Modern War Institute | Robert G. Rose, Matthew Revels
The US Army's shift to division-centric warfighting for multidomain operations, outlined in the Army 2030 plan, risks misaligning its force design with its strategic context, particularly against a Chinese joint island landing campaign. This centralized approach, reminiscent of France's interwar "methodical battle" doctrine, prioritizes synchronization and higher-echelon control of intelligence and fires, potentially sacrificing the decentralized flexibility and rapid responsiveness needed to counter strategic surprise. Historical examples from World War I, World War II, and contemporary Ukrainian operations against Russia demonstrate the critical importance of decentralized capabilities, unit cohesion, and responsive fires at lower echelons. Ukrainian forces, for instance, primarily fight at the brigade level, assigning artillery batteries in direct support of infantry battalions for fires within three minutes. The article contends that Army 2030's focus on division-level control and ninety-six-hour targeting processes could lead to slow decision-making and a lack of cohesion, mirroring the French Army's systemic breakdown in May 1940 when confronted by a fluid German Schwerpunkt attack.
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