The UK lacks an adequate methodology for estimating foreign state information, influence, and interference (III) threats, a gap this research addresses by focusing on Russian digital disinformation operations. These include the Internet Research Agency's post-2017 terror attack amplification and the Social Design Agency's Doppelganger campaign.
Key challenges involve the UK's de-centred institutional response across six government departments and difficulty attributing harmful narratives. The report proposes a '3E model' (Effort; Exposure; Effect) informed by Russia's 'conflictology' doctrine, which systematically exploits existing divisions. It stresses focusing on strategic effects over time, contrasting with Western analysts' tactical assessments, and notes exposure estimation is complicated by automated bots and AI spoofing. Qualitative case studies, like 2024 health speculations about the Princess of Wales, illuminate foreign state asset influence on UK political decision-making. Future frameworks should integrate micro-, meso-, and macro-level indicators and a 'harm footprint' model to prioritize responses across dimensions like reproduction rate, reach, resonance, reactance, and real-world impact.
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