Indian Strategic Studies

25 July 2025

The Importance of Kachin State to Myanmar’s Revolution

Michael Martin

Four years on, Myanmar’s civil war has spread to all 14 regions and states, as well as the major cities of Mandalay, Naypyidaw, and Yangon. According to the analysis of the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, opposition groups have effective control over 34 percent of the country’s landmass,

including all but one of the border townships. Townships under opposition control form a crescent that arcs from Rakhine State in the west, through Chin State, Sagaing Region, across Kachin State, and into Shan State in the east. Almost all of the cross-border towns with neighboring Bangladesh, China, India, and Thailand are under the administration of opposition forces.

The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and its affiliated People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) have reportedly captured more than 300 military installations and 15 towns in Kachin State, Shan State, or Sagaing Region since the 2021 coup. The KIA and its allies have also taken control of all but one of the border crossings into China. In addition, they control most of Kachin’s valuable mining region, including its rare earth mines.

The KIA’s latest military offensive is Bhamo, a strategically important city in eastern Kachin State. If the KIA can capture Bhamo, it will effectively control all of eastern Kachin State. Myanmar’s military junta has reinforced its estimated 3,000 troops in Bhamo; it’s also conducting up to 50 airstrikes each day to help defend the city. In addition, the junta has launched a counteroffensive in an attempt to retake control of some of Myanmar’s valuable jade mines.

The People’s Republic of China has stepped up its military assistance to Myanmar’s military junta, in part to help the defense of Bhamo. China is apparently concerned that the loss of Bhamo will significantly weaken the junta and could lead to another state—in addition to Chin State and Rakhine State—falling under the control of the anti-junta opposition.

Gaza health ministry says 33 people died from malnutrition in 48 hours

At least 33 Palestinians, including 12 children, have died as a result of malnutrition across the Gaza Strip in the past 48 hours, the Hamas-run health ministry has said.

The deaths of 11 adults and four children were reported over the past day, a spokesman told the BBC.

It came as UN Secretary General António Guterres told the UN Security Council that "malnutrition is soaring" and "starvation is knocking on every door" in Gaza.

He has said the 2.1 million population is facing grave shortages of basic supplies and that Israel has an obligation to facilitate humanitarian assistance by the UN and its partners.

The Israeli military body responsible for co-ordinating aid deliveries, Cogat, accused Hamas of "conducting a false campaign regarding the humanitarian situation".

It has insisted that Israel acts in accordance with international law and facilitates the entry of aid while ensuring it does not reach Hamas.

WHO condemns Israeli attacks on facilities in central Gaza

UK and 27 other nations condemn Israel over 'inhumane killing' of Gaza civilians seeking aid

International journalists, including the BBC, are blocked by Israel from entering Gaza independently, so it is difficult to verify the number of reported malnutrition deaths.

However, footage filmed by a local Palestinian journalist working for the BBC at al-Aqsa Martyrs hospital in the central city of Deir al-Balah showed the emaciated body of a man called Ahmed al-Hasanat, who doctors said had died from malnutrition on Tuesday.

Health officials said a 13-year-old boy, Abdul Hamid al-Ghalban, also died in the southern city of Khan Younis. Photos from AFP and Anadolu news agencies showed the teenager's small

Iran and the Logic of Limited Wars

Raphael S. Cohen

Israel's air war against Iran—“Operation Rising Lion”—may be over, but the controversy surrounding the attacks lives on. One key question is whether the U.S. strikes on the Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan, dubbed “Operation Midnight Hammer,” succeeded in obliterating the deeply buried Fordow site or merely incapacitated it for a few months.

The extent of the damage to Iran's nuclear program is, of course, important from an operational perspective. But the broader critique—that the 12-day air campaign was somehow foolhardy because it may not have permanently destroyed the Iranian nuclear program—misses the point.

Operation Rising Lion was a limited war fought with limited means for an even more limited period—all of which, in turn, means that the campaign's objectives were also limited. The campaign,

therefore, needs to be judged against the alternative strategies—engaging in a longer, more protracted campaign or doing nothing militarily and sticking with diplomatic options. And by that measure, the operation was a success.

To begin with the option of a longer war: There were certainly more targets left in Iran when U.S. President Donald Trump called an end to the war. Although a full public accounting of the attacks' effects will take time, the Israeli military claims it eliminated roughly 1,000, or 40 percent to 50 percent,

of Iran's ballistic missiles; destroyed 250 (or roughly two-thirds) of Iran's missile launchers; killed several dozen senior Iranian military leaders and nuclear scientists; and set the nuclear program back by “years.” In other words, even by the Israeli military's own estimates, Iran's nuclear program is not demolished, it retains most of its missiles, and most of its military leaders remain untouched.

Golden Dome Could Learn from SDI Politics

William Courtney

President Trump has proposed that to “protect our homeland” he would move ahead with a Golden Dome missile defense. The Department of Defense is seeking a hefty budget increase for it next year, but the program is controversial.

Missile defense was contentious also in the 1980s when President Ronald Reagan offered a vision to render nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” Golden Dome proponents might avoid some of the disputes of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) era.

Golden Dome recalls Reagan's concept for SDI to defend the United States against long-range ballistic missiles. It was seen as futuristic or infeasible. Although controversy weakened support for SDI, ever since Reagan's presidency Congress has funded work on long-range missile defense. This is in addition to Congressional backing for tactical ballistic missile defense to safeguard U.S. forces on land and at sea.

Although controversy weakened support for SDI, ever since Reagan's presidency Congress has funded work on long-range missile defense.

Don't Exaggerate

Reagan's vision was seen by many as other-worldly, sapping SDI's credibility. A 1987 American Physical Society study said directed energy technologies, if ever to work, needed gains of a hundred times or more. Rigged tests spawned criticisms. A Reagan decision document warned of a Soviet missile defense “breakout,” but the USSR was lagging.

Edward Teller, a hydrogen bomb designer, touted to Reagan the idea of an x-ray laser powered by a nuclear explosion in space, possibly over the heads of Americans. Teller lost ground when he claimed a laser could shoot down the “entire Soviet” land-based missile force. The Reagan administration soon vetoed this concept, clarifying that SDI would be nonnuclear only.

Why are young women increasingly left-wing?

There has been much commentary about boys and young men turning to the right. The surprise Netflix hit “Adolescence” set off another cascade of columns on the crisis of masculinity and the malign influence of Andrew Tate.

These worries are not unjustified. Some young men are attracted to misogynistic online content, and that can act as a gateway to the broader far right universe with the help of social media algorithms. It’s true that more boys struggle in the education system, that deindustrialisation has taken away the standard career paths for boys who get poor exam grades, and that it’s getting harder for men with low status jobs to find a partner.

But there has been much less written on a substantially bigger shift in voting behaviour amongst young women, who are moving leftwards fast (Gaby Hinsliff and Cas Mudde are honourable exceptions). John Burn-Murdoch highlighted the worldwide phenomenon of polarisation between the genders in younger age groups last year. It’s clear from his graphs that, in most countries, it’s driven more by women shifting left than men right (South Korea is a notable outlier). Yet it’s the men that have got most of the attention.

It's a phenomenon that’s continued in more recent elections. In the UK last year almost a quarter of 18-24 year old women voted Green (according to YouGov), and just 12% voted for any right-wing party. Since the election YouGov data suggests Reform’s support in this age group hasn’t risen – all the increase in their vote has come from older people – and that the Greens are doing a lot better.

In Germany, earlier this year, 34% of 18-24 year old women voted for Die Linke, driving the left-wing party’s dramatic resurgence and helping them get back into the Bundestag. In Spain, at last year’s European elections a poll found 59% of 25-30 year old women saying they’d vote left-wing. In Australia, according to a 2024 analysis, Gen Z women are by far the most left-wing voter segment.

Hegseth Attends Meeting on Ukraine After Skipping Last Session

John Ismay and Eric Schmitt

Days after President Trump shifted his tone on Ukraine, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth participated in a meeting on Monday of the roughly 50 nations supporting the embattled country.

The collection of countries, which is known as the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, was founded during the Biden administration by Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III. But Mr. Hegseth has largely taken a hands-off approach, ceding leadership of it to Britain shortly after Mr. Trump took office in January.

When the contact group met in person at NATO headquarters in April, Mr. Hegseth opted to call in. He did not participate in the next meeting, which was in June.

Mr. Trump initially expressed deep skepticism of giving U.S. military support to Ukraine, which Russian forces invaded in 2022. But last week, he said the United States would help Europe send more weapons to Ukraine and warned Russia that if it did not reach a peace deal within 50 days, he would impose a new round of punishing sanctions.

A spokesman for the Pentagon declined to comment on Monday regarding Mr. Hegseth’s role in Monday’s meeting. The Defense Department said in a statement that it would not comment on internal discussions between the administration and partner nations.

A senior American official, speaking on the condition of anonymity before the meeting to discuss internal planning, said the United States expected “several countries” to commit to purchasing additional “capabilities” — weapons, munitions and equipment — to donate to Ukraine.

Ukrainian leaders have repeatedly said their greatest need is more air-defense systems like the American-made Patriot and the interceptor missiles they fire, which are effective against Russian ballistic and cruise missiles.

Iran’s Leaders Turn to a New Brand of Nationalism After Israeli and U.S. Attacks

Erika Solomon and Sanam Mahoozi

The event had all the typical trappings of Ashura, Iran’s ritualistic Shiite Muslim mourning period. The kneeling crowds were dressed in black. They beat their chests in unison. Then, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, beckoned the man leading the chants, videos of the event showed, and whispered in his ear.

Grinning, the singer broke into a tune that would have been wildly out of place at a religious ceremony for the Islamic Republic just a few weeks ago: “Ey Iran, Iran,” a patriotic anthem.

“In my soul and spirit, you remain, O homeland,” he sang, as the crowd recited the words back to him. “Wasted be the heart that does not tremble for you.”

Iran has emerged from its war with Israel — briefly joined by the United States — deeply wounded. Its military defenses are battered, its nuclear program was pummeled and its population has been devastated by a heavy civilian toll over the 12-day war.

Amid that bleak outlook, the country’s leaders see an opportunity. Outrage over the attacks has set off an outpouring of nationalist sentiment, and they hope to channel that into a patriotic moment to shore up a government facing daunting economic and political challenges.

The result has been an embrace of ancient folklore and patriotic symbols that many of Iran’s secular nationalists once saw as their domain, not that of a conservative theocracy that often shunned Iran’s pre-Islamic revolutionary heritage.

In the ancient city of Shiraz, a billboard depicts Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel kneeling before a statue of Shapur I, the third-century Persian king, mimicking a frieze from the ruins of the ancient city of Persepolis.

In Tehran’s Vanak Square, a popular shopping area, a billboard has been erected for Arash the Archer, the mythological figure said to have created Iran’s borders by launching his life force from an arrowhead. Now, alongside his arrows, it is the missiles of the Islamic Republic being fired, too.

America’s Pill Problem

Nearly 25 years ago, Americans discovered just how critical the antibiotic ciprofloxacin could be. Commonly prescribed for bacterial infections, “cipro” is also the first-line treatment for anthrax exposure. In September 2001,

just one week after the 9/11 terror attacks, the American public found itself contending with yet another nightmare: someone was sending anthrax through the U.S. Postal Service to media companies and congressional offices—ultimately killing five people and infecting 17 others. Those with even the smallest risk of exposure lined up for treatment.

Today, anthrax remains one of the deadliest and easiest biological weapons to produce. Yet 80 percent of the U.S. supply of ciprofloxacin is still imported. Moreover, most of those imports, whether from Europe, India, or Jordan, rely on key starting ingredients made in China.

It’s not just cipro. The United States is alarmingly dependent on imports for many of its critical medicines and their ingredients. Over the last two decades, according to U.S. Census Bureau data, U.S. pharmaceutical imports have grown by an average of nine percent annually. Over the last 12 months, the value of U.S.

pharmaceutical imports has ballooned 40 percent, to $315 billion; the pharmaceutical sector, which U.S. manufacturers once dominated, was the fifth-largest U.S. import category in 2024. By volume, China and India are the largest suppliers of drugs and their ingredients to the United States, including common antibiotics,

statins, and other older low-cost generic medicines. By value, Germany, Ireland, and Switzerland dominate the U.S. pharmaceutical trade, largely through their exports of top-selling branded drugs such as Viagra and Botox and patented medicines such as new weight-loss treatments and Keytruda,

the top-selling cancer drug. The United States has long dominated the production of innovative medicines, but even that market segment is at risk: in 2024, one-third of the new compounds licensed by U.S. pharmaceutical companies reportedly were made by Chinese biotechnology firms.

America Should Assume the Worst About AI

Matan Chorev

National security leaders rarely get to choose what to care about and how much to care about it. They are more often subjects of circumstances beyond their control. The September 11 attacks reversed the George W. Bush administration’s plan to reduce the United States’ global commitments and responsibilities.

Revolutions across the Arab world pushed President Barack Obama back into the Middle East just as he was trying to pull the United States out. And Russia’s invasion of Ukraine upended the Biden administration’s goal of establishing “stable and predictable” relations with Moscow so that it could focus on strategic competition with China.

Policymakers could foresee many of the underlying forces and trends driving these agenda-shaping events. Yet for the most part, they failed to plan for the most challenging manifestations of where these forces would lead. They had to scramble to reconceptualize and recalibrate their strategies to respond to unfolding events.

The rapid advance of artificial intelligence—and the possible emergence of artificial general intelligence—promises to present policymakers with even greater disruption. Indicators of a coming powerful change are everywhere. Beijing and Washington have made global AI leadership a strategic imperative,

and leading U.S. and Chinese companies are racing to achieve AGI. News coverage features near-daily announcements of technical breakthroughs, discussions of AI-driven job loss, and fears of catastrophic global risks such as the AI-enabled engineering of a deadly pandemic.

There is no way of knowing with certainty the exact trajectory along which AI will develop or precisely how it will transform national security. Policymakers should therefore assess and debate the merits of competing AI strategies with humility and caution. Whether one is bullish or bearish about AI’s prospects, though,

Europe’s Security Plans Must Extend Beyond its Backyard

Chels Michta

The recent decision taken at The Hague by European NATO allies to increase defense spending to 5% by 2035 has been justly celebrated as a step in the right direction. And though one can be skeptical whether the decade-long timeline will survive the test of political will,

it nonetheless marked the recognition that rearmament is no longer a theoretical conversation while bringing the alliance closer to operationalizing NATO’s new regional plans.

The final communique — remarkably brief by past NATO standards — conveyed a sense of determination and purpose, giving the US administration and European governments a justifiable reason to call the summit a success.

While the meeting focused on Russia and European security, the new spending commitments cannot be considered separately from other theaters. The US and its European allies must now find a way to broaden the conversation so that European rearmament dovetails into the larger geostrategic environment the West faces.

For although all eyes were on the Atlantic theater at The Hague, democracies face a challenge to their security that is truly global in nature, as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea work jointly to dismantle the security system America and its allies have built.

The difference between preserving a modicum of systemic stability, and hence peace, and an all-out military confrontation will likely come down to four key regions: Europe, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and the Indo-Pacific.

Two of these theaters have already been engulfed in war, while the remaining two are increasingly areas of concern, both due to North Korea’s aggressive nuclear and missile program and China’s massive military buildup, especially the expansion of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, which has surpassed the US Navy in fleet size.

Are Soldiers Obsolete?

Vilda Westh Blanc

The U.S. Army has long believed that its greatest asset is the American soldier—tough, disciplined, and trained for combat. But as AI and autonomous systems take center stage on the battlefield, even that longstanding truth is up for debate.

With recruitment rates at historic lows and battlefield technology evolving faster than military bureaucracy, one must ask: will tomorrow’s wars be fought by people at all? And if soldiers won’t be fighting in trenches or engaging in face-to-face gunfights, why are we still training them for it?

We’re at a moment of convergence. Three crises, plummeting enlistment, outdated training regimes, and the rapid rise of military artificial intelligence, are forcing a sweeping reassessment of what the Army is, what it needs to be, and who (or what) actually fights wars in the 21st century.

The use of AI and autonomous systems is already transforming military operations. From real-time battlefield analytics to drone swarms capable of autonomous targeting, AI is fundamentally reshaping how wars are both planned and fought. Warfare no longer hinges purely on human strength, endurance, or even marksmanship. Instead, war is becoming a contest of speed, data, and automated systems.

Battlefield AI can detect threats faster than human scouts, manage logistics with remarkable efficiency, and analyze thousands of data streams to help commanders make quicker, more informed decisions. For an Army struggling to maintain end strength, that’s not just innovation, it’s survival.

With recruitment numbers down nearly 25% from pre-pandemic levels, the Army is confronting a hard reality: there may never again be enough young Americans willing or eligible to serve in a conventional capacity. Roughly only one in four Americans aged 17 to 24 qualifies for military service without waivers. That eligibility pool continues to shrink due to rising obesity, drug use, and educational deficiencies.

The US Air Force’s New Drones Are a Game Changer

Harrison Kass

The US Air Force’s forthcoming Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program is designed to serve as an autonomous drone wingman to the sixth-generation F-47 NGAD, marking the beginning of a new era in airpower, where automated and manned aircraft work in synchronization.

The CCA drones, which are designated as fighter aircraft, are being built to provide combat capability at a mere fraction of the cost of standard, manned fighter jets. The CCAs will be built with an emphasis on survivability, autonomy, and adaptability, with the Air Force planning to procure about 1,000 units, allowing for two CCAs to be paired with each manned fighter.

The result, in theory, will be scalable force multiplication while controlling costs and reducing risk exposure for human pilots. While the CCA is ostensibly a pairing between manned and autonomous platforms, the program is undoubtedly the next step in a shift away from manned fighters toward autonomous or unmanned fighters. If the CCA program goes well, expect the fighter developed after the F-47 to be completely unmanned.

The CCA program will feature two distinct platforms: the General Dynamics YFQ-42A and the Anduril Industries YFQ-44A. In March 2025, the Air Force designated both CCA platforms as a “fighter,” the first time any drone has received the fighter designation. The symbolism is clear, marking a doctrinal shift towards the use of drone aircraft.

The YFQ-42A is derived from the XQ-67A demonstrator, which first flew in early 2024. The YFQ-44A is derived from Anduril’s Fury drone. Both drones are part of the Air Force’s Increment 1 effort, which focuses on air-to-air missions and integration with manned fighters, such as the F-35 Lightning II and F-47 NGAD.

Ground testing for both CCA platforms commenced in May 2025. First flights are expected in late summer. The Air Force is expected to make a final production decision by the end of fiscal year 2026. Operational fielding of the CCAs could begin as early as the late 2020s.

The United States is Falling Behind in Drone Technology

William Lawson

The Pentagon has announced what Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth calls a “Top Gun” event for battlefield drones like those deployed by Ukraine against Russian forces. Hegseth recently announced an all-out effort to assert “American drone dominance,” of which this event is a part. The so-called Top Gun school will be part of the semi-annual Technology Readiness Experimentation (T-REX) event at Camp Atterbury, Indiana, in August.

Beginning in 2023, T-REX has served as a showcase for emerging technologies, including new drone prototypes. This will be the first year that T-REX will host a head-to-head simulated drone combat in urban and other environments. The exercises will feature first-person viewer (FPV) drones, which are kamikaze-style drones widely used in the Ukraine War.

American forces are rushing to close the gap between US drone capability and that of Russia, Ukraine, China, and Israel. Realistic exercises are imperative to understanding what works and what does not. The Top Gun exercise is a crucial first step in that direction, pitting “red vs. blue” forces in simulated combat. Counter-drone technology will also be showcased during the exercise, forcing participants to account for every possible contingency.

Russia has reportedly equipped its frontline soldiers with approximately 1.5 million small drones last year, and this number is expected to continue growing. Ukraine, however, may have surpassed that output, supplying its troops with 200,000 drones per month. Current American manufacturing capability cannot approach those numbers, not least because the infrastructure and doctrine for their deployment are still being developed.

China also has an advantage driven by its dominance in manufacturing, not only small drones, but also the electronic and digital components required for drone operation. American manufacturing capacity will need to expand rapidly if the United States seeks to catch up with China.

Hegseth is attempting to streamline the drone development process by opening the door to manufacturers and entrepreneurs, while also easing the procurement process for drones by allowing military units to bypass the traditional, bureaucratic Pentagon procurement process.

Three Years of War in Ukraine: Are Sanctions Against Russia Making a Difference?

Since Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has implemented a broad sweep of sanctions focused on isolating Russia from the global financial system, reducing the profitability of its energy sector, and blunting its military edge. These added to a bevy of sanctions that the United States imposed on Russia after it annexed the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014.

The reelection of U.S. President Donald Trump injected uncertainty into the future of U.S. support for Ukraine, but his administration has not lifted or relaxed the sanctions regime against Russia implemented under President Joe Biden.

As the United States has pushed for new ceasefire talks to no avail, Trump’s ire with Russian President Vladimir Putin has grown, prompting new tariff threats to bring Russia to the negotiating table and more arms for Ukraine.

Financial sector. The United States began its 2022 barrage of sanctions by freezing $5 billion of the Russian central bank’s U.S. assets, an unprecedented move to prevent Moscow from using its foreign reserves to prop up the Russian ruble.

It also barred the largest Russian bank and several others from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), a Belgium-based interbank messaging service critical to processing international payments. The U.S. Treasury Department prohibited U.S. investors from trading Russian securities,

including debt; all together, the sanctions restrict dealings with 80 percent of Russian banking sector assets. Washington has also sought to seize the U.S. assets of sanctioned Russian individuals, including President Vladimir Putin.

CFR President Mike Froman analyzes the most important foreign policy story of the week. Plus, get the latest news and insights from the Council’s experts. Every Friday

Spain’s anti-migrant riots are a warning to Europe

Another flashpoint has emerged in Europe’s long-simmering migrant crisis. Torre Pacheco, a small town in southern Spain, has been the scene of days of fighting between right-wing groups and mainly Moroccan migrants. While a tentative peace has been restored, tensions remain.

On 9 July, a 68-year-old local man, Domingo Tomas, was confronted by three young men during an early morning walk. One of the trio – all were described as being of ‘Moroccan origin’ and in their early 20s – brutally beat him. Images of Tomas’s bloodied and bruised face quickly went viral.

Agitators descended on Torre Pacheco in the days afterwards. Calls for a ‘Maghrebi hunt’ – essentially, a hunt for North African immigrants – spread on far-right forums. On the night of 11 July,

thugs clashed with masked Moroccan youths, leaving several people injured and a trail of damage. More fighting and vandalism – including the destruction of a kebab shop owned by a Muslim local – took place over the following nights.

Order was largely restored on 14 July after police stopped cars carrying weapons from entering Torre Pacheco. Fourteen arrests have been made since the unrest began and a heavy police presence remains in the town.

Politicians from Spain’s left-wing government, led by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, have rightly condemned the far-right thuggery. Indeed, there appear to be strong grounds to think that extremist groups played a role in stoking up much of the violence that unfolded.

Yet the government has had little to say about the organised violence from the other side of those clashes. Despite police ordering people to stay indoors, some migrants clashed with police and possibly also locals – not just with the organised far right.

How Russia Ended the Taliban’s Isolation

Giorgio Cafiero

Nearly four years after the Taliban reconquered Afghanistan, numerous countries have diplomatically engaged with the Islamic Emirate, accepting its rule as a political reality. Yet, no government had formally recognized the “Taliban 2.0” until Russia did so on July 3.

While Russia’s decision marked a major victory for the Kabul regime, exiled Afghan dissidents and human rights advocates strongly criticized Moscow’s move, arguing it risks legitimizing gender apartheid in Afghanistan while dimming prospects for democratic reforms.

Still, in the face of Afghanistan’s enduring hardships, Russia’s decision may mark the beginning of a new chapter—one in which greater international engagement could help steer the war-torn, impoverished country toward economic revival and enhanced stability.

The fact that Russia was the first to recognize the Islamic Emirate was unsurprising. Since the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, Russia-Taliban diplomatic engagement has steadily deepened.

In March 2022, Russia’s Foreign Ministry accredited Taliban envoy Jamal Nasir Gharwal as chargé d’affaires at the Afghan embassy in Moscow, with Gharwal formally assuming control of the mission the following month. This gradual normalization continued with Moscow revoking its terrorist designation of the Taliban in April 2025, paving the way for official recognition earlier this month.

Both Moscow and Kabul hope that Russia’s act of recognition will serve as a precedent, prompting a gradual cascade of similar moves by other non-Western nations.

“The decision to be the first country in the world to recognize the Taliban state was driven by Moscow’s desire to present itself as a leader in the region who is not afraid to set precedents. In this regard, the Kremlin hopes that its decision will be followed by other countries,” Nikita Smagin, an independent expert on Russia’s foreign policy in the Middle East, told this author.

Shifting Tides: The National Security Implications of the United States’ Pacific Drawdown

Charles Edel, Kathryn Paik, and John Augé

For the last decade, the United States has maintained that it is a “Pacific power,” and multiple administrations have affirmed the importance of the vast Pacific Islands region to U.S. national security. Increased engagement with the Pacific, which began under the first Trump administration,

has broad bipartisan support as a security priority. As the first 100 days of the second Trump administration drew to an end, rhetoric coming out of the administration echoed this trend, with Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth visiting Guam and Hawaii on his first trip to the Indo-Pacific, during which he stressed the critical nature of Pacific U.S. territories at the “tip of America’s spear” of deterrence.

However, Pacific leaders have consistently stated that they look to actions, and not just words, as proof of a nation’s commitments. Here, recent cuts to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the pausing of U.S. foreign assistance, enacting tariffs on small and vulnerable island economies, and deprioritizing climate change—the top priority for the region—have had a decidedly negative impact.

Regardless of U.S. intent, the perception across the Pacific of the United States as a disinterested and mercurial partner undercuts the country’s ability to build meaningful and lasting partnerships in the Pacific and simultaneously opens space for China to displace U.S. influence and presence in this critical region.

In a region that has quietly become a stage for great power competition, this perception of U.S. disinterest not only opens new entry points for Beijing’s influence but also puts wind in the sails of a new narrative: that it is China, not the United States, that is the committed partner and protector of global rules and norms.

While it is too soon to understand the full implications of the United States’ recent actions, early signs in the Pacific suggest that the trajectory is counter to U.S. interests. Reversing this trend will require quick action, sincere engagement, and creative diplomacy.

24 July 2025

The Taiwan scenarios 1: Subversion, quarantine, blockade, invasion

Xi likely favours a path to unification in which Taiwan is gradually worn down by sustained and intensifying Chinese coercion. However, if he sought to accelerate this process, he would likely favour actions that remained below the threshold of war but still compelled Taiwan to cede aspects of its sovereignty.

This could include the China Coast Guard enforcing a quarantine of Taiwan—asserting a right to block certain imports and exports— or covert acts of subversion intended to trigger a broader crisis and increase pressure on Taipei.

While more overt options, such as a full-scale invasion or naval blockade, remain possible, they carry significant risks that could threaten the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power. As long as Xi views these risks as credible, actions that could rapidly escalate to war are unlikely to be his preferred course.

Xi has made his intentions regarding Taiwan clear. At the 20th Party Congress, he reiterated that, while peaceful unification was his preferred approach, China still reserved the right to use force if necessary. Although he has set no specific deadline,

he warned in 2013 that the Taiwan issue ‘should not be passed down generation after generation.’ In his recent speeches, Xi continues to assert that unification is inevitable, signaling his determination to bring Taiwan under Beijing’s control sooner rather than later.

Mesh Sensing for Air and Missile Defense

Masao Dahlgren, Patrycja Bazylczyk, and Tom Karako

The era of massed air and missile threats is already here. Adversaries are finding and fixing friendly forces and aim to disrupt air defenses’ ability to see and make sense of the battlespace. What is needed is a thicket of sensors—both high- and low-end—to better survive this environment.

As Army doctrine exhorts, air defenders must “account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact.” To date, however, the air and missile defense force structure has remained too heavily reliant on handfuls of exquisite, large-signature surface-based radars.

Proliferation, distribution, and emission control are all needed adaptations in this era. To that end, this report describes what is needed to realize a proliferated, resilient surface-based sensor architecture,

with model-based analysis of asset coverage, engagement geometry, network bandwidth, and other factors. By combining meshed passive sensors with active radar, defenders could better cover difficult regions, conserve radar resources, and discriminate false targets from real ones.

This report is made possible by support from the Sierra Nevada Corporation and by general support to CSIS.

China’s Fast-Shrinking Central Military Commission: Implications for the PLA

Zi Yang

Since taking power, China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping has made purges under the anti-corruption pretext a hallmark of his tenure. As the chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), Xi executed similar purges in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA),

first targeting officers from rival factions before turning on military leaders that he had promoted himself. The second round of the PLA anti-corruption campaign, launched in 2023, has destabilized the military’s high command, leading to the downfall of several sitting CMC members.

Defense Minister and CMC member Li Shangfu was the first to fall, disappearing after August 2023. His case was referred for criminal prosecution in June 2024, but there has been no news regarding the verdict. In November 2024, the Director of the CMC Political Work Department Miao Hua also fell from grace. Then,

in April 2025, the Financial Times reported that CMC Vice Chairman He Weidong had been removed from power, making him the first incumbent CMC vice chairman to be purged since 1967. He has not appeared in public since.

These atypical removals have reduced CMC membership from seven to four. As China’s supreme defense decision-making organ, the CMC is responsible for managing some three million PLA personnel and 500,000 People’s Armed Police.

The downsizing of the CMC under extraordinary circumstances is bound to have profound consequences for the PLA’s ability to function as a modern warfighting organization.

Bureaucratized Confucianism: How Tradition Became a Tool of Control in China

Carlo J.V. Caro

What does it mean when a regime speaks the language of ancient virtue but enforces it through curriculum mandates and ideological scorecards? The opening essay of Simulated Sagehood, a five-part series, traces how Confucianism has been reconstructed, not as a living tradition, but as a calibrated instrument of bureaucratic control.

Through textbook reform, propaganda choreography, and institutional incentives, Xi’s China fuses ethical language with Leninist mechanics. The result is not revival but simulation: a Confucianism of surfaces, stripped of its moral interior.

The return of Confucian language under Chinese leader Xi Jinping isn’t a spontaneous cultural revival. It’s a carefully orchestrated campaign — engineered from the top of the Chinese party-state — to wrap centralized political control in the language of ancient virtue. What’s unfolding is a quiet reversal: values once rooted in moral constraint,

like filial piety, virtue, and ethical cultivation, are being refitted to serve a system built on obedience and authority. This isn’t Confucianism reborn. It’s a state-authored script, stitching together the vocabulary of tradition to legitimize modern power.

The turning point came in 2013 with a little-known but foundational document: the Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere — more commonly known as Document No. 9. Here, the Chinese Communist Party elevated “cultural security” to the same strategic level as political or cyber defense,

identifying “Western constitutional democracy,” “universal values,” and “historical nihilism” as existential threats. The proposed solution wasn’t dialogue or reform, but insulation: Confucian culture would be deployed as a kind of ideological firewall, meant to inoculate China against liberal ideas.

This approach was codified in the 2017 Opinions on Implementing the Inheritance and Development Project of Excellent Traditional Chinese Culture — a mouthful of a title, but one with clear intent. It brought Confucian texts under the wing of national security. The classics were no longer seen as sources of independent moral insight, but as symbolic tools linking the Communist Party to an unbroken Han civilizational arc.

Can Rapidus Achieve Japan’s Semiconductor Revival?

Atsushi Sumikawa

Japanese chipmakers gained supremacy in the global market during the 1980s. However, as the market evolved and new competitors emerged in East Asia, the country fell out in the race for advanced logic chip manufacturing. Today, Japan lags behind the world’s leading edge by as much as two decades.

The need to rebuild the domestic chipmaking industry has gained urgency among Japanese policymakers for strategic reasons. The supply chain disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the fragility of global semiconductor supplies.

Likewise, rising geopolitical risks – such as cross-strait tensions and China-U.S. competition – suggest the vulnerabilities of certain supply chain bottlenecks. With the global explosion of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, advanced semiconductors are also regarded as a key driver of broader economic growth.

At the heart of Japan’s economic strategy, Rapidus was founded in 2022 by the joint funding of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) and a group of eight leading corporations, including household names like Toyota Motors, NTT, Sony, and Softbank Group. Through aggressive investment and drawing best knowledge worldwide,

Rapidus aims to achieve mass production of today’s most advanced 2-nanometer process node logic chips in as little as five years. In April, the company activated its pilot production line in its newly constructed production site in Hokkaido, Japan. It plans to deliver its first prototypes as early as this July.

Despite the huge expectations it carries, Rapidus’ project has raised as much skepticism as it has hope. Given that advanced semiconductor production is one of the most complicated and capital-intensive industries in modern times, many point to the difficulty for a newcomer like Rapidus to achieve technological maturity on a compressed timeline.

Furthermore, many doubt Rapidus’ ability to break into the competition with existing players in the fierce global chip market. To successfully develop 2-nm chip production capability and embody the country’s semiconductor revival, Rapidus must overcome at least three key hurdles.

The Great Wall Between China and the EU

Zoltán Fehér and Valbona Zeneli

In times of evolving transatlantic dynamics under the second Trump administration, and in response to shifting global power balances, some within the European Union have shown interest in exploring a more nuanced engagement with China.

However, there are structural obstacles to a warming up between Brussels and Beijing, considering China’s unfair trade practices in the economic sphere, its troubling human rights record, and its alliance with Russia and support for Moscow’s war on Ukraine in the security sphere. China’s leadership is not willing to change course. Instead,

China is gambling on the EU’s weakness and hoping that Brussels will simply give in. While the EU is indeed in a tough spot currently, it cannot agree to a “grand deal” if China is unwilling to make major concessions on its unfair economic practices and support for the war in Ukraine.

Now all eyes are on the upcoming China-EU summit to take place in Beijing on July 24, an important gathering that will mark 50 years of diplomatic relations. But if the summit demonstrates anything,

it will be the fact that China is unwilling to play by the rules of the international order and that it is in neither in the EU’s nor in the United States’ interests to try to make a grand deal with Beijing without a major paradigm shift in China’s behavior.

The months-long discourse about an China-EU rapprochement and the China-EU summit take place against the backdrop of major divisions between the EU and the United States in recent months. The second Trump administration’s initial ambiguity on support for Ukraine and the assertive approach toward the EU in its trade policy created uncertainty in Europe,

The Syrian State After Suwayda

Kheder Khaddour

After fourteen years of civil war, Syria is engaged in its toughest battle yet, namely reshaping the state during a complex transitional phase in which local and regional dynamics have become intertwined. The recent events in Suwayda, which quickly descended into sectarian violence,

exposed the limits of centralized control and attempts to impose sovereignty within fragile local contexts. Southern Syria, long a contested zone of influence, has resurfaced as a place of conflict, where localism has merged with sectarianism, and where national politics have clashed with regional ambitions.

The Suwayda fighting followed the kidnapping of a Druze vegetable seller by a Bedouin group, in a region where the Druze-Bedouin rivalry has long simmered. This soon escalated into widespread sectarian violence, marked by retaliatory attacks and summary executions. The transitional government,

led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, sent government forces to Suwayda to restore order. However, the military operation failed both tactically and politically, as these forces were accused of perpetrating human rights violations against Druze civilians. Meanwhile, Israel seized the moment to implement a decision taken last February that southern Syria remain demilitarized,

and it carried through on its pledge to protect the Druze in Suwayda by bombing the Syrian Defense Ministry in Damascus and an area near the presidential palace. This led to outside intervention to prevent an escalation,

leading to an agreement involving the United States and the Syrian authorities. Syrian government forces were compelled to withdraw from Suwayda, and since then a shaky ceasefire has been in place.

At the height of the fighting, Bedouin tribes mobilized on the outskirts of Suwayda Governorate in solidarity with their Bedouin kin, but they lacked a unified leadership. The Bedouin-Druze fighting, with government forces deployed in the background, transformed the conflict from a relatively limited local dispute into a complex multiparty struggle with regional repercussions.

US Warns Over Another Middle East War

The United States has warned there is "no Plan B" for Syria as it called for calm following a ceasefire brokered with Israel in the wake of clashes in southern Syria in which Israeli forces intervened.

"President Trump has huge interest in making sure we have regional stability," U.S. Ambassador to Turkey and Envoy to Syria Thomas Barrack said in Lebanon.

Newsweek has reached out to the U.S. State Department, the Syrian government and the Israeli prime minister's office for comment.

Why It Matters

Syria is at the intersection of conflicts involving major Middle Eastern powers Israel, Iran and Turkey and if it spins out of control it could become an epicenter of a bigger regional war that could also pull in the United States.

The ambassador's comments highlighted U.S. support for the transitional Syrian government of President Ahmad al-Sharaa, a former jihadi who overthrew Iranian-backed President Bashar al-Assad late last year.

Syria is trying to rebuild, regain control from armed groups, stop sectarian violence, and fight off ISIS. The latest fighting and Israel's expanded deployment shows the situation remains fragile.

Syrian soldiers raise the Syrian national flag in front of the Syrian Defense Ministry building, which was heavily damaged by Israeli airstrikes last Wednesday, in Damascus, Syria, Saturday, July 19, 2025. Omar Sanadiki/AP Photo

What To Know

U.S. envoy Tom Barrack on Monday reaffirmed support for Syria's transitional government, saying there's "no Plan B" for uniting the war-torn country. He said Israel's intervention "creates another very confusing chapter" and "came at a very bad time," in an interview with the Associated Press on Monday.

Confucian peace myth: East Asia minus US risks disaster

Hanjin Lew

Recently, several arguments have emerged suggesting that Korea, Japan and China could peacefully coexist without the US’s presence in Northeast Asia.

Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs recently argued that China has never invaded Japan in its entire history – aside from two failed attempts – and characterized Japan’s incursions into China as anomalies.

Citing Harvard sociologist Ezra Vogel, he claimed the two Confucian civilizations enjoyed nearly 2,000 years of relative peace – a striking contrast, he noted, to the near-constant wars between Britain and France.

Yonsei University professor Jeffrey Robertson added that, as “US attention drifts away from East Asia, the unthinkable becomes thinkable” – a region where Europe, Russia, India, and China balance each other imperfectly, but none dominates.

Political scientist John Mearsheimer also weighed in: “If I were the national security adviser to Deng Xiaoping – or Xi Jinping – and they asked me what I thought about the US military presence in East Asia, I’d say, ‘I want the Americans out. I don’t want them in our backyard.’”

This vision of a self-balancing Asia – shared by economists, sociologists, strategists and realists alike – assumes that history, culture and trust can fill the vacuum left by American power. But can it?

Confucian peace myth

Sachs’s notion of a historical “Confucian peace” collapses under scrutiny. In his speech, he conveniently omits Korea – arguably the most Confucian state in East Asia – which has frequently been at war with both China and Japan.

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