Israel-Iran conflict unleashes wave of AI disinformation

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A wave of disinformation has been unleashed online since Israel began strikes on Iran last week, with dozens of posts reviewed by BBC Verify seeking to amplify the effectiveness of Tehran's response.

Our analysis found a number of videos - created using artificial intelligence - boasting of Iran's military capabilities, alongside fake clips showing the aftermath of strikes on Israeli targets. The three most viewed fake videos BBC Verify found have collectively amassed over 100 million views across multiple platforms.

Pro-Israeli accounts have also shared disinformation online, mainly by recirculating old clips of protests and gatherings in Iran, falsely claiming that they show mounting dissent against the government and support among Iranians for Israel's military campaign.

Israel launched strikes in Iran on 13 June, leading to several rounds of Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel.

One organisation that analyses open-source imagery described the volume of disinformation online as "astonishing" and accused some "engagement farmers" of seeking to profit from the conflict by sharing misleading content designed to attract attention online.

"We are seeing everything from unrelated footage from Pakistan, to recycled videos from the October 2024 strikes—some of which have amassed over 20 million views—as well as game clips and AI-generated content being passed off as real events," Geoconfirmed, the online verification group, wrote on X.

Certain accounts have become "super-spreaders" of disinformation, being rewarded with significant growth in their follower count. One pro-Iranian account with no obvious ties to authorities in Tehran - Daily Iran Military - has seen its followers on X grow from just over 700,000 on 13 June to 1.4m by 19 June, a 100% increase in under a week.

America’s War With Iran

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The United States has attacked Iran. Just days after suggesting he might delay any American military action for weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on June 21 that U.S. aircraft had struck three Iranian nuclear sites, 

including the deeply buried facility at Fordow. Iranian officials confirmed that the strikes had taken place. Although Trump insisted that the sites had been “obliterated,” it remains unclear what damage the attacks have done.

It is clear, however, that with this U.S. intervention, the war Israel launched against Iran over a week ago has entered a new phase. Events could turn in several directions. The American attack could indeed lead to Iranian capitulation on terms friendly to Israel and the United States. But it is equally or even more likely to draw the United States deeper into the war with profoundly negative consequences. 

Iran will almost certainly seek some manner of retribution, perhaps by attacking nearby U.S. bases and potentially killing U.S. soldiers. That could lead to ever widening escalation, with devastating effects for the region and American entanglement in a war that few Americans want.

How Cyber Warfare Changes the Face of Geopolitical Conflict

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When Israeli hackers deleted data from Iran's state-owned Bank Sepah, disrupting financial services, the act represented another escalation of the use of cyberattacks during geopolitical conflicts, the largest since Russia downed the Viasat communications system during its initial invasion of Ukraine.

The Israeli cyberattackers did not stop there: A second compromise, this time of Iran-based cryptocurrency exchange Nobitex, resulted in nearly $82 million in lost digital assets, according to a post on X by the hacktivist group Gonjeske Darande, or "Predatory Sparrow." For its part, more than 35 Iran-aligned hacktivists and state-sponsored actors had launched a coordinated attack against Israel's infrastructure, including distributed denial-of-service attacks and defacements.

The major role that hacktivists are playing in geopolitical conflicts highlights the growing importance of cyber-augmented warfare and the blurring of lines in citizen participation, says Adrien Ogée, chief operating officer of the CyberPeace Institute, a nonprofit that studies cyber-conflict and provides cybersecurity services to humanitarian organizations.

"That's likely where we're headed — more blurred boundaries, more civilian spillover, and growing demand for cyber volunteerism that's structured, legal, and ethical," he says, adding: "Cyber may not always lead the fight, but it's part of almost every modern conflict now — and civilians are often on the front lines, whether they want to be or not."

A militarily degraded Iran may turn to asymmetrical warfare – raising risk of proxy and cyber attacks

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Israel’s air assault on Iran has focused largely on degrading the Islamic Republic’s military and would-be nuclear capabilities.

In the space of several days, Israel has totally or partially destroyed at least two nuclear sites, destroyed numerous air defense capabilities in a number of cities and killed at least 14 nuclear scientists and several senior leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Israeli operation has compromised how Iran can wage conventional warfare – through the use of military hardware, missiles, drones and aircraft. It has also likely curtailed any progress Iranian scientists had made in enriching uranium to a weapons-level grade, at least in the short-term.

But conventional military weapons are only one tool in Tehran’s arsenal. As a researcher who studies how Iran partners with militant groups, I know Iran still has the means to target its enemies. Despite the degradation of its military capabilities, Iran can leverage proxies, criminal organizations abroad, and cyberattacks to hit Israeli, and possibly U.S., targets.

Forward deterrence doctrine

The Islamic Republic is well suited for asymmetric warfare, or conflict between two countries that have different conventional capabilities and that is below the threshold of conventional war.

It fits a central tenet of Iran’s forward deterrence policy. In short, the doctrine holds that Iran should target its adversaries before their threat reaches the country’s borders. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in 2019, Iran “must not limit ourselves within our own borders. It is our duty to recognize and confront threats that lie beyond our walls.”

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The Perils of Middle East Triumphalism

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To many outside the Middle East, the American and Israeli war with Iran reads like a linear narrative: the two allies’ formidable militaries and intelligence agencies arrayed against their adversary, poised to prevail, on the cusp of indisputable, decisive triumph. The fight and its expected outcome are viewed through the prism of familiar antecedents: Hitler’s Germany overwhelmed, defeated, willing to acquiesce to the victor’s demands; 

Japan following suit. When proponents of this war speak of one side’s surrender and of the other being on the right side of history, it is on such clear-cut notions of progress and finality that they rely. History, to them, advances in a straight line, swiftly heading to safe shores, and one had better choose the correct side or be left adrift.

To those who know the Middle East, such thoughts make little sense. They are hogwash.

The region has its own favored antecedents. As early as the 1970s, Jordan’s crushing of Palestinian guerrillas prompted the emergence of the Black September organization and the Munich Olympic massacre of Israeli athletes. Israel invaded South Lebanon in 1982 and forced the Palestine Liberation Organization’s exile to Tunisia. The result: the ascent of an energized Hezbollah and, in time, the movement of banished Palestinians closer to Israel, in Gaza and the West Bank. In the 1980s, 

Washington’s support for Afghan mujahideen helped drive out Soviet forces. It also led to the rise of the Taliban and a generation of jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda, for whom Americans were the chief villains. After Washington’s victory in the 1990-91 Gulf War, Osama bin Laden and his followers made the United States their primary target. After they carried out the 9/11 attacks, the George W. Bush administration invaded Afghanistan, 

routing the Taliban, and later toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. Twenty years later, the Taliban returned to power. In Iraq, the Islamic State rose from the rubble, and pro-Iranian militias played a dominant role in the country.

Retaliate now, later or never: What Iran's next move could be

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Iran has responded furiously to the overnight US airstrikes on three of its nuclear sites, vowing what it calls "everlasting consequences".

But beyond the words, there will be feverish discussions taking place at the highest level inside Iran's security and intelligence establishment.

Should they escalate the conflict through retaliation against US interests, or, as US President Donald Trump has called on them to do, negotiate, which in practice means giving up all nuclear enrichment inside Iran?

This internal debate will be taking place at a time when many senior Iranian commanders will be looking over their shoulders, wondering if they are about to be the next target of an Israeli precision airstrike or whether someone in the room has already betrayed them to Mossad, Israel's overseas spy agency.

Broadly speaking, there are three different strategic courses of action now open to Iran. None of them are risk free, and uppermost in the minds of those taking the decisions will be the survival of the Islamic Republic regime.

Retaliate hard and soon

Many will be baying for blood. Iran has been humiliated, first by Israel, now by what it has often in the past called 'the Great Satan', its term for the US.

Iran's ongoing exchange of fire with Israel continues into its tenth day but retaliating against the US brings a whole new level of risk, not just for Iran but for the whole region.

Critics Demand Pakistan ‘Revokes’ Decision to Nominate Trump for Nobel Peace Prize After U.S. Strikes on Iran

Rebecca Schneid

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Just a day before the U.S. launched strikes on Iran, Pakistan had stated its intention to “formally recommend” U.S. President Donald Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize. The country expressed its desire to recognize Trump’s role in helping India and Pakistan reach a cease-fire after conflict between the two long-time rivals resurged earlier this year.

Previous Nobel Prize recipients include former TIME100 Women of the Year honoree Malala Yousafzai, and previous TIME Person of the Year recipients Martin Luther King Jr., and former President Barack Obama.

“At a moment of heightened regional turbulence, President Trump demonstrated great strategic foresight and stellar statesmanship through robust diplomatic engagement with both Islamabad and New Delhi, which de-escalated a rapidly deteriorating situation, ultimately securing a cease-fire and averting a broader conflict between the two nuclear states that would have had catastrophic consequences for millions of people in the region and beyond,” the Government of Pakistan said in its announcement via social media. “This intervention stands as a testament to his role as a genuine peacemaker and his commitment to conflict resolution through dialogue.”

The Pakistani government went on to say that Trump’s “leadership during the 2025 Pakistan-India crisis manifestly showcases the continuation of his legacy of pragmatic diplomacy and effective peace-building.”

Read More: India and Pakistan Cease-Fire Appears to Hold Despite Accusations of Violations

When Trump announced the cease-fire between India and Pakistan on May 10, he said the agreement had been reached after “a long night of talks mediated by the United States.” He later went on to thank Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio for their efforts.

Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif took to social media to express gratitude to Trump at the time, saying: "We thank President Trump for his leadership and proactive role for peace in the region. Pakistan appreciates the United States for facilitating this outcome, which we have accepted in the interest of regional peace and stability.”

Ramifications of the Death of Iran’s (Former) President Ebrahim Raisi

Masoud Kazemzadeh 

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May 19, 2025, was the first anniversary of the death of Ebrahim Raisi. His death would not have mattered greatly if Raisi were merely the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). This article argues that the death of Ebrahim Raisi, widely believed to be Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s designated successor, has upended Iran’s succession trajectory, which will increase the elite factionalism and internal conflict in the aftermath of Ayatollah Khamenei’s death.

According to a 2023 report by Aman, the Military Intelligence of the Israel Defense Forces, the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was preparing the path for Raisi to succeed him in this position. It adds that other Western intelligence agencies also shared that assessment. The report further states that Khamenei not only orchestrated the 2021 presidential election to pave the path for Raisi to become president but also dismissed IRGC Gen. Ali Shamkhani (who was killed by Israel on June 13, 2025) from his position as the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council in order to increase President Raisi’s power.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was born in 1939 and is 86 years old. The fundamentalist constitution grants extensive executive, legislative, and judicial powers to the Supreme Leader. According to the fundamentalist constitution, the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 fundamentalist Shia clerics, chooses the Supreme Leader.

Khamenei had invested at least 10 years in preparing the path for Raisi to assume that position. This includes not only appointing Raisi as the Head of the Judicial Branch but also manipulating the 2021 elections for the presidency and the 2024 elections for the Assembly of Experts. Raisi was the sole candidate allowed to run for the seat from his district for the Assembly of Experts. Raisi’s father-in-law, Ayatollah Ahmad Alamolhoda, is a powerful hardline member of the fundamentalist oligarchy and a powerful member of the Assembly of Experts. Finding another suitable candidate for Supreme Leader will not be easy. Raisi checked all the boxes.

Striking Iran Will Not Change the Long-term Strategic Picture—America Should Still Do It

James Diddams

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The great theme of international affairs in the 21st century (so far) has been America’s failure to appreciate the implacable, ideological hostility of Russia, China, and Iran to the American-led world order. The “Russia reset” was laughable in retrospect, China’s admittance to the WTO, among other forms of international integration, did not moderate the CCP, and the JCPOA was never going to stop Iran from developing a nuke or otherwise being a sower of chaos across the Near East.

The common thread across different theaters has been an inability to recognize and appreciate the distinctly non-Western, non-liberal values according to which our adversaries operate. That Iran’s theocratic regime desires not peace with the West but perpetual conflict to legitimize itself should always have precluded the possibility of a nuclear deal except under the most stringent conditions. 

The Iranian regime’s unique combination of apocalyptic Shi’a theocracy, postcolonial Marxist anti-imperialism, and fascist-style authoritarianism necessitates a constant struggle against the Great Satan (America) and the Little Satan (Israel). Though many Westerners believe peace to be possible because governments such as Iran’s, despite violent rhetoric, must ultimately be concerned with matters like public health and economic growth, this epicly misses that the Islamic regime’s interests are far removed from that of the general population because the mullahs’ raison d’être is conflict with a decadent, capitalist, liberal-democratic West.

Bearing in mind that the mullahs’ aversion to normalized relations with America and Israel is structural rather than incidental, the United States faces a set of unpalatable options when it comes to Iran’s nuclear ambitions: (1) full-scale regime change that could entail the deployment of Americans to Iran, (2) attempts at another détente, likely to reproduce the present crisis in a few years, or (3) a policy of maximum pressure and, if necessary, targeted strikes to delay Iran’s acquisition of the bomb indefinitely. Only the third option is viable, yet it demands endurance for long-term, low-intensity conflict that the American public has never possessed.

The Unintended Consequences of War

Francis P. Sempa

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In 1990-91, the United States sent a large military force to Saudi Arabia and subsequently to Kuwait and Iraq to defeat Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Two years later, Islamists reacted to our “desecration” of their land by setting off a bomb at the World Trade Center in New York.

Ten years later, Islamists hijacked airplanes in the United States and used them as weapons to destroy the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York killing more than 2,000 people, attacking and damaging the Pentagon, killing more Americans, and attempting to destroy either the Capitol or the White House in Washington — an attempt foiled by the courageous passengers of Flight 93. 

Those Islamist attacks on September 11, 2001, resulted in the futile, endless, and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Global War on Terror.

As the Trump administration ponders joining Israel’s war with Iran, it should factor in its consideration such unintended consequences of war.

The lead-up to the first Gulf War involved extensive debate in Congress, which passed a resolution authorizing the president to use whatever force was necessary to evict Iraq from Kuwait. The United Nations passed a similar resolution. But there was no congressional declaration of war. (RELATED: Why Democrats Are Dodging the Iran Debate)

Similarly, prior to the Afghan and Iraq wars, Congress passed resolutions authorizing the president to wage war but refrained from actually declaring war against Iraq and our terrorist enemies. In the current Israel–Iran War, there has been no formal debate by Congress on whether this country should join Israel in going to war against Iran. 

Congress once again has abandoned its constitutional responsibility to determine whether this nation should go to war. (RELATED: When American Power Meets Jewish Survival)

Why Ukraine’s AI Drones Aren’t a Breakthrough Yet

David Kirichenko

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Despite early hopes, machine vision has not yet become a game-changing feature of Ukraine’s battlefield drones. But its time will come.

The technology, a form of AI, allows drones to identify and strike targets autonomously. They can’t be jammed, aren’t restrained by the length of optical-fibre cables and don’t need continuous monitoring by operators.

But performance has been limited, according to Stacie Pettyjohn, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. The Institute for the Study of War wrote, ‘Promises of an immediate AI … drone revolution are premature as of June 2025.’

Problems include poor camera quality, difficulty hitting moving targets and inconsistent software performance. Ukrainian army units often prefer more reliable alternatives such as optical-fibre drones.

Nonetheless, Ukrainian developers continue refining AI-controlled drones. More than 100 companies in the country are working on such guidance systems. Some are already testing drone swarms, which would overwhelm even strong defences.

‘Swarms of drones are an advanced technology that will allow the military to stay not one, but several steps ahead of the enemy,’ Herman Smetanin, Ukraine’s minister of strategic industries, said last year.

Ukrainian soldiers tell me that AI-targeting struggles in certain terrain, such as hills and forests, and works best on flat, open ground. Cost is also an obstacle.

US Sends World's Largest Military Aircraft Near Iran's Border

James Bickerton

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The United States Air Force has sent the largest military aircraft in the world to Saudi Arabia, close to Iran's border, according to flight tracking data.

A C-5m Super Galaxy travelled from Aviano Air Base in Italy to Saudi Arabia on Thursday, according to Flightradar24, which tracks aircraft around the world.

At 10:26 p.m. ET on Thursday, the aircraft was recorded approaching Riyadh, the Saudi capital.

When contacted by Newsweek, the U.S. Department of Defense declined to comment on the flight.

Stock image. A U.S. Air Force C-5m Super Galaxy military aircraft flew to Saudi Arabia on Thursday. U.S. Department of Defense

Why It Matters

President Donald Trump has been mulling whether to join Israeli strikes targeting Iran's nuclear facilities, many of which are a short flight from Saudi Arabia.

The White House announced on Thursday that Trump had set a two-week deadline to decide whether the U.S. would strike Iran.

"Based on the fact that there is a substantial chance of negotiations that may or may not take place in the near future, I will make my decision of whether or not to go within the next two weeks," White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said.

What To Know

The U.S. is increasing its military presence in the Middle East, including deploying more F-16, F-22 and F-35 aircraft, officials told Reuters earlier this month.

The C-5m Super Galaxy is a transportation aircraft that has been in service with the U.S. Air Force since 1970.

The Guardian view on Trump and Iran: Netanyahu’s war has no visible exit

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The maxim that wars are easy to start and hard to end does not appear to be troubling Benjamin Netanyahu. For the Israeli prime minister, conflict is an end as much as a means, extending his political survival. Under international pressure – however belated and insufficient – over the slaughter in Gaza, he launched the attack on Iran. Initially presented as essential to prevent Tehran from the imminent acquisition of a nuclear bomb, a claim running counter to US intelligence, it is increasingly discussed as the path to bringing down the regime. The defence minister, Israel Katz, has said that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “can no longer be allowed to exist”.

Donald Trump has generally seen armed conflict as a trap rather than an escape route. He said that the US would “measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars that we end – and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into”. Yet his failure to achieve the Nobel-worthy peace deals he wants, and Mr Netanyahu’s manoeuvring, appear to have made him keener on US intervention.

 Israel wants US bunker-busters to attack the underground nuclear facility at Fordow. There is no guarantee that those would succeed. Israel’s regime-ending aspirations further undermine its claim to offer what might be called, in the term infamously used of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a cakewalk. There isn’t a bad plan for the day after; there is no plan.

What Mr Trump and Mr Netanyahu have in common is that they consistently subsume their nations’ best interests to their personal political imperatives,

 and that neither cares about 90 million Iranians. The brutal theocratic regime is repugnant to many, but hundreds of civilians have already died as Israel offers to bomb them to freedom, and the horrors of Gaza suggest that far worse could come. Many Iranians lived through the unforeseen and unwanted consequences of toppling a hated ruler in 1979, and more watched those spawned by the US invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile, Israeli civilians now face Iranian retaliation.

Close NATO’s Door to Ukraine

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President Donald Trump returned to the White House promising to end the war in Ukraine “in 24 hours.” Since then, his administration has badly mishandled diplomatic efforts to bring about a cease-fire. 

Trump underestimated Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to subjugate Ukraine and has consequently failed to confront the Kremlin with the coercive pressure needed to stop its ongoing aggression.

But amid its bungled Ukraine diplomacy, the Trump administration has gotten one important strategic issue right: it is time to take NATO membership for Ukraine off the table. After years of promises to bring Ukraine into the alliance, Washington is

Putting Operation Spider’s Web in Context

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On June 1, 2025, the Ukrainian special intelligence services launched Operation Spider’s Web, a remotely triggered drone attack that may have damaged or destroyed over 40 Russian strategic aircraft at four air bases deep inside the Russian Federation’s borders. Spider’s Web was undeniably successful: 

Russia’s capacity to launch cruise missiles into Ukrainian cities and kill civilians has been sharply curtailed. Part of the Russian nuclear triad may have been reduced by more than 30%. And Russia certainly will have to reallocate some precious combat manpower for internal security missions. I and others who support Ukraine in its war against Russia celebrated these attacks.

But nothing about Operation Spider’s Web changes either the nature or character of warfare, however those overused terms might be defined. Nor is this special intelligence operation indicative of any broader change in war that might already have been underway. Drones have been a feature of warfare since World War II and have been in regular use in conflict since the early 1980s. Irregular operations like Spider’s Web have long been a consistent feature of even large-scale conventional war. Moreover, successful deep penetration airfield raids have routinely occurred since they were first mastered by special operations forces in the early 1940s.

So why is there so much inclination to bite on the idea that a novel integration of an old technology with an old tactic indicates a change in the very nature of war itself? I argue in my book Ground Combat: Puncturing the Myths of Modern War, that a yawning gap in modern military historical analysis has made it difficult to put emerging events in context. Ahistoricism, a disregard or lack of concern for historical context, makes us more prone to buy into the idea that the very nature of war is in constant, uncontrollable flux.

War is not in constant or high-amplitude flux. Instead, it evolves in form and remains far more steady in function. But this overreaction to Operation Spider’s Web—and more broadly to the use of drones and AI in some modern wars—provides an excellent opportunity to help put exciting irregular operations like these in historical context.

Airfield Raids in World War II

Management Prototypes to Bolster Integrated Defense in Guam

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The US Department of Defense has issued a request to industry partners to build prototypes to streamline American defense capabilities in Guam.

The project aims to develop the Joint Integrated Battle Manager (JIBM), a command and control system that will be designed to unify existing tactical and agency components in the region in response to threats posed by China, North Korea, Iran, and other “violent extremist organizations.”

Selected companies will collaborate with the Guam Defense System Joint Program Office (GDS JPO), which is responsible for planning and transferring tasks related to military assets across the US territory.

A Harpoon missile launches from the missile deck of the littoral combat ship USS Coronado (LCS 4) off the coast of Guam, August 22, 2017. Image: US Navy/Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Kaleb R. Staples

Once the JIBM is fielded, GDS JPO will oversee “long-term operation and sustainment, managing the integrated system’s cost, schedule, performance, and risk posture.”

Contracting of the prototype is led by the US Army’s Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama.

The work for this initiative will run until 2026, with a test planned for the year’s third quarter and a final prototype delivery in the fourth quarter.

Other Projects Expected

In addition to the JIBM task, GDS JPO will lead other projects in support of the Pentagon’s broader objective to bolster Guam’s security, particularly its air and missile defense.

The program office has been accepting funding since November 2024 to employ subject matter experts and increase its workforce, which is currently at 45 percent.

The Pentagon knows its cyber force model is broken. Here’s how to fix it

Erica Lonergan and Jiwon Ma

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The U.S. military has tried almost everything to fix its cyber readiness issues except the one solution that would work: standing up a dedicated cyber service.

At a congressional hearing in May, senior defense officials publicly acknowledged that CYBERCOM 2.0 — an initiative launched by U.S Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to overhaul how it builds and manages cyber forces — fell short of the Pentagon’s expectations. The effort was loosely modeled on Special Operations Command, but even under this model, CYBERCOM still lacks the authority to enforce common standards for the services,

 tailor recruitment to the unique dynamics of cyberspace operations, or control initial training. “We think it needs even more work,” said Laurie Buckhout, the acting assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy.

There have been attempts to address structural shortfalls in the past. Most recently, Congress granted CYBERCOM enhanced budgetary control in fiscal year 2024, giving the command oversight of roughly $2 billion in acquisitions for cyber tools, systems, and training. But the services still control the vast majority of cyber acquisition funds.

More than two decades after declaring cyberspace a warfighting domain, the U.S. military relies on an inefficient and ineffective solution to generate the capabilities needed to defend it. CYBERCOM holds the primary responsibility for operating in and through cyberspace,

but it relies on personnel drawn from five different military services to do so. There are no common standards for recruiting, initial training, or career progression across the services, and none treats cyberspace as a core mission. The result is chronic readiness gaps, inconsistent quality, and top talent regularly lost to the private sector.

How Big Tech learned to love America's military

Jackie Snow

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Since Donald Trump's presidential election victory, major tech companies have abandoned years of policies restricting military work and sought out lucrative defense contracts and deeper connections with the Pentagon.

Executives from Meta, OpenAI, and Palantir will be sworn in Friday as Army Reserve officers. OpenAI signed a $200 million defense contract this week. Meta is partnering with defense startup Anduril to build AI-powered combat goggles for soldiers.

All while Trump is pushing a $1 trillion defense budget — the largest in U.S. history.

The companies that build Americans' everyday digital tools are now getting into the business of war. Tech giants are adapting consumer AI systems for battlefield use, meaning every ChatGPT query and Instagram scroll now potentially trains military targeting algorithms. Meanwhile, safety guardrails are being dismantled just as these dual-use technologies become central to warfare.

A reversal for Silicon Valley

The relationship between Silicon Valley and the military isn't new. DARPA funding helped create the internet, GPS, and even Siri. For decades, military research has flowed into civilian applications: The Pentagon has developed the technology, and companies have commercialized it for everyday use.

Western democracies are actually pretty good at war

Noah SmithJune 

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The democracy vs autocracy in war-fighting debate is heating up as world teeters toward a major conflict. Image: Wikimedia

“They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too.” — William T. Sherman

I am not a military analyst or expert. Usually, I look at the world through the lens of economics, which I actually have some training in. But if you want to get a good holistic picture of the world, you need to understand at least a little bit about war and conflict.

I think most pundits intuitively understand this, which is why you see them weighing in on things like the usefulness of military aid to Ukraine, or the cost-effectiveness of the F-35, or the need to establish military deterrence against China. And so I do the same, while being careful to remember that I’m not any kind of expert in the field.

One of the most persistent and annoying tropes I see, in discussions about war, is the idea that autocracies are inherently tough and martial, and that democracies — especially Western democracies — are irresolute, decadent, flaccid, and generally not very good at fighting.

You see this when rightists praise Russian military ads where soldiers do a bunch of push-ups, and decry the state of America’s “they/them army” in comparison. You can see it when leftists declare that America loses every war it fights (which is obviously false).

The idea is ingrained in our deep history — Thucydides lamented that “a democracy is incapable of empire”, and plenty of modern people will cite autocratic Sparta’s victory over democratic Athens in the Peloponnesian War.1

In fact, if you just looked at the results of the last two decades, you might be forgiven for buying the authoritarian hype. America was pushed out of Afghanistan, and its proxies quickly collapsed under the Taliban assault. Most people also say the US lost the Iraq War.2

The Obsolete Divide: We Need a New Rank System for the Future Fight

Mike Cartier

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When the French Army went to war against Imperial Germany in August 1914, it did so with a military absolutely convinced of the superiority of its military traditions on the modern battlefield, of which the traditional red trousers worn by its soldiers were the most literally and figuratively obvious. Despite evidence that more inconspicuous uniforms were necessary, any proposals to change something viewed as foundational to the French Army’s legacy and heritage were fiercely opposed, despite the obvious need for a change. 

It was only after hundreds of thousands of casualties at the Battle of the Marne—at least some of which were attributed to the ease with which Germans could spot French infantry—that the French Army finally retired its red trousers from the battlefield. The reluctance to abandon practices borne of tradition is a strong one across military establishments, which often resist change until the realities of war force it upon them. In an era of increasingly rapid military innovation and adaptation, and renewed rivalry between the great powers, members of the American defense community should ask: What is our pantalon rouge?

As then Air Force chief of staff (and subsequent chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) General Charles Q. Brown described in 2020, 

the US military faces an imperative to “accelerate, change, or lose” the coming fight. This clarion call underscored the need for the Department of Defense to embrace bold, transformative thinking in its approach to innovation. Our service chiefs have since initiated significant reforms to force employment concepts, organizational structure, and the incorporation of new technologies, reflecting a bold yet disciplined embrace of progress that seeks genuine improvement over change for its own sake. While each service reconsiders its doctrine, organization, 

and technological capabilities to better confront emerging threats, one orthodoxy remains sacrosanct: the joint force’s anachronistic officer-enlisted divide. If it wants to remain the world’s premier military force, the Department of Defense must expand the aperture of its innovative reforms to unlock the full leadership potential of the modern force, establishing a unified military hierarchy and rank system, 

India Turns East: International Engagement and U.S.-China Rivalry

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The Elephant Looks around the Dragon Aparna Pande The belief in India as an Asian leader and a model for other countries in the region has been deeply ingrained in Indian thinking for centuries. The 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung—which served as the launching pad for the Non-Aligned Movement—advanced India’s aspiration to emerge as the leader of formerly colonized nations. That hope, however, was never fulfilled. Instead, India remained bogged down in South Asian politics and security challenges, first from Pakistan and later from China. 

Slow economic growth also impeded India’s efforts to play a greater role on the world stage and resulted in an inward orientation for more than four decades. In the early 1990s, the end of the Cold War triggered both domestic and international changes, 

compelling New Delhi to implement economic reforms and rebuild relations with countries in Southeast and East Asia. India’s antagonistic relationship with China has always framed both its perception of East Asia and how countries in the region view India. As India opened its economy, it sought economic partners, 

partly to offset the impact of growing Chinese economic and military prowess. Countries in East Asia turned to India as they looked for options beyond China. As India deepened ties with the primary military and economic power in the Asia-Pacific, the United States, it became easier to forge closer ties with countries that were U.S. allies. While the initial pillar of the Look East policy was economic, over the last three decades India’s relations with Southeast and East Asia have acquired strategic and military dimensions as well. Moreover, 

most countries in Asia are beginning to consider China an economic and military great power that seeks to undermine the international liberal order established by the United States and its allies at the end of World War II. Washington and its allies see India as a like-minded democratic, free-market society that will help uphold this rules-based order. The 2015 U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision on the need for a free and peaceful Indo-Pacific and India’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic grouping of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—reflect this view.

Cooperation, Coexistence, and Contestation in India’s and China’s Overlapping Strategic Spaces

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By dint of their geographies, partnerships, development imperatives, and broader objectives, China and India have had overlapping strategic spaces since India became independent in 1947 and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) came into being in 1949. As their interests and capabilities—and thus reach—have grown, 

the theater of their strategic interaction has expanded to encompass a wider geography and multiple domains. It has evolved from primarily the bilateral space and a focus on their borderlands to include regional and global spaces, as well as the diplomatic, geopolitical, economic, technological, and ideological spheres.

There has been some Sino-Indian cooperation in these spaces, but more often there has been competition—and it has become more intense over time. The phases of cooperation and contestation have been sequential, with both elements present but one dominant. This essay outlines these periods of early competition and collaboration, of coexistence and cooperation, and then a return to contestation.

Cooperation or coexistence has dominated when China and India have seen the other, on balance, as enabling their broader interests. That was the case in the 1950s and the 2000s. These were periods when there was a sense, as reflected in a 2010 joint statement, that there was “enough space in the world for the development of both India and China and indeed, enough areas for India and China to cooperate.”1 But when Beijing or New Delhi has seen the other as constraining its diplomatic, 

geopolitical, or economic space—bilaterally, regionally or globally—this has led to contestation and even collision. That is the phase the countries are in today, and indeed have been in for the last decade and a half. There is not just one site of divergence (e.g., their border). Instead, the differences are about a sense of their own place and strategic space—and each country’s view that the other will impinge on rather than increase it.

Fortress America: India’s gateway to global innovation

Ananya Raj Kakoti

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This article is authored by Ananya Raj Kakoti, scholar, international relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House has reignited familiar fires: nationalist trade wars, stricter immigration, and a cold shoulder to international students and tech collaboration. But beneath the surface of this hardline resurgence lies a quiet irony—by closing its doors, America may be opening new ones elsewhere.PREMIUMUS President Donald Trump 

For India, this is not just an economic opportunity. It’s a strategic moment to step into the vacuum and shape the next wave of global innovation.

Already, we are seeing signals of a shift. Canada, Europe, Australia, and even Southeast Asian nations are wooing researchers, startups, and students displaced by the US’s policies. 

The idea of a multipolar innovation ecosystem—where talent circulates more freely between regional hubs—is gaining momentum.AI and deep tech: Build global research and development (R&D) partnerships and incubate indigenous solutions.

Green economy: Leverage India’s leadership in solar and emerging hydrogen capabilities.

Advanced manufacturing: Cement India’s place in the electronics and semiconductor supply chain.

Taiwan Adds New Export Controls on China’s Chip Industry

Megha Shrivastava

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The recent salvo of export control measures against China’s semiconductor industry came not from the United States, but Taiwan. On June 14, Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs added a total of 601 entities to its trade blacklist – including China’s Huawei and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC), alongside organizations like al-Qaida and the Taliban. This move will require Taiwanese companies to obtain government licenses in order to ship to SMIC or Huawei. Though the International Trade Administration of Taiwan highlights larger national security considerations, the move signifies Taiwan’s rising position in the global chip supply chain.

Taiwan’s strategic value in the global semiconductor supply chain derives from its near-monopoly over cutting-edge chip manufacturing. For decades, its predominant position in the global chip value chain, especially through TSMC, has left both the United States and China economically and technologically dependent on Taiwan, arguably preventing cross-strait tensions from escalating to a forceful military occupation by China. The blacklisting of Huawei and SMIC signifies a conscious shift in Taiwan’s role from a neutral supplier in the tech ecosystem to an assertive actor holding a crucial position in the global supply chain.

In addition to that, there are two reasons why Taiwan’s move to restrict exports to SMIC and Huawei remains significant. First, this policy is unfolding at a time when the current U.S. policies appear to be more inward-looking, and Washington’s attention to tightening export controls remains low. Second, China’s two chip giants, Huawei and SMIC – specializing in the design and foundry sectors, respectively – are making coordinated strides at bypassing the controls and achieving breakthroughs in independent innovation.

Chinese companies’ breakthroughs – indicating rising indigenous chip development capabilities – often highlight their ability to bypass U.S. sanctions. TSMC’s business with Chinese companies, despite U.S. sanctions, was seen as a major loophole; TSMC chips are reportedly found in Huawei products. Taiwan’s blacklisting of exports to these Chinese firms now tightens the grip of U.S. policies, plugging a key gap in the export control regime that had previously allowed Chinese firms to access critical components via indirect routes.

Iranians Put Faith in Diplomacy. Israel and Trump Shattered Their Hopes | Opinion

Alex Shams

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Every night for the last week, my family in Tehran wakes up to the Earth shaking as missiles strike and children scream. When the bombs go silent, they hear drones buzzing—a constant reminder they're being watched by the foreign army assaulting their city.

Last week, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran. Over 600 people have died, the majority civilians, including entire families killed while asleep. It has bombed Iran's state TV live on air, killing at least one journalist. Israeli bombs have hit hospitals and ambulances, killing paramedics. Medical facilities are overflowing with the injured.

Smoke rises from the state media building targeted by Israel in the north of Tehran, Iran, on June 18, 2025, as the military confrontation between Iran and Israel escalates. NIKAN/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

Israel says it targets military bases and nuclear sites. But its bombs have struck homes across the country. President Donald Trump said Tehran should evacuate—a threat to the entire civilian population. Tehran is a vast city of 10 million people. In June, 

the flowers are in bloom and the rivers overflow with glacier water. Mountain hiking paths fill with people. Tehran is also a diverse city. I lived near a church, close to a synagogue and Zoroastrian temple. There are Sunni and Shiite Muslims, atheists and Baha'is, Afghan and Iraqi refugees.

Today everyone in Tehran is experiencing terror.

Israel gives evacuation orders, like in Gaza and Lebanon. But it's impossible for everyone to leave. Many orders go out at night, when Iranians are asleep. Israel has hit fuel depots, causing gasoline shortages. On Monday, Israel told residents of District 3 to leave—300,000 people live there, including my family. They have nowhere to go. Many of my friends have also stayed to take care of elderly relatives.

Under the mountain: what Israel needs and Trump must decide

Kurt Davis 

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As Israel escalates its confrontation with Iran, Donald Trump faces a defining foreign policy test. The choice before him is not between diplomacy and war. Diplomacy has largely been exhausted; war, in some form, is already underway.

The real question is more consequential and more concrete: should the United States supply Israel with its most formidable non-nuclear weapon, the 30,000-pound bunker buster, which only America has the air power capability to deliver?

These Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) are designed for a singular purpose: to destroy deeply fortified targets, such as Iran’s hardened nuclear facilities. Fordow, Iran’s mountain-buried enrichment facility, was built to survive conventional airstrikes.

For years, US policy rested on a mix of sanctions and diplomacy, backed by the unspoken threat of these weapons. That deterrent is now being tested.

Israel, having demonstrated its military capabilities in Gaza and against Hezbollah, is now striking Iranian nuclear scientists and sites and senior military commanders. There is growing confidence in Jerusalem that it can push further, potentially taking out Iran’s political leadership.

Trump himself recently claimed to have vetoed an Israeli request to target Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. From Israel’s perspective, Iran is advancing too close to nuclear breakout, and the margin for delay is vanishing. Yet Israel still lacks the means to destroy Iran’s most hardened assets. Only the US can fill that gap—and must now decide whether to do so.

Will Iran Surrender?

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There is an update at the end of this post written on Sunday morning following the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities.

The first round of high-level diplomacy geared to persuading Iran that the game is up and that it should accept the strictest limits on its nuclear programme took place on 20 June in Geneva between European foreign ministers and their Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi.

The talks ended with European claims that the discussions had been constructive, Iranian insistence that nothing could be done until Israel abandons its aggression, and President Trump suggesting it was all a waste of time. It wasn’t that he was opposed to diplomacy, or even a ceasefire. 

His point was that only direct talks between the US and Iran would make any sense. Israel was not involved in any of these discussions, although it did participate in a fiery debate at the United Nations. Otherwise its main contribution was to remind everyone, and in particular Iran, that it was prepared to keep up its campaign for some time.

If Trump had looked more carefully at what the Europeans were saying he would have appreciated that they were also urging the Iranians to talk to the Americans, and on a much broader agenda than before. Not only will they need to make major concessions on its nuclear programme, of the sort they were unprepared to make at the start of the month, 

but they will also need to restrict their missile programme and activist role in the region. These concessions will only happen, if at all, when the Iranians are not only convinced privately that they are losing but that they are prepared to acknowledge it publicly. This moment may not come as long as they can keep firing missiles into Israeli cities.

u.s.-china competition

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for Global Influence © 2020 The National Bureau of Asian Research restrictions on use: This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . To purchase U.S.-China Competition for Global Influence, 

please visit . India Managing U.S.-China Rivalry: India’s Non-escalatory Reinforcement Frédéric Grare executive summary This chapter examines how India manages the tensions between the U.S. and China vis-à-vis its own independent efforts of balancing 

China while maintaining some form of cooperation. main argument The intensification of the rivalry between the U.S. and China does not change the nature of the challenges to India’s interests. It does, however, exacerbate the tensions and potential contradictions within Indian foreign policy. This is particularly true with regard to India’s relations with China. China’s growing rivalry with the U.S. does not substantially alter its differences with India, but in a context of growing polarization, this rivalry tends to transform those differences into leverage points for China to try to weaken the links between India and the U.S. Similarly, 

it does not affect the congruence between U.S. and Indian objectives but does strain the condition under which this congruence could be translated into actual cooperation. policy implications • India’s strategic, political, and economic interests converge with those of the U.S., and New Delhi will not do anything that may undermine Washington’s position vis-à-vis China so long as U.S. policies will not affect major Indian interests. It could therefore be counterproductive for the U.S. to be excessively transactional or try to coerce India into policies that are detrimental to its regional interests.

• Possible U.S. frustration will be subtly compensated for by India mobilizing capacity around U.S. objectives in places where the U.S. is quasi-absent. The inclusion of the East African shores in the Indian concept of the Indo-Pacific should be understood in this perspective. 

• The slow pace of Indian economic reforms generates questions regarding India’s ability to manage its power asymmetry with China. The U.S. should therefore manage its own expectations and incentivize, rather than coerce, India to reform.

Iran’s Use Of Psychological Warfare Against Its Adversaries And Strategies For Deterrence – Analysis

Middle East Quarterly / Babak Taghvaee

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The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB)—Iran’s state-controlled media corporation—holds a monopoly over the country’s domestic radio and television services. 1 Accordingly, it plays a central role in Iran’s psychological operations against political adversaries—operations commonly understood as components of the regime’s “soft war.” 2

The IRIB operates alongside news outlets affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as well as a network of IRGC-controlled psychological warfare units and front companies. Together, these entities form the core of Iran’s state-directed influence apparatus that target adversaries. As of March 13, 2025, the IRIB controls approximately 376 million U.S. dollars (about 35,000 billion tomans) that it allocates toward psychological warfare.3 In recent years, the U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned the IRIB and affiliated media organizations for their involvement in human rights violations. 4 However, these sanctions have not significantly impeded the IRIB’s initiatives.

Over time, the regime’s propaganda warfare tactics have evolved into a comprehensive system of influence operations. 5 These activities have not only expanded Tehran’s reach beyond its borders but also endangered the national security of its adversaries. 6 They range from incitement and orchestrated unrest to the recruitment of foreign nationals who carry out acts of terrorism and sabotage, and engage in espionage across Europe and North America. 7

The U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions8 have frequently targeted the financial arms of the IRIB, aiming to impose financial costs on the managers and authorities who oversee the regime’s propaganda apparatus. However, these measures have largely failed to disrupt the IRIB’s operations in any meaningful way. A key reason for this failure has been the active role played by Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in helping these entities to evade sanctions.9

This paper draws on six years of comprehensive research focused on identifying the threats posed by Iran’s propaganda warfare apparatus against regime critics. Its principal goal is to recommend effective strategies to fully neutralize these threats.