Indian Strategic Studies

28 June 2025

How NATO Can Support the United States in Asia

Iselin Brady and Daniel Byman

The United States is preparing for a confrontation with China even as U.S. officials meet with their counterparts for the 2025 NATO Summit. NATO members can, and should, play an important role in the event of a crisis over Taiwan,

in the Philippines, or other confrontations with China. NATO members’ roles are less about fighting side-by-side with the United States, though signaling their commitment to doing so is important, and more about helping the United States manage other security commitments around the world to free up U.S. forces to concentrate on Asia.

Getting Europe more involved in Asian security will be difficult. European states trade extensively with China—China remains the European Union’s second largest trade partner (after the United States), with an average daily trade of $1.5 billion. Geography also matters: The United States is a Pacific as well as Atlantic power, while European states focus more on their Russian neighbor, not far-away China.

Even if European states wanted to play a greater role, their military capabilities are limited. There are doubts about how much the continent can contribute to Ukraine’s defense and that of post-war Europe, a far more straightforward task than projecting power halfway across the world to Taiwan, the South China Sea, or other areas.

NATO’s policy in Asia is further complicated by the lack of member-state unity in their individual relationships with China, ranging from boasting of close economic ties (Hungary) to those concerned with Beijing's influence (United Kingdom). The first major NATO statement addressing China was released in December 2019 and stated that the country presented “both opportunities and challenges.” However, following the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, and China’s support for the former, NATO has become more willing to critique China, as demonstrated during the 2024 NATO Summit and in the NATO 2030 agenda.

Opinion | JD Vance Said the Iran Strikes Set Their Nuclear Program Back ‘Substantially.’ He’s Wrong.

Speaking on Sunday morning, Vice President JD Vance stated that the Saturday U.S. air strikes on Iran had “set their nuclear program back substantially.” His comments came soon after President Donald Trump said that the operation had “completely obliterated” key nuclear facilities in the country. Satellite images of bombed buildings and cratered mountainsides certainly give credence to these claims.

But these statements from Vance and Trump are far too confident. In reality, Iran can likely reconstitute its program rapidly — perhaps in a year or so. What’s more, after the U.S. strikes, there is also now a real danger that Tehran will make the decision to go further than enriching and amassing uranium and actually build a bomb.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Dan Caine, stated that all three sites targeted by the United States, including Iran’s underground enrichment facility at Fordow, appeared to have sustained “extremely severe damage and destruction,” though he also warned that a final assessment “will take some time.” Even so, Iran probably retains highly enriched uranium, centrifuge components and expertise — a triad that will allow it to reconstitute its program rapidly.

First, it’s unclear how much weapons-grade or near-weapons-grade uranium the strikes even destroyed. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran had accumulated about 900 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent by May 17 — that’s enough for a handful of nuclear weapons after further enrichment.

The organization’s director general, Rafael Grossi, has publicly indicated that, before hostilities began, Iran likely moved some or all of this material from the storage facility where it was under IAEA monitoring. Indeed, Vance had hinted hours earlier that that the material was still in Iranian hands.

After Iran uses missiles, US braces for cyberattacks

Sean Lyngaas

Hospitals, water dams and power plants across the US are on alert for any potential Iranian cyberattacks in retaliation for US airstrikes on Iran nuclear sites over the weekend.

The United States dropped massive bombs on three nuclear sites inside Iran on Saturday, decisively entering into conflict with the country. In the three days since the US strikes, the US power grid’s cyberthreat-sharing center has monitored the dark web for Iranian activity, and hospital executives have checked in on the threat level with the FBI, sources familiar with those conversations told CNN.

It’s a state of vigilance dictated by common sense: For Iran, retaliation against the US is far easier in cyberspace than physically. Tehran-linked hackers have previously attacked American hospitals and water facilities.

“Iran’s kinetic retaliation is already in motion and the digital dimension to that may not be far behind,” Adam Meyers, a senior vice president at cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike, told CNN on Monday, shortly after Iran fired missiles towards a US military base in Qatar in retaliation for the US strikes. “This cyber element is what lets them extend their reach and there’s an air of deniability to it.”

There haven’t been any new confirmed breaches of US organizations from Iranian hackers, Meyers said. But hackers linked with Iran have reportedly been scanning the internet for vulnerable software and have been talking openly about retaliating against US organizations, he said.

Hours after the Iranian missile strikes, President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire between Israel and Iran. But it remained unclear Monday night in the US – early Tuesday morning in the Middle East – whether the fragile equilibrium would hold.

International Nuclear Watchdog Issues Stark Warning in Wake of US Iran Strikes

The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in an emergency meeting on Monday that the escalating conflict in Iran “risks collapsing the global nuclear nonproliferation regime” and that if diplomacy is not pursued, “violence and destruction could reach unimaginable levels.”

The IAEA, the United Nations’ international nuclear watchdog, convened the emergency meeting following US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites this weekend. In remarks delivered to the organization’s board of governors, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the IAEA, called for a “return to the negotiating table” to allow inspectors for the agency to safely assess damage to the sites and check in on Iran’s nuclear stockpile.

Iran has maintained to the IAEA that no additional radiation has been monitored at the sites throughout the duration of the attacks. IAEA inspectors have not been able to inspect the sites since the crisis began earlier this month.

“IAEA inspectors are in Iran, and they are ready,” Grossi said on Monday. He added that “no one, including the IAEA, is in a position to assess the underground damage at Fordow,” but he expected that the strikes did “very significant damage.”

Fordow, a centerpiece of Iran’s nuclear program and a uranium enrichment facility, was one of three sites struck by US bombs this weekend. Fordow has nearly 3,000 centrifuges stored some 90 meters underground. It was unclear as of Monday morning just how much damage the strikes did to the Fordow site, although some of the damage was visible from satellites. Natanz, another enrichment facility, as well as an important nuclear research facility near the city of Isfahan, which operates three small research reactors, were also attacked. (Israeli forces had also previously targeted Isfahan.)

Why Trump Changed His Mind on Iran

Steven A. Cook

For five months, U.S. President Donald Trump seemed clearly to want a negotiated settlement to Iran’s nuclear program. Since the start of his second term in January, he sent U.S. negotiators to meet with their Iranian counterparts in either Oman or Italy five times toward this end. Yes, he had given Iran a 60-day deadline in April. But journalists and analysts mostly ignored it,

placing it in the category of Trump bombast much like his tariff timelines, which seemed to change daily. The conventional wisdom was and remained that Trump wanted a deal.

The U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Esfahan undermined this conventional wisdom—and likely closed off the possibility of negotiations. So what changed? And why now?

Steven A. Cook is a columnist at Foreign Policy and the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. His latest book is The End of Ambition: America’s Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. X: @stevenacook

Read More On Iran | Israel | Nuclear Weapons | United States | War

Shaky Israel-Iran Cease-Fire Appears to Hold After Trump Publicly Rebukes Both Countries

Callum Sutherland

President Donald Trump has said it was his "great honor to destroy all [Iranian] nuclear facilities and capability" and "stop the war" between Israel and Iran. He also said that both countries "wanted to stop the war equally." His statement, shared via social media, came hours after he publicly intervened as the shaky cease-fire threatened to break down entirely when Israel accused Iran of violating the preliminary terms of the deal and vowed retaliation. Iran denied firing further missiles.

Trump issued a stern, public warning to Israel early Tuesday morning, instructing the country not to bomb Iran as the cease-fire he announced just hours before hung in the balance.

"ISRAEL. DO NOT DROP THOSE BOMBS. IF YOU DO IT IS A MAJOR VIOLATION. BRING YOUR PILOTS HOME," Trump posted on his social media platform, Truth Social.

Trump, who has since travelled to The Hague in the Netherlands to attend a NATO Summit, further aired his frustrations when talking to reporters outside the White House. He claimed both countries had violated the cease-fire, and said he didn't like the fact that "Israel unloaded right after we made the deal."

Taking aim at Israel and Iran, Trump said: "We have two countries that have been fighting for so long and so hard, that they don't know what the f-ck they're doing."

In a follow-up post online, Trump announced a reprieve in the tensions, saying: "Israel is not going to attack Iran. All planes will turn around and head home, while doing a friendly 'plane wave' to Iran. Nobody will be hurt, the cease-fire is in effect."

Doubling down on his previous statements, whereby he said that U.S. strikes had "obliterated" three key Iranian nuclear sites over the weekend, Trump added: "Iran will never rebuild their nuclear facilities!"

Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Program Isn’t Dead Yet

Michael Rubin

Key Points and Summary – Following US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Russian official Dmitry Medvedev hinted that countries like Russia or North Korea might supply Iran with nuclear warheads directly.

-This threat should be met with a firm US response based on strategic brinksmanship.

-If Russia or its allies provide nuclear weapons to Iran, a state that has serially violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, President Trump should make it clear that the United States will, in turn, provide nuclear weapons or station intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Russia’s own neighboring countries, such as Ukraine, Poland, or Kazakhstan, to re-establish deterrence.

The Iran Nuclear Threat Isn’t Gone Just Yet

The Islamic Republic may have lost its prize nuclear facilities, but the delays caused by American handwringing mean that it very likely salvaged much of its enriched uranium. Iranian nuclear engineers could now likely reconstitute a nuclear weapon should they so choose.

Many American officials and their European counterparts hope to end the military conflict by getting Washington and Tehran to commit to a diplomatic process.

Some American officials might also exaggerate the impact of the strikes to please President Donald Trump or to justify their calls for a complete cessation of hostilities.

And while it is true that the destruction of Natanz and Fordow could have set the Iranian program back years, the assumptions behind such an estimate matter: Are analysts assuming a completely indigenous Iranian program or do they factor in the possibility that Iranian allies could help Iran rebuild core components of its program without reinventing the wheel?

What Is the Strait of Hormuz and What Impact Could It Have on International Trade If Iran Closes It?

Callum Sutherland

Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, in what would serve as another act of retaliation, after the U.S. launched strikes on three key Iranian nuclear facilities over the weekend. While there was a brief reprieve in the tension after President Donald Trump announced a cease-fire between Israel and Iran on Monday, the conflict has erupted again, with both sides accusing each other of breaking the preliminary cease-fire terms. Now, concerns over the Strait of Hormuz are once again at an all-time high.

Iran controls the Northern side of the Strait of Hormuz, a passage which sees significant global trade pass through daily. If it so wished, Iran could block vessels from journeying through, or disrupt trade by seizing and attacking shipping containers and oil or gas tankers in the area. With roughly 20 million barrels of oil passing through the Strait daily, making up about a fifth of global consumption, any interruption could be catastrophic.

Here’s what to know about the Strait of Hormuz, its grave importance, and what stands to happen if the passage is disrupted amid the ongoing Israel-Iran conflict, of which the U.S. is now an active participant.

What is the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait is narrow, stretching roughly 31 miles at its widest point. Iran is on its north bank opposite Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Most oil exports from Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE pass through, as well as Iran’s own exports. Around 20% of global liquid natural gas exports also flow through the passage, mostly originating from Qatar.

The passage has long been an area of tension and geopolitical significance.

In 2019, two ships were struck, one flying a Marshall Islands flag and the other from Panama, whilst passing through. The U.S. blamed Iran for the attacks, which Tehran denied. A month prior, four other tankers—two from Saudi Arabia, the others from the UAE and Norway—were struck by suspected underwater mines, which the U.S. accused Iran of planting.

War and the Constitution

George Friedman

The U.S. attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities has raised an important constitutional issue. The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority to declare war. It was a wise and appropriate principle. Wars are perhaps the most consequential actions a nation can take. They can put a nation’s very survival at risk and endanger military and civilian lives. Wars also reshape the economy and must by nature place some limits on citizens’ constitutional right to control government actions. Congress is designed to be the representative and guarantor of the right of citizens to govern themselves.

Therefore, the idea was that the United States could not wage war without the consent of Congress, nor avoid war if Congress deemed it necessary. As commander in chief of the military, the president could decide how a war would be waged but not whether there would be a war.

The last time the United States followed the Constitution in going to war was in December 1941, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, when it declared war on Japan. In response, Japan’s allies, Germany and Italy, declared war on the United States. Since that time, the United States has waged numerous wars and military actions decided upon solely by the president, acting as commander in chief, without congressional action. The constitutional requirement for Congress to approve war has been ignored. Though Congress retains the option to vote against the funding of wars, it has exercised this power rarely and only marginally, since doing so once a war is underway and American lives are already at risk is politically and morally fraught.

This constitutional erosion since World War II is largely due to changes in technology and the nature of modern war. When the Constitution was written, the U.S. engaged in wars much more slowly. Mobilizing and invading a country took more time than it does today. Surprise attacks like Pearl Harbor were rare – and even Pearl Harbor did not threaten the immediate survival of the U.S. military or the nation. Afterward, there was still time to convene Congress and secure a formal declaration of war. Given the isolationists’ strength in Congress, a war declaration prior to the Japanese attack would have been time-consuming and may have failed. But the nature of time in war has changed dramatically, especially over the past 20 years. A modern Pearl Harbor might defeat the U.S. military in a few hours.

The USS Nimitz Could Be Damaged by an Iranian Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

Brandon J. Weichert

A salvo of Iranian missiles, launched from coastal batteries or mobile platforms—especially if paired with drone swarms—could theoretically penetrate the carrier group’s defenses.

American forces in the Mideast are waiting for the arrival of the USS Nimitz, America’s oldest nuclear-powered supercarrier. In the run-up to the recent “Operation Midnight Hammer”—America’s airstrikes on three key Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities—it was speculated that the carrier’s air wing would be needed to escort the US Air Force’s B-2 Spirit long-range stealth bombers carrying GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators (MOPs) to their targets.

Ultimately, the air wing went unused for that purpose; there are other carriers on-site. However, the Navy is placing the Nimitz near the Persian Gulf in preparation for an Iranian counterattack against American troops in the region. In doing so, it is putting the ship within the extended range of Iranian anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)—leaving open the possibility that the ship might be targeted in retaliation.

Iran’s Missiles Pose a Threat to the USS Nimitz

Should Tehran decide to retaliate fully—and should the Americans (and Israelis) fail to totally dominate the airspace over Iran—the Iranians could very well get a kill shot on the American carrier in the days to come. Indeed, during America’s recent unsuccessful mission to defeat the Houthi militant group in Yemen, its ASBM capability was so profound—and came so close to damaging US carriers—that Washington cut its losses rather than continue risking its vulnerable and expensive carriers.

Of course, the assets that the Trump administration brought to the strike on Iran was greater than those devoted to Yemen. During the strike, the US Navy deployed E/A-18G Growlers and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to cover for the B-2 Spirits. And in the aftermath, rather than risk a newer carrier with possible retaliation from Iran’s complex ASBM arsenal, the Americans are choosing to risk an older one—the venerable Nimitz—that is set to be decommissioned next year in any case.

How Will Russia Respond to the Israel–Iran War?

Mikael Pir-Budagyan

Russia sees the Israel–Iran war as both a strategic distraction and a dangerous gamble, boosting oil profits and diverting Western focus from Ukraine, but risking nuclear chaos and regional upheaval.

As Israel and Iran exchange missile and drone strikes, the Russian leadership is watching closely.

The Kremlin has condemned Israel’s attacks on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities, calling them a “clear violation of the UN Charter and established principles of international law.” The war could still benefit Moscow in the short term if Iran remains intact.

However, the risks of uncontrolled escalation would benefit no one. As the war drags on, the likelihood of nuclear accidents increases, and the prospect of US intervention becomes more real, threatening to open a Pandora’s box of regional instability.

What Are the Effects of the Iran-Israel War?

The first and most traceable benefit is the immediate spike in global oil prices. Despite most of Iran’s oil going to China, Israel’s strikes on oil facilities and the prospect of Tehran blockading the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints, generate sustained market uncertainties.

For Russia, any price above the G7 cap of $60 a barrel means a substantial resource increase to fund its continued military campaign in Ukraine. Earlier in May, Russia reported a record 32 percent drop in oil taxes compared to last year, and following Israel’s strikes on Iran, global oil prices jumped nearly 10 percent. While oil prices have recovered from the initial shock, some reports suggest that a prolonged conflict could lead to $90 a barrel before they decline in 2026.

Donald Trump at War—How Will Iran Respond?

Peter Harris

As of Saturday evening, June 21, Donald Trump is now a wartime president. This is a far cry from how Trump began his presidency five months ago, with promises to wind down existing conflicts and refrain from starting new ones. But despite his fondness for calling himself a peacemaker, Trump can no longer persist with this charade. For better or worse, he has taken the United States to war with Iran.

To be sure, Trump has expressed hope that Iran will be restrained in its response to US airstrikes against three key nuclear sites. Perhaps he will get his way. After all, the president ordered the assassination of the top Iranian general Qasem Soleimani in January 2020 without provoking a massive retaliation.

The case for Iran exercising restraint is simple. America has what scholars of International Relations call “escalation dominance.” This means that Iran stands to lose more than it can gain by climbing rungs on the escalation ladder. Consequently, Iran would be irrational to launch a significant counterattack against US forces in the Persian Gulf. Fighting back would only make things worse.

Will this be enough to keep a lid on Trump’s war of choice with Iran? Maybe. However, there are at least three conflicting reasons to expect that Iran will not allow these airstrikes to pass off without serious repercussions.

First, Iran has powerful incentives to retaliate against the United States because passivity would risk giving a green light to more US attacks on Iranian soil. What message would Tehran be sending if it allowed nuclear sites to be bombed with impunity? To discourage leaders in Washington from attacking Iran again, the regime might conclude that a large-scale military response is essential, no matter the short-term costs to Iranians.

Second, Iran’s top brass have reasonable fears that their enemies abroad want to bring about regime change. Trump denies that this is a war aim, but the president has a “credible commitment problem” to overcome—that is, he probably cannot convince Iran that he means what he says.

Iran Can Hit Gulf Energy Assets Hard, But Will They?

Greg Priddy

With President Trump’s decision to launch strikes against Iranian nuclear sites on the evening of June 21 Washington time, Iran now faces difficult decisions about how and where to retaliate. Trump has suggested that the United States was finished with military action if Iran refrains from doing so, but that is unlikely, and it will probably strike US military assets in the region in some manner. Striking energy targets to try to create havoc in global energy markets also is an option, but this is one where there are conflicting pressures on Iran. This could keep their response below that threshold.

Interrupting the flow of oil out of the Gulf in some manner is something Iran is probably capable of doing, and given the relative price inelasticity of oil demand, a large oil disruption event could do significant economic damage to the United States and other importers. This is true despite the United States currently being a net oil exporter. A severe hit to global supplies, even if it did not exhaust the large amount held in commercial and strategic stocks, can be expected to cause a price spike that would tend to strengthen inflationary pressures in the US economy as well as slow down economic activity somewhat, despite having a stimulative effect on US upstream activity.

The dilemma for Iran is that, despite being a very effective means of inflicting some economic pain on average Americans, the interdiction of oil has a number of serious downsides for Iran itself. Shutting down tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz would cut off Iran’s oil exports, except for the small volume which could move via the port of Jask, outside the strait. It also would involve attacking ships sailing under the flags of neutral countries.

Iran also has markedly improved its relations with several of its Arab neighbors on the other side of the Gulf in recent years, particularly since the Saudi-Iranian agreement on normalization of diplomatic relations in 2023. Several of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have stated in recent months that they would not allow their bases or airspace to be used as part of a strike on Iran. However, all of the GCC countries have US military personnel present, and several host US aircraft, either routinely or on temporary deployment as a result of the current crisis.

What are the main US military bases in the Middle East?

Reuters

U.S. President Donald Trump delivers remarks to U.S. troops, next to a banner reading, "Peace Through Strength", during a visit to Al Udeid Air Base in Doha, Qatar, May 15, 2025. REUTERS/Brian Snyder/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab

June 22 (Reuters) - U.S. forces have struck Iran's key nuclear sites, drawing threats from Tehran to retaliate, with U.S. military installations in the region a potential target.

Following are significant U.S. facilities in the Middle East:

Home to the headquarters of the U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet, whose area of responsibility includes the Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and parts of the Indian Ocean.

QATAR:

The 24-hectare Al Udeid Air Base, in the desert outside the capital Doha, is the forward headquarters for U.S. Central Command, which directs U.S. military operations in a huge swathe of territory stretching from Egypt in the west to Kazakhstan in the east. The Middle East's largest U.S. base houses around 10,000 troops.

KUWAIT:

Several sprawling military installations include Camp Arifjan, the forward headquarters of U.S. Army Central and the Ali Al Salem Air Base, roughly 40 kilometers from the Iraqi border and known as "The Rock" for its isolated, rugged environment. Camp Buehring was established during the 2003 Iraq War and is a staging post for U.S. Army units deploying into Iraq and Syria, according to the U.S. Army website.

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES:

The Al Dhafra Air Base, situated south of UAE capital Abu Dhabi and shared with the UAE Air Force, is a critical U.S. Air Force hub that has supported key missions against the Islamic State, as well as reconnaissance deployments across the region, according to the U.S. Air Force Central Command.

Europe’s Two-Front War

Erik Jones

In the first half of the twentieth century, Europe was the most militarized and violent region on the planet. By the early twenty-first, it had become the least militarized and least violent, a model of peace, cooperation, and transnational integration. But as Europeans concentrated on building a calmer future, others were resurrecting a more tumultuous past. In recent years, challenges from Russian aggression to Chinese mercantilism to American abandonment have revealed just how unprepared a demilitarized Europe is to handle old-fashioned power politics.

Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of the Donbas in 2014 and the election of Donald Trump as U.S. president in 2016 were wake-up calls. But after a flurry of concern, Europe’s major powers rolled over and went back to sleep. Moscow’s full-scale invasion of the rest of Ukraine, in 2022, got their full attention, leading to increases in defense spending, reductions in vulnerability, and substantial support for Kyiv. But in absolute terms,

the changes were still small, and it was the United States that continued to bear primary responsibility for military aid to Ukraine, as well as for European security more generally.

Then came Trump’s second election victory. The post–World War II order was founded on a central bargain: the United States would use its extraordinary power to provide international public goods such as peace, security, and an increasingly open global economic system, and Europe, Japan, and other allies would bandwagon with Washington rather than balance against it. Although generations of U.S. policymakers tried to get other NATO members to contribute more to their own defense, they stuck with the bargain even when those partners refused because the broad benefits the United States received from consensual hegemony outweighed the costs and risks of securing it.

Regime Change in Iran? History Says Unlikely

Emily Stranger

Abstract: Although Israeli and US objectives claim attacks on Iran are meant to destroy its nuclear capabilities, Israel has suggested that regime change may happen. This article argues that regime change in Iran is unlikely due to historical precedence.

After launching Operation Rising Lion on June 12, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signaled that Israel’s objectives extend beyond merely dismantling Iran’s nuclear program. Instead, Israel appears

to hope that the strikes will encourage the Iranian people to revolt against the theocratic regime that has ruled the country since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Following the initial attack, Netanyahu reportedly addressed the Iranian public, stating, “This is your opportunity to stand up [to the regime].”

On June 21, prior to US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, Israel’s Persian X account, the official page of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, posted a picture depicting the face of a lion overlapping both the Israeli and pre-Islamic Revolutionary flag of Iran. The accompanying text, in English, proclaimed: “Reminder:

Israelis and Iranians have a rich history of friendship and cooperation. Our war is not with the Iranian people – it is with the regime that divided us. When this regime collapses, our friendship will grow stronger than ever.”

How Iran Lost

On June 12, Israel unleashed a series of strikes that damaged Iranian nuclear facilities and missile sites, destroyed gas depots, and, critically, killed scores of top regime officials. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei remains alive.

But his most important deputies—including Mohammad Bagheri, the chief of staff of the armed forces, and Hossein Salami, the commander in chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—are dead.

A few years ago, the sudden, near-simultaneous killing of Bagheri, Salami, and a host of other senior leaders would have been unthinkable. Over three decades, the hard-liners who control Iran’s regime had built up

The Pentagon knows its cyber force model is broken. Here’s how to fix it

The U.S. military has tried almost everything to fix its cyber readiness issues except the one solution that would work: standing up a dedicated cyber service.

At a congressional hearing in May, senior defense officials publicly acknowledged that CYBERCOM 2.0 — an initiative launched by U.S Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to overhaul how it builds and manages cyber forces — fell short of the Pentagon’s expectations. The effort was loosely modeled on Special Operations Command, but even under this model, CYBERCOM still lacks the authority to enforce common standards for the services, tailor recruitment to the unique dynamics of cyberspace operations, or control initial training. “We think it needs even more work,” said Laurie Buckhout, the acting assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy.

There have been attempts to address structural shortfalls in the past. Most recently, Congress granted CYBERCOM enhanced budgetary control in fiscal year 2024, giving the command oversight of roughly $2 billion in acquisitions for cyber tools, systems, and training. But the services still control the vast majority of cyber acquisition funds.

More than two decades after declaring cyberspace a warfighting domain, the U.S. military relies on an inefficient and ineffective solution to generate the capabilities needed to defend it. CYBERCOM holds the primary responsibility for operating in and through cyberspace, but it relies on personnel drawn from five different military services to do so. There are no common standards for recruiting, initial training, or career progression across the services, and none treats cyberspace as a core mission. The result is chronic readiness gaps, inconsistent quality, and top talent regularly lost to the private sector.

The solution is not more reform around the margins. Instead, a dedicated U.S. Cyber Force is long overdue. A U.S. Cyber Force would unify the responsibility for recruiting, training, and promoting cyber talent under one roof. It would foster a cyber-native culture, prioritize cultivating mastery within the cyber domain, and allow for a more flexible, mission-driven force structure. This construct is consistent with how the military organizes itself to man, train, and equip forces across all the warfighting domains. And it is structurally and fiscally viable.

Iran’s dangerous gamble of threatening to withdraw from the NPT

Darya Dolzikova

The outlines of Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program since last Friday have been extensively reported and mulled over. While considerable uncertainties remain over the precise extent of the damage at Iran’s key nuclear sites, there’s a bigger question: What are the implications for Iran’s strategic calculus on the future and role of its nuclear program?

The Israeli strikes have had a meaningful impact on rolling back Iran’s nuclear expertise and technical capabilities. But they have probably had the opposite effect on Iran’s threat perception and, therefore, its resolve to advance and potentially weaponize its program.

On Monday, June 17, three days after the first Israeli aerial strikes on Iran, the Iranian parliament introduced a bill that—if passed—could see Iran withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Tehran has repeatedly threatened in the past to withdraw from the treaty, which underpins the global non-proliferation regime. However, the scale of the current Israeli attack has made that threat—and the subsequent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program—eminently credible. Notably, the Iranian ambassadors to the United Kingdom and France have reiterated Iran’s continued commitment to the NPT.

Iran probably hopes that threatening withdrawal—or even moving toward NPT withdrawal—can help it generate leverage in the current escalation cycle. But that would be an exceptionally dangerous bet to make and could be counter to Tehran’s interest.

Stronger resolve. Israel’s military operation of the last few days has already degraded Iran’s technical capabilities, especially the country’s ability to produce enriched uranium. However, on a strategic level, the scale of Israel’s attacks carried out against multiple targets in Iran, including in the capital of Tehran, may convince Iranians that acquiring a nuclear weapon capability is the only way to deter similar aggression in the future.

Iran provides warning before attack on US base in Qatar. No Americans killed; Trump announces ceasefire

John Mecklin

Iran launched a retaliatory attack on the United States air base in Qatar on Monday, but only after warning the attack was coming, an apparent attempt to de-escalate hostilities between the two countries. All but one of the missiles fired in the attack were intercepted, US President Donald Trump said, and no Americans or Qataris were killed or injured. In a series of posts on social media, Trump called the attack “very weak” but used the occasion to suggest that Iranian leaders may have “gotten it all out of their ‘system,’ and there will, hopefully, be no further HATE.”

In a subsequent post on Truth Social, Trump said Israel and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire after days of Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iranian counterattacks on Israel, and an American attack over the weekend on Iranian nuclear facilities with bunker-buster bombs Israel does not possess. There was no immediate confirmation of a ceasefire from Israeli or Iranian officials.

The telegraphed Iranian attack on the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar and Trump’s almost immediate calls for peace followed by just two days the US bombing of three Iranian nuclear sites on Saturday. The American attack came just days after President Donald Trump suggested he would wait two weeks before deciding whether to take military action. US warplanes and submarines reportedly attacked nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan, in actions that Trump said in a White House address constituted a “spectacular military success” that had “completely and totally obliterated” Iran’s key nuclear enrichment facilities.

Trump provided no documentation for his claims, and some observers questioned whether a detailed battle damage assessment could have been completed by the time Trump spoke. On Saturday, Richard Nephew, a senior research scholar at Columbia University and former director for Iran at the National Security Council, wrote on the Bluesky social media site, “Suggestion, folks: it is the middle of the night in Iran. We have no battle damage assessment. We have a tweet. We will know more things soon and likely not know things for a while longer. Asking questions is fair, but answers fleeting. Hot takes exciting but not diagnostic.”

Red Lines in Orbit: Deterrence, Sovereignty, and the Risk of Escalation in Space Conflict

DeLaine Mayer

The next war may begin without a sound—in orbit, far above the battlefield. As satellite proximity operations, grappling technologies, and AI-enabled space systems proliferate, space is no longer just a technical domain; it is a new theater of power. Orbital assets are fast becoming the front line of great power confrontation, yet international norms and deterrence doctrines have not caught up, creating a world that is dangerously unprepared for the political and military consequences of space-based first strikes.

In March 2025, US Space Force General Michael A. Guetlein, the vice chief of space operations, revealed that American systems had observed “five different objects in space maneuvering in and out and around each other in synchronicity and in control,” a scenario he called “dogfighting in space.” China, along with the United States and other major space powers, is rapidly developing counterspace capabilities. These aren’t science-fiction weapons; they reflect a strategic shift. Satellites are the nervous system of modern warfare, vital for intelligence, navigation, and communication. Disabling an adversary’s satellites can blind its battlefield or situational awareness and create a powerful advantage in the early stages of conflict.

Unlike traditional warfare, there is no clear legal framework for what constitutes aggression in space. Satellite interference can be framed as a malfunction, a test, or a provocation, making it an ideal gray-zone tactic. The first move in the next major conflict may not come as a missile strike or cyberattack, but as a silent,

deniable maneuver in orbit that signals war before the world even realizes it has begun, just like the February 2022 cyberattack on Viasat in the hours before Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

27 June 2025

How China made electric vehicles mainstream

"I drive an electric vehicle because I am poor," says Lu Yunfeng, a private hire driver, who is at a charging station on the outskirts of Guangzhou in the south of China.

Standing nearby, Sun Jingguo agrees. "The cost of driving a petrol car is too expensive. I save money driving an electric vehicle," he says.

"Also, it protects the environment," he adds, leaning against his white Beijing U7 model.

It's the kind of conversation climate campaigners dream of hearing. In many countries, electric vehicles (EVs) are considered luxury purchases.

But here in China - where almost half of all cars sold last year were electric - it's a banal reality.

At the beginning of the century, China's leadership laid out plans to dominate the technologies of the future. Once a nation of bicycles China is now the world's leader in EVs.

For Guangzhou's more than 18 million people, the roar of the rush hour has become a hum.

"When it comes to EVs, China is 10 years ahead and 10 times better than any other country," says auto sector analyst Michael Dunne.

Chinese EV makers are looking to sell more cars overseas

China's BYD now leads the global EV market, after overtaking US rival Tesla earlier this year.

BYD's sales have been helped by a vast domestic market of more than 1.4 billion people and it is now looking to sell more cars overseas. So too are a raft of other Chinese start-ups that make affordable EVs for the mass market.

Japan’s new quantum breakthrough cuts qubit needs and boosts speed by 30x

Quantum computers promise to revolutionize everything from drug discovery to climate modeling. By processing information in quantum bits, or qubits, these machines could one day outperform even the most powerful supercomputers.

But building them remains a monumental challenge. The biggest hurdle: quantum systems are fragile. They are prone to errors from even the tiniest disturbances, making accurate, large-scale computing nearly impossible without error correction.

Now, a team of researchers in Japan has unveiled a major step forward. Scientists from the University of Osaka have developed a powerful new approach to a long-standing problem of preparing the ultra-pure quantum states essential for error-resistant computation.

Their method drastically reduces the resources required, bringing us closer to building reliable, large-scale quantum machines.

The study introduces a process called “zero-level” magic state distillation. It prepares high-fidelity quantum states with far fewer qubits and much lower computational cost than traditional techniques.

The researchers say this advance could significantly shrink the time and scale needed to develop fully fault-tolerant quantum computers.

Xi Jinping’s Iran Dilemma

Trevor Filseth

On Tuesday, June 17, Xi Jinping made his first official statement regarding Israel’s ongoing war with Iran on the sidelines of the “China-Central Asia Summit” in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Chinese leader decried the outbreak of violence, claiming that Beijing “oppose[d] any act that infringes upon the sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of other countries,” and stressing that escalation was “not in the common interest of the international community.”

Xi’s statement was notable not so much for its content—the language used was unremarkable—as for its timing. The statement came five days after Israel’s initial series of airstrikes on Iran, killing a series of high-ranking IRGC officers and nuclear scientists and seemingly knocking the Natanz nuclear enrichment plant out of action. China’s initial reaction to the crisis was anodyne and inoffensive,

vaguely condemning the escalation in violence and urging a peaceful resolution to the Israel-Iran dispute. Many countries issue similar statements in the opening hours of a crisis, to be supplanted by more substantive ones once the country’s leadership determines what its position should be. But more than a week later—and as other countries in the region and around the world have been far more vocal in their criticisms of Israel—Beijing has seemingly remained indecisive.

The call between Xi and Russian leader Vladimir Putin to discuss the war on Thursday is also instructive in this regard. As the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s readout observes, Putin fiercely condemned the Israeli decision to attack Iranian nuclear facilities, claiming that the attack had been “very dangerous” and insisting on its immediate resolution.

Conversely, Xi “expounded China’s principled position and said that the current situation in the Middle East is very critical, which once again confirms that the world has entered a new period of turbulence and change.” The difference in tone could hardly be more remarkable. Though Xi did also emphasize the importance of a ceasefire—and singled out Israel for starting the conflict—the Chinese leader’s remarks seem to indicate a tacit acceptance of the war.

Drones, Missiles, and a Battle of Chinese and European Fighter Jets: Lessons on the Future of War from the Indian Subcontinent’s Skies

Arsalan Bilal

When Indian and Pakistani jets took to the skies last month, the world witnessed one of the largest and technologically most complex air confrontations in recent history. For four days, both sides unleashed precision strikes, drones, and long-range missiles in an engagement that, while brief, could reshape thinking about modern warfare in the region and beyond.

Although the fighting de-escalated as a ceasefire was brokered amid risks of a nuclear confrontation, the battle—its tactics, technologies, and consequences—offers rich insights for militaries, defense planners, and experts worldwide. With confirmed losses, unverified claims, and evolving doctrine, the air war between India and Pakistan in 2025 underscores that future conflicts may be won or lost far from the battlefield—in the invisible domains of sensors, algorithms, and contested airspace.

The Spark: A Strike and a Race to the Skies

The latest India-Pakistan crisis was triggered on April 22, when twenty-five innocent tourists and a local guide were killed in a terrorist attack in Indian-controlled Kashmir. India blamed Pakistan-based militants for the attack and responded by launching precision airstrikes on May 7 against multiple sites, which New Delhi called terrorist camps, across Pakistani cities and Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Pakistan retaliated by scrambling its jets and targeting the Indian fleet.

What followed was not a conventional border skirmish, but a complex, beyond-visual-range (BVR) aerial confrontation involving more than one hundred combat aircraft. Interestingly, neither side penetrated the other’s airspace. The missile exchanges between the adversaries took place at distances of up to one hundred miles. Among the aircraft used in the confrontation were some of the most advanced jets, including 4.5-generation fighters. The Indian Air Force is reported to have deployed, inter alia, French-built Rafale fighters armed with Meteor missiles, while Pakistan scrambled Chinese-made J-10s carrying PL-15 missiles.

Chinese engineers bring artillery-launched drones from concept to life

After 12 years of technical hurdles and scepticism, China has successfully tested artillery-launched drones capable of surviving the crushing load in a 155mm (6 inches) cannon shell.

Five live-fire trials at a western test base confirmed the drones endured launch forces exceeding 3,000 times their own weight – comparable to 35 adult African elephants on a person.

The advance centres on a pyrotechnic ejection mechanism co-developed by the Shaanxi Applied Physics and Chemistry Research Institute, the Chinese air force, and defence contractor Norinco.

This highly reliable but low-cost system orchestrates a sequence of precisely timed detonations to separate the drone from its artillery shell mid-flight while shielding it from aerodynamic damage – all without electronic controls.

These drones can “reach distances exceeding 10 kilometres (6.2 miles) in seconds, multiply flight range, significantly save power consumption and extend loiter time,” the team, led by senior engineer Huang Yunluan, wrote.

Israel-Iran conflict unleashes wave of AI disinformation

A wave of disinformation has been unleashed online since Israel began strikes on Iran last week, with dozens of posts reviewed by BBC Verify seeking to amplify the effectiveness of Tehran's response.

Our analysis found a number of videos - created using artificial intelligence - boasting of Iran's military capabilities, alongside fake clips showing the aftermath of strikes on Israeli targets. The three most viewed fake videos BBC Verify found have collectively amassed over 100 million views across multiple platforms.

Pro-Israeli accounts have also shared disinformation online, mainly by recirculating old clips of protests and gatherings in Iran, falsely claiming that they show mounting dissent against the government and support among Iranians for Israel's military campaign.

Israel launched strikes in Iran on 13 June, leading to several rounds of Iranian missile and drone attacks on Israel.

One organisation that analyses open-source imagery described the volume of disinformation online as "astonishing" and accused some "engagement farmers" of seeking to profit from the conflict by sharing misleading content designed to attract attention online.

"We are seeing everything from unrelated footage from Pakistan, to recycled videos from the October 2024 strikes—some of which have amassed over 20 million views—as well as game clips and AI-generated content being passed off as real events," Geoconfirmed, the online verification group, wrote on X.

Certain accounts have become "super-spreaders" of disinformation, being rewarded with significant growth in their follower count. One pro-Iranian account with no obvious ties to authorities in Tehran - Daily Iran Military - has seen its followers on X grow from just over 700,000 on 13 June to 1.4m by 19 June, a 100% increase in under a week.

America’s War With Iran

The United States has attacked Iran. Just days after suggesting he might delay any American military action for weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on June 21 that U.S. aircraft had struck three Iranian nuclear sites,

including the deeply buried facility at Fordow. Iranian officials confirmed that the strikes had taken place. Although Trump insisted that the sites had been “obliterated,” it remains unclear what damage the attacks have done.

It is clear, however, that with this U.S. intervention, the war Israel launched against Iran over a week ago has entered a new phase. Events could turn in several directions. The American attack could indeed lead to Iranian capitulation on terms friendly to Israel and the United States. But it is equally or even more likely to draw the United States deeper into the war with profoundly negative consequences.

Iran will almost certainly seek some manner of retribution, perhaps by attacking nearby U.S. bases and potentially killing U.S. soldiers. That could lead to ever widening escalation, with devastating effects for the region and American entanglement in a war that few Americans want.

How Cyber Warfare Changes the Face of Geopolitical Conflict

When Israeli hackers deleted data from Iran's state-owned Bank Sepah, disrupting financial services, the act represented another escalation of the use of cyberattacks during geopolitical conflicts, the largest since Russia downed the Viasat communications system during its initial invasion of Ukraine.

The Israeli cyberattackers did not stop there: A second compromise, this time of Iran-based cryptocurrency exchange Nobitex, resulted in nearly $82 million in lost digital assets, according to a post on X by the hacktivist group Gonjeske Darande, or "Predatory Sparrow." For its part, more than 35 Iran-aligned hacktivists and state-sponsored actors had launched a coordinated attack against Israel's infrastructure, including distributed denial-of-service attacks and defacements.

The major role that hacktivists are playing in geopolitical conflicts highlights the growing importance of cyber-augmented warfare and the blurring of lines in citizen participation, says Adrien Ogée, chief operating officer of the CyberPeace Institute, a nonprofit that studies cyber-conflict and provides cybersecurity services to humanitarian organizations.

"That's likely where we're headed — more blurred boundaries, more civilian spillover, and growing demand for cyber volunteerism that's structured, legal, and ethical," he says, adding: "Cyber may not always lead the fight, but it's part of almost every modern conflict now — and civilians are often on the front lines, whether they want to be or not."

A militarily degraded Iran may turn to asymmetrical warfare – raising risk of proxy and cyber attacks

Israel’s air assault on Iran has focused largely on degrading the Islamic Republic’s military and would-be nuclear capabilities.

In the space of several days, Israel has totally or partially destroyed at least two nuclear sites, destroyed numerous air defense capabilities in a number of cities and killed at least 14 nuclear scientists and several senior leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

The Israeli operation has compromised how Iran can wage conventional warfare – through the use of military hardware, missiles, drones and aircraft. It has also likely curtailed any progress Iranian scientists had made in enriching uranium to a weapons-level grade, at least in the short-term.

But conventional military weapons are only one tool in Tehran’s arsenal. As a researcher who studies how Iran partners with militant groups, I know Iran still has the means to target its enemies. Despite the degradation of its military capabilities, Iran can leverage proxies, criminal organizations abroad, and cyberattacks to hit Israeli, and possibly U.S., targets.

Forward deterrence doctrine

The Islamic Republic is well suited for asymmetric warfare, or conflict between two countries that have different conventional capabilities and that is below the threshold of conventional war.

It fits a central tenet of Iran’s forward deterrence policy. In short, the doctrine holds that Iran should target its adversaries before their threat reaches the country’s borders. As Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei said in 2019, Iran “must not limit ourselves within our own borders. It is our duty to recognize and confront threats that lie beyond our walls.”

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