Reining in China’s Dominance of the International Telecommunication Union: Highlights from My Conversation with Danielle Pletka, Brett Schaefer, and Dominique Lazanski

Shane Tews, Danielle Pletka

Source Link

A specialized UN agency called the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is holding its plenipotentiary conference later this month, where members will vote on a new secretary general and group of high officials. If China’s favored candidates succeed, Beijing—with the support of other authoritarian nations like Russia—will continue to dictate the rules, standards, and best practices around emerging technologies such as 5G networks. Failure on the part of the US to thwart this effort will have tangible effects on how our networks operate in the future. As two of our guests today have warned, “What is at stake is secure air travel, privacy in every sphere of modern life, and the ability of the US military to protect the American people. The stakes could not be higher.”

On the latest episode of Explain to Shane, I sat down with AEI Distinguished Senior Fellow Danielle Pletka and Heritage Foundation Senior Research Fellow Brett Schaefer, who co-authored a report titled Countering China’s Growing Influence at the International Telecommunication Union. We were also joined by Dominique Lazanski, a global internet governance expert and previous Explain to Shane guest who last came on the show to discuss her 2020 essay, Standardising the Splinternet: How China’s Technical Standards Could Fragment the Internet. My distinguished guests discussed the upcoming ITU election, reminded us of its high stakes, and explained how China’s quest to dominate the ITU is emblematic of a larger strategy to intimidate rivals and erode the United States’ global influence.

NATO and Nuclear Weapons: What Ukraine Needs to Ensure Russia Never Invades Again

Michael Rubin

Source Link

Ensuring “Never Again” for Ukraine: President Volodymyr Zelensky has done more to defend the liberal order and defeat fascism than any leader since British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in World War II. Ukrainian men, women, and children paid a high price. Unlike so many in the West who are relatively distant from conflict and existential threat, they understand the cost of freedom. While the Biden administration has rallied to support the Ukrainians in their hours of need, they did so only belatedly, giving substance to Churchill’s quip that the Americans always do the right thing but only after trying everything else first.

Ukrainians will triumph, even if Russian President Vladimir Putin, in desperation, lashes out with tactical nuclear weapons. In order to short-circuit this possibility, many Western diplomats may urge compromise: Let Russia keep the Crimea or portions of the self-styled Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics carved out of Ukrainian territory during Russia’s prior aggression. This would be a mistake. It would send the message that aggression has little cost and would encourage future aggressors to engage in the same sort of salami-slicing tactics that China uses in the South China Sea, Azerbaijan now employs in the Caucasus, and Turkey embraces along its borders and in the Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean Seas.

Energy innovation funding and institutions in major economies

Jonas Meckling, Clara Galeazzi, Esther Shears, Tong Xu & Laura Diaz Anadon

Source Link

Abstract

Accelerating energy innovation for decarbonization hinges on public investment in research, development and demonstration (RD&D). Here we examine the evolution and variation of public energy RD&D funding and institutions and associated drivers across eight major economies, including China and India (2000–2018). The share of new clean energy grew at the expense of nuclear, while the fossil fuel RD&D share remained stable. Governments created new institutions but experimented only marginally with novel designs that bridge lab to market to accelerate commercialization. In theory, crisis, cooperation and competition can be drivers of change. We find that cooperation in Mission Innovation is associated with punctuated change in clean-energy RD&D growth, and clean tech competition with China is associated with gradual change. Stimulus spending after the financial crisis, instead, boosted fossil and nuclear only. Looking ahead, global coopetition—the interplay of RD&D cooperation and clean tech competition—offers opportunities for accelerating energy innovation to meet climate goals.

Main

Decarbonizing the economy to mitigate climate change requires accelerating energy innovation. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that 35% of cumulative emissions reductions necessary to achieve the Paris climate goals hinge on technologies that are currently only at the prototype or demonstration phase and require further research, development and demonstration (RD&D)1. Accelerating energy innovation hinges critically on public investment and institutions for RD&D, among other measures such as deployment policies2,3.

Why Tensions Over Taiwan Aren’t Likely to Die Down Soon

PAUL HAENLE

Source Link

On a recent episode of the China in the World podcast, Paul Haenle spoke with Anja Manuel about tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the warming Russia-China relationship. Manuel is co-founder and partner at Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC. A portion of their conversation, which has been edited and condensed for clarity, is below.

Paul Haenle: In your view, how acute is the risk of conflict in the Taiwan Strait? How do you think the United States should respond?

Anja Manuel: Geopolitically, we are in for a wild ride. Buckle your seatbelts—it’s not just Taiwan. I know we’re going to talk about Russia-Ukraine. The level of conflict and worry and instability in the international system is much higher than it has been in recent years.

Speaking to Taiwan specifically . . . the Chinese reaction and response to [U.S. House] Speaker [Nancy] Pelosi’s visit . . . was extreme by any measure. And I think China gained something very important from the speaker’s visit, and that is with these military exercises, which are difficult to respond to because they are not military attacks. There is nothing you can really do. They’re merely exercising.

Corroding Western Democracy: The Disparity Between Azerbaijan and Russia

Vahagn Avedian

Source Link

Over the past few decades, we have witnessed how public faith is faltering, not only in the established leadership in the Western democracy, but in the concept of democracy itself. A major contributing factor to this erosion is the failure of decision makers to uphold the values they extol, being fundamental for our democracies, especially regarding human rights. This aspect is not only true domestically, but perhaps even more on the international arena where the collective community is supposed to uphold the enshrined democratic values guiding our decision-making globally. One such example among many is how both the US and the EU have addressed the democratic shortcomings of Azerbaijan and Russia in light of the wars in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine respectively. The disparity has even increased due to the Ukraine War as the 2022 energy crisis in Europe has propelled Azerbaijan, an outspoken autocracy, to be heralded as a “strategic partner for the EU.” This article examines how the perceived double standard of Western Institutions, such as the EU, towards Russia and Azerbaijan have emboldened an autocratic Baku, whilst risking undermining emerging democracy in Armenia.

Despite the advancement of our democratic systems and its core values concerning the universality of justice and human rights, decision-making still follows a strict power-centered “us first” policy. This is hardly surprising as we tend to first and foremost look after our own interests, individually, nationally and internationally. However, this selfishness has a price which grows exponentially when applied collectively and has a perilous effect on our democratic systems, which in the modern world are indeed based on universal equal rights. Such an inwardness corrodes and hollows out the backbone of democracy, namely the public’s faith in the system itself. This corrosion does not only pertain to domestic politics but is highly valid, as it grows in proportion with the globalization of our world, interlinking us much tighter to each other in every aspect: political, financial, climate, health, etc.

Foreign collaboration continues in China’s drive for technology self-reliance

Rebecca Arcesati

Source Link

For decades, China’s government has been tapping into foreign inputs and knowledge to close gaps in its national innovation system. As the political project of breaking China’s foreign technology dependencies becomes more important for Beijing, so too does the need for policymakers in Europe and elsewhere to understand and assess these connections.

For China’s ambition of industrial self-sufficiency in chip production, photoresists are a major headache. These light-sensitive materials are essential for the global semiconductor industry. In lithography—the process by which information contained in a design is encoded into patterns of a wafer—circuit features form after wafers are coated in photoresists. A handful of Japanese companies control 90% of the global market for these materials, making Chinese companies highly reliant on imports.

As John Lee and Jan-Peter Kleinhans write, photoresist development is prioritised in Chinese central and local governments’ industrial policy plans. National funding for research and development has helped some companies make some inroads at the lower ends of the value chain. But getting closer to the cutting edge within the next five to 10 years is an unlikely prospect.

What the U.S. gets wrong about China’s relationship with Russia, and Xi Jinping’s relationship with Vladimir Putin

Lili Pike

Source Link

On Thursday, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian leader Vladimir Putin, a clear sign that their ties remain strong despite the seismic shifts since their last meeting seven months ago. At that February summit, on the sidelines of the Beijing Winter Olympics, the two leaders said their countries enjoyed a “no limits” friendship, built upon a mutual resentment of Western nations. They issued a long joint statement that was a not-so-veiled attack on the U.S.-led global order, and — in language that was likely music to Putin’s ears — a full-throated defense of Russia’s hard-line stand against NATO.

Less than three weeks later, Russia invaded Ukraine.

At Thursday’s meeting, held in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, the tone was slightly different — no doubt a consequence of how much has changed since February. Putin said, “We highly value the balanced position of our Chinese friends when it comes to the Ukraine crisis” — a note of thanks to China for standing with Russia in terms of financial support, U.N. votes, and continued condemnation of the U.S. and NATO. But Putin also acknowledged that China may not be as fully supportive of Russia now as it was before the tanks rolled in. “We understand your questions and concerns about this,” Putin said of the war in Ukraine.

Russian Invasion of UkraineChinese Support for Putin’s War Looks More Shaky After Summit

Source Link

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia said on Thursday that Moscow understood that China had “questions and concerns” about the war in Ukraine — a notable, if cryptic, admission from Mr. Putin that Beijing may not fully approve of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

And his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping — in his first face-to-face meeting with Mr. Putin since the invasion began — struck a far more subdued tone than the Russian president, and steered clear in his public comments of any mention of Ukraine at all.

Taken together, the remarks were a stark sign that Russia lacks the full backing of its most powerful international partner as it tries to recover from a humiliating rout in northeastern Ukraine last week.

The two authoritarian leaders met during a summit in Uzbekistan that was meant to signal the strength of the relationship between the countries at a time of increasing animosity with the West and challenges to their agendas. The meeting was particularly important to Mr. Putin, who has become more isolated by the United States and its allies over his invasion of Ukraine.

Ukraine Situation Report: Top U.S. Marine Praises Battlefield Lessons Learned

HOWARD ALTMAN

Source Link

The Marine Corps's top officer says there are many lessons and affirmations to be learned from how Ukrainian troops are fighting Russians.

Especially in Ukraine's empowerment of small unit leaders and its use of surveillance and countersurveillance to target artillery fires. These are two elements that are a big part of Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger’s Force Design 2030 concept to remake the Corps into a forward-deployed, distributed force under the guns of a peer adversary like China.

Ukraine’s success on the battlefield “does reaffirm the fact that small unit leaders who are well-trained, who have the experience and maturity to make decisions and are empowered to make decisions in lieu of detailed guidance is powerful,” said Berger, speaking at the Defense One’s State of Defense virtual conference Thursday.

Israel’s Defense Minister Reveals Syrian Military Sites Used to Produce Advanced Weapons for Iran

JOE TRUZMAN

Source Link

At a Jerusalem Post conference in New York on Monday, Israel’s Defense Minister, Benny Gantz, revealed a map displaying Syrian arms manufacturing facilities used to produce advanced weapons for Tehran and its proxies in the region.

Gantz attributed the development of the precision guided munitions (PGM) sites to former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qassem Soleimani and said the facilities were being used to distribute advanced arms to Lebanese Hezbollah including other militant organizations backed by Tehran.

“Under the vision of Qassem Soleimani, Iran transformed CERS (Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center) into production facilities for mid and long-range, precise missiles and weapons, provided to Hezbollah and Iranian proxies. In other words, it became yet another Iranian front – a factory for advanced, strategic weapons,” Gantz stated.

Putin’s Next Move in Ukraine Mobilize, Retreat, or Something in Between?

Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage

Source Link

For the first time in the war in Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin must contend with the serious prospect of losing it. Early setbacks around Kyiv and Chernigov had been balanced by Russian gains in the south and the east; they could be justified as tactical retreats and thus as Russian choices, regardless of whether they truly were. By contrast, the near rout of Russian soldiers in the Kharkiv region on September 10—and the rapid reconquest by Ukrainian forces of territory spanning some 2,000 square miles in the east and south—clearly showed that Ukraine was on top and that Russian troops may continue to fall to future such offensives. Ukraine’s Kharkiv offensive destroyed the illusion of Russian invincibility. It has also heralded a new stage in the West’s expectations. Suddenly, Western leaders and strategists have been able to contemplate Ukraine gaining the upper hand in this war. This shift in perspective seems certain to unleash a new dynamic of military support for Ukraine. The argument that Ukraine should sue for peace, rather than keep fighting, has been refuted.

But the perspective has changed most dramatically for Russia, and this entails significant new risks for both Ukraine and the West. Since the failure of his lightning strike to take Kyiv in February 2022, Putin has been keeping two balls in the air. One is sustaining the war for the long term with a peacetime Russian army, having surmised that Ukraine’s military is weaker and that a prolonged war favors Russia. The other ball is ensuring that Russian society remains insulated from the war, on the assumption that Putin can maintain high levels of domestic support as long as ordinary Russians are not exposed to the war’s costs. Ukraine’s battlefield successes around Kharkiv, however, have dramatically upset these calculations.

The Weaponization of Capital

Emily de La Bruyère, Nathan Picarsic

Source Link

Introduction

The People’s Republic of China opened to the world in the 1970s. China has subsequently enjoyed unprecedented economic growth. From the outset, that growth has been championed by, and disproportionately benefited, the U.S. financial sector. However, the benefits to the financial sector have not augmented overall U.S. economic or relative national strength. The CCP’s relative gains — in particular over the past two decades, since China joined the World Trade Organization — have coincided with U.S. losses in industrial strength.4 The economic assumptions provided to justify China’s opening did not account for Beijing’s “state-led, enterprise-driven model” or its violation of the laws and norms of international trade and investment.5 Now, almost half a century later, Beijing’s long-standing asymmetric approach to economic engagement, and corresponding pursuit of coercive leverage, are finally recognized as strategic threats to the U.S.-led rules-based international order.6

The Biden administration, in its first days, appeared poised to acknowledge, and rein in, the role of finance in U.S. policy toward China. “Why, for example, should it be a U.S. negotiating priority to open China’s financial system for Goldman Sachs?” National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan asked.7 It is yet to be seen whether that was more than a flippant sound bite. Financial integration remains a core CCP objective — and one pursued with new gusto as global markets grapple with COVID-19, follow-on supply chain challenges, and inflationary pressures.8

Putin’s NATO bungle

IVO DAALDER

Source Link

Russian President Vladimir Putin had high hopes for the invasion of his western neighbor earlier this year — he was going to bring all of Ukraine back into Russia’s fold; he was going to expand Russia’s influence throughout Eastern and Central Europe; he was going to fracture, if not force, the collapse of NATO.

In short, the Russian president was going to regain everything Russia had lost when the Soviet Union disintegrated, and reverse what he saw as “the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 20th century.”

But Putin’s hopes have been brutally crushed, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine may well turn out to be the greatest geopolitical disaster of the 21st century — at least as far as Russia is concerned.

US Intelligence Predicted Resurgence of Islamic State Group Threat, Declassified Report Shows

Source Link

WASHINGTON — U.S. intelligence officials predicted two years ago that the Islamic State group would likely regain much of its former strength and global influence, particularly if American and other Western forces reduced their role in countering the extremist movement, according to a newly declassified report.

Analysts said many of the judgments in the 2020 report appear prescient today, particularly as the group is resurgent in Afghanistan following President Joe Biden’s withdrawal of American forces last year.

The Islamic State group is no longer controlling huge swaths of territory or staging attacks in the United States as it did several years ago before a major U.S.-led offensive. But it is now slowly rebuilding some core capabilities in Iraq and Syria and increasingly fighting local governments in places including Afghanistan, where an affiliate of the IS group, also known by the acronym ISIS, is fighting the ruling Taliban following the U.S. withdrawal.

Kharkiv offensive has shown the west that Ukraine can win

Frank Ledwidge

Source Link

Most people outside Ukraine, even military analysts, have never heard of Oleksander Syrski. But Colonel General Syrski has a claim to being the most successful general of the 21st century so far. The success of this week’s operation in eastern Ukraine – which he commanded – amounts to the most significant Ukrainian victory of the war so far, alongside the 57-year-old military commander’s defeat of Russian forces before the gates of Kyiv in March.

Tactically, the assault towards Kupiansk and Izium was a well planned and superbly executed strike at a weakly held part of the Russian lines. The success can partially be attributed to poor Russian and excellent Ukrainian intelligence.

A Ukrainian official commented: “They are blind, we see everything.” It is likely that this was at least in part due to Ukraine taking temporary control of the air by destroying Russian radars and using their German-supplied Gephard anti-aircraft systems to shoot down their aircraft and drones.

Oleksandr Syrski is the commander of Ukraine’s ground troops responsible for the successful counteroffensive. Ukrainian Military via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-NC-SA

The long-term telegraphing of the (successful and continuing) operation to retake Kherson in the south of Ukraine resulted in Russian commanders redeploying considerable forces to defend that sector. This served to thin out already overstretched lines in the east.

All of this was followed by a swift combined arms strike, integrating tanks, infantry, artillery and air power in overwhelming force which would have been considered a success had it only taken the vital supply base at Kupiansk. It has gone far further than that, with the even more important node of Izyum now in Ukrainian hands.

In the face of this assault the Russians are in disarray and their military is running severely short of options, with all available forces committed to what amounts to firefighting, where the fire looks to be getting out of control.

The best the Russians can hope for is to try to consolidate their defences on the banks of the broad Oskil River in the east of the Kharkiv oblast and hope the Ukrainians pause to allow their logistics to catch up.

Dashing Putin’s dream

The Kharkiv offensive has great significance off the battlefield. Vladimir Putin’s imperial dreams of taking the whole country have evaporated. And retaking the key towns of Izium and Kupiansk has even compromised Russia’s ability to hold captured territory in the Donetsk oblast, which had become Putin’s declared basic objective.

Across the Russian media there is generalised gloom. Even among Russia’s cheerleaders there is a sense of anger and some desperation, including (or especially) among the most nationalist voices.

Igor Girkin – the pro-Russian commander of the breakaway so-called “Donetsk People’s Republic” during the 2014-2015 campaign in Donbas and an influential and well-connected blogger – takes the view that: “We have already lost, the rest is just a matter of time.”

Away from Russia, those countries who do not oppose the Kremlin (Putin has few allies) will be reassessing whether they have backed a loser. This especially includes China, whose leader Xi Jinping is due to meet with Putin this week.

On the other side, Ukrainians have been hearing their president, Volodymyr Zelensky, talk about liberating all of Ukraine’s lost lands. Now they believe it – and they are not alone. The offensive has demonstrated conclusively to western donors that Ukraine is capable of complex combined operations to retake its territory.

New US aid package: Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and US secretary of state, Anthony Blinken, announce a US$2 billion aid package for Ukraine and Nato allies in eastern Europe. UPI/Alamy Stock Photo

This is important. It is one thing to use complex equipment such as Himars rocket launchers effectively in small numbers. It’s quite another to organise thousands of weapons systems in combination with tens of thousands of troops in fast-moving combat.

Allies and donors can now be confident that Ukrainian commanders are capable of using western aid not only in defence but, crucially, also in operations to retake land. In doing so, the narrative of Ukrainian success is firmly reestablished in international media. This is vital for keeping the country’s situation high on government agendas.

Western reactions

All of this asks questions of western strategy, which until now was predicated on weakening Russia and preventing Ukrainian defeat. Ukraine has now demonstrated that there is a real possibility to impose strategically significant costs on the invaders – and eventually defeat them.

The dilemma for Joe Biden and European leaders is whether to reinforce success and double down. The war is nowhere near over. One-fifth of Ukraine’s territory is still under occupation, the criminal nature of which becomes ever clearer when the territory is retaken and atrocities revealed.

Syrski’s boss, chief of staff of the Ukrainian armed forces General Valery Zaluzhnyi, recently co-authored an article asking how far Ukraine’s military ambitions should extend in 2023 and assessing what Ukraine will need from its partners to achieve them.

He sees the focus for Ukraine’s operations as Crimea. The means for retaking Crimea, he says, are to be “ten to 20 combined military brigades” representing about 60,000 fully-equipped combat troops armed with modern western equipment.

Zaluzhnyi observes the essential and continuing disparity between Russia’s weapons, which can – and regularly do – strike deep into Ukrainian territory, and those of the defenders which have only one-20th the range. Ukraine needs the capability to threaten or impose costs deep into Russia if the war is not to go on and on.

While that disparity continues, he argues, and given the nature of the Russian regime, the war could go on indefinitely no matter how much territory Ukraine has recaptured recently. Facing an all-out war wherein Ukraine is effectively defending the west, full-scale support is required, not simply replacement of losses.

Will the west have the courage to back him up? Last week, Zaluzhnyi’s article would have seemed a quixotic fantasy. Now, with the blitzkrieg liberation of most of the Kharkiv oblast, and the obviously abject and ramshackle state of the Russian armed forces made even more apparent, Ukrainian victory looks truly achievable for the first time.

Ukraine Pulled Off a Masterstroke

Phillips Payson O’Brien

What happens on the battlefield is rarely the thing that decides a war. Normally, the preparations beforehand determine what happens when the fighting begins—and these preparations are what settle the outcome of the war itself. This truth is playing out along the roads and in the towns of Kharkiv Oblast, the province that includes Ukraine’s second-largest city. The stunningly swift advance of Ukrainian forces, which started around September 1 and sped up soon after, has easily been the most dramatic—and for Ukraine and its supporters, the most uplifting—episode of the war since the current Russian invasion began on February 24. In a few days the Ukrainians liberated about as much territory as Russia had captured in a few months, while causing the disintegration of Russian forces around Izium, Kupyansk, and other logistically vital cities. From the outside, Ukraine appears to have changed the whole complexion of the war.

This stunning Ukrainian advance was anything but sudden. It resulted from a patient military buildup, excellent operational security, and, maybe most important, the diversion of some of the Russian army’s most powerful units from Kharkiv Oblast itself. The overall planning by the Ukrainian government and armed forces worked well on so many levels that it produced one of the greatest military-strategy successes since 1945.

Ukraine’s Oligarchs Are a Dying Breed. The Country Will Never Be the Same

Konstantin Skorkin

Source Link

It was not so long ago that the oligarchs and their relationship with the central government were a key element in Ukrainian politics. Their enormous capital that grew out of the corrupt privatization of Soviet industry on the eve of the 2000s influenced the most diverse aspects of the country’s political life, from the agenda set by the media to the makeup of parliament.

That has all changed, however, with the outbreak of war. With every passing day, the influence of Ukraine’s oligarchs is fading, and their capital alongside it. Without them, Ukraine is becoming a different country.

The process of deoligarchization, as it has become known, was already one of the biggest issues in Ukrainian politics in the year before the war. President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced a controversial law designed to limit the “excessive influence” of major tycoons, but the law was criticized both for its dubious legal status and for not going far enough.

Above all, there was no confidence that the young president would prevail in his confrontation with the country’s richest people: that the powerful oligarchs might not just decide to chip in to support the opposition and kick out Zelensky and his Servant of the People party at the next elections.

Biden’s Daunting Task at the United Nations

STEWART PATRICK

Source Link

President Joe Biden faces an immense task when he addresses the United Nations General Assembly on September 20. Last year, the U.S. leader won easy plaudits as the “anti-Trump,” pledging that America was “back.” This year demands more. The liberal, rules-based international system is reeling, battered by Russian aggression, Chinese ambitions, authoritarian assaults, a halting pandemic recovery, quickening climate change, skepticism of the UN’s relevance, and gnawing doubts about American staying power. The president needs to articulate an affirmative vision of world order rather than adopt a reactive stance that allows adversaries to define U.S. grand strategy. He must persuade audiences at home and abroad that an open world order grounded in global institutions remains the only viable path for the world’s sovereign nations to enjoy peace and prosperity on an interdependent planet.

Biden’s first goal should be to frame the challenges posed by Russia and China in a manner that’s both clear-eyed and pragmatic. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is the most blatant breach of the UN Charter in a generation, and Biden should condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin for seeking to erase Ukrainian sovereignty. He should castigate China for escalating tensions over Taiwan and warn it against following Russia’s example. At the same time, he should beware declaring a new cold war with either adversary, to avoid donning an ideological straitjacket or alienating fence-sitters in the developing world.

Iraq Is Nearing the Brink of a Shiite Civil War

Ahmed Twaij

Source Link

In a period of 24 hours, Iraq’s Moqtada al-Sadr was able to demonstrate the extent of his power as the streets of Baghdad submitted to, and then subsided from, widespread violence, both at his behest. On Aug. 29, Sadr’s followers made the capital into a war zone, until he called for an end to armed conflict the next morning. Within an hour, the chaos in the city had stopped, claiming with it least 21 lives and injuring 250 others.

The events leading up to the turmoil revealed the geopolitical battle at play between Iran and Iraq’s efforts to form a government in Baghdad. Unlike the grassroots protests of 2019, born out of frustration from political corruption, this violence was triggered directly by Iranian influence in the country.

The catastrophic spiral of events that peaked with parts of Baghdad turning into a war zone was triggered by a largely overlooked statement by a religious leader. On Aug. 28, the Iraqi Shiite spiritual leader Ayatollah Kadhim al-Haeri shockingly announced his retirement from his position of religious authority with immediate effect. More surprisingly, Haeri proceeded to ask his followers to back Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei instead. Although Haeri is unknown to most outside Iraq and even to some Iraqis, he is a highly influential spiritual leader (marji) for Sadr’s supporters.

Review – White as the Shroud

Aijaz Ashraf Wani

Source Link

A number of contentious issues have marred relations between India and Pakistan since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. However, the conflict over the control of Siachen glacier, ongoing since 1984, stands out both in terms of terrain as well as cost. The information about the conflict in the glacial region until now is very scant. The details about how the conflict started, what sustains it and how it is being fought are relatively low, as previous researchers have focussed on the on-going conflict prevailing in the Kashmir valley (See Schofield 2010; Wirsing 2004; Verghese 2004, Bose 2003). MacDonald’s insightful book White as the Shroud is written in light of this conflict and aims to find a new way of looking into the Kashmir dispute from the periphery. The book is based on interviews with the soldiers and military officers on both sides of the Indian and Pakistani controlled side of the glacier, as well as her fear-defying personal visits to the glacier. The book is divided into sixteen chapters and brings a whole new perspective on this war fought on the peripheries of these countries by focusing on Ladakh, Siachen, soldiers, contested borders, border wars and the Kargil conflict of 1999 in which both countries lost several hundred to a thousand men and triggered fears of a nuclear war across world, after both had gone nuclear just a year before.

The book begins with a historical introduction of the Ladakh region, the largest part of the erstwhile princely state of the Jammu and Kashmir, where the Siachen glacier is located at the tri-junction of the India, Pakistan and China border, in the eastern Karakorum of the mighty Himalayas. Ladakh was once a staging point on the network of tributaries that fed the silk route and its history was of greater openness, shaped by many empires and bigger powers. The author traces the history of the region in a chronological manner under various kingdoms and sheds light on past disputes, agreements, ancient trade and the fluidity of borders. The book subsequently traces the history of the region in light of the partition and the creation of two new nations (India and Pakistan), as well as the inheritance of a colonial legacy. The war of 1947-48 over Jammu and Kashmir led to the split of the princely state between India, Pakistan and China. India ended up with control over the largest portion of territory, Gilgit and Baltistan, parts of the Ladakh went with Pakistan, while China annexed the Aksai Chin region, over which it also fought a war with India in 1962 and inflicted a humiliating defeat on the later.

The Tide Has Already Turned in Ukraine’s Favor

Amy Mackinnon

Source Link

Over the past week, Ukrainian forces stunned the world—and the Russian military—as they regained control over swaths of territory in the country’s south and east in a lightning offensive that forced Moscow’s forces into retreat.

On Monday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said the country’s armed forces had liberated some 2,400 square miles in the Kharkiv region to the east and around Kherson, on the southern coast.

Senior officials in Moscow have remained tight-lipped about the hasty retreat of Russian forces, as the Kremlin has come under fire from nationalist figures and influential patriotic bloggers, urging Russian President Vladimir Putin to further escalate the conflict.

To understand how Ukraine was able to mount its counteroffensive—and how Russia may respond—Foreign Policy spoke with Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank.

Which NATO Do We Need?

Stephen M. Walt

Source Link

In a world of constant change, the endurance of the trans-Atlantic partnership stands out. NATO is older than I am, and I’m no youngster. It has been around even longer than Queen Elizabeth II reigned in Britain. Its original rationale—to “keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”—is less relevant than it used to be (Russia’s war in Ukraine notwithstanding), yet it still commands reflexive reverence on both sides of the Atlantic. If you’re an aspiring policy wonk hoping to make your mark in Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, etc., learning to praise NATO’s enduring virtues is still the smart career move.

This longevity is especially remarkable when one considers how much has changed since NATO was formed and the idea of a “trans-Atlantic community” began to take shape. The Warsaw Pact is gone, and the Soviet Union has collapsed. The United States has spent 20-plus years fighting costly and unsuccessful wars in the greater Middle East. China has risen from an impoverished nation with little global clout to the world’s second-most-powerful country, and its leaders aspire to an even greater global role in the future. Europe itself has experienced profound shifts as well: changing demographics, repeated economic crises, civil wars in the Balkans, and, in 2022, a destructive war that seems likely to continue for some time.

To be sure, the “trans-Atlantic partnership” hasn’t been entirely static. NATO has added new members throughout its history, beginning with Greece and Turkey in 1952, followed by Spain in 1982, then a flurry of former Soviet allies beginning in 1999, and most recently Sweden and Finland. The distribution of burdens within the alliance has fluctuated as well, with most of Europe cutting their defense contributions drastically after the end of the Cold War. NATO has also gone through various doctrinal shifts, some of them more consequential than others.

Some Hope for Afghans in Need

Source Link

Embargoes imposed to coerce dictators also punish suffering populations. For years, lawyers, economists, and policy wonks have searched for technocratic solutions to this dilemma—for example, by designing “targeted” economic and travel sanctions against individual leaders and their cronies. As America’s use of sanctions grows, such efforts have become a booming field of public-policy design and, occasionally, bold experiments.

The Biden Administration’s announcement this week that it will release $3.5 billion in frozen Afghan-central-bank funds to a new Swiss foundation—the Afghan Fund, whose mission will be “to benefit the people of Afghanistan”—is such an experiment. The foundation’s bespoke rules will increase Afghan participation in deliberations over the money’s fate and broaden international responsibility, yet allow the Biden Administration to wield a veto over any disbursements. The Taliban are not a party to the project.

Ukraine Pulled Off a Masterstroke

Phillips Payson O’Brien

Source Link

What happens on the battlefield is rarely the thing that decides a war. Normally, the preparations beforehand determine what happens when the fighting begins—and these preparations are what settle the outcome of the war itself. This truth is playing out along the roads and in the towns of Kharkiv Oblast, the province that includes Ukraine’s second-largest city. The stunningly swift advance of Ukrainian forces, which started around September 1 and sped up soon after, has easily been the most dramatic—and for Ukraine and its supporters, the most uplifting—episode of the war since the current Russian invasion began on February 24. In a few days the Ukrainians liberated about as much territory as Russia had captured in a few months, while causing the disintegration of Russian forces around Izium, Kupyansk, and other logistically vital cities. From the outside, Ukraine appears to have changed the whole complexion of the war.

This stunning Ukrainian advance was anything but sudden. It resulted from a patient military buildup, excellent operational security, and, maybe most important, the diversion of some of the Russian army’s most powerful units from Kharkiv Oblast itself. The overall planning by the Ukrainian government and armed forces worked well on so many levels that it produced one of the greatest military-strategy successes since 1945.

Only a week ago, the most important engagement for Ukraine appeared to be the battle for Kherson. For months, President Volodymyr Zelensky, his senior aides, and other Ukrainian sources had publicly proclaimed the goal of liberating the politically and strategically important southern city and the rest of the Russian-controlled territory on the west bank of the Dnipro River. Not only did the Ukrainians discuss the upcoming campaign, but they took all the necessary preparatory steps. They used their most effective long-range weaponry, including the American-supplied High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, to destroy bridges, ammunition depots, and other targets up and down the Russian lines near Kherson. These logistical attacks suggested that the Ukrainians would focus on this area for the rest of the summer.

In response, Russian President Vladimir Putin—who seemed to agree that the city was the highest priority—did exactly what the Ukrainians hoped: He rushed forces to the area. Evidence exists that some well-armed Russian units were redeployed there from the Russian-occupied Donbas in the east.

By some criteria, Kherson was a much better place than the Donbas or Kharkiv Oblast for the Ukrainians to engage the Russians. The southern city is deeper into Ukraine and farther from the sources of Russian supplies. Supply lines into Kherson depend on only a few crossings over the Dnipro. Ukrainian strategists who want to keep wearing down the Russian army would rather see its most powerful parts in Kherson than the Donbas, which is much easier for Russia to protect by air.

On August 29, the Ukrainians stepped up their attacks around Kherson. Though they made some incremental advances at first, the battle seemed to be only a somewhat accelerated version of the attritional warfare that has been under way since April. Stories started circulating that the Ukrainians were being cautious in their plans and that U.S. officials had dissuaded them from bolder maneuvers.

Ukraine’s restraint in Kherson now looks like a tactical decision. As Ukrainian Minister of Defense Oleksii Reznikov admitted Saturday, Ukraine’s generals had been planning to launch two campaigns simultaneously. If the Kherson offensive was designed to grind down Russian forces by drawing them in and then confronting them head-on, the Kharkiv Oblast offensive had greater territorial ambitions. Ukraine hoped to retake the city of Kupyansk. The Russians were using this road-and-rail hub to get supplies to Izium, a base for their operations in the Donbas.

In retrospect, both offensives were possible only because of a ghastly summer of attritional warfare in that region. Since April the Ukrainians have suffered horrifying losses in that region but have inflicted even larger ones on the enemy. So the Russian army has been trying to hold a large and geographically unwieldy slice of Ukraine even as its own numbers decline. Ukraine, which has been conscripting soldiers since Putin started this war, has amassed an army larger than the Russian invasion force. Russian officials, meanwhile, are terrified of upsetting their populace and have avoided conscription—to the point of deploying mercenaries and sourcing soldiers from prisons and mental hospitals. So when Putin took the Ukrainians’ bait in Kherson, a shrinking Russian army moved forces away from the area that Ukraine wanted to attack and toward an area where Ukraine was waging a war of attrition.

The Ukrainians wrote a script, and the Russians played their assigned role. Unlike Kherson, where the invaders had massed forces and set up a multilayered defense, Kharkiv Oblast was thinly protected by the Russian forces. The Ukrainians were thus easily able to break Russian lines, which seem to have been held by poorly motivated and trained forces, and streak deep behind them. To give their forces the best chance to succeed, the Ukrainians also seem to have built up a substantial, fast-moving strike force. Without allowing details of their preparations to leak out—Ukrainian sources have disclosed little if any information valuable to Russia—they seem to have constructed a number of specialized combat brigades with lighter, faster wheeled vehicles. This has allowed them a crucial mobility advantage over their enemy.

Though the war is far from over and Russia can find new ways to punish Ukraine, collapsing Russian forces have not only been pushed back; in abandoning their former headquarters in Izium, they also left behind large stores of equipment and ammunition that the Ukrainians can now use against them. Even if the Russians stabilize the line in the coming days, they will be in a far worse position than they were on September 1. Building on months of careful efforts to both prepare Ukrainian forces and waste Russian ones, Ukraine has achieved a strategic masterstroke that military scholars will study for decades to come.

The Contradiction at the Heart of U.S. Policy Toward the Pacific Islands

DARSHANA M. BARUAH

Source Link

“We are not threatened by geopolitical competition,” Fiji’s defense minister, Inia Seruiratu, told the audience at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June. “In our blue Pacific continent, machine guns, fighter jets, grey ships, and green battalions are not our primary security concerns. The single greatest threat to our very existence is climate change.”

Seruiratu took the stage to share a perspective on security challenges and defense priorities that differed greatly from his counterparts around the world. While the United States, China, and others identified each other as strategic threats and destabilizing actors to regional stability, Seruiratu underlined the contradiction between small islands and bigger powers on the definition of security, which he noted is now “broader than many of us have traditionally defined.”

This contradiction is at the heart of the increasingly mismatched policy approaches toward island nations, as geopolitical competition over influence and access to island shores skyrockets. In the past few months, the Pacific islands have seen a flurry of attention and official visits—such those from Australia’s new foreign minister, Penny Wong, and U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman—and the first ever U.S.-Pacific Island Country Summit scheduled for September 28–29. But as this competition increases, so must the major powers’ focus on the issues most important to islands—and the concept of security, as discussed in strategy and policy circles, must now include climate change to better reflect the geopolitical conversations occurring on the ground in island nations.

Ukraine’s Oligarchs Are a Dying Breed. The Country Will Never Be the Same

Konstantin Skorkin

Source Link

It was not so long ago that the oligarchs and their relationship with the central government were a key element in Ukrainian politics. Their enormous capital that grew out of the corrupt privatization of Soviet industry on the eve of the 2000s influenced the most diverse aspects of the country’s political life, from the agenda set by the media to the makeup of parliament.

That has all changed, however, with the outbreak of war. With every passing day, the influence of Ukraine’s oligarchs is fading, and their capital alongside it. Without them, Ukraine is becoming a different country.

The process of deoligarchization, as it has become known, was already one of the biggest issues in Ukrainian politics in the year before the war. President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced a controversial law designed to limit the “excessive influence” of major tycoons, but the law was criticized both for its dubious legal status and for not going far enough.

Above all, there was no confidence that the young president would prevail in his confrontation with the country’s richest people: that the powerful oligarchs might not just decide to chip in to support the opposition and kick out Zelensky and his Servant of the People party at the next elections.

Biden’s Daunting Task at the United Nations

STEWART PATRICK

Source Link

President Joe Biden faces an immense task when he addresses the United Nations General Assembly on September 20. Last year, the U.S. leader won easy plaudits as the “anti-Trump,” pledging that America was “back.” This year demands more. The liberal, rules-based international system is reeling, battered by Russian aggression, Chinese ambitions, authoritarian assaults, a halting pandemic recovery, quickening climate change, skepticism of the UN’s relevance, and gnawing doubts about American staying power. The president needs to articulate an affirmative vision of world order rather than adopt a reactive stance that allows adversaries to define U.S. grand strategy. He must persuade audiences at home and abroad that an open world order grounded in global institutions remains the only viable path for the world’s sovereign nations to enjoy peace and prosperity on an interdependent planet.

Biden’s first goal should be to frame the challenges posed by Russia and China in a manner that’s both clear-eyed and pragmatic. Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine is the most blatant breach of the UN Charter in a generation, and Biden should condemn Russian President Vladimir Putin for seeking to erase Ukrainian sovereignty. He should castigate China for escalating tensions over Taiwan and warn it against following Russia’s example. At the same time, he should beware declaring a new cold war with either adversary, to avoid donning an ideological straitjacket or alienating fence-sitters in the developing world.

Is South Korea the New Quintessential Soft Power?

Daniele Carminati

Source Link

This article is the last of a three-part investigation of the capabilities of major East Asian powers, from a soft power perspective. The first covered China and its all-encompassing international ‘charm offensive,’ and the second dealt with Japan and its multifaceted global appeal. This one will cover what can be seen as the latecomer, South Korea, but the reality is more complex than it appears, and the capable country may be catching up fast, or even leapfrogging its competitors in certain domains.

Hardly a month passes without a new show of South Korea’s burgeoning cultural might, from winning the Oscar with the movie Parasite, to the accolade of awards and praises that ‘k-pop’ groups such as BTS and Blackpink are receiving internationally. And this seems to be just the beginning, as Korean style and fashion, TV series, cosmetics, and certainly food are all getting increasing attention across the globe. All these developments can be investigated through the lens of soft power, the power of attraction in international relations. But what does this phenomenon mean? Can South Korea be seen as the new ‘quintessential’ soft power?

The Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Shivani Singh

Source Link

A cornerstone of the global nuclear order’, ‘a foundational pillar of the non-proliferation regime’, ‘a touchstone agreement’ in maintaining stability in the international order. These are all phrases that are referred to in common parlance when talking about the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – more commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The tenth NPT review conference (RevCon) met from 1–26 August 2022 in New York and saw participation from all state parties, observer states and intergovernmental organisations. This gathering featured intensive discussions on all aspects of the NPT and the nuclear architecture at large – such as nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, it fell short of adopting a consensus/final document. This article assesses the RevCon against two long-standing roadblocks – the inability to showcase dynamism in keeping up with the changing realities in the third nuclear age owing to a jaded NPT structure and a lack of consensus amongst party states and non-party states with nuclear weapons capability.

The need to address Emerging and Destructive Technologies (EDT) at the NPT and other similar forums has been a long-standing issue, especially with the advent of the third nuclear age. Technological advancements including artificial intelligence (AI) and hypersonic weapons carry adverse implications for not only non-conventional weapons space, mainly the weapons of mass destruction, but also conventional and hybrid warfare. There is plenty of research on ways in which AI systems, when fused with nuclear capabilities, can compress the decision-making time to react to potential threats. With advanced machine-learning, speed becomes a critical factor and when combined with absence of human intervention, can lead to inadvertent escalation. Similarly, other threats like a cyber-attack can cause just as much damage without having to use a nuclear weapon.

China-Pakistan economic corridor: Beijing’s expansionist ulterior motives in Gilgit-Baltistan

Roland Jacquard 

Source Link

The importance of Gwadar, a port strategically located on the Arabian Sea, lies in the fact that a naval base there will give China a big hold over the maritime traffic passing between West Asia and therefore a say in the global energy economics. On the other hand, control over GB, a landlocked region that is disputed between India and Pakistan, is important because it borders China’s restive Muslim majority province of Xinjiang. Creating a ‘buffer zone’ in GB will assist China in blocking Islamic terror groups access to Xinjiang. In other words, if Gwadar is critical for China’s external power projection, GB is critical for internal security as China fears that this region could become the route for Islamic terrorist groups infiltrating into the country.

Reports of the growing Chinese presence in GB first came around 2010, nearly three years before CPEC was announced. At that time, several hundred Chinese soldiers were believed to be present in GB to secure road links, build infrastructure projects, including nearly two dozen tunnels. After the announcement of the CPEC, the presence of Chinese nationals in GB grew further, ostensibly in connection with the CPEC projects being built in the area. Around 2015, the Chinese started expressing serious concern about security of not only their projects but also their personnel. Later, in 2017 there were reports that China wanted Pakistan to incorporate GB as a province under the country’s Constitution, in order to be on firmer legal basis in so far as Chinese investments in the area were concerned.