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17 February 2026

What Bangladesh’s New Leader Tarique Rahman Means for South Asia and the World

Charlie Campbell

Tarique Rahman had spent 17 years in exile before returning to Bangladesh on Christmas Day. Just seven weeks later, he looks set to become the South Asian nation’s new Prime Minister.

Polling indicates that Rahman’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) is set to win an outright majority of around 185 seats in the 300-member legislature in Thursday’s general election, which is the first since the ouster of autocratic former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina on Aug. 5, 2024.

TIME sat down with Rahman in early January as he laid out his plans for rebooting South Asia’s second biggest economy and healing social divisions. Asked what his first priorities would be, Rahman replied: “ensuring rule of law. The second one is to bring back financial discipline. The third will be to try to unify the country. Whatever political programs we have, whatever policies we take, if we cannot unify the country, it won’t be possible to take the country forward.”

From safety to impact: what India’s AI summit signals about global governance

Dongyoun Cho

The India AI Impact Summit on 16–20 February 2026 marks a turning point in the global debate on artificial intelligence (AI) governance. This is not simply because it elevates India to a more central role in global AI governance, but because it crystallises a strategic choice the country is making. Rather than advancing another set of high-level principles on AI safety or ethics, India is prioritising deployment, diffusion and measurable impact as central questions of AI governance.

AI has major implications for productivity growth, labour markets, energy demand and state capacity. Governance frameworks that mature more slowly than deployment risk becoming irrelevant, regardless of their normative ambition. What is increasingly decisive, as India’s approach makes explicit, is whether states possess the institutional capacity to absorb AI into civilian and public systems before technological diffusion outpaces regulatory adaptation.

The Sino-India Relationship and the Future of Asia: A European Perspective

Jan Luykx

In the context of the recent global geopolitical flux, it would be useful to give a European perspective on the evolving relationship between India and China and its broader implications for Asia’s future. Drawing from recent developments and historical context, this policy brief explores the complexities of their bilateral ties, regional dynamics, and the roles of external actors, including the European Union.

Current State of the Sino-Indian Relationship

Although India and China in 2005, declared that they established a strategic relationship, it is definitely a misnomer to describe their ties as such. Of course, the early 21st century witnessed a surge in strategic partnerships globally—such as the EU-India and EU-China relationships—fuelled by an optimistic era of globalization. The 2005 agreement was a culmination of a process initiated in 1988 with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing, following decades of strained relations since the 1962 war. Subsequent bilateral agreements, particularly in the 1990s, aimed, inter alia, to ensure that border issues would not hinder broader cooperation in other domains. This resulted, amongst others, in significant growth in bilateral trade.

Infrastructure of Insecurity: Deterring Maritime Incidents in the Malacca Straits

Azifah Astrina

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) are among the world’s most intensively monitored maritime corridors, yet low-level maritime crime persists. Despite sustained investment in patrols, surveillance systems and regional cooperation, incidents of piracy and armed robbery continue to cluster around specific choke points, anchorages and traffic separation schemes. This report focuses on criminality at sea rather than strategic competition between states, recognising that each operates according to distinct logics and policy tools.

Deterrence in the SOMS is spatially uneven and highly localised. Maritime security infrastructure is deliberately concentrated in high-risk, high-value corridors, producing overlapping zones where enforcement presence and criminal opportunity coexist. Incident clustering near security posts does not indicate deterrence failure, but reflects choke-point geography, infrastructure placement and offender adaptation.

Xi Jinping Is Losing Control of China’s Military

Gordon G. Chang

“The fact that Xi Jinping has been able to cashier so many [People's Liberation Army] elites since he assumed power...is a clear sign his position in the regime is unassailable,” James Char of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore told CNN last month, just after Xi’s removal of two senior generals from important command posts. The news outlet summarized the almost unanimous view of analysts: “Xi Has Absolute Control Over China’s Military.”

But the narrative that Xi controls the military is almost certainly wrong. The purges, taken by almost all as proof of Xi’s power, in fact show the opposite.

On the 24th of last month, China’s Ministry of National Defense, in a 30-second video, announced that two generals sitting on the Communist Party's Central Military Commission, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, were placed under investigation.

Why Iran is Building a Digital Cage It Can’t Afford

Calla O'Neil

Summary and Key Points: The January 2026 internet blackout in Iran, following protests that erupted on December 28, has exposed the deep failures of the National Information Network (NIN).

-Despite two decades of development, the NIN remains only 60% operational, forcing the regime to cut all global connectivity for 92 million citizens to suppress dissent.

-This digital isolation carries a staggering daily cost of $36 million, crippling e-commerce and banking.

-Meanwhile, Tehran is escalating its war on Starlink with military-grade jammers, proving that internal “intranets” cannot replace global access.

-The strategy emphasizes a regime prioritizing total control over economic survival.

Iran’s Divided Opposition

Sanam Vakil and Alex Vatanka

Whenever Iran is shaken by nationwide protests, as it was just last month, analysts and activists are consumed by the same two questions: Will the country’s regime finally fall, and what will come next if it does? Answers abound. Some analysts think that the country’s leadership is surprisingly secure and that the regime can withstand more demonstrations. Some believe it will collapse, only to be followed by another dictatorship under the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the most politically powerful branch of the country’s armed forces. Others are more optimistic, arguing that the entire system will go down

Deathonomics: The Social, Political, and Economic Costs of War in Russia

Vladislav INOZEMTSEV

The rise of deathonomics has led to some profound changes in both the Russian economy and society. The prospect of enormous earnings attracted to the army ranks, en masse, residents of underdeveloped regions, those lacking permanent employment, indebted people, as well as criminal and pauperized elements, who were also attracted by the promise of having their criminal records expunged. As a result, the Kremlin has started to purchase the lives of Russians who possessed virtually no economic value—paying more than these people might expect to earn right up to their prospective retirement. In addition to injecting considerable funds into the economy, this policy led to a sharp rise in wages in most sectors, supporting consumer demand. The enormous number of deaths, resulting from individuals’ free choice, failed to provoke a public outcry, allowing the authorities to portray a readiness to die at the call of the state as an important social value inherent in Russians. This trend has reinforced the glorification of militarism and entrenched the Kremlin’s new cult of sacrifice.

Deathonomics is depicted not only as an important element of the new Russian economic system that has emerged since the start of the war, but also as a tool legitimizing the arbitrary use of legal norms inherent to Putin’s regime and a means of incorporating numerous elements of criminal culture into a broader social and political fabric. The “monetization of life”, which serves as its core principle, expands the standards of acceptable behavior and almost certainly will significantly affect Russians’ lifestyle and worldview for many years to come. The report places particular emphasis on assessing the quantitative impact of deathonomics on economic developments in Russia, and also offers answers to questions about whether such a practice can support Russian militarism and retain its significance even after Putin’s aggressive war in Ukraine terminates.

After Erdogan: Who Will Control Turkey?

Sinan Ciddi
Source Link

It’s the strongman’s dilemma. When one leaves power — one way or another — does one pave the way for a successor? With an aging leader, Turkey may have to face that question sooner rather than later.

There is no official confirmation, but sources allege that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 71, is in poor health. This is now common knowledge. Pro-government media and official “counter-disinformation agencies” have nevertheless branded the reports of poor health as “insults” to the president. And in Erdogan’s Turkey, insults are punished with jail time.1

This is not the first time Turkish media have called attention to the longtime leader’s well-being. During the hotly contested 2023 presidential campaign, Erdogan fell ill during a live-broadcast interview and later missed several planned public appearances due to what he deemed “serious stomach flu.”2 Rumors swirled about more serious conditions.

One battle after another: Factional struggles and the making of Trump’s foreign policy

Majda Ruge

It seems winning the inaugural FIFA peace prize was not enough for Donald Trump. Having kicked off this world cup year with a regime decapitation in Venezuela, the US president swiftly refocused on his old goal to “acquire” Greenland. He also found the time to threaten Iran’s leaders with the “Maduro treatment”, and he did not spare America’s world cup co-hosts either: Canada was treated to tariff threats and Mexico those of the military variety. In early February, the boss of global football’s governing body, Gianni Infantino, was asked whether, in hindsight, his peace prize might not have gone to the right person. His response was, “objectively, he deserves it.”

January left European leaders reeling. They had spent the first year of Trump’s second term belatedly coming to terms with the prospect of “defending Europe with less America”. Now, they were confronted with an imperialist US and the possibility of defending Europe against America. The days of Trump’s campaign promises to put “America First” with a “president of peace” at the helm seem like a lifetime ago. The purging and sidelining of the traditional Republican foreign policy hawks (“primacists”) from the second term cabinet does not seem to have had much impact on its ideological direction. “Restrainers”, who want US policy to focus on the homeland, have not prevailed in their stead; nor have “prioritisers”, who think the focus should be the Indo-Pacific. The much-delayed publication of America’s national security strategy in December and national defence strategy in January only added to the confusion.

The Epstein Files and the Hidden World of an Unaccountable Elite

Robert Draper

Journalists and researchers will spend the next months ferreting through the Epstein files in search of further criminal conduct or a new conspiratorial wrinkle. But one truth has already emerged.

In unsparing detail, the documents lay bare the once-furtive activities of an unaccountable elite, largely made up of rich and powerful men from business, politics, academia and show business. The pages tell a story of a heinous criminal given a free ride by the ruling class in which he dwelled, all because he had things to offer them: money, connections, sumptuous dinner parties, a private plane, a secluded island and, in some cases, sex.

That story of impunity is all the more outrageous now in the midst of rising populist anger and ever-growing inequality. The Caligula-like antics of Jeffrey Epstein and friends occurred over two decades that saw the decline of America’s manufacturing sector and the subprime mortgage crisis, in which millions of Americans lost their homes.

Russia Struggling to Resist PRC Rare Earth Dominance

Anna J. Davis

On February 2, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin appointed Ksenia Shoigu as Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Development Fund of the Innovative Scientific and Technological Center, referred to as Mendeleev Valley (Долина Менделеева, Dolyna Mendeleyeva) (Government of Russia, February 2). Shoigu is the daughter of Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian Security Council and former defense minister, who originally proposed the creation of scientific, industrial, and economic centers in Siberia, now known as “Siberianization” (Сибиризации, Sibirizatsii) (Vedomosti, August 9, 2021; see EDM, February 5). One priority for Mendeleev Valley is to advance technology for the production of rare earth elements (REEs) in Siberia, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s November 2025 order to the Cabinet of Ministers to approve a national roadmap for rare earth mining and refining (see EDM, December 5). This represents an important step in Moscow’s efforts to build a domestic REE production chain for long‑term economic resilience in a market dominated by the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Three Roadblocks on Europe’s Path to Defense Independence

Jason W. Davidson

As the world’s geopolitical elite gather later this week at the Munich Security Conference, many European analysts and policymakers will urge their governments to develop the means to defend themselves in response to the Trump administration’s policies over the past year.

First, there is a rift over values and sovereignty. The 2025 US National Security Strategy warned European allies of “civilizational erasure” as a result of immigration, vowing that the United States would “cultivate resistance” against mainstream political forces in Europe.

Second, President Donald Trump repeatedly demanded control of Greenland, the territory of NATO ally Denmark, and refused to rule out force to do so. After European allies stood by Denmark, Trump finally ruled out force, but he continued to insist that the United States must control Greenland.

Finally, the Trump administration has repeatedly demanded that European allies provide for their own security, with the United States in only a supporting role.

Cuba’s Energy Crisis Deepens Amid U.S. Tariffs

Charles Kennedy

Cubans are struggling with blackouts and fuel rationing amid President Trump’s campaign to provoke regime change by choking off the energy supply of the island nation, which is heavily dependent on fuel imports.

Trump last month threatened to impose tariffs on any country that sends oil to Cuba, labelling the island “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to U.S. national security. He noted the Cuban government’s relations with Russia, China, and Iran as evidence of that threat, which, Trump suggested, would present as “migration and violence.”

The island’s biggest oil supplier was out of the picture already, since that was Venezuela, and the United States effectively took control of the country’s oil industry following the ousting of President Nicolas Maduro.

Project Vault: Trump’s bold plan to stop China from starving our military

Victoria Coates

Since the COVID pandemic, Americans have had a crash course on the importance of rare earth elements and recognized the unpleasant reality that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has a near stranglehold on their mining and processing. Practically everything we manufacture in the modern world, from fighter jets to medical equipment to cameras, now requires some quantity of these materials, and we are almost entirely at the mercy of the PRC for them.

Recognizing that this dependency is a potential national security crisis, President Donald Trump has directed an all-of-government initiative called "Project Vault" to protect the American people from immediate shocks while building up our ability to supply ourselves in the future.

The Chinese regime has shown itself very willing to use its rare earths advantage as blackmail against the United States as well as manufacturing allies such as Japan. At the end of President Trump’s first term, China issued veiled threats about limiting their exports to retaliate for U.S. tariffs on Huawei. Those threats became realities last year as China announced export controls and then outright bans on the export of rare earth elements to foreign militaries. When President Trump issued tariff threats of his own, the PRC backed down, but the scale of our vulnerability was clear.

Russia Attacks a NATO Country in a War Game. It Doesn’t End Well.

Carolina Drüten

Imagine Ukraine is forced into a peace deal later this year. In the aftermath, Russian troops conduct military exercises in neighboring Belarus, then stay put, massed along the Lithuanian border despite Moscow’s assurances that they would be pulling out.

A video begins circulating online, later identified as fake. It appears to show German soldiers stationed in Lithuania abusing Russian-speaking teenagers. Soon after, a cyberattack hits Germany’s savings banks, knocking large numbers of ATMs offline. In Vilnius, Lithuania’s government issues a warning: Russian troops could cross the border to the NATO country, a move that would test the alliance to its core.

And what if the United States hesitated?

Many security experts believe such a scenario is plausible, particularly as President Donald Trump signals that Europe must shoulder more of its own defense and as Russia seems intent on re-establishing itself as Europe’s dominant power.

Growing US Vulnerability Under Trump: Chinese and Russian Perceptions

Robert Bruce Adolph

There are four classical elements of national strategic power: Military, diplomatic, economic, and informational. In all four, the US is losing ground in the second Trump administration. There is a fifth element worthy of consideration, Reputational, which I will also address. From the perspectives of our near-peer adversaries, China and Russia, the current White House occupant is a “useful idiot.” Let’s look at these elements to see why.

Military

America’s military is the most powerful in the world. Few doubt it, especially Putin and Xi. Neither is interested in taking on the US Armed Forces directly. Both have shown a preference to take the indirect approach, sometimes called Gray Zone Warfare, exploiting their intelligence, cyber, and diplomatic services, which are sometimes indistinguishable from one another. Mr. Trump, by making it his stated national security policy to focus on his hemisphere, also gave both a gift: China regarding Taiwan and Russia regarding all matters concerning Ukraine. Moreover, this commander-in-chief has chosen to use the martial cudgel recently on only two oil-rich nations, Iran and Venezuela.

Germany Prepares to Authorize Offensive Cyber Operations Amid Russian Hybrid Threats

DARIIA MYKHAILENKO

Germany is preparing to expand the powers of its intelligence and cybersecurity agencies, including authorizing offensive cyber operations abroad, as reported by Politico on February 9.

According to the outlet officials are drafting two separate pieces of legislation. One would revise the mandate of the country’s foreign intelligence services to allow them to conduct cyber operations outside Germany. The second would grant security services broader authority to respond to hybrid threats, including coordinated digital and physical disruptions.

The move comes as Germany faces a sustained wave of cyber and hybrid incidents. In recent months, the country has reported drone incursions over airports in Berlin and Munich, as well as a cyberattack targeting its air traffic control system. German institutions have also been hit by major cyber operations attributed to Russian intelligence services, including the 2015 hack of the Bundestag and the 2024 breach of the ruling Social Democratic Party.


Men lie, strategies lie—numbers don’t: The word counts of the new National Defense Strategy.

PETER W. SINGER

Measuring the frequency of words and themes in a document can offer insights, reveal underlying messages, and even illuminate what’s on the minds of its writers. The 2026 National Defense Strategy is meant to help align ends, ways, and means, and to signal goals and values. But to find the truth, sometimes you just have to count.

This kind of content analysis can act like an X-ray for a document, unveiling structural DNA that the authors themselves might not realize they’ve left behind. The cold, hard math of the text itself can reveal overall priorities or even a “Say-Do” gap. For instance, if a corporate strategy has five mentions of “customers” but 50 of “shareholders,” you know who the company cares most about.

It also tracks rhetorical inflation—i.e., whether the strategy is largely actionable or mostly fluff. A high frequency of “aspiration” words with a low frequency of “resource” words usually signals a strategy that lacks a real execution plan. Tone and context can also be indicative. As an illustration, a strategy paper heavy on defensive terminology suggests an organization playing not to lose vs one with more aggressive terms is seeking change.

Ukrainian forces say Russian troops paid them for a fake Starlink service that instead revealed battlefield locations

Matthew Loh

A Ukrainian cyberwarfare division said on Thursday that it created a fake Starlink registration service to trick Russian soldiers into giving up sensitive data.

The 256th Cyber Assault Division said it partnered with open-source intelligence groups to promote a network of Telegram channels and bots that offered to help the Kremlin's troops register Starlink terminals on a Ukrainian whitelist.

But the channels were a ruse, and had instead been run by Ukrainian forces, who were sent location and terminal data from the soldiers, the 256th said.

Its statement is yet another example of how wartime operations have spilled into social media, and comes after repeated reports that Russian forces have been trying to circumvent a region-wide Starlink block by paying Ukrainian civilians to register terminals for them.

Unmanned Ground Vehicles Could Be the Next Big Battlefield Disruptor

Peter Suciu

Both Russia and Ukraine are increasingly using armed ground drones—vaguely reminiscent of “Terminator” robots—for missions in eastern Ukraine.

As the ongoing war in Ukraine is set to enter its fifth year later this month, it is worth remembering that few could have anticipated the role that unmanned aerial systems (UAS) would play in the conflict. Aerial drones have proven extremely effective at destroying tanks, striking convoys, and targeting forward positions. Likewise, Ukraine has employed unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to successfully target Russia’s warships and submarines in the Black Sea.


Both Russia and Ukraine continue to employ unmanned and even semi-autonomous systems, but according to a new study from the Jamestown Foundation think tank, Kyiv could be leading the way in the deployment of “unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs),” which can “perform surveillance, logistics, fire support, and self-detonating attacks in lethal frontline ‘kill zones.'” The study added that UGVs could reduce “Ukrainian casualties” and reshape “tactics through coordinated, multi-domain robotic warfare.”

The Critical Importance of Space to U.S. National Security

Bert Chapman

Space has become essential to all aspects of civilian and military space policy. In our personal lives cell phones use GPS satellites to track our locations, satellites are involved in multiple bank and financial transactions, and when we watch news and sports from domestic and international locales such as the Winter Olympics, we depend on satellites to transmit and receive these images. GPS guides commercial airlines and container ships to their locations along ambulances, fire departments, and police depending on GPS to execute their responsibilities. Storms such as hurricanes are also tracked by satellite.

Recent years have seen the establishment in the U.S. and other countries of government agencies aspiring to regulate the commercial space industry and space transportation This has also been true as the national militaries have also developed or are in the process of developing military forces and intelligence capabilities to defend space assets and monitor the capabilities and threats posed by hostile countries. Examples of some of these agencies for the U.S. and their allies include the U.S. Space Force, the 3 Canadian Space Division, the Australian Defence Force’s Space Command, Britain’s Royal Air Force U.K. Space Command, and France’s Air and Space Force. These military forces have also begun developing military doctrine to conduct operations in space.

NGC2: Data-Informed Sustainment Decision Making

COL Paul Smith

“Data is the sword of the 21st century, those who wield it well, the samurai.”
— Jonathan Rosenberg

As the Army prepares for the demands of large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against strategic competitors, the importance of sustainment forces cannot be overstated. Sustainment is the backbone of operational success, ensuring that forces remain supplied, mobile, and ready to fight. However, current command and control (C2) systems are ill-equipped to meet the challenges of LSCO. These systems are cumbersome, lack integration, and create data silos that hinder commanders’ ability to visualize the battlefield holistically. Without modernized tools that enable informed decision making, sustainment operations across extended and contested environments will falter.

To address these challenges, the Army is advancing its Next Generation Command and Control (NGC2) initiative. NGC2 is not just a technological upgrade; it is a paradigm shift designed to empower commanders and sustainment forces with advanced analytics, unified data structures, open architectures, and resilient networks. By integrating sustainment into the broader operational picture, NGC2 ensures that logistics teams can anticipate and respond to the demands of LSCO with precision and speed.

Our Network Can’t Be the First Obstacle in the Fight

James Mingus, Berline Marcelin and Zak Daker

Cold light spills across a European plain, sixty-five kilometers of flat terrain that spans the territory of multiple nations. As the lead platoon moves forward, the squad leader scans the horizon while distant artillery zeroes in, guided by multiple drones stalking out front. He looks to his device for the picture that weaves together US and allied unit locations, overhead sensors, munitions stocks, and national-level intelligence, all in real time. Instead, the feed glitches, data lags, and systems refuse to speak to one another. In that fragile moment, trust breaks, the formation slows, and the enemy gains the upper hand. In modern warfare, where information and shared understanding rules, the network cannot be our opening obstacle.

Why The Need for Change

The current state of Army command and control (C2) reflects decades of incremental additions rather than deliberate design. Tactical networks grew in isolation, producing seventeen distinct battle command systems. Each new capability became a box within a box: One tool solved a specific problem while creating interoperability gaps, redundant data entry, increased maintenance demands, and heavier training loads. This complexity causes leaders to spend a majority of their time reconciling disparate feeds, troubleshooting links, or manually bridging systems instead of focusing on the fight, which results in slower decision cycles, eroded confidence in shared information, and unnecessary cognitive burden on every soldier. Our adversaries are operating on integrated, streamlined C2 architectures that enable swift and decisive action, which is why we are rapidly transforming our fragmented networks to ensure we maintain decision dominance.

Are Tanks Obsolete on the Modern Battlefield? Not Exactly

Stavros Atlamazoglou

Though tanks are vulnerable to low-cost missiles and drones, their crews have adapted and developed countermeasures over time—giving them a continuing place in modern warfare.

The conflict in Ukraine will enter its fifth year later this month. During that time, observers have gathered many crucial lessons about the nature of warfighting in the 21st century.

If there is one lesson to take from the war in Ukraine, it is that—in spite of gloomy prognostication about their supposed “irrelevance” on the modern battlefield—tanks are here to stay. Indeed, tanks of different types and generations are fighting on the battlefield in support of the combatants’ tactical and operational objectives, with great effectiveness.

The Role of Tanks in Modern Warfare

Before the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many analysts had begun to question the utility of armor in modern warfare. The hypothesis went that tanks were too detectable to modern ISR, and could be destroyed by anti-tank missiles at a fraction of their cost. Even then-British Prime Minister Boris Johnson weighed in in support of this view, claiming in 2021 that the era of tank battles was “over” and the British military should be investing in “better things” instead. Russia’s early setbacks following its invasion in February 2022 seemed to confirm doubts of tanks’ viability in combat.