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13 February 2016

Military Diplomacy: Future of Sino-Indian relations

By Shubhda Chaudhary
12 Feb , 2016

Military relations between rising powers are often caught in a conflictual cycle. Yet Sino–Indian military relations is an exception in spite of wariness on both sides of the others strategic intentions. While the two states have been at odds for much of the Cold War following the Sino–Indian border war in 1962, the two sides have fashioned their bilateral relations in a commendable manner during Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s government. Part of the credit should go to on-going military diplomacy, engineered in stages between the two countries, which have allowed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Armed Forces to manage disputes and maintain peace along the disputed borders.

The relative peace on the Chinese front has allowed India to redesign its force mobilization and redeploy them in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast for counter-insurgency operations.

The simultaneous visit by the Indian Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major, to Beijing with the Commander of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), General Wu Shengli, to New Delhi in the first fortnight of November 2008 reinforced the strength of this initiative in promoting Sino–Indian relations. While many more such initiatives are in the offing, it is open to question if such steps ‘alone’ will help in the settlement of the border dispute, remove the perception of China as a long-term threat among Indian defense planners and engender permanent peace between China and India.

It is worthwhile to discuss a few of the visible gains from Sino–Indian engagement through military diplomacy are worth mentioning. First, military diplomacy has led to the graduated reciprocation in tension reduction (GRIT) between China and India. Political relations have become less hostile and the LAC between the two countries has become relatively stable compared to the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan. Vary rarely are there reports in Indian newspapers about cross-fire between Chinese and Indian forces. The relative peace on the Chinese front has allowed India to redesign its force mobilization and redeploy them in Jammu and Kashmir and northeast for counter-insurgency operations.

Second, clandestine activities by the PLA near LAC are reportedly far less than by the Pakistan Army near the LoC. While there are cases of Chinese troops making regular incursions into Indian territories, they desist from supporting secessionist elements in crossing the border or in the supply of arms.

Third, in the last few years at least, Chinese and Indian forces have engaged each other near the LAC in a series of interactive activities such as mountaineering expeditions, celebration of national days, cultural and sporting activities. Such activities are yet to be inaugurated near the LoC.

…Sino–Indian military diplomacy may relieve India from the specter of having to face a ‘two-front’ war with China and Pakistan, at least in the near future.

In the long term, India can benefit from military diplomacy on several fronts. First, not much is known about the PLA’s modernization plans, its funding and budgetary process and its overall strategic objectives. India still relies heavily upon western intelligence and academic sources to develop its perspective on China’s military preparedness. As stakeholders in India’s national security, the Indian defense forces are entrusted with the duty to acquire new knowledge about the PLA’s functionaries, its combat preparedness and operational reach in the Asia-Pacific region. Military diplomacy will facilitate such ‘knowledge development’. Second, Sino–Indian military diplomacy may relieve India from the specter of having to face a ‘two-front’ war with China and Pakistan, at least in the near future.

During the 1999 Kargil War, it may have been due to India’s improved relations with China through some confidence building measures on the LAC that kept Beijing from siding with Pakistan. Third, it has given India some breathing space and confidence for a negotiated settlement of the vexed issue of the border. The protracted talks with no conclusion have often challenged the patience of policy makers as well as the public at large, but the relative peace on the borders has enabled diplomats on both sides to discuss the issue without any external constraint. Fourth, military diplomacy has enabled the two countries to move away from the position of bilateral confrontation to explore the potential of being stakeholders in the emerging Asian security architecture. Both the countries have identified terrorism, maritime piracy, drug trafficking, illegal arms trade, security of sea lanes and humanitarian response as issues that require sharing of resources and expertise.

In discussing these issues, China and India are willing partners in multilateral military-diplomatic platforms like the Shangri La Dialogue and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA).

China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors are also a subject of concern.

Having presented these three historic Sino-lndian CSBM agreements, the single most important element that comes to the fore lies in the sustained mutual commitment from both these countries towards the sanctity of what is known as the Panchsheel. These Five Principles of peaceful co-existence not only represent the very soul of Sino-Indian friendship and understanding but also form the common thread that provides continuity and joins these three agreements together, Panchsheel, therefore, can be safely described as the very core and the very essence of these three agreements that represent the successful termination of two different phases of flux and friction in Sine-Indian relations.

These Five Principles have since been adopted not only in various other Sino-Indian agreements and other bilateral documents but have also been presented to the world as an ideal framework for peaceful and stable inter-state relations. During the historic visit by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing in December 1968, China’s paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had, in fact, proposed that both China and India should work together and present Panchsheel as the basic framework for defining the new world order of post-Cold War world.

Seen individually, the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement formed the cradle of these historic Five Principles of Panchsheel. To start with, the Agreement had sought to put behind some of historical entanglements of the Sino-lndian ties, albeit incomprehensibly, By invoking the spirit of Panchsheel -which also have cultural connotations for being the integral core of Buddhist preaching – this agreement had once emerged as the strongest force in combining the people of these two civilizational-states of China and India. However, despite the fact that there was nothing wrong in the formulation of this agreement’s letter and spirit, the attack on it came, from a deteriorating atmosphere not generated from this agreement itself. For one thing, both the young republics were intoxicated in copious patristic nationalist alcohol. For another, there was the cold war developing from strength to strength, and India and China were unwittingly sucked into its whirlpool. Although the Agreement lapsed, in 1962, it has stood as a shining document with an immortal guiding principle in international affairs.

Even beyond the neighborhood, there are concerns about competition with China for markets, influence and resources across the globe.

Apart from various other factors like historical legacies, evolved conventions, and mutual perceptions, treaties remain the most widely accepted and most legitimate legal instrument that defines and determines the code of conduct for inter-state interactions. These three agreements assume special significance when signed by two nation-states which may be either widely different in terms of their histories, languages, cultures, political systems or levels of development or which may have fallen prey to unfavourable atmospherics generated by their not-so-friendly or conflictual relations. In fact, treaties have always had a special place in terminating inter-state wars or in resolving other inter-state disputes. Though, such a tradition of treaty-making can be traced back to the ancient times yet, the two World Wars and the consequent emergence of the League of Nations and United Nations have particularly clauses and principles, it soon fell prey to the difficult ground realities and unfavourable circumstances.

The 1954 Agreement was allowed to lapse at the end of its E-year life because the bilateral atmosphere in 1962 was too unfriendly to extend its existence. It was precisely because of this change in the ambiance in which this agreement was conceived that it could not bear fruition. Nevertheless, in looking back, it has stood as one most shining document in the historical times and its Five Principles of Panchsheel have found their place of pride in various other international treaties and other inter-state documents. This agreement has also continued to be the guiding force for all the latter Sino-Indian initiatives towards renewing their friendship and building confidence.

China’s growing political and economic ties with India’s neighbors are also a subject of concern. Delhi watches warily increasing Chinese interactions—political and commercial—with and involvement in countries like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Concern about a military dimension being added persists. Beijing’s increasing interest in operating in the Indian Ocean, which India has traditionally considered its backyard, has also not gone unnoticed. While China emphasizes that these activities have benign goals—economic development, security for its ships, etc.—some in India who tend to take a hawkish position are not convinced; others are taking a wait-and-see attitude. Even beyond the neighborhood, there are concerns about competition with China for markets, influence and resources across the globe.

Closer to home, water is the resource that has become the subject of tension—specifically Chinese dam construction on its side of the Brahmaputra River. Indian officials have publicly called for Beijing to reassure India on this matter. Domestic critics, however, perceive the Indian government as being too tolerant of the construction. They argue that China has not respected information sharing agreements on this front and warn of more ambitious Chinese river diversion plans.

…also note China’s reluctance to endorse India’s demand for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council or its objections to India being given membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Economic ties, which many envisioned as the driver of good Sino-Indian ties, have also not escaped trouble. Bilateral trade in goods actually fell almost 10 percent from 2011 to 2012. In India there’s much concern about the trade imbalance. The overall trade deficit has gone from $28 billion in 2010-2011 to $40.8 billion in 2012-2013. While investments have grown, they remain limited compared to the investment relationships that both China and India have with other countries. In India, there have also been complaints about market access in China and the treatment of Indian labor there, concern about Chinese investment in “strategic” sectors in India, accusations about visa abuses by Chinese companies and restrictions on Chinese labor. Indian companies also privately express concerns about cyber-espionage. Overall, reports of cyber-attacks on Indian government and military networks—allegedly emanating from China—have done nothing to decrease distrust that persists, especially among the public.

There is also an overall sense that China does not respect India and/or that it will seek to prevent India’s rise. As evidence, critics point not only to China’s relationship with Pakistan, which is seen as driven by a desire to keep India tied up in South Asia, but also note China’s reluctance to endorse India’s demand for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council or its objections to India being given membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Another overarching problem: the lack of trust in China and its intentions. This is especially evident among the public. According to a Pew poll last year, more Indians have an unfavorable view of China than a favorable view. In a more recent Lowy Institute poll, China ranked only second to Pakistan in terms of countries that people considered threatening to India, with 60 percent indicating China would be a major threat over the next decade (an additional 22 percent identified it as a minor threat). 73 percent of those surveyed identified “war with China” as a big threat over the next ten years. Almost three-quarters believed that China wants to dominate Asia. 58 percent felt that China’s growth had not been good for India. This reinforces what the Pew poll found last year. In that poll, two-thirds of urbanites who expressed an opinion on the subject believed that China’s growing economy was a bad thing.

…these problems are exacerbated by the lack of transparency when it comes to Chinese decision-making. This has led to uncertainty about Chinese behavior and motivations…

Overcoming this mistrust continues to be a major obstacle. The legacy of history remains a problem. Every time there is a border incident it reinforces the narrative that has prevailed in many quarters in India since the 1962 China-India war: that China only understands strength; that while Beijing’s leaders say China and India “must shake hands,” they cannot be trusted—that one hand held out might just be a precursor to the other stabbing one in the back. This problem is made worse by limited connectivity and communications, and little knowledge about the other country—even though these have improved. Media coverage about China and the relationship can also get quite heated, with a tendency to focus on the negative. All these problems are exacerbated by the lack of transparency when it comes to Chinese decision-making. This has led to uncertainty about Chinese behavior and motivations, which was evident in the debate about why the border incident in April occurred—and this uncertainty exists even among policymakers.

In sum, though Indian diplomats frequently speak the language of Sino-Indian comity, their strategic posture reveals a country profoundly affected-and threatened-by China’s rise. And while anti-India sentiments are both less prevalent and less fervent in China, nearly two-thirds of Chinese polled by Pew in 2012 reported an “unfavorable” view of India. Among China’s influential nationalists, disdain for India is more widespread, and more intensely felt.

So how has the China-India rivalry evolved in the twenty-first century? In the early 2000s it appeared as if the two sides would enjoy something of a second honeymoon. They signed two important agreements to manage their border dispute in 2003 and 2005, in addition to the first substantive rounds of military-to-military dialogues mentioned above, and the convergence of interests on climate change and trade.

…the two sides are witnessing increased friction in the maritime arena, as the PLAN enters its fifth year of anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean.

However, the lure of rivalry seemed to re-assert itself after 2005. The border negotiations process—now over four dozen rounds and counting—ground to a halt after 2005, with an arms and infrastructure buildup on both sides of the Line of Actual Control, aggressive border patrolling, and renewed Chinese claims on Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh. Chinese nuclear and military assistance to Pakistan, Chinese infrastructure projects in Kashmir, and China’s use of “stapled visas” for Indian residents from Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh frequently positioned China as a villain in Indian headlines.

Meanwhile, a new Indian assertiveness on issues relating to Tibet has come at a time when Chinese sensitivities on the plateau have been heightened by a wave of unrest, including over one hundred self-immolations by Buddhist monks protesting Chinese rule. The transition of power to an elected prime minister in the Tibetan Government in Exile and a forthcoming battle for the right to name a successor to the 78-year-old Dalai Lama are likely to keep Tibet a volatile issue in China-India relations for the foreseeable future.

Meanwhile, the two sides are witnessing increased friction in the maritime arena, as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) enters its fifth year of anti-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean. The first semipermanent deployment for the PLAN has given the Chinese navy valuable experience practicing blue-water techniques far from its shores, including operating in friendly ports around the Indian Ocean rim. Chinese submarines are increasingly active in the Indian Ocean and as China becomes more and more dependent on Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCS) through the Indian Ocean to meet its growing energy demands, nationalist pundits are beginning to question Beijing’s longstanding aversion to foreign military bases.

China and India are likely to witness continued friction across the geopolitical spectrum for the foreseeable future, even if outright conflict remains unlikely.

In East Asia, India has found common ground with regional capitals alarmed by China’s claims in the South China Sea, and Delhi has become a vocal proponent of “Freedom of Navigation” there. It has begun a robust agenda of military exercises in the region, joining trilateral naval exercises with the U.S. and Japan to complement regular military exercises with members of ASEAN. Finally, India is exploring for energy in waters off Vietnam—waters claimed by China as part of its Exclusive Economic Zone.

In conclusion, China and India are likely to witness continued friction across the geopolitical spectrum for the foreseeable future, even if outright conflict remains unlikely. Perhaps that should be expected from two powers so large, rising so fast, in such close proximity. And perhaps the Chinese and Indian leadership should be given credit for pursuing mutual cooperation despite their litany of differences. Whether they continue sparring and collaborating under the framework of a cold peace or descend into an openly hostile rivalry will depend on China.
© Copyright 2016 Indian Defence Review

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