based Green Berets who had been training Ukrainians for years ahead of the Russian invasion.)

Rep. Michael McCaul (R-TX), the likely new chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee come January, issued his own report in August deploring the abandonment of partner forces.

"As the Taliban's advance on Kabul progressed, there was no organized effort to prioritize the evacuation of critical Afghan military personnel who possessed unique knowledge of the U.S. military’s tactics, techniques, and procedures and could thereby pose a security risk to America if they could be forced to divulge their knowledge to a U.S. adversary,” he said.

Their American friends, mostly active-duty and retired Green Berets, have received countless photos and videos in the 15 months since the U.S. exit of Afghan commandos, Special Forces and National Mine Removal Group operatives murdered by the Talibs now in power, who had publicly promised all was forgiven.

Amid the chaos, thousands of NSU surrogate fighters with their families were transported from Eagle Base (which CIA operatives burned to the ground on August 26) to HKIA for evacuation from Kabul. That effort contributed to the over-crowding of the airport that day and was among the reasons U.S. commanders stopped most entries of Afghans into the airport in the hours leading up to the ISIS suicide blast at Abbey Gate that night, according to sources who were there. The other reason for the long gate closure was ISIS threat reporting, which was constant for several days.

Approximately 200 civilians and 13 American service members were killed in the ISIS suicide bombing just after 5:30 PM local time, which effectively ended the NEO.

Some have called what happened an intelligence failure, but that’s not quite right. No intelligence assessments anticipated the fall of Ghani’s government would come within six weeks of the U.S. withdrawal from Bagram Airfield. But sources also say there were no classified assessments that gave Afghanistan’s elected, albeit corrupt, government any chance of survival once the U.S completely left, sources told SpyTalk. Various assessments predicted that the collapse would occur in October or December 2021, or, most optimistically, by February of this year.

And yet throughout 2021, senior leaders receiving these intelligence assessments had publicly denied the collapse of Afghanistan’s democracy was a foregone conclusion. The CIA, of course, knew differently: It was already planning how to evacuate its people and assets. One Saigon was enough for the spies. For the rest left behind, only suffering and tragedy awaited.

Could The Ukraine War Turn Russia Into North Korea?

Peter Suciu

Russia: The New North Korea? As of last week, the Kremlin has reportedly lost more than 18,000 units of equipment – including tanks, armored personnel carriers, military vessels, combat aircraft, and large artillery – since it launched its unprovoked and ill-fated invasion in February. The losses are the greatest a military power has seen destroyed or captured since the Second World War.

Russian forces are believed to have seen more than 420 troops killed in the past week, while six tanks and seven APCs were destroyed. In total, nearly 2,900 Russian tanks have been destroyed or captured, along with more than 5,800 APCs.

Earlier this month, the Kremlin also lost 24 tanks and 800 men in a single day as its defense of Kherson crumbled. During the week-long fighting for the city, Russian forces saw 2,600 soldiers killed. The Russian death toll since the start of the full-scale invasion is believed to have surpassed 83,000.