China Ascendant?

by Stephen D. Krasner

Tuesday, July 22, 2014 

http://www.hoover.org/research/china-ascendent 

When it comes to the international system, realists believe that changing distributions of power are dangerous. The territorial boundaries, spheres of influence, and international regimes of the old order may no longer be stable. A rising power may use its newfound military capability to change existing territorial boundaries or even to completely conquer and annex all of the territory of a neighboring state. Extant spheres of influence within which a dominant power is able to influence or dictate the important foreign policy choices of subordinate states, including their security alliances and trade policies, may crumble, if they are challenged by a rising power that can make credible threats with regard to military action and trade sanctions, or offer promises of greater security or prosperity. International regimes, whose rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures have been taken for granted or at least not actively challenged, may not be sustainable if a rising power refuses to adhere to them or offers some alternative principles and rules that might be more attractive for weaker states.

The classic example of the dangers presented by power transitions is the rise of Germany in Europe in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. The following table shows the percentage of world capabilities for major countries from 1870 to 2007. These scores are based on the composite index of national capabilities (CINC), which is derived from six indicators (energy consumption, iron and steel production, military expenditure, military personnel, total population, and urban population). The table clearly shows the rise of German power from 1870 to 1939. Germany’s share of world power increased from 11 percent in 1870 when its still trailed Britain and France, to 16 percent on the eve of the first world war when it was the most powerful state in Europe but still trailed the United States, to 18 percent in 1939 when it was tied with the United States at the top.

CINC INDICATORS (% OF WORLD CAPABILITIES) 1870-2007

US Intelligence Community Has Repeatedly Underestimated the Threat Posed by ISIS, Report

Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes
Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2014
U.S. Underestimated Urgency of Islamic State Threat in Iraq

WASHINGTON—Days before the takeover of the Iraqi city of Mosul by the militant group calling itself the Islamic State, U.S. intelligence analysts were sharply divided over whether the group would seize the city, according to people familiar with the debate.


U.S. officials saw initial indications the group might seek to take Mosul and urged Iraqi action, to no avail. But on the day of the June 10 takeover, U.S. officials played down its significance. “Obviously, this has got our attention in Mosul, but it doesn’t change the calculus,” said Rear. Adm. John Kirby, the chief Pentagon spokesman.

Although U.S. spy agencies have monitored and warned about the Islamic State over the past year, they often have underestimated the group’s ability to make rapid operational gains, U.S. officials said. That was the case a week ago when militants launched a dramatic and successful offensive in Iraq’s Kurdish region.

The offensive prompted President Barack Obama to authorize an airstrike campaign. The president acknowledged Saturday that U.S. spies and policy makers had underestimated the group, also known as ISIS and ISIL. “There is no doubt that their advance, their movement over the last several months has been more rapid than the intelligence estimates, and I think the expectations of policy makers both in and outside of Iraq,” he said.

The inability of U.S. spy agencies to provide details about the timing of Islamic State offensives or their likelihood of success has touched off debate among U.S. national-security officials about whether intelligence on the group has been adequate.

The struggle to understand the capabilities of the group reflects the difficulty of collecting detailed intelligence on its internal planning. “Collection is tough,” one senior U.S. official acknowledged.

That is the challenge facing intelligence officials and the U.S. military as American warplanes launch waves of airstrikes. The success of the strikes may depend in part on how well the U.S. is able to read the group.

A decline in U.S. spy resources after the U.S. military pulled out of Iraq in 2011 has limited American intelligence capability in the region. In some cases, intelligence officials have been frustrated by the Obama administration’s reluctance to get more involved in Iraq and Syria, current and former U.S. officials said.

Intelligence officials say that while they can assess a situation, they can’t predict outcomes. “The will to fight is inherently difficult to assess,” said Jeff Anchukaitis, a spokesperson for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. “Analysts must make assessments based on perceptions of command and control, leadership abilities, quality of experience and discipline under fire—none of which can be understood with certainty until the first shots are fired.”

"Managing the U.S.-China Great Power Relationship"

Author: Robert D. Blackwill, International Council Member, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

June 18, 2014

Presentation to The World Cultural Forum

Robert D. Blackwill presented to The World Cultural Forum a speech entitled "Managing the U.S.-China Great Power Relationship," on June 18, 2014 in Shanghai.

To see the full text of his speech, please find a link to the PDF below:

2014-06-14 RB Shanghai Speech.pdf (331K PDF)

Hamas Beat Israel in Latest Fighting Over Gaza Strip, Israeli Analyst

Ronen Bergman

New York Times, August 10, 2014

How Hamas Beat Israel in Gaza

Tel Aviv — If body-counts and destroyed weaponry are the main criteria for victory, Israel is the clear winner in the latest confrontation with Hamas. There’s no doubt that Israel could conquer the entire Gaza Strip and completely wipe out Hamas’s military apparatus. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has chosen not to do so and now enjoys his highest approval ratings ever.

But counting bodies is not the most important criterion in deciding who should be declared the victor. Much more important is comparing each side’s goals before the fighting and what they have achieved. Seen in this light, Hamas won.

Hamas started the war because it was in dire straits; its relations with Iran and Egypt were severed. But soon enough Hamas was dictating the duration of the conflict by repeatedly refusing cease-fires. Furthermore, it preserved its capability of firing rockets and missiles at most of Israel’s territory, despite the immense effort the Israeli Air Force invested in knocking out launch sites.

Hamas also waged an urban campaign against Israeli ground forces, inflicting at least five times as many casualties as in the last conflict and successfully used tunnels to penetrate Israeli territory and sow fear and demoralization. It made Israel pay a heavy price and the I.D.F. eventually withdrew its ground troops from Gaza without a cease-fire.

Israeli leaders have now set the demilitarization of Gaza as one of their goals. But it’s difficult to picture how this could be achieved. Hamas would never agree to disarm unless faced with a protracted Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, which is something the Mr. Netanyahu has declared he won’t undertake.

So how did a terrorist guerrilla organization overcome the strongest army in the Middle East?

After Iraq: Surviving the Summer of Global Chaos

James Jay Carafano

August 10, 2014

If Obama really plans to come back from the beach with real long-term plans, he needs to address Iraq, as well as other foreign policy obstacles, in the context of relations with Tehran and Moscow.

“I don’t think we’re going to solve this problem in weeks,” said President Obama said Saturday. Summing up his new strategy for Iraq, he added, “This going to be a long-term project.”

Indeed, it won’t be easy to sort out a winning way forward for Iraq. The president's problems with Baghdad are intertwined with a series of setbacks his foreign policy has suffered during this ongoing summer of chaos.

For weeks, the Administration has hopped from crisis to crisis like a globe-trotting traveler skipping across continents. From Syria to Ukraine to Iraq, then Gaza, back to Ukraine, then Afghanistan, back to Gaza, now Iraq,with another round of crisis possible in the Ukraine, the president's problems are piling up.

Without question each of these challenges is unique. There is no grand conspiracy bent on spoiling the First Family’s summer vacation. Besides, it matters little at this point how this mess started. Where the U.S. goes from here is far more important than mulling over where it has been.

Fixing foreign policy has to be the president's top concern.

What is most troubling about each of these troubles is what they have in common.

First, each impacts a vital U.S. interest. The stability of Europe, South Asia and the Middle East are all important to the United States. Each of these conflicts has the potential to lead to spiraling violence or strategic competition that could fuel much bigger dangers. The White House ought to take action in each case to safeguard American interests.

Second, in every one of these crisis the U.S. finds itself chaffing with Iran or Russia. The U.S. has sketchy relations and clashing interests with both. But the U.S. can't effectively engage with the world unless it figures out how to engage with them.

If President Obama really plans to come back from the beach with real long-term plans, he needs to address Iraq, as well as other foreign policy obstacles, in the context of relations with Tehran and Moscow.

The glib answer would be this is an opportunity for the three powers to work together. After all, the U.S., Iran, and Russia have all been targets of Islamist terrorist groups linked to Sunni-extremists. The U.S. and Iran share concerns with the future of Iraq. Nobody is happy with the roiling conflict in Syria. Nobody wants Afghanistan to be "their" problem.

But don't look for even tacit coordination between Washington, Moscow and Tehran.

The Last Pagans of Iraq

Sanjeev Sanyal

AUG 8, 2014 1

Source Link 

Sanjeev Sanyal, named "Young Global Leader 2010" by the World Economic Forum, he is the author of The Indian Renaissance: India's Rise After a Thousand Years of Decline (Penguin 2008) and Land of the Seven Rivers: A Brief History of India's Geography (Penguin 2012). 

SINGAPORE – With US President Barack Obama belatedly ordering air strikes and humanitarian airdrops of food and relief supplies to refugees in northern Iraq, the world is finally taking action against the Islamic State. Within a few months, the jihadist group, which until recently called itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, has taken control of large parts of both countries, where it has proclaimed a new “Caliphate.” But the real reason to fear the Islamic State is not its lust for power; it is the systematic, cold-blooded way in which its members are erasing the region’s social, cultural, and demographic past.

Within a few weeks, the Islamic State has virtually eliminated the entire Shia Muslim and Christian populations from the lands that it controls. The city of Mosul, home to one of the world’s oldest Christian communities, no longer has any Christians left. Priceless Assyrian artifacts have been publicly destroyed in a campaign against idolatry.

Indeed, the Islamic State has not even spared Sunni co-religionists who do not adhere to their extreme interpretation of Islam. A number of revered shrines have been demolished, including one said to be the Tomb of Jonah.

As terrible as all of this is, the worst of the persecution has been aimed at the Yezidi, an ancient religious group that lives among the Kurds. They number less than a half-million, and two-thirds of them live around Mosul in northern Iraq. The rest are scattered across neighboring countries like Syria, Armenia, and Turkey. More recent immigrant communities are to be found in Germany and the United States.

Although influenced over the centuries by Christianity and Islam, the Yezidi religion has ancient pagan roots that go back at least to the late Bronze Age. Interestingly, their beliefs have many similarities with Hinduism – for example, they believe in reincarnation, say their prayers facing the sun at sunrise and sunset, and even have a system of castes. They also worship Tawûsê-Melek, the peacock angel – a bird that is found in the Indian sub-continent but not in Yezidi lands.

While the origins of the Yezidi are uncertain, cultural and genetic evidence suggests that they may be remnants of Indian tribes that migrated west in the second millennium BC. There is considerable evidence of Indian links with the Middle East during the Bronze Age. For example, Zoroastrianism, the religion of ancient Iran – to which Yezidi religious beliefs have been linked – is closely related to early Hinduism.

The jihadist governance dilemma

By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Amichai Magen 

Source Link

On June 16,demonstrators chant pro-Islamic State slogans as they carry the group’s flags in front of the provincial government headquarters in Mosul, 225 miles northwest of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. (AP) 

After making astounding territorial gains in its war against the Iraqi government, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – which has refashioned itself “the Islamic State” – declared that it had reestablished the caliphate. The group’s gains put a spotlight on several questions related to Salafi jihadists’ efforts at building states. Can jihadists govern? Can they sustainably control and extract resources from territory and populations? As Ariel Ahram recently wrote for The Monkey Cage, insurgent groups face a “resource curse” that has a significant impact on their conflicts; this is true of Iraq, where the Islamic State has gained momentum in its efforts to control oil and water resources. But beyond these factors that confront any insurgency, jihadist groups face distinctive governance problems that they won’t be able to overcome in the near future, and will struggle mightily to address in the longer term. 

Academics have grown increasingly interested in non-state actors’ attempts at governance. In Inside Rebellion, Jeremy Weinstein finds that a violent non-state actor’s discipline is central to determining whether it will build governance structures and protect populations from violence or kill indiscriminately. Weinstein concludes that richer organizations have a harder time maintaining discipline because they attract opportunists obsessed with immediate gain, and thus predisposed to violence, while resource-poor organizations instead attract committed individuals with a shared sense of purpose. Thus, Weinstein believes resource-poor organizations are more likely to establish governance and provide services. In Rebel Rulers, Zachariah Cherian Mampilly examines the variance in governing strategies among insurgent groups, focusing on the groups’ initial leadership decisions and subsequent interactions with various actors. Among other things, he argues insurgent groups are more likely to establish governance if the state had significant penetration prior to insurgent takeover of a region. 

Jihadists have now had several experiences with governance: In Iraq (2006-08), Somalia (2007-12), Yemen (2011-12), North Mali (2012-13), and again in Iraq (2014-??). There have been some efforts by scholars to examine jihadist governance, but given how important governance is to jihadists, this is an area ripe for more detailed examination. 

Ukrainian Army Says It Has Split Rebel Forces and Is Close to Capturing Donetsk

Ukraine’s Forces Say Close to Taking Rebel-Held Donetsk

Reuters, August 11, 2014

KIEV/DONETSK — The Ukrainian military said on Monday it was preparing for a “final stage” of taking back the city of Donetsk from pro-Russian separatists after making significant gains that have split rebel forces on the ground.

Spokesman Andriy Lysenko said Kiev’s troops had now cut Donetsk off from the other main rebel-held city of Luhansk, 150 km (90 miles) away, on the border with Russia.

"The forces of the anti-terrorist operation are preparing for the final stage of liberating Donetsk," Lysenko told Reuters. "Our forces have completely cut Donetsk off from Luhansk. We are working to liberate both towns but it’s better to liberate Donetsk first - it is more important."

The city, which had a pre-conflict population of 900,000, rocked to the crash of shells and gunfire over the weekend and heavy guns boomed through the night into Monday from the outskirts of the city.

There was no definitive word on casualties from either side from the weekend assault by the government.

One artillery shell hit a high-security prison on the city’s western outskirts late on Sunday, killing one inmate and injuring three others, the city council said. More than 100 inmates escaped from the “strict regime” prison for dangerous criminals after the shell struck - though some returned later.

Further shelling on Monday from the direction of the international airport and Yasynuvata to the north knocked out a string of power stations, the municipal authority added.

Government forces called on the rebels to surrender on Sunday. The separatists, who have proclaimed “people’s republics” in the Russian-speaking east, have said there will be no end to fighting until Kiev withdraws its troops.

"TIGHTENING THE RING"

Though the government says it is tightening a cordon around the separatists in Donetsk amid changes in their leadership and desertions in their ranks, swathes of the east are still under rebel control including the big border city of Luhansk, Horlivka to the north of Donetsk and Makiyivka to its east.

U.N. agencies say more than 1,100 people have been killed in four months of fighting between the separatists who seek union with Russia and troops representing a pro-Western government.

Ukrainian Army Pressing Its Attack to Take Rebel-Held City of Donetsk

Ukraine Steps Up Assault of Rebel City

Andrew E. Kramer

New York Times,  August 11, 2014

DONETSK, Ukraine — Ukraine pressed ahead on Sunday with its military assault to stamp out pro-Russian separatists in the east of the country with its most intensive artillery bombardment of this rebel capital yet.

The attack with artillery and ground-to-ground rockets defied Russian threats to intervene here as the civilian death toll rose.

It also reinforced the Ukrainian leadership’s rejection of a cease-fire on humanitarian grounds offered on Saturday by the head of the main pro-Russian separatist group here, the Donetsk People’s Republic. The separatist leadership clarified Sunday that the cease-fire offer had covered only so-called green routes, or roads used by evacuees.

Still, Ukraine’s outright rebuff of the proposal only added to concerns that Russia would intervene with what the authorities in Moscow are calling a humanitarian mission but what European nations and the United States would view as an invasion, analysts said. Secretary of State John Kerry has cautioned Russiaagainst intervening on the “pretext” of providing aid.

Through the day on Sunday, artillery shells rained down on three districts of Donetsk, hitting a rebel checkpoint and leaving it swathed in smoke, but also striking houses, apartment buildings and the maternity ward of the city’s main hospital.

Shells killed at least one civilian in the city. Roma Pronyakin, 37, was at home with his mother, watching TV, when their living room was struck. His mother, Alla, stood on the road in a state of shock. “I had one son, and now I have none,” she said.

A pro-Ukrainian paramilitary group called the Azov battalion, one of a half-dozen such organizations positioned around the city and used for urban combat, said Sunday that its fighters had raided the Ilovaisky district of the city, but pulled back.

The Ukrainian military said it had engaged in 30 firefights with the pro-Russian separatists in the previous 24 hours.

“The terrorists who are still active in Donetsk and Luhansk regions should lay down their arms and not bring up empty conversations about cease-fires,” a Ukrainian military spokesman said in Kiev, according to Ukrinform, the state news agency.

“If they want to take initiative, it is realized in a practical way, not with words, but by raising a white flag and laying down arms,” the spokesman said. “In this case, nobody will shoot the terrorists.”

The city’s main hospital, known as Hospital No. 1, was struck Sunday by artillery fire for a second time in recent days. It has the misfortune of falling right in the center of a line of fire between Ukrainian positions outside the city and the rebel military headquarters.

Photo


Ukrainian soldiers pressed ahead with their campaign to stamp out pro-Russia separatists in the east of the country with a bombardment of the rebel capital, Donetsk. Credit Roman Pilipey/European Pressphoto Agency

Pity America’s Friends

By James Kirchick

AUGUST 8, 2014 

http://www.nationalreview.com/article/385048/pity-americas-friends-james-kirchick

People in the Middle East who put their trust in Barack Obama are suffering right now. 

Too little too late? Iraqi Yazidis take shelter in Dohuk. (Getty Images)

In January, President Obama likened fighters from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria to a “jayvee team” in Lakers jerseys on the basketball court.

Eight months later, that squad of bloodthirsty maniacs is playing quite a game of pickup. Occupying swaths of territory stretching from Syria into Iraq, ISIS stands in control of a landmass unprecedented in the annals of terrorist organizations, makes millions of dollars a day selling oil on the black market, has beheaded men and sold women into slavery, and now threatens to kill 40,000 Yazidis — an Iraqi sect ISIS accuses of devil-worship.

It was the plight of the Yazidis, stranded on a mountain, that ultimately compelled the president to initiate a humanitarian airlift of food and water, which he announced from the White House Thursday night. The president has also authorized a limited number of air strikes on ISIS forces approaching the Yazidis. The mission, however, according to White House press secretary Josh Earnest, will be “very limited in scope.” This led Senator John McCain, in an exclusive interviewwith my Daily Beast colleague Josh Rogin, to ridicule the strikes as mere “pinpricks,” a reference to Obama’s insistence last year that the strikes he briefly supported in response to Assad’s chemical-weapons attacks would not be useless.Asked seven years ago if the need to stave off potential genocide might convince him to change his mind about a total and precipitous withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, then-candidate Obama replied that it would not. “Well, look, if that’s the criteria by which we are making decisions on the deployment of U.S. forces, then by that argument you would have 300,000 troops in the Congo right now — where millions have been slaughtered as a consequence of ethnic strife — which we haven’t done,” Obama said.

This cynical avowal, I wrote at the time, was an indication of what might become the “Obama doctrine,” which I described thusly: “The United States will remain passive in the face of genocide.” Seven years later, I regret to say, my prediction stands up pretty well.

Why the US-Africa Summit Was Important and Why It Wasn't Enough

Source Link

If America really wants to help Africa grow with trade and investment, it needs to ditch a number of stereotypes it still holds.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times….

It was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair. 

Those words penned by Charles Dickens about the period leading up to the French Revolution seem quite applicable to Africa today on the heels of the first-ever U.S.-Africa Summit. The Summit rightly focused primarily on the “spring of hope” being experienced by many in Africa’s burgeoning middle and upper classes, fueled by impressive economic growth data and lucrative trade and investment opportunities in a continent which hosts six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world. But life remains truly a “winter of despair” for the millions of hungry, impoverished, displaced, and conflict-affected people who don’t fit easily into the “Africa Rising” narrative being burnished around Washington this week. 

The Summit had many objectives: increasing trade and investment between the U.S. and Africa; delivering messages about the critical need for better governance; showing strong support for African civil society’s contribution to state-building; the list could go on and on. And there was important progress made on a number of these goals. But underlying all this was a more general and ambitious aspiration: to change the narrative about Africa from that of a basket case to a land of opportunity. 

Americans’ perceptions of Africa remain rooted in troubling stereotypes of helplessness and perpetual crisis. Therefore, the Summit’s focus on positive trends on the continent is crucial to beginning to re-calibrate the story of Africa to one more balanced between progress and setbacks. But addressing that “winter of despair” should not reinforce the inaccurate perceptions. 

"Learn, But Don't Overlearn, Vietnam's Lessons"

Author: Nicholas Burns, Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Politics, Harvard Kennedy School

Op-Ed, Boston Globe

August 3, 2014

Belfer Center Programs or Projects: The Future of Diplomacy Project

A half century after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution catapulted the United States head first into the tragedy of Vietnam, three lessons stand out.

First, the memory of over 58,000 American soldiers lost in that long, tortuous war compels our presidents to set the bar very high when contemplating the use of force. Vietnam tore a gaping hole in every American city and town over the sacrifice of young men sent to fight Communism in Indochina.

Second, presidents can too often see the military as a quick fix for complex international problems. Vietnam should remind us there is always the alternative of diplomacy. While negotiating with enemies to prevent war is not always possible, presidents should think diplomacy first and resort to war only when there is truly no other choice.

But, third, we can also misinterpret or overlearn the lessons of bitter wars such as Vietnam and Iraq. We become so convinced by the error of the last war that we are incapable of confronting new threats when they inevitably arise. The “Vietnam syndrome” cast a pall over American foreign policy for two decades. It made us an uncertain and hesitant power, robbing us of the self-confidence needed by the most powerful country in the world.

We may be suffering something similar today, following the bloody and divisive wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Are we pulling back too much on the throttle of global leadership and succumbing to a new isolation from the world’s ills? The Gulf of Tonkin disaster reminds us to be wary of rushing to war. But, the world also needs a strong and purposeful America, ready to meet new challenges 50 years later.

Nicholas Burns is a professor of the practice of diplomacy and international politics at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. Follow him on Twitter @rnicholasburns.

OBAMA’S BOMBSHELL: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF AIR STRIKES IN IRAQ

by Fortuna's Corner

August 10, 2014

http://www.foreignaffairs.com

Finally, in military terms, strikes will rapidly hit the point of diminishing returns for the United States. ISIS consists essentially of light infantry. When the fighters mass, or move via convoy, U.S. firepower can be effective at killing and dispersing them. But there are relatively few fighters to begin with — one of the astounding things about this war — and they don’t possess installations, depots, or other assets that the United States can menace. In this fight, airpower alone can be used effectively. But winning would require a combination of both ground troops and air superiority. And it won’t be the United States that supplies the ground troops. At the moment, though, the plight of Yezidis and Christians and the imminent exposure of Americans to jihadi raiders make that tomorrow’s concern.

Obama’s Bombshell

The Unintended Consequences of Air Strikes in Iraq

Steven Simon

STEVEN SIMON is Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C.

On Thursday, U.S. President Barack Obama authorized limited air strikes on militants in Iraq to stop their advance toward Erbil, where a number of U.S. diplomats, civilians, and military personnel reside. He also promised to send aid to refugees fleeing the militants’ advance. The next morning, warplanes struck the first targets as the United States rushed assistance to a Kurdish-speaking religious minority, the Yezidis, which had recently been pushed into the mountains by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Air strikes are undoubtedly necessary for the narrow purposes stipulated by Obama. But they will have a wide range of unintended consequences — some relatively manageable, others less so.

Despite Obama’s carefully framed justification for the strikes — to protect Americans and to help minorities — the inadvertent beneficiary is the Iraqi government, which gets to retain its free-rider status. So far, Baghdad’s response to the current crisis has been the political equivalent of rearranging deck chairs on a plunging Titanic. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his allies have done nothing to salvage the Iraqi state, despite the selection of a new president and speaker of the parliament, or to fulfill the prime moral directive of any government: to protect the population from harm. The strikes will almost certainly reassure these officials that their torpor has been justified, that others — Iran, the United States, or both — can be expected to do the job. In turn, Iraqi officials’ will to counter the ISIS threat will further diminish.

HACKER SHOWS HOW [EASY IT IS] TO BREAK INTO MILITARY COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

by Fortuna's Corner

August 10, 2014

http://www.fortunascorner.wordpress.com

Hacker Shows How To Break Into Military Communications Systems

The use of satellite communications is ubiquitous throughout the U.S. military — in both strategic and tactical environments. Patrick Tucker, writing in the August 7, 2014 DefenseOne.com, notes that a “a well-known hacker claim’s he’s found some major flaws in the communication equipment that U.S. ground troops use to coordinate movements. The equipment is also common on a variety of commercial ships and aircraft rely on to give pilots vital information. In other words, you can hack planes,” Mr. Tucker writes.

Speaking at the annual gathering of cyber security geeks — The Black Hat Conference — in Las Vegas, Nevada last week, cyber security analyst Ruben Santamarta of IOActive, presented a “much anticipated paper showing that communications devices from Harris, Hughes, Cobham, Thuraya, JRC, and Iridium — are all highly vulnerable to [cyber] attack,” wrote Mr. Tucker. “The security flaws are numerous; but, the most important one — the one that’s most consistent across the systems — is back doors,” Mr. Santamarta contends. “Another common security flaw,” he observed was hardcoded credentials, which allows multiple users access to a system — via a single login identity.”

Santamarta argued that “a satellite communications system that’s common in military aviation, the Cobham Aviator 700D, could be hacked in a way that could affect devices that interact with critical systems — possibly resulting in “catastrophic failure.” Mr. Tucker adds that “in conversations with reporters, Santamarta was careful to point out that none of the vulnerabilities he found could directly cause a plane to crash, or override pilot commands. But, the security gaps were significant enough,” he argued, — “that a hacker could make it much harder to fly.”

“The most serious vulnerability, Santamarta found on Cobham’s equipment,” writes Mr. Tucker, “allowed a hacker access to systems swift broadband unit, or SBU, and the satellite data unit, SDU.” “Any of the systems connected to these elements, such as the Multifunction Control Display Unit (MDCU), could be impacted by a successful attack,” Mr. Santamarta wrote in his paper. “The SBU contains a wireless access point.”

“The MDCU provides information on such vital areas as the amount of fuel left in a plane,” writes Mr. Tucker. “A hacker could give the pilot a lot of bad information that could imperil the aircraft, as happened in 2001 aboard Transat Flight 236, when a mechanical error did not inform the pilots that fuel was being diverted to a leaky tank. The pilots did not know the severity of the mechanical problem — until there was a massive power failure in mid-air,” noted Mr. Tucker.

“IOActive found vulnerabilities an attacker could use to bypass authorization mechanisms — in order to access interfaces that may allow control of the SBU, or SDU. Any of these systems connected to these elements, such as the MCDU, could be impacted by a successful attack,” Mr. Santamarta wrote.

Ebola virus: Public health a big challenge

Ajey Lele

August 11, 2014

The death toll from the recent outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa, which began in March 2014, is now over 900. Initially the disease spread was slow; however during the end of July, within a span of two-three days, more than 50 to 60 deaths have occurred indicating the gravity of the situation and an urgency to respond quickly. The World Bank has announced allocation of USD 200m as emergency assistance for West African countries to contain the Ebola outbreak. Initially the spread of the virus was restricted to states like Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The disease has now engulfed more states with infections rising sharply. The World Health Organization (WHO) is constantly monitoring the situation and has called for concentrated efforts by all. Currently, the Red Cross, United State’s Center for Disease Control (CDC) and few European Union and African agencies are providing both technical as well as financial support to tackle this threat.

This virus was first identified in the 1970s and its initial symptoms are similar to flu or the common cold but over a period of time advances to vomiting, upset stomach, organ failure and bleeding. During the last four decades there have been dozens of Ebola outbreaks, mainly in Central and East Africa. The rate of fatality has been around 55 per cent of the infected cases. Ebola is not spread through casual contact but is highly contagious; the deadliest strain of this disease can kill up to 90 per cent. Unfortunately, no medicine has yet been found for curing this disease nor any vaccine is available to stop its spread. While a good number of health workers are assisting authorities in Africa to handle this threat but more than 50 doctors have died in the process of controlling this outbreak.

Compared to the cases in the past this time the disease spread has been quick and has rapidly covered a wide geographical span. There could be many reasons for this. One, this time the disease is found to be prevalent more in cities suggesting clearly that a vast number of people undertake intra and interstate travel. Two, it may be true that owing to the nature of the disease, the exact identification took time, which unknowingly allowed the spread of the disease. Three, the present virus is the most deadly strain in the Ebola virus family and the disease appears to be contagious. Four, in certain parts of Africa panic among local communities lead to attacks on health workers and the process of ‘isolation’ stands hampered. In the absence of any known treatment, the medical aid administered is only in the form of a supportive therapy to control the deterioration of health.

Various countries have already started putting systems in place to guard against any likely impact of this disease. Obviously the immediate threat is expected from the airline travelers from the African region. Some airlines have already stopped their flight operations to a few places in Africa. Also, a few states have started undertaking “passive screening” at various international airports for passengers returning from the affected African countries.

Gauging the Success of Pakistan’s North Waziristan Operation

Gauging the Success of Pakistan’s North Waziristan Operation http://www.criticalthreats.org/pakistan/jan-gauging-success-nwa-operation-july-25-2014

Between Co-operation and Insulation: Afghanistan’s Relations with the Central Asian Republics https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/20140608-Bleuer_Kazemi-Central_Asia.pdf

Predictions of the Third War on Gaza http://studies.aljazeera.net/ResourceGallery/media/Documents/2014/7/24/2014724112746580734Predictions%20of%20the%20Third%20War%20on%20Gaza.pdf

Shi'ites of the Middle East: An Iranian Fifth Column? http://www.aei.org/files/2014/07/03/-shiites-of-the-middle-east_135242134698.pdf

Hamas Underground Warfare http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Hecht-Eado-Underground-Warfare-DW-edit-most-recent.pdf

Mowing the Grass in Gaza http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Inbar-Efraim-and-Shamir-Eitan-Mowing-the-Grass-in-Gaza-PP255-20-July-20141.pdf

Strategic Implications of Operation Protective Edge http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Sandler-Shmuel-Strategic-Implications-of-Operation-Protective-Edge-PP256-Jul-22-2014.pdf

The War With Hamas; Decision Time Approaching http://besacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Amidror-Yaacov-Decision-Time-Approaching-PP257-Post-track-changes.pdf

National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/MAB_2014.pdf

The Indian Ocean Region: A Strategic Net Assessment http://csis.org/files/publication/140725_Indian_Ocean_Region.pdf

Understanding India's Maoists http://idsa.in/system/files/book_UnderstandingIndiasMaoist.pdf

Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings: Implications for the Region and Beyond http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1208

Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213

Joint Pub 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_05.pdf

Of Spycraft and Statecraft

by Josef Joffe

Friday, July 18, 2014

"Gentlemen don't read each other's mail," expounded Henry Stimson when explaining why he had closed the State Department's code-breaking office in 1929. Gentlemen no longer populate the spy business, and the United States has 16 intelligence outfits rather, than none as in the 1930s, with at least $80 billion in spending-money per year.

With this embarrassment of riches, the spooks naturally seek out ever more business opportunities; call it "supply-side spying." The latest targets have been the Germans—America's trusty comrades-in-snooping ever since Reinhard Gehlen, head of Wehrmacht intelligence on the Eastern front, had the good sense to abscond to the U.S. side in 1945. To prove his bona fides, Gehlen delivered crates of microfiches to his new friends.

Ever since, the German BND (Federal Intelligence Service) and its U.S. counterparts have enjoyed a profitable partnership, marred only by regular Soviet penetration forays into Pullach, the BND headquarters. German agents in Baghdad even supplied the U.S. Air Force with targeting tips during the 2003 invason.

Such a lucrative relationship was bound to attract freelancers. So earlier this month, the Berlin chattering class exploded in righteous indignation over a 31-year old BND underling who had reportedly delivered 218 documents to the Americans for about $150 apiece—a bargain. Too bad that, included in the heist, were three papers detailing the work of a Bundestag committee looking into a vast NSA surveillance scheme in Germany—as previously betrayed by form NSA contractor Edward Snowden, now at large in Russia. Delicately, the Economist notes: "So the Americans are spying on German's parliament even as it looks into American spying."

Apparently, a second mole has been uncovered in the German defense ministry. And let's not forget Angela Merkel's cell phone, which the NSA had tapped years ago, as Mr. Snowden claims. Americans (and everybody else) have spied on the Germans as a matter of routine. Helmut Schmidt is dead-sure that his phone in the Chancellor's Office was an open book. His successor Helmut Kohl kept a Mason jar full of coins in his car so that he could make confidential calls from secluded telephone booths in the countryside.

When caught, American spooks used to be sent packing quietly. Not this time. With great fanfare, the CIA's Berlin station chief was marked "persona non grata." For days, Chancellor Merkel refused to speak to President Obama. The country has been luxuriating in a "ritual of outrage" (Der Spiegel), interrupted only by its World Cup win and the war in Gaza. Unsympathetic commentators have shed crocodile's tears over the "end of German-American friendship." One pundit has denounced Berlin as an American "poodle." Former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher suspects that the U.S. is a case for the couch. Washington "does not apprehend how the world has changed," he says. Accordingly, its "unipolarity" and "domination" have segued into a "cooperative world order."

*** IS THERE A MILITARY MILLENNIAL PROBLEM? TWELVE RESPONSES TO CDR DARCIE CUNNINGHAM

MATT HIPPLE

AUGUST 9, 2014 

Source Link

In the most recent edition of Proceedings, CDR Darcie Cunningham, USCG, describes what she sees as the strategic challenge of cultural friction between millennial expectations and the rigors of professional military duties in an article titled, “Millennials Bring a New Mentality: Does It Fit?”

Now, mind you, I can be pretty dismissive of my own Millennial generation at times, but the reality is that our newest generation of Sailors are professional, courteous and – based on the fact we are the most kick-ass navy on the planet – doing a damn fine job. For the USCG, the service of the author, I’m often jealous of the exotic, far-afield deployments of their Mobile Training Teams and the challenging mission they do with our partners. As a Patrol Coastal guy the Gulf, I was glad to have the WP’s there to carry some of the load. Here at home? The response during Hurricane season is always a testament to the Sailors of the Coast Guard. Is there REALLY a strategic “millennial culture” problem or are we using the idea to run away from our REAL problems?

To answer the first part of that question, I will endeavor to respond to 12 major points posed by CDR Darcie Cunningham. I hope this better frames the reality of the “millennial issue.”

Iron Dome is an advanced defense system, designed for quick detection, discrimination and interception of rockets & mortar threats with ranges of up to and over 70 km and against aircraft, helicopters, UAVs and PGMs.

1. “This generation has me questioning how they can acclimate to the highly traditional, structured U.S. military.”

To the cognitive bias about “traditional (&) structured” – let’s talk about a generation in “general” terms being able to acclimate to those traditions and structures. The article is right – the millennial generation cannot row for days on end and do not like the sound of leather drums. I also find the horned helmet a bit heavy and the hamlets we burn down a bit boring. I also do not feel it necessary to fire cannon salutes upon the departure of the CO’s dinghy – I would note that getting Non-Combat Expenditure Allocation (NCEA) can be a pain, and I’d like to maximize the ammunition I have for training. I would also likely die if subjected to liberal use of lashings. Barring that, I would then likely chafe at the idea of paying for my commission or being rejected due to my family’s social standing. I also do not have the disdain for my steam plant engineers that other Union Officers have. Finally, I do not, in fact, know how to splice a mainbrace. That said, we do power some of our ships by rending apart the very base material of the universe. The ships that burn boring ol’ dead dinosaurs can shoot a bullet down with another bullet in space. You take what you can get, I guess.

Iron Dome is effective in all weather conditions, including low clouds, rain, dust storms or fog.

2. “The younger generation postures to work only the bare minimum number of hours required. Additionally, they continuously request more time off in the form of early liberty, shorter workdays, the ability to go home after an office luncheon, and so on.”

With greatly decreased crew sizes and 8-10 month deployments, can we REALLY complain when people try to get some extra leave in? Can we even claim they “work less”? Long-gone are the times of a 300+ DDG crew and a rope-yarn day. Is this “extra” time off, or just normal requests that are now a bigger deal due to the normal workload. Now, that said, if there is time for an “office luncheon”, likely there is nothing critical going on and no reason to stay around the office for tradition.

Srlsy bro? Passed over AGAIN?

3. Upon hearing they would not be in-zone for promotion or advancement in a given year, these younger members declare they are fed up with the service and wish to resign. They have an expectation of accelerated advancement through the organization, without regard for the value that experience provides to those in leadership positions. 

People complaining about being looked over for promotion would seem completely in-line with reactions since the time some random Athenian strategos was looked over for command during the Peloponnesian War.

Iron Dome uses a unique interceptor with a special warhead that detonates the targets in the air within seconds. The system can handle multiple threats simultaneously and efficiently.

4. There are an increased number of negative confrontations between very junior members and senior leadership. Rather than saying “Yes Sir” or “Yes Chief” when tasked with a project or simple task, our newer members frequently question why they have to do it.

AMERICAN AIR AND NAVAL POWER CRITICAL TO SUCCESS IN IRAQ

ROBERT CARUSO

AUGUST 7, 2014 

http://cimsec.org/ 

Elements of the United States Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Fleets will be needed to dislodge the Islamic State, support Kurds, and thwart Iran 

As the administration and Congress weigh whether to reach out to Iraqi Kurdistan President Masoud Barzani to explore materially supporting the effective, but underequipped Peshmerga, the naval component will be absolutely critical. There are no status of forces agreements on the deck of a CVN. Similarly, the aircraft the task group can spin up almost immediately after direction comes down from the National Command Authority don’t rely on unreliable partners. Naval air wings don’t need to ask permission to fly anywhere.

To complement these military missions, national intelligence agency elements will be engaged in area familiarization, reconnaissance and targeting missions. This also will necessitate US Navy support, from E-2D Hawkeyes to Prowlers directly supporting US Special Operations Forces who are in turn supporting national intelligence agency taskings.

Kurdish forces made up of thousands of insurgents from Turkey and Syria attacked Islamic State positions at Sinjar, one of three Iraqi cities that fell to the Islamic State over the weekend, while the vaunted Peshmerga, loyal to Iraq’s autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government, pressed to lift the Islamic State’s siege of the Mosul Dam, Iraq’s largest and an important source of electricity.

As this went to print, the dam had been overrun by Islamic State fighters due to US inaction and a refusal of the White House to resupply the Peshmerga. U.S. officials said they were working with the Kurdistan Regional Government in Irbil and Iraq’s central government in Baghdad to counter the Islamic State’s advance. But it was unclear what material assistance, if any, the United States was lending to the fight. Now we know—next to nothing.

Traditionally, Pentagon spokesmen have equivocated on whether the US provides military assistance to the Kurds to fight ISIS. There are already signs that the Central Intelligence Agency and Joint Special Operations Command have made preparations to arm and train the Peshmerga directly.

Time is of the essence. If Islamists are able to successfully defeat Kurdish forces, the remaining Kurdish population will flee to Turkey and other neighboring countries, to include Syria. Any remaining Kurds, especially the Yazidis, will be left to the slaughter. The United States cannot stand idly by while atrocities of this magnitude are committed. President Obama already increased the operational tempo of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights, but continued shortcomings in ISF targeting ability evidenced by daily airstrikes and bombardments of civilians evidences a need for even greater ISR cooperation and more discriminate weaponry.

MILLENNIALS IN THE MILITARY

http://cimsec.org/millenials-military/12497 

AUGUST 9, 2014 

This post is a response to an article in the August issue of USNI’s Proceedings by Commander Darcie Cunningham, U.S. Coast Guard, titled “Millennials Bring a New Mentality: Does it Fit?” So if you haven’t read it yet, I recommend you start there.

Where to begin? To her credit, Commander Cunningham asks an important question: “how does our structured military culture adapt to this new generation?” It’s also clear her frustrations are borne of personal experiences in command. Unfortunately it’s a question she fails to answer (more on that later) and in doing so perpetuates myths and patronizing generalizations. [Full disclosure: I’m in the millennial generation, on the older end of the spectrum, and like all such groupings the term “millennial” is a debatable construct but I’ll accept her definition (those born in the 80s and 90s) for argument’s sake.]

“Kids These Days!”

From a more disciplined era of service.

Commander Cunningham begins by noting several behaviors that are supposedly unique to millennials: that they “posture to work only the bare minimum number of hours required,” that their “customs and courtesies are eroding,” and that “there are an increased number of negative confrontations.” It is entirely possible that this is what is happening at Coast Guard Base Los Angeles, it is certainly her perception. But more likely it is just that: perception. Such perceptions have existed about pretty much every generation when they were in their youth. That doesn’t make them accurate.

Let’s return to the important question: “how does our structured military culture adapt to this new generation?” Beyond the advice to use positive feedback to keep the crew motivated, the Commander Cunningham offers nothing. Instead she says they must be “educated,” “course-corrected,” and evaluated for whether they will “truly be able to adapt to the service.” And that’s the thing – this isn’t really an article about adapting the military to millennials, it’s about adapting millennials to the military, as reflected in the title. Which is not all bad. To be sure respect for rank and proper military etiquette are just good manners, and appreciation for a service’s traditions, structure, customs, and courtesies are the marks of a professional.

THE VIRTUE OF BEING A GENERALIST, PART 1: A DAY IN THE LIFE OF SUB LIEUTENANT SNODGRASS

http://cimsec.org/virtue-generalist-part-1-day-life-sub-lieutenant-snodgrass/11907 

The United States Navy’s surface fleet finds itself in dynamic times. The standard length for deployments continues to rise, numerous hulls are on the chopping block, maintenance is battling to keep up with a harried operational tempo, and as ever, its leaders – Surface Warfare Officers, or SWO’s – are struggling to both improve, and in fact define, the community’s identity. Whether it is the uniforms we wear, our training pipelines, or our often-mocked culture, the community seems to lack a firm grasp on who we are, what we stand for, and how we do business. Over a series of three articles, I intend to first analyze a few counterparts – the Royal Navy, U.S. Naval Aviation, and U.S. Navy surface nuclear officers – and then explore some proposals meant to solidify the officers who take the world’s most powerful ships to sea.

Just Another Day at the Office

After working alongside the Royal Navy, most American surface warriors walk away immensely impressed by the impeccable professionalism of their British counterparts. When SWO’s talk about improving their community, the Royal Navy’s practices inevitably come up. “We should do it like the Brits,” is a common theme. Few truly appreciate what that statement means, though. The Surface Warriors of the U.S. and Royal Navies are different: in size, mission sets, tempos, training, and priorities. There is not always a one-for-one correlation between the two. Before analyzing proposals or judging the merits of each side, let us simply gather some information by comparing the lifestyles of Sub Lieutenant Snodgrass, RN, and Ensign Timmy, USN.

The first area of comparison is training and path to qualification. All Royal Navy officer cadets spend between six and eleven months at Britannia Royal Naval College (BRNC), where students receive military indoctrination and learn the ins and outs of the naval profession through a standardized curriculum. Upon graduation from BRNC, the young surface officer proceeds on to a training track for Warfare Officers or Engineers. The prospective engineers endure a rigorous 20-month pipeline of practical and theoretical training.

Our Sub Lieutenant Snodgrass is a Warfare Officer, which is the career track most comparable to an American SWO’s. He and his comrades train for an additional 18-months. First, they attend three months of advanced seamanship theory training, followed by an intense year of practical bridge watch standing under instruction. If they are successful to this point, they stand for a week of individual bridge simulator assessments. Students must achieve passing marks on these assessments to proceed on to a final three months of advanced seamanship and navigation training. Upon graduation, they report aboard their first ship as an Officer-of-the-Watch (OOW) with a well-earned Navigational Watch Certificate. Within a month or so, SLt Snodgrass has earned his Commanding Officer’s Platform Endorsement – akin to a SWO’s Officer-of-the-Deck Underway Letter – and is entrusted with operating the ship unsupervised. While some Warfare Officers attend a 4-month long course and become navigators after gaining at least 4 years experience as an OOW, the next major pipeline for now-LT Snodgrass is the Principal Warfare Officer (PWO) Course and occurs at the nine-year point. Thirteen months long, the PWO Course trains Royal Navy surface officers to be the Commanding Officer’s advisor on either “Above Water” or “Under Water” Warfare, and can see up to 40 percent attrition.