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11 August 2019

Western Balkans Foreign Fighters and Homegrown Jihadis: Trends and Implications

ADRIAN SHTUNI
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Abstract: Over 1,000 adult male foreign fighters, women, and minors from the Western Balkans spent time in Syria and Iraq and around 500 from the region are still there, including children born in theater. After seven years of fighting and at least 260 combat deaths, the last active jihadi unit from the Western Balkans in Syria and Iraq is a modest ethnic Albanian combat unit fighting with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib. The rest of those remaining in Syria and Iraq, mostly minors, are held in Kurdish-controlled IDP camps. Some 460 others have gradually returned home, making the Western Balkans the region with the highest concentration of returning foreign terrorist fighters in Europe and creating a long-term security challenge compounded by inadequate resources and the threat posed by homegrown jihadi militants.


The Western Balkans emerged as a meaningful source of European foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict.1Although it appeared suddenly, this jihadi mobilization wave did not materialize in a vacuum. It was and remains the most visible manifestation of a wider religious militancy phenomenon in the region. This article will examine both parts of the phenomenon: the current state of the Western Balkans foreign fighter contingenta and the complex challenge they represent as well as the scope and significance of the homegrown jihadi pool in the region. The metrics provided in this article have been compiled from data that was last updated in early to mid-2019 and was provided or released by Western Balkans law enforcement agencies and/or collected from a wide range of reports released by international organizations and academic institutions.

Part One: Exploring the Western Balkans Foreign Fighters Contingent

Data and Observed Trends
Since 2012, about 1,070 nationalsb of Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, and Montenegro traveled to Syria and Iraq, primarily joining the ranks of the Islamic State and in lesser numbers the al-Qa`ida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra—most recently rebranded Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This unprecedented outflow of foreign fighters from the region peaked in 2013-2014 and almost grinded to a halt by 2016,2 although aspiring jihadi militants continued their largely unsuccessful attempts to cross into Syria well into 2017.3 About two-thirds of the contingent, or 67 percent, were male adults at the time of departure, 15 percent women, and 18 percent children.c Kosovo contributed the region’s largest number of men (256),4 whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina contributed the highest number of women (61) and children (81).5

Due to new births between 2012 and 2019, the number of children of foreign fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria and Iraq has sizably increased. According to official data, the number of children born in theater to Kosovan and Bosnian parents as of early 2019 stood at 155.d These new births have further increased the size of the Western Balkans contingent who have spent time in Syria and Iraq to at least 1,225.e

In the last seven years, about 260 of those who traveled to Syria and Iraq from the Western Balkans have been reportedly killed in armed hostilities, or, in a few cases, died of natural causes. That represents almost one-quarter of the original contingent of 1,070 individuals. Some 460 others have returned to their countries of nationality or residence.f The majority had returned by 2015.g A few others were transferred to North Macedonia by the U.S. military in 20186 after being captured by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), thus making that country one of the first in Europe to publicly repatriate Islamic State fighters detained in Syria.7 The repatriation continued in April 2019 with Kosovo accepting the transfer of 110 individuals, of whom 74 are children, 32 women, and four alleged male foreign fighters. This was one of the largest repatriations of its kind so far.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina repatriated only one alleged foreign fighter.9

The author estimates the size of the Western Balkans contingent of foreign fighters and family members remaining in Syria and Iraq stands at over 500 individuals, made up one-third by male combatants and two-thirds by children (including those born in theater) and women.h They are mostly being held in Kurdish-controlled prisons and camps for displaced people while a smaller number continues to be embedded with the organizations they joined in Syria and Iraq.10 At least two foreign fighters, one from North Macedonia and one from Kosovo, are serving life sentences in Turkey.11 Nationals of Bosnia and Herzegovina currently compose the largest group of the Western Balkans contingent remaining in the conflict theater.i

As of mid-2019, the largely mono-ethnic Islamic State-affiliated units of Western Balkans foreign fighters appear to no longer be active in the conflict theater. This is mostly due to successful targeting of their leadership by U.S.-led coalition airstrikes and considerable battlefield casualties that have caused a significant drop in the presence of active Western Balkans foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq, likely to the lowest point since the beginning of the jihadi outflow in 2012.12

The last active jihadi presence from the region in Syria is an ethnic Albanian unit within HTS. Xhemati Alban is a katiba (combat unit) composed of ethnic Albanian fighters operating in and around the northwestern Syrian province of Idlib. Combatants of other Western Balkans ethnicities continue to fight with HTS, but ethnic Albanians appear to be the only ones from the region to still operate a mono-ethnic unit with its commanding structure.13 This may be indicative of both a sufficiently large number of fighters and adequate military capabilities. Research by the authorj and linguistic idiosyncrasies from propaganda footage indicate that these fighters originate primarily from North Macedonia and Kosovo. Video and photographic propaganda material released between 2017-2018 by an affiliated media outlet suggest the unit may have up to two dozen active fighters in its ranks.k Other martyrdom propaganda footage indicates that the unit may have suffered at least 18 combat deaths, one after a SVBIED attack during an offensive in Aleppo in late February 2016.14 The latest martyrdom announcement was issued by the unit’s official propaganda channel on May 13, 2019.

The unit’s commander is Abdul Jashari, a 42-year-old ethnic Albanian citizen of North Macedonia, going by the nom de guerre Abu Qatada al-Albani. Jashari is an influential figure and close military advisor to Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of HTS, who appointed Abu Qatada al-Albani in the summer of 2014 to lead the organization’s military operations in Syria.15 The U.S. Treasury Department designated Jashari a terrorist on November 10, 2016.16 His name appeared recently in HTS communiqués as one of the members of a high committee tasked with leading reconciliation efforts with Hurras al-Din, a jihadi faction affiliated with al-Qa`ida.17

As part of Xhemati Alban’s continued engagement and propaganda efforts via social media channels targeting audiences in the Balkans, in August 2018, the group released a 33-minute video entitled “Albanian Snipers in the Lands of Sham.”18 This high-quality propaganda video, narrated in Albanian with English subtitles, documents various stages of training, planning, and combat efforts of the unit’s sniper squad, which appears to be self-sufficient both at weapons craftsmanship and tactical training. Its members use customized, high-precision rifles with relatively expensive scopes and craft-made suppressors.19 The skillsets displayed in the video indicate possible ex-military or paramilitary background and affiliation.

The Complex Challenge of Returnees
From the start of the Syrian armed conflict, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia experienced some of the highest rates in Europe for mobilization into jihadi terrorist organizations relative to population size.20 A similar trend has characterized the reverse flow, where according to official data about 460 individuals from the region have returned home from Syria and Iraq, 242 of whom to Kosovo.21 By comparison, the countries of the European Union, with a cumulative population size of 500 million, have received about 1,500 returnees.22As data indicates, the Western Balkans is currently the region with the highest concentration of returned foreign fighters in Europe. With some 500 other adult male combatants, women, and minors still in Syria, it is not inconceivable that the number of returnees may double in size in the future. Kosovo, with its 134 returnees per million nationals, tops the chart, followed by North Macedonia with 42 per million. The United Kingdom, by comparison, has reported about 6 returnees of “national security concern” per million, whereas Germany and France about four per million.l The scale of the Western Balkans challenge in dealing with the long-term social and national security implications of this considerable wave of returnees becomes clearer when considering the very modest resources and capacities available in the region compared to the rest of Europe.

The emerging practice of stripping citizenship or permanent residence to foreign fighters that is gaining traction in some European countries might complicate things further for the Western Balkans, as it shifts the burden of prosecuting and handling dozens of returnees with dual nationality to countries already overburdened and ill-equipped to do so both in terms of resources and expertise.m In October 2018, Kosovan authorities accepted the transfer from Turkey of an ethnic Albanian Islamic State fighter and his three children. He was born in Germany to parents that had emigrated there from Kosovo.23 That was after Germany revoked his permanent residence permit although he had lived all his life in Germany, had reportedly been radicalized there, and fought in Syria with the so-called “Lohberger Brigade,” a German-speaking jihadi unit.24 He was swiftly indicted, tried, and found guilty in Kosovo within a three-month timeframe for “organizing and participating in a terrorist group.”25 Though, after pleading guilty, he received a five-year prison sentence, that was only for the crime of joining a terrorist organization rather than possible crimes committed during the four years spent fighting with the Islamic State in Syria.n

Despite significant capacity and resource challenges, the Western Balkans countries have tried and sentenced a significant number of returning jihadis. Kosovo has been at the forefront of these efforts with 73 successful prosecutions of male returnees as of early 2019, which is more than all the other countries of the region combined.26 That is six out of every 10 returnees. By comparison, the United Kingdom has prosecuted one in 10 jihadis returning from Syria, for a total of about 40 individuals.27 o Courts in North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina—the other two countries with the largest numbers of returnees in the Western Balkans—have issued guilty verdicts against 32 and 18 of their foreign fighter nationals, respectively.28

Yet, due to generally lenient sentencing regimes29 in the countries of the Western Balkans, often based on plea bargains, the prison sentences in terrorism-related cases have largely ranged from one to six years with few exceptions in cases of prominent recruiters.30 For example, in Kosovo, the average sentence in terrorism-related cases has been 3.5 years.31 As a result, about 40 percent of those sentenced for terrorist offenses in Kosovo in the past few years have already been released from prison.p In Bosnia and Herzegovina, sentencing leniency has gone even further. In one criminal proceeding, a defendant holding dual Bosnian and Austrian citizenship entered a guilty plea for providing recurrent financial support to the Islamic State and settled with the court to pay a fine of about $15,000 in lieu of a one-year prison sentence.32 Another returning foreign fighter was sentenced in late 2016 to one year in prison after admitting that going to Syria was a mistake.33 On average, the 25 individuals prosecuted and sentenced by a court of appeals verdict in Bosnia and Herzegovina have received prison sentences of one year and 11 months for terrorism-related activities, including fighting in Syria.34

Overall, the sentences handed down in the Western Balkans for terrorism offenses are among the most lenient in Europe. The average sentence in the European Union for terrorism-related offenses was five years in 2017.35 The average increased to seven years in 2018.36 By comparison, the average sentence for criminal offenses related to the Islamic State in the United States in mid-2019 stood at 13.5 years in prison.37 Yet, while E.U. countries have the resources, capabilities, and practical experience required to develop and implement prison-based rehabilitation and post-incarceration aftercare programs—including employment assistance and socioeconomic incentives—that is not the case in the Western Balkans. Uneven progress has been made to date toward putting in place any meaningful rehabilitation and reintegration programs for returning foreign fighters, women, or minors.38Although detailed strategies and action plans have been drafted across the region, inadequate allocation of funding has hampered their implementation and impact.39

Another concern related to foreign fighter returnees is the likelihood that some may have returned to the region with the assistance of support networks without being detected by the authorities, or at least have been able to evade them for some time. An alleged Kosovo-born Islamic State recruiter and a U.S. permanent resident at the time of travel to Syria in 2013, relocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2017 using fake travel documents. He was able to hide in Sarajevo for about six months using numerous fake identities before being arrested, at which time he was reportedly found in possession of passports from six countries.40 He was extradited to the United States in October 2017 where he has been indicted. While the purpose of his relocation to Bosnia and Herzegovina remains unclear, he could face a life sentence in the United States if found guilty.41

In another case, a former Islamic State foreign fighter of Kosovan citizenship was arrested in February 2019 by the Albanian customs authorities while attempting to board a ferry to Italy using a forged North Macedonian passport. In January 2017, a court in Kosovo had sentenced him to two years and six months in prison, but the police had been unable to locate him following the completion of the trial until he resurfaced in Albania.42 Both of these cases illustrate the ability of these returning foreign fighters to evade law enforcement authorities, travel and relocate abroad, and obtain travel documents under false identities. In other cases, returnees under house arrest absconded and returned to Syria.43 All the above is unlikely to have happened without the logistic and financial assistance of support networks with criminal connections.Xhemati Alban – Albanian HTS katiba. The banner indicates this cohort of fighters is an “infiltration unit.” Date posted: October 18, 2017 (Source: Telegram)

Part Two: Examining the Scope and Significance of the Homegrown Jihadi Pool
The unprecedented jihadi mobilization wave of the last decade in the Western Balkans may have been sudden in its manifestation, but it did not occur in a vacuum.44 As such, the foreign fighters are only the most visible manifestation of a wider phenomenon of religious militancy in the Western Balkans, the size and threat of which is not easily measured. Numerous counterterrorism operations resulting in hundreds of arrests, convictions, and various foiled terrorist attacks have revealed the instrumental role of well-integrated radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization networks organized around salafi enclaves, ‘unofficial’ mosques, and a variety of faith-based charities, movements, and associations run by local fundamentalist clerics and religious zealots.45

In essence, observed radicalization and mobilization patterns are similar to those elsewhere in Europe, where known salafi organizations like Sharia4Belgium, Millatu Ibrahim, and Die Wahre Religion have been heavily linked to foreign fighter flows to Syria and Iraq. In 2015, for example, a court in Belgium found 45 members of the salafi organization Sharia4Belgium guilty of sending fighters to Syria and other terrorist-related offenses.46 In 2016, Germany banned Die Wahre Religion (The True Religion) known for its proselytizing campaign “Lies!” (Read!) that was also active in the Balkans—about 140 of the group’s supporters are known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq.47One key difference, nonetheless, is that in the Western Balkans, the proliferation of ultraconservative organizations with political agendas was enabled by the post-Balkans conflict environment, where these entities were able to exploit societal vulnerabilities and rifts, mixing humanitarian aid with salafi indoctrination and militantism.48

While the contingent of Western Balkans foreign fighters is only the most visible manifestation of the terrorist threat in the region, questions abound as to the size of the less visible component of the problem: the contingent of radicalized individuals that has often provided ideological, logistical, or financial support to foreign fighters and at times has been responsible for plotting terrorist attacks. In a way, terrorism-related arrests and failed plots make some aspects of this problem set more visible. Although no official data exists for these countries, data and trends observed elsewhere in European countries may provide a general indication of the possible size of the problem in the Western Balkans.

According to a report on the terrorist threat in France presented to the French Senate, as of March 2018 the French intelligence services had identified 1,309 French nationals or residents who had traveled to Syria and Iraq since 2012.49 The same report indicated that as of February 2018, the “Fichier de traitement des Signalements pour la Prévention de la Radicalisation à caractère Terroriste,” (FSPRT) a database used by French security services to monitor and assess the magnitude of the domestic terrorist threat posed by Islamist extremists,q had 19,725 “active profiles/entries” of radicalized individuals, 4,000 of which considered “particularly dangerous.”50 r In France therefore, the number of radicalized individuals considered to pose a potential national security threat is about 15 times higher than the number of known foreign fighters.

Similarly, the British MI5 has over the years identified 23,00051 onetime jihadi extremists living in the United Kingdom, 3,000 of whom were the focus of 500 ongoing terrorism investigations or monitoring operations in early 2017.s By comparison, the number of reported British foreign fighters in July 2017 stood at about 850,52 making the number of the homegrown jihadi—posing either a residual or active national security threat—about 27 times higher than the number of foreign fighters.

It is very possible the divergence between the French and United Kingdom ratios is because the FSPRT list and the MI5 list are based on different criteria. But based on the similar trends observed in France and the United Kingdom regarding the much larger size of the homegrown jihadi population relative to the foreign fighter contingent, it would not be inconceivable to assume at least a 15:1 homegrown jihadi to foreign fighter ratio in the Western Balkans context.t Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that methodologies for measuring terrorist radicalization and national security threat differ from country to country. Also, while similar in some ways, jihadi radicalization trends are not uniform across countries as they result from the interplay of a variety of socio-political, historical, and ideological variables that are largely country and region specific.

Two other indicators point to the existence of a robust and ideologically committed contingent of jihadi militants operating in the Western Balkans: the persistent activities of ‘social media jihadis’ who openly support and disseminate the ideology and propaganda of terrorist organizations, and the unprecedented number (as far as the region is concerned) of both foiled terrorist attacks and arrested homegrown terrorists in recent years. Following the clampdown on accounts disseminating jihadi content by Facebook, local ‘social media jihadis’ have partially migrated over the past years to other social media platforms such as the messaging application Telegram, which has a relatively less aggressive content removal policy.u

Research conducted for this assessment on the week of March 11, 2019, identified 27 active (not requiring membership) Telegram channels/pages in the Albanian language and 6,352 subscribers/accounts that followed one or more of these pages operated by militants and/or fighters of the Islamic State (13 channels), HTS (six channels), or generic jihadi supporters (eight channels).v The content circulated through these channels focused on promotion of jihad; sharing news bulletins from official media channels of jihadi organizations operating in various conflict theaters; salafi literature; sermons of local and foreign salafi clerics generally imprisoned for terrorism-related activities; propaganda videos and infographics; and jihadi nasheeds.w

While in the past couple of years there has been a drop in jihadi media output in Western Balkans’ languages,x an avid cadre of committed ‘social media jihadis’ continue to engage regularly with audiences online, disseminate jihadi propaganda, recruit, incite violence, and even plot attacks. In late 2017, a court in Kosovo sentenced an Islamic State supporter to one year and six months in prison for using social media platforms to incite attacks against Kosovan government institutions and foreign embassies.53 A few months later, another Islamic State supporter, the sibling of a Kosovan Islamic State suicide bomber, received a sentence of 200 hours of community service for inciting vehicular attacks via social media.54 In October 2018, they were both found guilty on additional charges, the first for attempting to enlist support and funding for a suicide attack and the other for not reporting the case to the police.55

Terrorist plots have been successfully disrupted by counterterrorism operations in the past three years in Kosovo, Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. In a 2016 foiled plot involving an advanced Islamic State-directed plan to carry out simultaneous attacks in the region, including one on the Israeli national soccer team visiting Albania, nine Kosovan citizens were found guilty.56 According to the prosecution, one of the perpetrators had previously fought in Syria and some of the plotters were taking directives on the attack from their compatriots in leadership positions within the Islamic State.57

In 2015, two soldiers were killed in the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina by an armed Islamist gunman who blew himself up after carrying out the attack. Notes glorifying the Islamic State were found in his house.58 In June 2018, Kosovan authorities reportedly foiled another attack targeting NATO forces stationed in Kosovo.59 One of the plotters was arrested previously for attempting to travel to Syria and another one was expelled from Italy.60 The latest foiled attack was reported in North Macedonia on February 15, 2019, where the police arrested 20 alleged Islamic State supporters.61

In sum, some returnees from Syria and Iraq have reportedly been involved in terrorism-related activities and found in possession of illegal firearms and explosives upon their return.62 Yet, the foiled terrorist plots have largely involved individuals not known to have traveled to Syria and Iraq, although in many cases they were related to or associated with known foreign fighters. Judging from this perspective, the homegrown jihadis have so far been a more significant source of domestic security threat than foreign fighters.

Conclusions
This assessment has found that the presence of Western Balkans foreign fighters currently active in Syria and Iraq is likely at the lowest point since 2012 and the remaining contingent of about 500 individuals is made up for two-thirds by minors and women. While already the region with the highest concentration of returning foreign fighters in Europe, additional repatriations are bound to compound the Western Balkans’ long-term social and security challenge further.

In light of the sizable wave of returnees from Syria and Iraq, special attention and resources should be dedicated to assessing, monitoring, and actively countering the robust jihadi networks in the region. The considerable numbers of terrorism-related arrests, convictions, and foiled attacks in the Western Balkans clearly indicate that the countries of the region have stepped up their CT efforts in response to a heightened terrorist threat. Yet, unless adequately augmented, scarce resources and capacities will likely continue to hamper the scope and effectiveness of these efforts. Prison sentences that are not matched by substantive prison-based rehabilitation and post-incarceration supervision and support efforts are unlikely to duly mitigate the social and security risks posed by returnees and homegrown terrorist offenders.

Policy makers should consider proactively adjusting national security responses to the demographic shifts observed in the composition of the remaining Western Balkans contingent in Syria, currently dominated by noncombatants. The “children of the Caliphate,” including those from the Western Balkans, will likely represent a long-term challenge with national security implications. As such, there is a strong case for prioritizing efforts addressing this complex challenge. CTC

Adrian Shtuni is CEO and Principal Consultant of Shtuni Consulting LLC. He specializes in foreign policy and security issues with a regional focus on the Western Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean. Follow @Shtuni

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