Indian Strategic Studies

18 August 2025

The Shocking Rift Between India and the United States

Happymon Jacob

In the past 25 years, India and the United States have become closer than ever before, building strong economic and strategic ties. Their partnership has rested on shared values and shared interests: they are the two largest democracies in the world, home to vast multicultural populations, and both have been concerned about the rise of India’s northern neighbor, China. But in the past four months, that carefully cultivated relationship has abruptly gone off the rails. The return of U.S. President Donald Trump to the White House threatens to undo the achievements of a quarter century.

Trump’s actions have disregarded several of India’s core foreign policy concerns, crossing sensitive redlines that previous U.S. administrations tended to respect. The United States once treated India as an important American partner in Asia. Today, India faces the highest current U.S. tariff rate, of 50 percent—an ostensible punishment for India’s purchase of Russian oil after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. India finds itself dealing with a higher tariff rate than even China, the country that, at least until recently, Washington wanted New Delhi to help contain. Indeed, Trump seems far more keen to strike a deal with China than to relent on his tough stance toward India. And to make matters worse, Trump announced a deal in late July with India’s frequent adversary Pakistan, under which the United States will work to develop Pakistan’s oil reserves.

These tariff woes follow on the heels of another shock to the Indian system: Trump’s intervention in May in a clash between India and Pakistan. After a few days of escalating strikes precipitated by a terrorist massacre in India, Trump unilaterally announced that he had brokered a cease-fire between the two countries. India vehemently denied that claim—New Delhi has long resisted any external mediation of its disputes with Islamabad, and American officials have been careful not to offend Indian sensitivities in this area—but Trump doubled down. No doubt he was offended by Indian pushback, just as he was pleased by Pakistan’s immediate embrace of his claims and its eventual nomination of him for the Nobel Peace Prize.

Pakistan’s History of Terror

Natiq Malikzada

Pakistan’s role as an incubator and launchpad for global jihad has come at a steep cost—but one that its military appears happy to pay.

Thursday, August 14, is Pakistan’s Independence Day, marking 78 years since the territory gained independence from the British Empire in 1947. In an odd coincidence, the following day is the fourth anniversary of the Taliban’s conquest of Afghanistan, with decisive support from Islamabad. On these two anniversaries, a sober assessment of Pakistan’s regional legacy is warranted.

Pakistan has long been accused of tolerating terrorist activity within its borders—undermining regional stability and nurturing global jihadist networks. For decades, Islamabad’s security establishment, particularly its politically untouchable military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), has leveraged extremist proxies as a weapon against India and a tool for influence in Afghanistan. As part of this strategy, Islamabad has extended steady patronage, as well as a territorial safe haven, to a litany of jihadist terror groups—notably including the Taliban, but also anti-India organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed.

This strategy reaped enormous rewards in 2021, when the Taliban took advantage of America’s departure from Afghanistan to once again seize power. In the aftermath of the chaotic collapse of the internationally recognized Afghan government and the fall of Kabul, billions of dollars of advanced American weapons and equipment have seeped into militant black markets, and ultimately into the hands of terrorists across the region.

Pakistan’s Islamist Strategy

The complex fault lines of the Thai–Cambodian armed conflict

Evan A. Laksmana

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The recent conflict between Thailand and Cambodia came at a time when historically acrimonious border dynamics were stressed by political tensions and a worsening cyber-scam crisis. This offers lessons for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and policymakers in the region.

After months of simmering tensions, fighting erupted along the Thailand–Cambodia border on 23 July 2025, reigniting a long and bitter dispute between the two countries. The violent episode over five days involved heavy exchanges in artillery fire and airstrikes, inflicted dozens of fatalities and forced upwards of 300,000 people to flee their homes on both sides of the border.

Malaysia, in its role as Chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), stepped in to broker a ceasefire during a meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 28 July. In the meeting, which senior officials from the United States and China attended, a deal was struck for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. A series of meetings have since followed – many of which have been facilitated by Malaysia – between Thai and Cambodian regional commanders, senior officials and ministers to discuss paths toward a sustainable peace.

On 7 August, at the Extraordinary General Border Committee meeting in Kuala Lumpur, both sides agreed to halt further troop movements and not to undertake escalatory steps, including building military infrastructure. They also agreed to refrain from disseminating false information and to comply with international humanitarian law. Perhaps more importantly, both sides would maintain regular communications between local military commanders and senior officials, and support a Malaysian-led ASEAN observer team consisting of ASEAN defence attachés.

What China Wants (And Fears) from a Trump-Putin Deal

Jianli Yang

When Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin meet in Alaska this Friday to discuss “ending” the war in Ukraine, Beijing will carefully study every handshake, phrase, and subtle signal that emerges from the talks. For China, such a meeting is not primarily about the performance of peace diplomacy. Rather, it is about the deeper structure of global order that could emerge afterward and especially whether the outcome will help lock in a Eurasian balance of power favorable to Beijing’s strategic ambitions. Alternatively, an agreement could bind China into a new set of constraints on sanctions enforcement and technology controls, as well as its relationships with key European states.

Since February 2022, Xi Jinping has walked a narrow political and diplomatic ridge, publicly professing “neutrality” and respect for sovereignty while actively providing Russia with material and technological support. At the same time, Beijing has strengthened what it calls a “no limits” partnership with Moscow.

A US-Russia bargain that effectively freezes the frontlines and normalizes some of Russia’s gains would, in most respects, suit Beijing. It would preserve a strategic partner in Eurasia and avoid an outcome in which Moscow is weakened to the point of dependency on the West. Conversely, a deal that ties any ceasefire to tough, enforceable restrictions on Chinese dual-use exports to Russia would be unwelcome. This is why the choreography of the Alaska meeting—who initiates, who concedes, and what details are left vague—matters as much as the headlines.

Beijing’s conduct since the start of the war has been guided by three interlocking imperatives. The first is to ensure Russia’s survival as a functioning strategic actor. Moscow remains China’s only peer-level counterweight to Washington across the Eurasian landmass. It is also a vital supplier of discounted energy and raw materials, and a partner in constructing alternatives to a US-centric order.

China’s military wants to target US undersea sensor network: Analysis

Michael Peck

Submarines are a major part of China’s naval strategy. And U.S. underwater sensors are a major threat to those subs, Chinese experts warn.

Thus, some People’s Liberation Army Navy, or PLAN, officers are advocating a systematic attempt to destroy America’s undersea sensor network in time of war. This includes destroying, sabotaging or spoofing underwater microphones using a variety of countermeasures, from undersea drones to China’s huge fleet of commercial fishing vessels.

Chinese experts believe that “the U.S. undersea surveillance system suffers from a number of vulnerabilities, amplified by the sheer scale of the Western Pacific battlespace,” Ryan Martinson, a professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College, wrote in an essay for the Center for International Maritime Security. “If enough nodes are degraded, the system as a whole may lose its functionality.”

Ironically, American and Chinese views of the undersea balance of power seem mirror images. The U.S. and its Pacific allies worry over China’s growing submarine fleet, which the Pentagon predicts will reach 65 units this year and 80 by 2035. China already can deploy six nuclear ballistic and six nuclear attack submarines, plus a large number of conventional subs armed with anti-ship missiles, including 21 advanced Yuan-class diesel-electric boats.

Navy leaders are concerned about increased Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic and Chinese submarine activity in the Pacific. The U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary from such threats, they warn.

China will keep the Quad together. Let’s get through this rough patch quickly

Justin Bassi and Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

Don’t give up on the Quad. The current tensions between its four members won’t overcome the underlying strengths of their relationships and lead to permanent breakdowns.

The common challenges of the Quad members—above all the need to compete with China—form a powerful binding force. The Quad provides the mechanism through which that force can operate.

It is too easily forgotten that the Quad seemed dead after 2007. The motivation for its resurrection in 2017, Beijing’s malign behaviour, has only intensified.

Differences among the Quad nations are insignificant short-term irritants compared with the structural security threats posed by China’s military power, cyberattacks, foreign interference and ambition to supplant the US as the globe’s technological powerhouse. Quad members’ task is to overcome those differences, perhaps by learning to live with them, as smoothly and quickly as possible, keeping their eye on the main game.

The leaders of the Quad’s members—Australia, India, Japan and the United States—are due to meet in Delhi this year but, if conflicting schedules prevent this, September’s United Nations General Assembly must be seized as the opportunity to show solidarity. India, through private channels, is already seeking a meeting with US President Donald Trump on the sidelines of the General Assembly.

One of the current problems is on defence spending, as Washington rightly demands that allies take a fair share of the security burden.

In Trump’s first presidential term, the US’s Quad partners faced less pressure than European countries in that regard. But global security is far worse in 2025 than it was in 2017. We see growing and open tension between Washington and Canberra over Australia’s defence spending, which has not risen in step with security threats that the Australian government itself assesses as the worst since World War II. Australia should be less defensive when its security commitment is questioned by its ally, which has its good reasons for concern.

Chinese military researchers seek to draw electronic warfare lessons from Ukraine jamming

Stephen Chen

When Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022 satellite navigation signals were one of its first targets.

The jamming started with civilian navigation systems, but within less than two weeks, military bands had been targeted as well. All satellite navigation systems in the war zone, including the US GPS system, the European Union’s Galileo, China’s Beidou and even Russia’s own Glonass, fell victim.

Western powers, led by the United States, immediately launched a counter-jamming mission to stall Russia’s attempts, according to a paper by Chinese scientists.

While this did not receive a great amount of coverage at the time, some analysts have described it as the first major bout of electronic warfare between major military powers.

It also presented a golden opportunity for Chinese observers, particularly given that Beidou was among the systems affected.

Electronic warfare has emerged increasingly as a decisive factor in modern military conflicts, as demonstrated in the latest air battle between India and Pakistan, where China’s relatively untested J-10 downed at least one French Rafale fighter jet. The electronic guidance system, powered by Beidou, was believed to be the key,according to some Chinese defence technology analysts.

Even though Beijing has not been directly involved in the Ukraine war, a study of Russia’s electronic warfare tactics and subsequent American countermeasures offers “crucial implications for addressing challenges in future wars”, according to Chinese researchers who closely studied the case.

What to Know About Trump’s Nvidia Deal and China’s Response

Miranda Jeyaretnam

The world’s most valuable company is now at the center of President Donald Trump’s trade war with China.

Trump said Monday that he has cut a deal with chipmaker Nvidia, allowing it to sell certain artificial intelligence chips to China in exchange for a cut of the revenue, which would go to the U.S. government. Trump said he also negotiated a similar deal with chipmaker Advanced Micro Devices (AMD).

The deal is a marked departure from an effort by the U.S. to restrict China’s access to advanced semiconductors over concerns that they would be used to advance the country’s military technology. Washington began restricting exports of some semiconductors to China in 2022, although Nvidia was able to export a specially made-for-China chip, the H20, which is deliberately slowed down.

In April, the Trump Administration announced that it would require a license to export the H20 chip, abruptly curbing the shipment of $2.5 billion of H20 revenue from China in the fiscal quarter ending April 27. The announcement spurred months of lobbying by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who committed a $500 billion investment from Nvidia to make AI servers in the U.S. Last month, Nvidia announced that it would resume sales of the H20 to China after Trump and Huang met in the Oval Office, and the Commerce Department began licensing the chips for export last week.

But the unusual deal is not just a return to the previous status quo—rather, analysts and lawmakers warn that it could open the doors to a “pay-to-play” trade policy. Here’s what to know.

What the deal means for Nvidia

How to Stop a Humanitarian Catastrophe in Gaza

Jacob J. Lew and David Satterfield

Ahumanitarian crisis is unfolding in the Gaza Strip. Since the March 2025 breakdown of a cease-fire between Israel and Hamas, conditions have worsened dramatically, and the potential for widespread starvation is real. Thousands of containers with food, medical supplies, and shelter materials remain stranded at border crossings on both sides, awaiting Israeli clearance to enter Gaza and conditions for safe passage free from seizure by desperate Gazan civilians, Hamas or gang attacks within the enclave. At least several hundred truckloads of food aid must enter daily to avert a wider catastrophe.

Many parties bear responsibility for this crisis. First and foremost, Hamas launched a war with the brutal October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel; because Hamas fighters live and fight in civilian areas and in tunnels running underneath them, Hamas invited an Israeli response that would put millions of people at risk. Gazan civilians have suffered hardships and deaths at an unfathomable scale since the start of the war, and outside organizations attempting to meet humanitarian needs are struggling to deliver aid in the midst of intense combat and disorder in a dense urban environment.

From the very beginning, U.S. President Joe Biden was steadfast in his support of Israel’s right to defend itself in Gaza and defeat Hamas as a military threat. But his administration, in which we both served, also made clear that Israel was responsible for exercising care to limit civilian harm and to ensure access to food, medical care, and shelter. As the U.S. ambassador to Israel (Lew) and as the U.S. special envoy for Middle East humanitarian issues (Satterfield), we communicated these dual positions in our daily engagements with Israeli leaders at all levels. And we pressed all parties to coordinate so that enough lifesaving supplies reached Gaza, even if inconsistently.

There was still too much scarcity and precarity, and for months following the October 2023 attacks on Israel, some commentators labeled the situation in Gaza a famine. But although the results of our work never satisfied us, much less our critics, in reality the efforts we led in the Biden administration to keep Gaza open for humanitarian relief prevented famine. The fact remains that through the first year and a half of relentless war, Gazans did not face mass starvation because humanitarian assistance was reaching them.

Turkey is Making a Power Play to Dominate the Middle East

Sinan Ciddi

With Iran’s regional influence in steep decline, Turkey is aggressively positioning itself to fill the vacuum and assert dominance across the eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. This ambition is clearly evidenced by Ankara’s rapid military buildup, its expanding engagement with African states such as Libya and Somalia, and its assertive military activity in Syria, all of which exploit Tehran’s retreat from the regional stage.

Turkey Fills the Void

These developments have alarmed key US allies—including Greece, Israel, and Cyprus—who warn that Turkey’s revisionist foreign policy directly threatens their security and sovereignty. Left unchecked, Ankara’s expansionist agenda may not only destabilize the region but could also entangle Europe and the United States in a broader conflict. As one analyst starkly observed, “Turkey may be the new Iran.”

Ankara’s recent diplomatic overtures in Africa illustrate a worrisome trend. In 2019, Turkey intervened in Libya’s civil war on behalf of the Tripoli-based government of Fayez al-Sarraj, providing weapons and deploying troops to help secure his regime. In return, al-Sarraj agreed to a maritime boundary deal that vastly expanded Turkey’s territorial claims in the Mediterranean—claims that directly challenge the internationally recognized maritime boundaries of Greece.

The agreement, roundly rejected by the European Union and regional powers like Egypt, served as a preview of Ankara’s ambitions. Now, Turkey is courting Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, head of the rival Libyan National Army in the country’s east—despite having previously backed his adversary. By hosting Haftar in Ankara in July, Turkish officials are banking on securing a similar maritime agreement with Libya’s eastern government. They are also counting on the EU to acquiesce, hoping Brussels will prioritize Turkish cooperation in curbing African migration to Europe over safeguarding Greek sovereignty.

The UN’s Permanent Process on Cybersecurity Faces an Uphill Battle

Pavlina Pavlova, Christopher Painter

In July, the United Nations Open-Ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (ICTs) reached consensus on a permanent mechanism to address responsible state behavior in cyberspace. Following six rounds of time-bound groups of governmental experts (GGEs) and two open-ended working groups (OEWGs), this new process under the First Committee—addressing disarmament and international security—will commence in March 2026 with an organizational session at the UN headquarters in New York.

The single-track “Global Mechanism” was agreed upon with relative ease after no delegation broke consensus on the third draft presented by the chair as a compromise package. The swift decision reached in the morning of July 11 stood in sharp contrast to several years of last-minute suspense preceding each interim report, created by Iran and Russia’s insistence that their views be featured more prominently.

At first glance, multilateralism defied the odds on the cybersecurity issue amid a challenging geopolitical situation. The surprise agreement recalled a similar moment less than a year ago, in which the Ad Hoc Committee successfully negotiated the first UN cybercrime convention.

Consensus agreements, though, come at a price. The underlying friction, caused by two competing proposals—the Programme of Action, led by France, and Russia’s call for a binding cybersecurity treaty—was largely left unresolved. The official name of the permanent mechanism is the “Global Mechanism on developments in the field of ICTs in the context of international security and advancing responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs”—a mouthful even for senior diplomats. Similarly, the UN Convention against Cybercrime has an addition to its name: “strengthening international cooperation for combating certain crimes committed by means of ICT systems and for the sharing of evidence in electronic form of serious crime.” These verbose titles are not accidental. Today, consensus-based decision-making at the UN arises not from a shared vision or reasonable compromise but, rather, from the accommodation of opposing views—often reflected in lengthy titles—that make the implementation of agreed commitments difficult, if not impossible.

Europe: spending defence euros and dollars

Ester Sabatino

In the last three and a half years, the EU has stepped up efforts to strengthen the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base, aiming to ensure its members can meet their defence requirements. The mantra of EU defence cooperation has been to spend more, better, together, and to reduce dependencies on third countries. But are countries ready to reduce reliance on the US?

Europe is ready to take on greater responsibility for its defence, and it recognises the ‘right and reason’ for the United States to shift its strategic priorities, according to European Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, speaking on a recent visit to the US. The commissioner noted that the European Union is not in a position to direct member states’ acquisitions and suggested that Europe’s increased defence spending will not necessarily reduce cooperation with the US.

EU mechanisms to sustain the European Defence Technology and Industrial Base (EDTIB) include conditions on the involvement of third countries and third-country entities. This is the case not only for older frameworks, such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund, but also for the latest instruments, such as the Security Action for Europe (SAFE), which was established in May 2025.

For non-EU actors, these requirements can be unappealing or unworkable, particularly in cases where external players have long-standing cooperative partnerships with EU states and have a well-developed and capable defence-industrial sector. Indeed, EU activities are often considered, particularly by the US, to discourage third-party involvement. This is partly due to the requirements that Washington’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations places on export recipients of US-manufactured defence materiel.

Many European countries have and continue to rely on the US for key defence platforms. This reliance, however, risks running counter to the effort to bolster the continent’s defence-industrial base.

The geo-economics of Russia’s bad harvest

Peter Frankopan

Russia’s ability to export grain and fertiliser has remained one of its few sources of economic strength and international leverage since its invasion of Ukraine. Unlike hydrocarbons, these exports have been spared Western sanctions, providing the Kremlin with critical revenue and soft power reach. But an increasingly erratic climate is now threatening this advantage. Russia’s bad 2025 harvest is more than a weather event: it reveals the structural fragility of Russia’s war economy and the growing risks to a system built on fiscal buffers and fossil fuels.

Strength in declineDuring the Cold War, the Soviet Union could not feed itself. It depended on grain imports, primarily from the United States. This gave Washington a lever of geopolitical influence during the era of detente by offering access to food on the condition of restraint in foreign policy.

A Soviet weakness became a Russian strength. The post-Soviet transition to private land ownership and heavy state investment transformed Russia into an agricultural powerhouse. This gave it the confidence to ban Western food imports in 2014 in retaliation against sanctions imposed after Russia annexed Crimea and parts of Donbas. By 2016, Russia had become the world’s largest exporter of wheat and a leading exporter of fertiliser. These exports brought not just foreign currency, but influence – especially among buyers in Africa and the Middle East.

Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Western sanctions have sought to isolate the Russian economy. These have largely exempted agricultural exports to protect global food security, particularly in developing countries. For the Kremlin, this omission has become a secure stream of foreign earnings and influence that have helped stabilise the economy and support the war effort. But nature, indifferent to political constraints, may now be doing what Western policymakers have declined to do.

The Fundamental Truth About U.S. Strategy That Putin Knows and Trump Ignores

M. Gessen

Donald Trump wants the war in Ukraine to end. Volodymyr Zelensky wants the war in Ukraine to end. Many other presidents and prime ministers want the war to end. Vladimir Putin is not one of those presidents. The war in Ukraine has become the political, psychological and economic center of Putin’s regime.

That basic asymmetry would seem to doom any attempt at a negotiated peace — it is, in fact, the main reason no meaningful peace negotiations have occurred in the three and a half years since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Trump thinks he has a solution, though. He says he intends to use his negotiating prowess and keep ratcheting up economic pressure until Putin has no choice but to stop the fighting.

Between the bombastic social media posts, the shifting deadlines, the erratic announcements — one day a White House official says Trump will meet with Putin only after Putin meets with Zelensky, another day Trump drops the requirement — it’s easy to overlook the fact that Trump’s policy toward Russia largely follows the same failed strategy employed by the Biden administration, the first Trump administration and the Obama administration before that. For more than a decade, the United States has responded to Russian aggression by threatening and gradually imposing economic sanctions. That some of Trump’s sanctions take the form of tariffs doesn’t alter the nature of the policy.

The conventional theory behind sanctions is that economic pressure destabilizes regimes, possibly forcing the leader to change course. In one scenario, widespread hardship — unemployment, inflation, shortages — leads to popular discontent, even unrest. In another, a shrinking economy and loss of access to foreign markets anger the elites, who stage a palace coup or at least compel the leader to change direction.

How NATO nations need to sell the 5 percent spending hike to their own people

Kristen Taylor

At the NATO Summit earlier this summer, NATO allies agreed to raise their defense spending target to 5 percent of GDP by 2035 — with 3.5 percent focused on hard security and 1.5 allocated to defense-enablers like critical infrastructure and cybersecurity. The move, pushed by the White House, represents a much-needed increase in spending to match mounting challenges to international security. Allies are already signaling considerable progress toward this goal. Following the Summit announcement, Berlin unveiled an ambitious plan to double its military spending by the end of a decade—a welcome, albeit delayed, commitment from Europe’s largest economy.

But the 5 percent figure belies the true cost. The gross domestic product of allied countries dwarfs annual national expenditures. So, while a rise from 2 to 5 percent of GDP may not seem like much on face value, but as a share of national expenditure, it is a massive ask, and one the people could begin to feel, sooner rather than later.

To understand the scale of the new spending request, look to Berlin. In 2024, Germany spent 2.12 percent of its GDP on defense, allocating a little over $97 billion in defense spending. In the same year, Germany spent approximately $485 billion on total national expenditures. In total, as a share of national outlays, this accounts for approximately 20 percent of Germany’s national expenditures. All else equal, if Germany were to increase defense spending to the newly agreed target, more than 47 percent of Germany’s total budgetary expenditures would go toward defense. Some allies, particularly laggard spenders who do not meet the 2 percent goal currently, face even sharper projections.

Now, this is an imperfect metric. These pledges have a time horizon over a decade; GDP certainly will not remain stagnant for allies over this time; economic conditions and tax demands will fluctuate; countries may be able to count already-planned infrastructure development toward the 1.5 percent for defense enablers; and governments and their constituencies will adjust spending based on the state of the international security environment balanced with domestic priorities.

Getting It Wrong: The EU and the War for Israel’s Surviva

Todd Huizinga

Vatican Steps In Where Others Can’t: Bridging Russia and the West

Both sides understand that renewing Russian-European dialogue is essential to ensuring the continent’s stability.

A Vassal’s Bargain: How Europe Signed Away Its Autonomy

Ursula von der Leyen’s tariff deal with Washington marks the clearest admission yet of Europe’s diminished status in the transatlantic order.

How Trump Could Cause a European Financial Crisis

Pressure from the U.S. president to cut interest rates could spark a chain reaction, pushing Europe to follow—and creating a potential equity market bubble.

Everyone knows it is possible for different groups of people to look at the same reality, see and acknowledge the same events, and still come to diametrically opposed conclusions. Since the Hamas terror attacks on Israel of October 7, 2023, we’ve seen this happening between Israel and many of its enemies in the West—on campuses and streets all over North America and Europe.

What is truly shocking, however, is to see this happening among leading officials of Israel on the one hand and the European Union on the other. These are not exuberant twenty-somethings stirred up by left-wing troublemakers; These are the adults in the room. They supposedly uphold a common Western democratic order, and lead a common civilization that shares the values of peace, tolerance, freedom, human rights, and human dignity.

As important as the question of the war between Israel and its enemies is, there is a more fundamental issue at stake: our so-called shared Western values seem to be failing us amid a worldview clash so sharp, stark, and consequential as to constitute a complete break, one that appears unbridgeable unless one side or the other profoundly changes its worldview.

Parallel realities?

Behind Wall Street’s Abrupt Flip on Crypto

Rob Copeland

Not long ago, bank executives would compete with one another to be the loudest critic of cryptocurrencies.

Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, once compared Bitcoin to a pet rock and said the whole crypto industry should be banned. Bank of America’s Brian Moynihan described the space as an “untraceable tool for money laundering,” while HSBC’s chief executive proclaimed bluntly: “We are not into Bitcoin.”

Now big banks can’t stop talking about crypto.

In investor calls, public presentations and meetings with Washington regulators, financial executives are tripping over one another to unveil new plans — including the development of fresh cryptocurrencies under bank umbrellas and loans tied to digital assets.

There’s no small mix of political opportunism at play, given that President Trump and his family are vociferous crypto boosters and investors. And of course there is a degree of old-fashioned jealousy among the traditional finance set at the riches earned by onetime fringe companies and investors as Bitcoin more than doubled over the past year to blow past $100,000.

But behind the scenes at major financial institutions — and in stark contrast to the public showboating among chief executives — fear is also rising that the rush into crypto may risk the safety of personal bank accounts in ways that Wall Street and Washington are just beginning to understand.

In maps: The war-ravaged Ukrainian territories at the heart of the Trump-Putin summit

Paul Adams

Speculation has swirled over whether the Trump-Putin summit will result in the map of Ukraine being forcibly – and fundamentally – altered.

Russia has laid claim to vast parts of Ukraine since 2014, when President Vladimir Putin made his first move.

At the time, in the space of a short few months, Moscow carried out the relatively bloodless occupation and annexation of the Crimean peninsula.

But that was followed by a Russian-backed separatist movement in the eastern Donbas region – specifically the two regions, or "oblasts", known as Donetsk and Luhansk.

Ukraine after 2014 and before the start of the 2022 full-scale invasion

Ukraine lost around 14,000 soldiers and civilians during this period.

But in February 2022, Putin launched his full-scale invasion. Russian troops quickly reached the outskirts of Kyiv and seized huge swathes of the south, including big chunks of two more oblasts, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson.

The war has ebbed and flowed ever since. Russia now controls rather less territory - down from about 27% in the spring of 2022 to around 20% now. In the east, Russian forces are advancing, but very slowly and at great cost.

President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine says an unconditional ceasefire is needed now. European allies also insist on a halt in fighting. US President Donald Trump says that is what he has been trying to achieve.

But in the run-up to his Alaska summit with Putin, Trump has talked instead about territorial swaps. That has sent shockwaves across Kyiv and Europe.

Elon Musk and Sam Altman’s AI Feud Gets Nasty

Rebecca Schneid

Along-running feud between Elon Musk and Sam Altman spilled out into the open this week as the AI billionaire heavyweights publicly fought over their rival companies.

The latest round in the battle between the X CEO and the CEO of OpenAI began when Musk claimed that Apple had been favoring Altman’s AI app over his own in the Apple Store rankings.

“Apple is behaving in a manner that makes it impossible for any AI company besides OpenAI to reach #1 in the App Store, which is an unequivocal antitrust violation,” Musk said on X on Monday evening. “xAI will take immediate legal action,” he added, referring to the AI company he leads.

Earlier in the day, Musk called out Apple for not putting his X app or its generative AI chatbot system, Grok, on its recommended lists:

“Hey @Apple App Store, why do you refuse to put either X or Grok in your ‘Must Have’ section when X is the #1 news app in the world and Grok is #5 among all apps?” he asked. “Are you playing politics?”

Apple said in an earlier statement that the “App Store is designed to be fair and free of bias.”

Altman, who founded OpenAI with Musk in 2015 before Musk left the company, responded on X: “This is a remarkable claim given what I have heard alleged that Elon does to manipulate X to benefit himself and his own companies and harm his competitors and people he doesn't like.”

Altman included a link to a Platformer News article, which claimed that Musk had manipulated the X algorithm so that his tweets would be displayed more prominently to users and favor his interests.

Golden Dome Development Is Supposed to Be Kept Under Wraps. Details Keep Leaking

Chad de Guzman

Since Donald Trump formally announced plans for the shield in May—after ordering the “Iron Dome for America” a week into his second term—the Pentagon has tried to keep discussion of its development under wraps, including by reportedly banning officials from discussing it at a military-industrial conference earlier this month and asking organizers to keep it off the general agenda, according to Politico. Organizers said they were told to keep discussion of the Golden Dome to a specific, closed-to-the-press summit on the sidelines of the main conference.

The Atlantic’s Tom Nichols, who expressed doubts over the viability of the Golden Dome, described the choice to “go silent” on the ambitious and expensive undertaking, at the 2025 Space and Missile Defense Symposium in Huntsville, Ala., which “is exactly the kind of place where the government can tell its story and get science, industry, and the military on the same page,” as “strange.”

Even former military officials have been baffled by the clamp down. “We gotta be able to talk about it,” Ret. Army Lt. Gen. Daniel Karbler, who served as commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command from 2019-2024, told the Washington Times.

“We have to be able to share with the American public what we are intending to do with Golden Dome for America. We gotta share with the industry what the architecture is going to look like. We have to share with the services what is going to be called upon for their forces,” said Karbler. “We have gotta do a good job at just communicating.”

A Defense Department official told media in a statement that “it would be imprudent for the Department to release further information on this program during these early stages,” citing “operational security.” The Washington Times theorized that the secrecy “could be explained by spying concerns,” particularly from geopolitical rivals like Russia and China.

National digital IDs in the age of artificial intelligence

Onur Kara

Digital IDs increasingly underpin state power, promising security and efficiency. But as AI models learn from leaked or stolen biometric data, these same systems are likely to create profound vulnerabilities for governments, industries and citizens.

In the United Kingdom, it seems the government of Prime Minister Keir Starmer is considering the rollout of national digital IDs – a potential move that sits at the crossroads of immigration policy, the newly implemented Online Safety Act and a fresh inquiry launched by the Home Affairs Committee to examine the potential risks and rewards of state-issued digital identification.

The news from the UK points towards a global trend. Since Finland introduced the first ‘electronic identity card’ in 1999, digital identity systems have played key roles in service provision and public security more than 130 countries. The COVID-19 pandemic was a major driver of adoption, since it heightened governments’ awareness of the benefits of using population-wide datasets for public-health responses. According to the United Nations, by 2024, 78% of member states had enacted legislation or issued policy documents for digital IDs enabling access to public services. Just in the last three months, China has rolled out a new biometric ID programme for online services and Ethiopia has launched its Fayda digital ID, while Armenia has announced plans to roll out a new biometric ID card system in 2026.

Approaches to citizen dataAlthough the introduction of digital ID systems holds significant promise, implementation remains a formidable task. At the heart of the challenge lies the personal data of millions of individuals, which powers each national ID system. The need to maintain comprehensive records of entire populations prompted some countries, particularly early adopters with large populations, to create centralised repositories. India’s Aadhaar programme, operational since 2010, is the most prominent example, hosting the world's largest biometric database, with records of over 1.2 billion citizens. Likewise, Turkiye integrated its population register with residency records in 2007; the resulting MERNIS system has become fundamental to the provision of public services.

Report to Congress on Hypersonic Weapons

U.S. Naval Institute Staff

The following is the August 12, 2025, Congressional Research Service report, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for Congress.

The United States has actively pursued the development of hypersonic weapons as a part of its conventional prompt global strike program since the early 2000s. In recent years, it has focused such efforts on hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles with shorter and intermediate ranges for use in regional conflicts. Although funding for these programs has been relatively restrained in the past, both the Pentagon and Congress have shown a growing interest in pursuing the development and near-term deployment of hypersonic systems. This is due, in part, to advances in these technologies in Russia and China, leading to a heightened focus in the United States on the strategic threat posed by hypersonic flight. Open-source reporting indicates that both China and Russia have conducted numerous successful tests of hypersonic glide vehicles and fielded an operational capability.

Experts disagree on the potential impact of competitor hypersonic weapons on both strategic stability and the U.S. military’s competitive advantage. Nevertheless, former Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Michael Griffin has testified to Congress that the United States does not “have systems which can hold [China and Russia] at risk in a corresponding manner, and we don’t have defenses against [their] systems.”

Although the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (FY 2019 NDAA, P.L. 115-232) accelerated the development of hypersonic weapons, which USD(R&E) identifies as a priority research and development area, the United States is unlikely to field an operational system before FY 2027. However, most U.S. hypersonic weapons programs, in contrast to those in Russia and China, are not being designed for potential use with a nuclear warhead. As a result, U.S. hypersonic weapons will likely require greater accuracy and will be more technically challenging to develop than nuclear-armed Chinese and Russian systems.

5 workplace habits from the military that you should keep doing forever

Blake Stilwell

No matter what branch we served in in the U.S. military, there are a few things that are universal. All veterans have this innate need to show up 15 minutes early to everything. Many of us can still eat Thanksgiving dinner within two minutes (including dessert). Many veterans would also be lying if they aren’t a little proud of themselves when their pee is clear (if you know, you know).

While those are fun but forcibly instilled personality quirks, there are a few things that will turn out to be pretty handy over the course of a veteran’s life and career that our service has provided us. These are things that aren’t just good to know, they’re good to keep. Here are five of those habits you learned from the military that you should keep doing in the workplace forever.

1. Praise in Public; Criticize in Private

It’s seldom a good idea to embarrass or belittle a subordinate in front of the entire unit. The same can be said for working in a civilian job. If we have to chew someone out, we don’t do it in front of all their coworkers.

Veterans know that a public ass-chewing doesn’t do the group any good, will hurt the group’s respect for you, and impact their performance. A good subordinate will know they messed up, no matter how loud you get. We all know discipline in private saves face and doesn’t hurt the unit as a whole.

2. Integrity First

Lies only force the teller to create more lies to support the original lie. Honesty is important in every aspect of everyone’s life, and dishonesty can hurt your relationships with everyone around you. The reason every branch of the military insists on integrity is because that’s how critical it is.

Once anyone is caught in a lie, it destroys the trust between two or more people. Faith in each other’s integrity allows us all to operate with full support and confidence in each other and our surroundings.

3. There is no such thing as “I can’t”

17 August 2025

How much is Trump pocketing off the Presidency?

David D. Kirkpatrick

At a press conference on January 11, 2017, President-elect Donald Trump explained for the first time how he would handle the many conflicts of interest that his business empire posed for his new role. His company, the Trump Organisation, collected money from all over the world for luxury condos, hotel rentals, development projects, and club memberships, and he had made deals that put his name on everything from mail-order steaks to get-rich-quick courses. Could citizens trust him to put the common good ahead of personal profit? How would he assure Americans that payments to his business weren’t doubling as payoffs?

A journalist asked Trump if he would release his tax returns, as Presidents had done for decades. Trump said no, and then explained just how unconstrained he felt by such conventions. He’d recently learned that the President, being beholden only to the voters, is subject to none of the regulations that restrict subordinate officials from conducting private business on the side. He called the loophole “a no-conflict-of-interest provision,” as if it were a perk of his employment contract.

To illustrate just how glaring a conflict the law allowed him, Trump volunteered that, during the transition, he’d entertained a two-billion-dollar offer “to do a deal in Dubai.” The offer had come from Hussain Sajwani, an Emirati real-estate tycoon with close ties to his country’s rulers. Trump emphasised that he “didn’t have to turn it down.” Nevertheless, he’d passed, because he didn’t “want to take advantage of something”; he disliked “the way that looks.” Therefore, he continued, his eldest sons, Donald, Jr., and Eric, would assume daily management of his businesses until he left office

The Dawn of Automated Warfare

Eric Schmidt and Greg Grant

Artificial Intelligence Will Be the Key to Victory in Ukraine—and Elsewhere RIC SCHMIDT is CEO and Chair of Relativity Space and Chair of the Special Competitive Studies Project. He previously served as CEO and Chair of Google and is a co-author, with Henry Kissinger and Craig Mundie, of Genesis: Artificial Intelligence, Hope, and the Human Spirit.

GREG GRANT is an Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Program at the Center for a New American Security. He previously served as Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defence Bob Work, and as a speechwriter for Secretaries of Defence Robert Gates, Leon Panetta, and Chuck Hagel

When Russia first launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the conflict drew comparisons to wars of the twentieth century. Tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery dominated the battlefield, and both sides’ infantry were dug into trenches. We witnessed this old-school style of war when we made our first visit to Ukraine in September 2022. Since then, we have made regular trips to Ukraine, affording us firsthand insight into a monumental transformation: the beginning of a new kind of warfare.

Incentives for U.S.-China Conflict, Competition, and Cooperation Across Artificial General Intelligence’s Five Hard National Security Problems

Michael S. Chase, William Marcellino

In a relationship marked by strategic rivalry and mutual suspicion, the prospect of either the United States or the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—or both—achieving artificial general intelligence (AGI) is likely to heighten tensions and could even increase the risk of competition spiralling into conflict. This is unsurprising, as AGI could reshape the global balance of power or yield “wonder weapons” capable of overwhelming intelligence systems, information ecosystems, and cyber defences (Mitre and Predd, 2025).

Yet the emergence of AGI could also create incentives for risk reduction and cooperation. We argue that both will not only be possible but essential. The United States and China will both want to avoid miscalculation and misunderstandings that could lead to an unwanted war. Neither will be able to manage alone the risks of AGI misuse—whether from rogue actors developing novel weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), autonomous agents triggering crises, or cascading disruptions that exceed state capacity. But such progress on risk reduction or on cooperation will not emerge organically. It will require a deliberate and carefully calibrated diplomatic effort to make it viable. In this paper, we offer some ideas for where to start, building on existing yet underdeveloped platforms and avenues for dialogue.

The PRC’s choices will be a principal factor in shaping the risks and opportunities that U.S. policymakers will face on the path to AGI, and, likewise, Chinese officials will likely view the United States as the most consequential external actor shaping AGI outcomes. At first glance, it might seem that the intensifying friction between Washington and Beijing over security, economic, and technology issues, along with each side’s extremely negative views of the other’s intentions, will drive relations between them in areas related to AGI.

The Militarization of Silicon Valley

Sheera Frenkel

In a ceremony in June at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall in Arlington, Va., four current and former executives from Meta, OpenAI and Palantir lined up onstage to swear an oath to support and defend the United States. The U.S. Army had just created a technical innovation unit for the executives, who were dressed in combat gear and boots. At the event, they were pronounced lieutenant colonels in the new unit, Detachment 201, which will advise the Army on new technologies for potential combat.

“We desperately need what they are good at,” Secretary of the Army Daniel Driscoll said of the tech executives, who have since undergone basic training. “It’s an understatement how grateful we are that they are taking this risk to come and try to build this out with us.” ImageAndrew Bosworth, Meta’s chief technology officer; Bob McGrew, an adviser at Thinking Machines Lab and OpenAI’s former chief research officer; Shyam Sankar, Palantir’s chief technology officer; and Kevin Weil, OpenAI’s chief product officer at a military ceremony in June.Credit...Staff Sgt. Leroy Council/United States Army

The military is not just courting Silicon Valley tech companies. In the age of President Trump, it has successfully recruited them. Over the past two years, Silicon Valley’s leaders and investors — many of whom had once forsworn involvement in weapons and war — have plunged headfirst into the military industrial complex. Meta, Google and OpenAI, which once had language in their corporate policies banning the use of artificial intelligence in weapons, have removed such wording. OpenAI is creating anti-drone technology, while Meta is making virtual reality glasses to train soldiers for battle.

So Long to Tech’s Dream Job

Kate Conger

When Rachel Grey started working at Google as a software engineer in 2007, it was a good time to be a Noogler, or what the search giant called new employees. At a two-week orientation at Google’s headquarters in Mountain View, Calif., Ms. Grey discovered a utopia of perks. The company’s cafeterias served steak and shrimp, kitchens were stocked with fresh juices and gyms offered free workout classes. Workers received stock grants on top of their salaries, a 50 per cent match on their retirement contributions and a Christmas bonus that came in the form of $1,000 tucked in an envelope.

What also made an impression on Ms. Grey during orientation was that Google revealed how many machines were in its data centres. “I saw how transparent things were in the company,” she said about the normally hush-hush information. Over the years, though, her experience changed as she became a software engineering manager. The Christmas bonus shrank. Employees were no longer provided a fire hose of corporate information. The company abandoned a pledge that its artificial intelligence would not be used for weapons. The budget for promotions dried up, pressuring Ms. Grey to lower performance ratings, which she said was “stunningly painful.” In April, just shy of 18 years, the 48-year-old quit what was once her dream job.

Life for workers at Silicon Valley’s biggest tech companies is different. Very different. Gone are the days when Google, Apple, Meta and Netflix were the dream destinations for tech workers, offering fat salaries, lush corporate campuses and say-anything, do-anything cultures. Now the behemoth firms have aged into large bureaucracies. While many of them still provide free food and pay well, they have little compunction cutting jobs, ordering mandatory office attendance and clamping down on employee debate.

Expanding China’s Geopolitical Influence through Peripheral Communication

Andrew Grant

The discourse of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and trio of global initiatives implies that the country’s geopolitical interests are firmly global. Nonetheless, in recent years Chinese scholars and intellectuals have increased their attention on the periphery of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). For many PRC scholars, this is presented as a course-corrective to earlier efforts to improve China’s position and status in “far away” places around the globe—efforts that in Western countries have produced weak results or backfired. The turn to its periphery can also be understood as an effort by China to reimagine its borderlands as geopolitical spaces that will serve as natural stepping stones between the consolidation of domestic frontier territories and long-term goals of extending China’s great-power influence around the world. From this viewpoint, control of China’s periphery is seen as a testing ground for the country’s global power.

In October 2013 and April 2025, Xi Jinping convened special meetings on China’s periphery. In his 2025 speech at the Central Peripheral Work Conference, he emphasized the importance of creating a “peripheral community of a shared future” (周边命运共同体). While development and a large assortment of “mutual” projects are presented as key to the establishment of this community, there is also a strong emphasis on finding a basis in cultural commonalities expressed via terms such as “affinity” (亲) and “tolerance” (容). Such shared traits are seen as attributes of populations on either side of the border that must be cultivated to strengthen peripheral states’ ties to China. These attributes will then become the foundations of a peripheral community that will serve China’s geopolitical interests and is responsive to “China’s new era foreign discursive system,” which, in line with Xi’s calls for building Chinese-centered narrative and conceptual frameworks, ensures that positive stories about China and its benevolent deeds are told, heard, and further disseminated.1 Such a peripheral propaganda program can help counter Western influence, thereby helping establish China’s stepping stones to greater world influence. At the heart of this approach is the concept of “peripheral communication” (周边传播)—an emerging field of study and action pioneered by the Peking University scholar Lu Di that seeks to control the discourse about China in the countries proximate to its borders.

A.I. is fueling a “poverty of imagination.” Here’s how we can fix it.

Meher AhmadJessica Grose, and Tressie McMillan Cottom

Artificial intelligence is already showing up in the classroom, so how are colleges, professors and students adapting to it? The New York Times Opinion editor Meher Ahmad is joined by the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cottom to talk about how the humanities are charting a new course, and whether ChatGPT is comparable to SparkNotes.

A.I. Is Fueling a ‘Poverty of Imagination.’ Here’s How We Can Fix It.What bots are really doing in the classroom. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYT Audio app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts. The transcript has been lightly edited for length and claritMeher Ahmad: I’m Meher Ahmad and I’m an editor for the New York Times Opinion section. Today I am joined by my colleagues the writer Jessica Grose and the columnist Tressie McMillan Cotto, to talk about artificial intelligence and education. Hi to both of you.

Jessica Grose: Thanks so much for having me.Tressie McMillan Cottom: Hello. Always a pleasure to be here. And hi, Jessica. Good to see you. Ahmad: So both of you have given this a lot of thought. Tressie, you’re in the classroom often as a sociology professor at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and have called generative A.I. “mid tech,” which we’ll get into. Jess, you’ve spent time interviewing parents, students and most recently educators across the humanities to write a series of pieces on A.I. and education for your newsletter.

Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion

Gabriel Honrada

Betting on stealth over speed, Taiwan is forging a long-range “carrier killer” to push back China’s carriers and toughen the First Island Chain—even as layered Chinese defences and shaky allied politics cloud the gambit. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defence analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China’s growing naval power, citing a defence ministry procurement list.

Under the Defence Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models. Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon’s development since 2021.

Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometres—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas. The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III’s 400-kilometre limit and the US-made Harpoon’s 200-kilometre reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) layered defences.

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