Indian Strategic Studies

30 June 2025

Russia Won’t Sit Out A US-China Asia-Pacific War – Analysis

Garrett I. Campbell

(FPRI) — Contrary to the popular assessments of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, Chinese and Russian national interests primarily converge in the Asia Pacific and Arctic, not in Europe and Ukraine. For the last two decades, the United States has not paid adequate attention to this convergence at our peril.

Overall assessments by the US national security community, think-tanks, and academia of the strategic partnership have almost universally fallen short and downplayed the Russia-China convergence.[1] This is a mistake. While establishing its sphere of influence over Europe will remain Russia’s priority, Russia could go to war to support China in the event of a US-China conflict in the Asia Pacific.

It is true that China has done much to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. While it has avoided direct involvement, it remains Russia’s primary enabler. Albeit China does not want to undermine its own economic interests in Europe. Russia’s position in the Asia Pacific is significantly different than that of China in Europe;

thus, there is less risk in how it pursues its strategic interests, and that may be fundamentally preparing Russia to elevate the Sino-Russian entente to a military alliance in the Asia Pacific. President Vladimir Putin and Russia’s elites bet their legacy not only on the forceful realignment of the international system, but on the country’s future economic prosperity anchored in the Sino-Russian relationship, including the collaborative development and use of the Arctic and Russia’s Northern Sea Route.

As such, Putin has implemented a series of Russian maritime doctrine and Arctic policy changes, undertaken force structure and alignment changes involving a geographic reprioritization, and empowered Russian elites to participate in supporting the Sino-Russian strategic partnership involving these mutually important regions. These actions convey the importance Putin places on the pursuit of Russian national interests and suggest he may be slowly preparing Russia to support its most important treaty partner in the event of a US-China conflict in the region.

The ASEAN–GCC–China Summit: more symbolism than substance

Despite being overshadowed by President Donald Trump’s tour of the Gulf states a week earlier, the ASEAN–GCC–China Summit on 27 May 2025 in Kuala Lumpur was symbolically significant. The first-ever meeting between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations,

the Gulf Cooperation Council and China emphasised a shared commitment to a ‘rules-based multilateral […] open global trading system’, deeper cooperation and a unified position on the Israel–Palestine conflict. With a combined GDP of nearly US$25 trillion and a total population of 2.15 billion, ASEAN, the GCC and China would potentially constitute a hefty coalition.

Speaking at the 22nd IISS Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore a few days later, Malaysian Prime Minister Dato’ Seri Anwar Ibrahim suggested the purpose of the summit was to ‘connect ASEAN’s energy and talent with the Gulf’s capital and China’s scale’. However, translating the political and economic ambitions declared at the summit into concrete progress is likely to remain challenging.

Symbolic significance The brainchild of Ibrahim, whose country is chairing ASEAN in 2025, the summit was symbolic for multiple reasons. Against the backdrop of President Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs and withdrawal from international organisations and agreements – including the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council,

UNESCO and the Paris climate accords – the trilateral commitment to rules-based multilateralism acquires added significance. It aligns with China’s attempts to portray itself as a responsible global power committed to the multilateral rules-based system, in contrast to Trump’s MAGA nationalist movement in the US. The summit followed the completion of ASEAN–China FTA 3.0 negotiations, the second update of their 2002 free-trade agreement, now including the digital and green economies. It also marked the official launch of FTA negotiations between the GCC and Malaysia.

The AI Cold War Is Here: And The Global South Is The Battlefield – OpEd

Angelo Valerio Toma

In the 20th century, the Cold War was fought with nuclear threats and ideological blocs. Today, a new kind of Cold War is unfolding — one powered not by missiles, but by machine learning. While Washington and Beijing dominate the headlines, the real battleground is neither Silicon Valley nor Shenzhen. It’s Nairobi. It’s Jakarta. It’s Brasília.

Artificial intelligence is becoming the currency of 21st-century geopolitics. What makes this race especially dangerous — and decisive — is the role of the Global South. Once treated as passive terrain for great power games, these countries are now both the testing grounds and the prize in a technological arms race that will shape the future of global power.

Tech Hubs or Digital Colonies?

China is moving fast. Through its Digital Silk Road initiative — the AI-driven arm of its Belt and Road strategy — Beijing exports surveillance technologies, facial recognition systems, and cloud infrastructure to dozens of developing nations. These tools often arrive bundled with generous loans and turnkey solutions, helping governments monitor citizens and manage dissent — all under the banner of development.

In Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Ecuador, Huawei-backed surveillance systems have raised alarms about human rights and data privacy. Yet from local governments’ perspective, the offer is pragmatic: Chinese firms deliver fast, affordable solutions without the regulatory headaches often faced with Western partners. For many, it’s not about ideology — it’s about access.

The United States, meanwhile, is waking up late. The Biden administration’s Digital Transformation with Africa initiative responds to China’s head start. But beyond slogans, Washington faces a credibility gap. Western companies often lack the political backing or sustained funding to compete with state-backed Chinese tech giants like Alibaba Cloud or

The Global A.I. Divide

Adam Satariano and Paul Mozur Graphics Karl Russell and June Kim

Last month, Sam Altman, the chief executive of the artificial intelligence company OpenAI, donned a helmet, work boots and a luminescent high-visibility vest to visit the construction site of the company’s new data center project in Texas.

Bigger than New York’s Central Park, the estimated $60 billion project, which has its own natural gas plant, will be one of the most powerful computing hubs ever created when completed as soon as next year.

Around the same time as Mr. Altman’s visit to Texas, Nicolás Wolovick, a computer science professor at the National University of Córdoba in Argentina, was running what counts as one of his country’s most advanced A.I. computing hubs. It was in a converted room at the university, where wires snaked between aging A.I. chips and server computers.

“Everything is becoming more split,” Dr. Wolovick said. “We are losing.”

Nicolás Wolovick, a computer science professor at the National University of Cordoba in Argentina. “We are losing,” he said.

Sarah Pabst for The New York Times

Artificial intelligence has created a new digital divide, fracturing the world between nations with the computing power for building cutting-edge A.I. systems and those without. The split is influencing geopolitics and global economics, creating new dependencies and prompting a desperate rush to not be excluded from a technology race that could reorder economies, drive scientific discovery and change the way that people live and work.

Trump’s risky Iran bet aims for political dividends at home

Natasha Lindstaedt

President Donald J. Trump attends the 2019 Army Navy Game in Philadelphia, Pa., Dec. 14, 2019. Photo: US Army / Sgt. Dana Clarke

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the United States’ recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was that neither US allies nor US legislators knew, either. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J D Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength. He sees himself as the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behavior give him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear program.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine – even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

In Trump’s second term, his MAGA base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal, due to concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – improving the economy having been one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict. “No more wars” is a common slogan on the campaign trail.

Can Washington Counter Beijing Without Repeating Cold War Mistakes

Andrew Friedman

At the height of the Cold War, U.S. partners could reliably count on U.S. military or intelligence support for any number of actions if they were sold as vital to counter communism. This included coup d’états and extreme human rights violations up to and including death squads. While U.S. military and intelligence support for unsavory regimes and actors is somewhat well known, historical examples of human rights concerns taking a back seat to geopolitics are not limited to the Pentagon or Langley.

Take, for example, the annual Human Rights Reports (HRRs). These reports are a legally required Department of State exercise that reports on human rights violations in every country around the globe. They are generally regarded as factual, objective, and a vital source for journalists, analysts, government adjudicators, and policymakers. However, analysis from the Cold War period shows consistent gaps between the analysis of human rights organizations and the Department of State’s HRRs in their reporting on U.S. allies versus countries seen as competitors or Soviet allies. According to the authors, this indicates “that the [United States] shows significant favoritism towards countries that it values strategically.”

This approach is unsurprising, as it is not uncommon for the United States or other sovereign states to stand by allies in international arenas, even in the midst of unpopular, problematic, or morally abhorrent decisions. It does, however, demonstrate the breadth of support for problematic regimes in efforts to counter geopolitical foes and the insistence on such support from all elements of the U.S. foreign policymaking process. Put differently, at times, all U.S. foreign policy decisionmakers, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Intelligence Community, have seen value in glossing over human rights concerns.

The Soviet Union, since its collapse in 1991, has no longer been the pacing threat for the United States. This role has been assumed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the past several years, leading to concerns that human rights and democracy, which were once dismissed in international efforts to counter Moscow, may now be dismissed in efforts to counter Beijing.

Innovation Lightbulb: U.S. Federal Investments in Quantum Technology Research and Infrastructure

Hideki Tomoshige

Of the 52 federal investments to date, 36 began in 2020 with funding from the National Quantum Initiative Act and the CHIPS and Science Act. They are geographically distributed across 19 states, highlighting major regional quantum research hubs. Currently, Illinois and Maryland lead with seven institutes each, followed by New York with six,

California with five, and Colorado and New Mexico with four and three, respectively. As highlighted in the figure, these investments are led by multiple federal agencies, each leveraging its existing infrastructure and expertise.

Federal Agencies and Their Roles in QIST

Federal agencies play central roles in supporting progress in QIST research and infrastructure, including by coordinating funding and resources, promoting public-private-academic collaboration, and advancing human resource development and innovation.

Department of Energy (DOE): DOE combines cross-disciplinary scientific expertise in fields such as particle physics,

materials science, and laser physics with knowledge of how to operate premier, large-scale research facilities.National Quantum Information Science Research Centers (NQISRCs): DOE has committed $575 million in quantum over 5 years through five NQISRCs and has announced an additional $625 million in funding for these centers this year. Each center integrates DOE's national labs and talent pools with private sector partners to advance R&D in quantum technologies. This investment represents the largest single federal investment in QIST.

Why the United States Acted Now Against Ira

Kari A. Bingen and Clayton Swope

Looking at the strategic chessboard, it’s clear why the president seized this moment to strike at Iran’s nuclear program. There may never have been a better time. Iran was closer than ever before to having the ability to manufacture an atomic bomb. In the run-up to Operation Midnight Hammer, Iran walked away from the negotiating table, signaling it was not interested in diplomacy. And,

finally, Iran was suddenly weak, its air defenses in shambles. It is too early to know the long-term ramifications of the U.S. decision to join Israel’s attack on Iran, but the short-term impacts are clear. Iran’s nuclear program has been set back, and the prestige and influence of the axis of resistance have ebbed. Operation Midnight Hammer is also a reminder of U.S. resolve and military power—and the consequences for those who underestimate either.

For years, Tehran has been constructing clandestine nuclear facilities in deeper, more expansive underground tunnel complexes. In May 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency assessed that Iran’s stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium had increased by 50 percent since its last report three months prior, citing the rapid accumulation of highly enriched uranium of “serious concern,” and placing Iran within short reach of a breakout capability. In testimony this month before Congress,

the commander of the U.S. Central Command wrote that Iran possessed enough enriched uranium—well past the enrichment level required for peaceful, civilian purposes—for 10 nuclear weapons and could produce enough weapons-grade material for one bomb within a week. Although Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei probably had not decided to build a nuclear weapon, pressure was likely increasing on him to do so, particularly after the start of Israeli strikes on June 12.

America’s Forgotten War in China: Psychological Warfare Against Imperial Japan’s Chinese Puppet Army

Samuel Hui

A leaflet targeting Chinese collaborationists accused the Japanese forces of failing to provide the puppet army officers and soldiers with sufficient clothing, food, and weapons. It demanded that the Japanese address these issues and questioned, “How can we fight a war under such conditions?” (Source: National Archives and Records Administration)

Abstract: This article explores the little-known U.S. psychological warfare campaign against the Chinese Reorganized National Government under Wang Jingwei during World War II. Drawing on declassified Office of Strategic Services (OSS) documents, U.S. Air Force records, and interviews with former puppet soldiers, this piece examines how American psychological operations targeted Chinese collaborationist forces—not to destroy them, but to win them over at a crucial moment at the dawn of the Cold War.

Most scholars consider the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 or the Korean War (1950–1953) as the opening shots of 20th century military conflict between the United States and China. Yet beyond these two well-known confrontations, there was another overlooked episode: the World War II shadow war between the United States and China’s Reorganized National Government under Wang Jingwei—an Imperial Japanese puppet government comprised of Chinese collaborationists. In the final stages of the war, the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) executed psychological operations targeting the Wang Jingwei regime in China.

The OWI primarily employed so-called “white propaganda” using platforms such as the Voice of America and air-dropped leaflets to urge both Chinese military personnel and civilians in Japanese-occupied territories not to collaborate with the invading forces. In contrast, the OSS focused on “black propaganda” aimed at driving a wedge between the Wang Jingwei regime and the Japanese military. Such psychological operations involved disseminating false information and fabricating rumors to exploit internal divisions within the enemy camp to encourage the defection of Chinese puppet troops.

Examining the psychological dimensions of the conflict between Wang’s regime and the United States offers valuable insight for today’s U.S.–China rivalry. The physical landscape may have shifted from Imperial Japan to the PRC, but the lessons of OWI and OSS-style “morale operations” remain highly relevant for strategic competition into the future.

War, Bound: Fiscal Constraints, Tactical Realities, and Contemporary Land Warfare

Gil Barndollar

It’s been a rough new millennium for armies. After the end of history ended abruptly on 9/11, US and NATO land forces spent twenty years pursuing counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, spending trillions of dollars to achieve strategic defeat despite the massive tactical overmatch they held against insurgent enemies.

The US Army now grapples with an identity crisis, while European NATO forces are in far worse shape: belatedly rearming, but increasingly unable to man their shrunken formations. The West’s potential adversaries are hardly better off: The failures of Russia’s military reforms have been dramatically exposed since 2022, while China seems to doubt its army’s readiness for war amid relentless purges of the top ranks.

A major land war in Europe, now three years old, has certainly given a shot in the arm to discussions of ground combat—and to European defense budgets. But the grinding, attritional nature of the war in Ukraine, after the failure of Russia’s initial coup de main and Ukraine’s 2023 counterattack, has fueled a legion of technological determinists who argue that drones have revolutionized warfare. (The metastasizing US defense venture capital sector, now armed with political influence commensurate with its growth, may also be a factor in this latest RMA devil’s tattoo).

William F. (Wilf) Owen is having none of it. A British Army veteran, defense consultant, and editor of Military Strategy Magazine, Owen is a longtime analyst and commentator on military affairs, often in the pages of the British Army Review and the RUSI Journal. A naturalized Israeli citizen, he blends deep knowledge of two nearly opposite military cultures. Britain wields the original long-service, professionalized Anglosphere army,

while Israel is the world’s foremost model for a conscript, reservist, nation in arms. In his new book, Euclid’s Army: Preparing Land Forces for Warfare Today, Owen has done something oddly rare in contemporary military writing: assembling an intensely practical primer on modern tactics and training, based around the idea of what an army division should look like and what it needs to fight today.

A Strait of Hormuz blockade would barely hurt the US

Phar Kim Beng and Luthfy Hamzah

The Strait of Hormuz has long stood as a symbol of global energy vulnerability. Stretching barely 39 kilometers at its narrowest point between Iran and Oman, it funnels nearly 20% of the world’s oil supply and over one-third of liquefied natural gas. Any threat of its closure—whether rhetorical or real—inevitably triggers alarms across energy markets.

Yet beneath the headlines and hyperbole lies a strategic paradox: closing the Strait of Hormuz would not deal a decisive economic blow to the United States. In fact, the economic and geopolitical recalibration underway since the US shale revolution suggests that Washington is less exposed than its adversaries and even some of its allies.

Since the early 2010s, the United States has pursued a pathway toward energy self-reliance. The shale boom transformed the US from a net importer into one of the world’s top oil producers. According to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), less than 10% of its crude imports now come from the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, the US has fortified itself with a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) capable of dampening supply shocks during times of geopolitical crisis. Though partially drawn down during the Ukraine and Gaza crises, the SPR remains a vital economic shield.

This structural shift has dramatically reduced America’s vulnerability to turmoil in the Gulf. In contrast to the 1970s oil shocks, when OPEC’s embargo inflicted widespread inflation and recession, today’s US economy is not tethered to the Strait of Hormuz.

Energy independence has become a cornerstone of US strategic confidence, especially under the Trump administration’s renewed emphasis on resource nationalism and transactional diplomacy.

But the implications go deeper. For President Donald Trump and his circle of foreign policy strategists, any regional escalation in the Gulf—whether through Iranian retaliation or Israeli provocation—can be leveraged as a controlled escalation.

What Happened to the US ‘Asia First’ Doctrine?

Adham Sahloul

President Donald Trump made the United States a direct party to the Iran-Israel conflict through a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21. That decision has forced the Asia policy community on both sides of the Pacific to ask whether the Trump administration is truly committed to an “Asia First” approach to U.S. national security strategy.

The U.S. is deepening its engagement in the over 16-month-long Middle East conflict even as Trump is straining its network of allies and partners over trade and pressuring its Indo-Pacific allies on defense spending. This backsliding on prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater is compounded by cuts to foreign assistance offices, U.S. information and media programs, and key China staff at the National Security Council.

U.S. policy in the Middle East has impacted Washington’s alliance management in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s decision to skip the NATO Summit can be read as linked to the escalation in Iran. This,

along with reports that Tokyo is rescheduling July 2+2 talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth over the Trump administration’s mixed messaging on Japan’s defense spending, suggests that Trump’s call sheet should include leaders well beyond the Middle East and Europe.

What happens in the Middle East has historically yielded global ripple effects, from oil shocks and mass migration to spikes in terrorist attacks. U.S. allies Japan, Australia, and South Korea and burgeoning partner India – to say nothing about China – will be directly impacted by any strain on oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports caused by a prolonged conflict.

More broadly, it is well recognized by both sides of the political aisle – albeit ignored by policymakers in successive U.S. administrations – that U.S. overextension in the Middle East comes at the expense of focusing on the Indo-Pacific and China, by siphoning away finite military and political resources.

The Iran-Israel Conflict Drives Home the Importance of Gwadar for China

Israel’s airstrikes on Iranian nuclear and military targets, followed by Iranian missile and drone counterattacks, have roiled the Gulf region. Amid the conflict, global energy flows and maritime security are increasingly in question, with shipping disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most vital oil chokepoint.

With traditional shipping lanes from the Gulf in jeopardy, Gwadar Port in Pakistan is once again in focus. Gwadar has never been just a commercial node, but instead serves as a strategic safety valve in China’s long-term energy calculus.

Approximately one-fifth of global oil trade transits through the Strait of Hormuz, and its closure would ripple through the world economy. Recently, Iranian MPs made exactly this threat amid the Iran-Israel hostilities. Meanwhile, shipping disruptions are already visible. Container vessels are slowing down in the strait, a sign of anxiety among maritime operators.

Markets have responded accordingly. Oil prices rose 7-14 percent in the immediate aftermath of initial strikes, then settled marginally as no actual blockade occurred. As one analyst noted, global supply thus far has remained firm because Tehran often prefers to leverage fear rather than follow through. Yet it is often true that threats drive prices more than actions.

Iran’s capability is real. It has amassed missiles, naval mines, anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) systems, and drones – all tools that could significantly disrupt Hormuz transit. Nevertheless, closing the Strait of Hormuz would also cause economic damage to Iran itself, jeopardizing its sea-based oil exports and risking the ire of key buyers like China.

Whatever unfolds from here, this unfolding crisis adds urgency to Beijing’s push to develop alternative transit routes like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which centers on the port of Gwadar. Strategically located just outside the high-risk Gulf area but connected to China via pipelines and highways, Gwadar offers a route to bypass the congested Malacca Strait – and potentially even Hormuz, if an overland pipeline connecting Pakistan and Iran ever becomes a reality.

The ‘German Connection’ in Myanmar’s Civil Wars

Thurein Naing

Myanmar’s civil war has been one of the most complex and enduring conflicts in the history of modern warfare. It is a tragic saga defined by ethnic strife, authoritarian rule, civil dissent, and relentless armed resistance against the control of the central state. At the heart of this entanglement lies Heckler & Koch (HK), the renowned German firearms manufacturer, which has quietly shaped the arsenals of both the Myanmar military and its opponents. While celebrated for its technological innovations,

HK’s historical connection to postcolonial Burma/Myanmar reveals a lesser-known narrative of how a company born in the ashes of the Third Reich came to arm both sides of a civil war with no clear end in sight. Initially intended to bolster a nascent post-colonial state, HK arms ultimately fueled a brutal civil war, leaving a continuing and indelible mark on Myanmar’s landscape and people.

In the defense industry, Heckler & Koch, has been renowned for its exceptional engineering in firearms since its inception. Founded in 1949, HK could be seen as being free from the legacies of Nazism. However, Alex Seidel, Edmund Heckler, and Theodor Koch, the three founders of HK, served in the Nazi military-industrial complex and can trace their technical training lineage to Mauser, the German arm manufacturer that armed the Third Reich with, K98K, Gewehr 98 rifles and other assortment of small arms.

HK’s headquarters in Oberndorf am Neckar, in the state of Baden-Württemberg, is the same town where Mauser was once based.

Theodor Koch actually served as the financier/patron (Förderndes Mitglied der SS) in the infamous Schutzstaffel (SS), which was responsible for carrying out the Holocaust and many other crimes against humanity during World War II. Koch, as the financier, did not serve on the frontline but paid a monthly contribution to the SS. Therefore, HK, like many other German industrial giants, has an undeniable linkage to Nazi Germany.

12 Days Of War: Takeaways From The Israel-Iran Conflict – Analysis

RFE RL / Kian Sharifi

(RFE/RL) — After 12 days of unprecedented direct hostilities, Israel and Iran have agreed to a cease-fire that has brought a tense and uneasy calm to the region.

The war, marked by devastating air strikes, missile barrages, and covert operations, has left both countries reeling. While the immediate fighting has stopped, the political, military, and nuclear implications of this brief but intense war are only beginning to unfold.

Both countries have rushed to claim success, with the Israelis insisting they accomplished their goals and the Iranians claiming to have “imposed” the cease-fire on their archfoe.

Yet beneath the official statements, analysts warn that the cease-fire is fragile, the strategic balance has shifted, and the risk of renewed conflict or dangerous escalation remains high.

Israel’s Gains, And A Critical Omission

Israel’s government declared it had “achieved all the objectives of Operation Rising Lion,” citing the reported destruction of key Iranian nuclear and missile sites, the elimination of senior military leaders, and air superiority over Tehran.

“Israel was able to strike key military strategic governmental targets quite effectively,” Farzan Sabet, a managing researcher at the Geneva Graduate Institute, told RFE/RL.

He said the conflict highlighted the extent of the Israeli infiltration of Iran’s security apparatus, adding the country’s intelligence agency Mossad “was able to basically create a legion of defectors who were probably one of the elements in this war that caused the greatest damage.”

Butm despite Israeli and US bombings, Iran’s nuclear program, while damaged, is not completely dismantled — some enrichment capacity and expertise survived, and the risk of a covert Iranian nuclear breakout remains.

The Future of American Cybersecurity

My theme today is to try and answer the question: “What do we expect from the Trump administration with respect to cybersecurity and data privacy in the next four years?” The “A” answer of course is that nobody really knows. Trump is exceedingly unpredictable—the more so with respect to issue areas where he really has no preconceived and settled notion. Unlike, say, tariffs, it seems likely that Trump has given little thought to cybersecurity or data privacy—and thus his reactions are likely to be off the cuff. But that would be a short analysis, and you deserve more. So let’s dive in.

My deeper analysis starts by providing a broad context for U.S.-EU cybersecurity and data privacy engagement today. I then turn to specific predictions about Trump’s expected actions in the areas of cybersecurity and data privacy. I conclude with some thoughts on how these actions will impact the EU and how the EU member states ought to consider responding.

Context

Geopolitics

Our consideration of Trump’s policies arises in the context of a particularly dangerous time in the world. Existing conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza are matched by potential conflicts over Taiwan and Kashmir. It is reasonably safe to say that the potential for state-on-state violence is at the highest level it has been since 9/11 and its aftermath or, possibly, since the Berlin Wall fell.

At the same time, the United States is systematically diminishing its ability to collect and analyze information on a global scale. Funding and staffing cuts at the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Department of State all portend less data on which to base decisions—as does a seeming rise in the reluctance of our traditional allies to share information with the U.S.

This is fundamentally scary—a more dangerous world about which we know less is a formula for disaster.

Beyond Bans: Expanding the Policy Options for Tech-Security Threats

In early April, President Trump granted TikTok another 75-day reprieve from its threatened ban in the United States. It is but the latest twist in a five-year, administration-spanning saga, in which the U.S. government has repeatedly threatened to ban the Chinese-owned app from the U.S. market if it is not sold to non-Chinese buyers—but has never followed through on such ultimatums.

While the TikTok case has some unique challenges, it is part of a broader trend of using bans to address national security risks associated with Chinese technology in the United States. After Chinese company DeepSeek released an innovative new AI model, members of Congress were quick to initiate a conversation about whether to ban DeepSeek in the United States.

The government has already announced measures to ban certain connected vehicles from China and is working on similar restrictions for Chinese drones; reports suggest certain Chinese routers could also be banned. Beyond China, the last administration also banned the Russian antivirus provider Kaspersky—another example of how the government is using national security authorities in the tech supply chain.

There are plenty of real national security issues posed by technology from China and other foreign adversary countries across various elements of U.S. industries and tech supply chains. Such risks range from espionage, to “prepositioning” of malware (quietly putting malicious code in place that can be activated later), to increased leverage over U.S. supply chains,

including for the defense industrial base. To better address this policy problem, however, the United States urgently needs to build policy toolkits—and policy muscles—beyond bans. Policy discourse about how to mitigate national security risks from a specific technology, such as a Chinese AI model or mobile app, all too often results in reductive conversations about whether or not to ban such technology. But this dichotomy leaves policymakers with an unappealing choice: Either ban any technology that poses a risk, or—if unwilling to follow through with an action as dramatic and costly as a ban—do nothing, and leave the American public exposed to potential national security risks as a result.

War and Tariffs Are a Double Shock to the World Economy

The twin shocks of the Israeli-US attack on Iran and Donald Trump’s tariff war come as global GDP growth continues to slow precipitously. Given that it doesn’t take much to tip an economy nearing its “stall speed” into outright recession,

these crises and their combined effects are setting the stage for a worldwide downturn.

NEW HAVEN – The outbreak of a new war in the Middle East, together with a destructive tariff war,

makes for a lethal combination in a sluggish world economy. Notwithstanding the possibility of a tentative ceasefire, the odds of imminent global recession have increased sharply.

Iran and the Fracturing West

LONDON – Over the centuries, “the West” has come to represent much more than a geographic region. It now embodies the enduring legacy of ancient Greece and the Roman Empire, the cultural achievements of the European Renaissance, the evolution of political philosophy, and the spirit of exploration and discovery.

Since the end of World War II, however, the term has taken a more explicitly geopolitical and security-oriented meaning. From the mid-1940s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, Europe and its allies often defined themselves not only by their shared ideals but also by their opposition to the Soviet Union.

US President Donald Trump, in one of his many inane remarks about history and global affairs, claimed that the European Union was established to “screw” the United States. In fact, the opposite is true.

After 1945, Europeans were eager for America to remain actively involved rather than turn inward, as it had after World War I. Left to their own devices, European countries risked drifting into yet another conflict, potentially forcing the US to intervene again to restore peace. To prevent that, European leaders urged the US to maintain its presence on the continent as a bulwark against the growing threat of Soviet communism.

In response, the US encouraged Europe to pursue greater economic and political integration, leading to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community and, eventually, the European Common Market. Both were seen by the US as essential to ensuring long-term peace and prosperity among its transatlantic allies and preventing the continent from impoverishing itself through trade wars and protectionist policies.

The Utility of Military Deception and Information Operations in Modern Warfare

John Wirges

Sun Tzu believed in the importance of the information environment and recognized that the quickest way to achieve military victory was to attack only when the adversary was confused, disoriented, and weakened. While the revolution in military affairs offered promises of a transparent battlefield,

modern conflicts such as the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War and the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War prove that Sun Tzu’s work remains as relevant today as it was in ancient China. Advances in technology over the last twenty years have led to unforeseen changes in the modern battlespace. Urbanization trends and social media have changed the relationship between combatants and non-combatants. Modern electronic warfare, long-range missiles, and unmanned systems have been integrated into cohesive sensor-to-shooter systems known as kill webs. While practitioners have seen kill webs and drones leveraged in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine,

these modern conflicts also indicate an increased importance for information warfare. Modern technologies have made skills such as military deception, public affairs, civil-military engagement, and cyber activities necessary to outpace enemy decision-making cycles, protect friendly forces, and achieve political goals of conflict within a civil component.

Understanding the Information Environment

The information environment (IE) is a key component of the military’s operational environment (OE). An OE is best described as the aggregate of all conditions bearing on a military commander. The IE comprises all aspects of human attitudes, behaviors, and perceptions, and is a critical component of conflict. Successful operations in the information environment can neutralize an enemy’s will and capabilities to fight,

provide offramps for conflict resolution, deceive enemy decision-makers to create surprise, and deny an enemy freedom of maneuver in cyberspace and across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS)—the spectrum of radio activity encompassing radio, x-ray, and gamma wavelengths. The Russo-Ukrainian War and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War have provided key insights into how modern technologies and human behaviors have changed the IE’s relationship with war.

These are the top 10 emerging technologies of 2025, according to the World Economic Forum

CHRIS MORRIS

Predicting which innovations will shape the future is always a challenge. On Tuesday, the World Economic Forum (WEF) released its list of the top 10 emerging technologies of 2025, highlighting those expected to influence global challenges within the next three to five years.

The list, compiled with the help of Frontiers Media, a publisher of peer-reviewed scientific journals, avoids naming specific companies. Instead, the WEF focuses on concepts that are both novel and nearing maturity, with the potential to deliver meaningful benefits to society.

Here’s what the WEF sees as being on the path to a breakthrough in 2025.

ADVANCED NUCLEAR TECH

Demand for nuclear energy is on the rise, with the Trump administration pledging to fast-track permits for nuclear projects. The WEF predicts that smaller nuclear designs and alternative cooling systems will offer safer, cleaner energy at a lower cost. These reactors, it says, “could play a key role in building reliable, zero-carbon power systems.”

STRUCTURAL BATTERY COMPOSITES

The weight of batteries has been a pain point for things like cars and planes, impacting their efficiency. New materials that store energy and support weight can make these vehicles lighter, improving both their performance and their environmental impact.

COLLABORATIVE SENSING

Speaking of vehicles, networking connected sensors can let vehicles share information in real time with each other, as well as with cities and emergency services. In the case of an incident, this can reduce traffic, increase response times, and improve safety, the WEF says.

29 June 2025

India’s defence story: Real boom or bubble waiting to burst?

Manvi Aggarwa

The defence sector has been getting serious attention for some time now, from domestic investors, global funds and even retail punters.

And if you think about it, it all adds up.

After all, how often do you find a sector with order books swelling at record pace, earnings visibility bright as day and government policy tailwinds blowing strong?

The stars do seem to be aligning. From Hindustan Aeronautics’ record order book to Bharat Electronics’ steady execution pipeline and the growing swagger of private players like Data Patterns and Bharat Forge, the market suddenly can’t get enough of defence stocks. The government’s aggressive push for self-reliance under ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ has only added fuel to this fire. It has ensured that large contracts stay within the country and critical technology know-how gets built here over time.

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Even foreign partners, like GE Aviation, Airbus and Dassault, are stepping in with joint ventures and tech-transfer deals. Most are lured by India’s growing manufacturing ambition and sheer scale of demand. Defence corridors, production-linked incentives, indigenisation lists, everything that could make India a manufacturing hub for the world’s defence needs is being rolled out.

Fixing the Pentagon’s Broken Innovation Pipeline

Michael Horowitz, and Lauren Kahn

In a world of rapid technological change and rising Chinese military power — as well as actors like Ukraine, the Houthis, and Iran gaining precision mass capabilities that can impose significant costs on the US military — there is broad agreement that the Pentagon must become far more agile in acquiring new military capabilities. What connects Ukraine’s recent daring strike inside Russia with Israel’s initial attack in Iran is the use of inexpensive, AI-enabled drones, a capability that warfighters, Silicon Valley innovators, and armchair strategists alike believe the Pentagon must urgently adopt and scale for the US military. So why hasn’t it happened yet?

Congressional Budget Dynamics Slow the Adoption of New Capabilities

Most discussions about the Pentagon’s need to move faster tend to focus on the role of senior leadership in advocating for and aggressively pursuing transformational capabilities. That’s true, but what’s less understood is Congress’s role. The relationship between the Pentagon and its congressional budget overseers, the appropriations committees, within the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process often turns innovation adoption into a long, grinding battle even in the best of times. These committees line-edit the Department of Defense’s $850 billion budget down to the thousand-dollar level and tend to favor legacy capabilities, further stacking the deck against change.

Today’s Threats Demand Urgent Reform of the PPBE Process

While these challenges are well known, the urgent too often crowds out the important, leaving systemic reform of the Pentagon’s budget process perpetually sidelined, even as it continues to undermine efforts to adopt emerging technologies. But today could be different. Rapid technological change, the rising threat from China, and the arrival of a new Trump administration have created a rare window of opportunity to modernize how the Pentagon budgets for and acquires capabilities suited to today’s world.

PLA Purges Provide Opening for Xi’s Rivals

New evidence suggests that a faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aligned with former president Hu Jintao and former premier Wen Jiabao could be exerting influence on the direction of the Party.

Three party elders—all of whom were Hu Jintao allies—reportedly criticized General Secretary Xi Jinping at Beidaihe in August 2023, while subsequent purges have eroded Xi’s base of support in the military.

More recently, signs that Xi’s erstwhile successor Hu Chunhua is regaining prominence following a demotion from the Politburo in 2022 could indicate that this “Tuanpai” faction is gaining ground. These signs include Hu leading an overseas delegation and visiting the Vietnamese embassy to convey his condolences for the passing of its former president—a role usually reserved for a politburo member.

Xi also recently made a speech referring to “scientific, democratic, and law-based policymaking,” a key phrase associated with his predecessor, Hu Jintao. This could be interpreted as a concession to the Tuanpai faction.

New evidence suggests that a faction within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aligned with former president Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and former premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) could be exerting influence on the direction of the Party. Earlier this year, we speculated that CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping’s power was being curtailed following purges that eroded his bases of support in the military (China Brief, March 15). Now, the return to prominence of Hu Chunhua (胡春华), alongside reporting about events that took place at the leadership’s summer retreat in Beidaihe in August 2023, could indicate that the “Hu-Wen faction” is resisting Xi Jinping to some degree.

China learned a valuable lesson in US trade talks: the value of its leverage

Simone McCarthy,

US President Donald Trump may have touted the latest trade deal between the US and China as a win for America. But it’s Chinese leaders who have walked away with an extra spring in their step.

While full details of the agreement, reached by negotiators in London last week, remain under wraps, it appears largely to restore an earlier arrangement sealed in May, which had rapidly deteriorated as mistrust and tension between the two sides spiraled.

This time around, China has learned a key lesson: the power of its leverage over the US — and how it can use that to its advantage in the months ahead.

“China feels it has more bargaining power than it originally expected,” said Liu Dongshu, an assistant professor focusing on Chinese politics at the City University of Hong Kong. And over recent months of trade tussles, Beijing has realized: “Trump is not as tough as he appeared to be.”

China’s official statements on the latest agreement have been much more muted than Trump’s, who wrote on social media in all caps that the “deal with China is done” and described how the US would get access to China’ rare earth minerals, while maintaining elevated tariffs.

Iran’s S-400: What Happened to Air Defenses Built to Fight B-2 Bombers?

Reuben Johnson

Iran’s S-400: What Happened to Air Defenses Built to Fight B-2 Bombers?© A B-2 Spirit makes a low pass flyover during the 2024 Warriors Over the Wasatch Open House and Air Show June 29, 2024, at Hill Air Force Base, Utah. The B-2 Spirit, the predecessor to the new B-21 Raider, has been the U.S. Air Force's premiere stealth bomber for more than 20 years. (U.S. Air Force photo by Cynthia Griggs)

Key Points and Summary: Despite Iran reportedly taking delivery of advanced Russian S-400 air defense systems in August 2024, the batteries have been conspicuously ineffective during Israel's recent massive air assault.

-The Israeli Air Force has flown with virtual impunity over Iran, striking key targets without any confirmed losses to the S-400, a system touted by Moscow as a world-beater.

-This failure, following significant losses of S-400s and other advanced systems in Ukraine, is reportedly causing alarm in Moscow, with Russian military officials and commentators now openly questioning the reliability of their own air defense technology against sophisticated Western electronic warfare, stealth, and suppression capabilities.
What Happened With Russia’s “All-Powerful” S-400 in Iran?

L’aéroporte Le Bourget, Paris - America has hit Iran's nuclear facilities with B-2 Spirit stealth bombers. And yet, Iran seemed to have a solution to this, courtesy of Russia. Experts ask: Where are the famous Russian-made Almaz-Antei S-400 air defense batteries? Should they not have been downing Israeli warplanes left and right by now and taking on those B-2 bombers?
o go on the offensive with an attack on the Jewish state.

Top lawmaker wants more progress on EW capabilities across services

Mark Pomerleau

There aren’t enough electronic warfare tools resident within the U.S. military services currently, according to a top lawmaker.

At the end of the Cold War, many of the services divested of their capability within the electromagnetic spectrum. Now, these technologies are at a premium and in high demand for jamming enemy communications, navigation and missiles while protecting against the same. Adversaries have invested heavily in this area following U.S. divestment, forcing a sprint to reinvigorate American EW prowess.

“We’ve made some progress this year [but] here’s my concern: there’s a lot of studies and there’s a lot of paper, but paper doesn’t jam and paper doesn’t hit missiles,” Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., said Tuesday during an event hosted by the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “We need to have more capability output, and I’m just not seeing enough of it right now.”

Bacon chairs the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies and Information Systems and is a retired one-star Air Force general who specialized in electronic warfare.

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He observed that what’s been learned from military history is that when nations feel dominant, they walk away from electromagnetic spectrum capabilities — thinking they might not be necessary — as was seen at the end of the Cold War when the United States was the sole superpower.

“If you’re very dominant, EW is an unnecessary expense. But if you think you’re going to be in a very tough fight, electronic warfare is critical to saving lives,” he said, adding: “We walked away from [it] in the ’90s and we put very little emphasis” on it. As a result, those capabilities atrophied.

Go BIG on Iran

Martin A. Perryman

The tit-for-tat strikes between Israel and Iran that led to the massive strike by the U.S. on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities scuttled diplomatic efforts by the U.S. to limit Iran’s nuclear program. There is no discernable strategic objective. This back and forth of retaliation will most likely go on for several weeks or months with much destruction and loss of life, but little forward progress. It is unlikely to devolve into a major war. Any negotiation to address Iran’s nuclear program will produce an agreement eerily like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), popularly called the Iran Nuclear Deal.

Since the U.S. withdrew from that agreement in 2018, Iran has exploited disengagement to accelerate processing. Sources estimate that Iran has a 400 kg stockpile of enriched uranium at 60%. For context, civilian uses, like medical or reactors, need an enrichment level of under 5% while weapons grade uranium is 90%. With further enrichment, that 400 kg would have been sufficient to produce about 10 bombs. Even with the recent strike, much of that uranium and the processing equipment are likely to be recovered eventually. In the worst case, a determined effort could still produce a handful of nuclear weapons in less than a year.

This illustrates the futility of myopically focus on only the nuclear issue and settling for some variation of a return to the pre-2018 status quo. As a ratifier of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran has every legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. Likewise, any state, determined to gain a nuclear capability, will not be thwarted. Any agreement that only addresses nuclear weapons will not hold up in the long term.

The only way to effectively deter Iranian nuclear ambitions is to alter the dynamic. World events offer an opportunity for a grand bargain that creates a path for rehabilitating Iran, removes their need for nuclear weapons, increases stability in the Middle East, improves the security paradigm for Israel, and reduces the ability of other bad actors like Russia and North Korea to evade international sanctions.

Since deposing the Shah in 1979, the government, run by Shia Clerics, has rejected western economic and cultural influence and cast themselves in opposition to their regional neighbors. As a result, Iran has been the most sanctioned nation on earth for several decades, only giving up the number one position to Russia following their invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The Spiderweb and the Lion: Subversive Infiltration and U.S. National Security

Evelinn Idenfors

Over a decade ago, when I was working on force protection issues for Navy air logistics missions, the threat of drone attacks was just beginning to be seriously discussed. We kicked around contingencies and “what ifs,” but those discussions were largely in the background of mission planning. Over the course of the past ten years however, that threat has exploded to the forefront of the military operational planning world and has presented something altogether new in modern warfare.

In the early hours of June 1, 2025, Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) executed Operation Spiderweb, an audacious drone assault on Russian airfields that destroyed or damaged a number of Russia's most prized aircraft, including possibly two A-50 early-warning planes and as many as a dozen strategic bombers. Drones,

smuggled into Russia over 18 months and concealed in remote-controlled containers, were launched from within Russian territory, catching Moscow’s defenses off guard. Just days later, on June 13, 2025, Israel’s Mossad orchestrated a similarly bold strike, dubbed Rising Lion,

targeting Iran’s nuclear and missile programs. Mossad agents, operating covertly within Iran, established drone bases near Tehran and smuggled precision weapons to dismantle air defenses and eliminate key figures, including Revolutionary Guards commanders and at least one senior nuclear scientist. Allow me to emphasize, the drone attacks came from within Russia and from within Iran.

These operations quite possibly signal a new era of warfare: patient, subversive infiltration by committed adversaries willing to play the long game. The United States—due to years of lax borders and insufficient oversight of foreign land purchases—is alarmingly vulnerable to such tactics, especially from a strategic rival like China, whose land acquisitions near U.S. military bases pose a clear risk.

Asymmetric Warfare Redefined?

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