A Simplified Framework for Assessing China's Four Warfares and the Need for Institutional Economic Statecraft in a Hybrid Era

Michael DiBernardo

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One of the reasons that the United States and its allies have had difficulty mobilizing resources against China’s hybrid warfare activities is that they often do not align with our definition of war. Our institutions are designed to manage state capabilities through the familiar DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic) framework, not against hybrid threats. The result is a growing mismatch between how we think about these challenges and vulnerabilities.

In 2003, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) commissioned the “Political Work Guidelines of the People’s Liberation Army,” wherein they expressed their intent to wage “three warfares” (psychological, media, and legal) and outlined their intent to undermine global norms via “war by other means” (Office of Net Assessment). In addition to the three warfares, China quietly expanded its economic spheres of influence and now leverages their capabilities for economic warfare (Cha). Over the past twenty years they have earned market share in varying domains of power through coordinated activities. Approaching them in silos is ineffective.