Indian Strategic Studies

28 September 2023

Wither Political Warfare: The Future of Grey Zone Competition

Andrew Maher

“Nothing becomes a General more than to anticipate the Enemy’s plans.”

— Niccolò Machiavelli, The Discourses, Book 3, Verse 18.

The term “grey zone” was a curious absentee from this year’s Australian Defence Strategic Review (DSR). Nor were similar terms, like “political warfare,” “subversion,” or “irregular warfare,” even once mentioned. This absence is notable given the prominence afforded in the earlier Defence Strategic Update(DSU), where grey zone was defined as one of a range of terms used to describe “activities designed to coerce countries in ways that seek to avoid military conflict.” The DSU identified that such activities are occurring now, a conclusion reinforced by a recent study of China’s strategy of political warfare by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. CSIS argues that “China is conducting an unprecedented campaign below the threshold of armed conflict,” using what the American Enterprise Institute described as “persuasion, coercion, and compellence.” In other words, grey zone activities are occurring now with unprecedented frequency and purpose.

Despite the purpose of the DSR being to respond to a state of increasing competition in the Indo-Pacific region, the DSR has seemingly ignored the nature of that competition.

The resultant dilemma is a grey zone gap that requires an educational, bureaucratic, and cultural response to grey zone activities, or “comprehensive coercion.” This, as Machiavelli indicates above, implies a need for leadership. That leadership has been provided by Ross Babbage and David Stillwell, who explore the issues associated with the Chinese Communist Party’s use of political warfare on the IWI podcast.

WHAT IS MEANINGFUL HUMAN CONTROL, ANYWAY? CRACKING THE CODE ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND HUMAN JUDGMENT

Lena Trabucco

Flying high above a near-future battlefield, an AI-enabled MQ-9 Reaper drone alerts operators that it has detected enemy forces moving in a vehicle in a remote location. The drone uses available data to predict that the vehicle will enter a residential area in fifteen seconds. Operators receive the alert and a request to authorize a strike before the window of opportunity closes. With three seconds left for optimal strike conditions, the operator is still deliberating, and the drone has not yet received either approval or rejection for the strike request. The drone engages the vehicle with one second left under what it has identified as optimal conditions. Six noncombatants are killed.

In the wake of the strike, the public discussion focuses on whether the operator had meaningful human control (MHC) of the autonomous weapon system (AWS). But that is the wrong question to ask, and focusing on the MHC of solely the operator in this tactical situation fails to appreciate the significance of the entire life cycle of the AWS. What about the MHC of the developers and designers of the AWS? What about the campaign planner who authorized the introduction of the AWS into this operational environment and authorized AWS strike capacity if the strike occurred in remote areas? In an era of rapidly increasing autonomy, failing to expand our conceptualization of MHC risks overlooking other opportunities, earlier in an AWS’s life cycle, for embedded MHC that can lead to more responsible and robust autonomous weapons.

What is Meaningful Human Control?

27 September 2023

Russia’s Growing Ties With Afghanistan Are More Symbolism Than Substance

Ruslan Suleymanov

Russia is one of just a handful of states in the world actively seeking to strengthen its relationship with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. While Afghanistan’s rulers, the Taliban, are still formally designated a banned terrorist organization in Russia, that has not prevented Moscow from inviting them to economic forums and discussing ambitious joint projects.

While the opportunities for closer economic and cultural ties are limited, the Kremlin is hoping for serious gains. Not only does the Taliban’s ideology of opposition to Western values overlap with Russia’s anti-Western narratives, but other benefits of cooperation could include access to new trade routes (mitigating the effect of Western sanctions) and burnishing Moscow’s reputation as an ally of the Global South.

When the Taliban was in charge of Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001, friendship with Russia was a distant dream. For a start, the Taliban had recognized the independence of Russia’s North Caucasus republic of Chechnya. Secondly, Moscow was trying to build good relations with the West. Russia’s then-young president, Vladimir Putin, supported the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the United States and its allies.

As Russia’s relationship with the West deteriorated, however, the Kremlin’s view of the Taliban changed. In August 2021, as the Taliban closed in on Kabul, Western diplomats rushed to shutter embassies and evacuate. But the Russian embassy remained open and, within two days of the takeover, Russian Ambassador Dmitry Zhirnov had become the first foreign diplomat to meet with Taliban representatives. After that encounter, Zhirnov proclaimed the Taliban fighters to be “reasonable guys,” and the Taliban began providing security for the Russian embassy.

China just stopped exporting two minerals the world’s chipmakers need

Laura He

China’s exports of two rare minerals essential for manufacturing semiconductors fell to zero in August, a month after Beijing imposed curbs on sales overseas, citing national security.

China produces about 80% of the world’s gallium and about 60% of germanium, according to the Critical Raw Materials Alliance, but it didn’t sell any of the elements on international markets last month, Chinese customs data released on Wednesday showed. In July, the country exported 5.15 metric tons of forged gallium products and 8.1 metric tons of forged germanium products.

When asked about the lack of exports last month, He Yadong, a spokesperson from China’s commerce ministry told a press briefing Thursday that the department had received applications from companies to export the two materials. Some applications had been approved, he said, without elaborating.

The curbs are indicative of China’s apparent willingness to retaliate against US export controls, despite concerns about economic growth, as a tech war simmers.

The world’s second largest economy is already grappling with weak domestic demand and a housing crisis. Last month, the country’s exports suffered their biggest drop in more than three years, dealing a new blow to its faltering recovery.

5 Chinese Military Weapons That Have Been Successfully Modernized

Ruetir

China continues to develop its military technology. Photo/Reuters

BEIJING – China’s long-term military modernization efforts are bearing fruit. This is realized by a series of ongoing upgrades to its warships and fighter aircraft amid increasing tensions in the Indo-Pacific, especially the Taiwan Strait.

The following are 5 new weapons that China has successfully modernized.

1. New Helicopter

According to Reuters, China showed off a 1,100 kilowatt turboshaft helicopter engine at the helicopter exhibition in Tianjin last week.

A Chinese military expert told Reuters that the high-powered engine, shown for the first time, is key to China’s development of medium and heavy class helicopters.

China’s Defense Minister Is Missing. What Does It Mean For The PLA?

Eric Tegler

China’s defense minister, Li Shangfu, hasn’t been seen for three weeks. Is that a good thing or bad for China and its military?

Reuters and other news organizations reported that Li, along with eight other senior officials, was under investigation for corruption in relation to military equipment procurement last week. The investigation appears to be centered on Li’s tenure as director of the equipment division of the Central Military Commission, the highest national defense organization in China, between September 2017 and October 2022.

Li was only appointed defense minister this past March. The position does not directly equate with the U.S. Secretary of Defense. Rather it is essentially a diplomatic and ceremonial role without a direct command function, according to Reuters. Li’s background as a logistician - not a combatant commander - aligns with the role.

But his position within the People’s Liberation Army and within the ruling Chinese Communist Party is important. He is reportedly one of the six military officials under President Xi Jinping on the core CMC and one of five State Councilors, a post outranking a regular cabinet minister.

Missiles, Deterrence and Arms Control: Options for a New Era in Europe

Camille Grand

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has seen NATO states increase their defence expenditures. It has also prompted the Alliance to consider new strategies to deter Moscow from future aggression. These developments follow a period characterised by NATO members’ arms reductions, decreased defence spending and de-emphasis of deterrence requirements amid Western countries’ rapprochement with Moscow in the 1990s and early 2000s.

In 2023, regional security is being destabilised by Russia’s violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, its disregard for the European security architecture and the Russian armed forces’ extensive use of missiles and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) against Ukraine. Russia’s actions are fuelling a demand in Western countries for new offensive and defensive missile capabilities.

This degraded security environment imposes upon NATO allies an imperative to address their capability shortfalls and bolster the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture in response to Russia’s aggression. Many European NATO members are already expanding and modernising their armed forces. However, the Alliance faces challenges in formulating a cohesive force posture. There is debate about the appropriate extent of NATO’s military presence on its eastern flank, whether the United States should deploy new types of long-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, and the potential expansion of the Alliance’s nuclear-sharing arrangements to new member states.

THE PATRIOT How General Mark Milley protected the Constitution from Donald Trump

Jeffrey Goldberg

This article was featured in One Story to Read Today, a newsletter in which our editors recommend a single must-read from The Atlantic, Monday through Friday. Sign up for it here.

The missiles that comprise the land component of America’s nuclear triad are scattered across thousands of square miles of prairie and farmland, mainly in North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming. About 150 of the roughly 400 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles currently on alert are dispersed in a wide circle around Minot Air Force Base, in the upper reaches of North Dakota. From Minot, it would take an ICBM about 25 minutes to reach Moscow.

These nuclear weapons are under the control of the 91st Missile Wing of the Air Force Global Strike Command, and it was to the 91st—the “Rough Riders”—that General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, paid a visit in March 2021. I accompanied him on the trip. A little more than two months had passed since the January 6 attack on the Capitol, and America’s nuclear arsenal was on Milley’s mind.

Russia says it sees growing friction between Ukraine and Poland, West

Russia sees tension between Poland and Ukraine growing in the future after a spat over grain exports, and expects further rifts to develop between Kyiv and its Western allies, the Kremlin said on Friday.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov was commenting on Poland's announcement this week that it would not send new arms deliveries to Ukraine. "We see that there are frictions between Warsaw and Kyiv. We predict that these frictions will increase," Peskov said.

Poland has been one of Ukraine's strongest backers in the conflict with Russia, but ties between the two countries have been strained by Poland's decision to extend a ban on Ukrainian grain imports in order to protect its own farmers. Peskov also said it was "inevitable" that tension between Kyiv and other European capitals would increase over time, an assertion for which he provided no evidence.

That would suit Moscow, which casts the conflict as a proxy war in which the West is using Ukraine to try to inflict a "strategic defeat" on Russia. There is no sign of an end to the 19-month conflict, while upcoming elections - including on Sept. 30 in

Slovakia and next year in the United States - could bring major political changes in countries that have provided arms and support for Ukraine.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 22, 2023

Christina Harward

Ukrainian forces carried out drone and cruise missile strikes on occupied Crimea and significantly damaged the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) Command headquarters in Sevastopol on September 22. The Ukrainian Armed Forces Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom) stated that Ukrainian forces launched a successful strike on the Russian BSF Command headquarters in Sevastopol, Crimea on September 22.[1] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces used Storm Shadow cruise missiles to conduct the strike, and social media footage of the headquarters indicates significant damage to the building.[2] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air defenses shot down five Ukrainian missiles and acknowledged that the Ukrainian strike damaged a building of BSF Command headquarters.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces launched a drone strike preceding the missile strike, and the Russian MoD claimed that Russian air defenses shot down two Ukrainian drones on the western coast of Crimea on the morning of September 22.[4]

Ukrainian Air Force Commander Lieutenant General Mykola Oleshchuk thanked Ukrainian pilots in general when amplifying footage of the strike.[5] Ukrainian Southern Operational Command Spokesperson Captain First Rank Nataliya Humenyuk stated that Ukrainian forces will strike more Russian military targets in Crimea in the future.[6] Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Oleksiy Danilov stated that Ukrainian forces will continue to strike Sevastopol and that the Russian BSF should destroy their own ships in order to avoid further Ukrainian strikes.[7]

A UN Expert on the Institution’s Successes, Failures, and Continued Relevance

MINH-THU PHAM

What was it like to work at the UN, based on your years in the Secretariat?

It was both inspiring and humbling—inspiring because you get to help the community of 193 nations try to uphold the values they agreed to, and humbling because you (or at least your boss, the Secretary-General) have no power and very little influence. Everything you do is shaped by dynamics among member states, and the success of your efforts ultimately depends on whether they agree with one another or not. But when member states see it’s in their interest to cooperate, it can be pretty cool.

Still, my experience was somewhat unique. I arrived at the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in January 2005, during a period of deep crisis. Under questioning from the press, then secretary-general Kofi Annan said the Iraq war was not in accordance with the UN Charter and therefore illegal. Typically tensions arise at the UN as a result of disagreement among states, but here it was between the UN’s most powerful member state (the United States) and its top official who works at the behest of its members.

That led to several U.S. congressional investigations into the UN, threats to withhold UN funding, and an independent inquiry, among other things. I was charged with staffing the UN’s response. That included several reforms, and in the end, we got agreement on the principle of Responsibility to Protect, important institutional changes on human rights and peace-building, and measures to improve management and operations.

Trends in Global Drug Use and Production

An estimated 296 million people worldwide are drug users, according to the most recent U.N. World Drug Report. The report warns about the rising use of opioids, which account for 80 percent of drug-related deaths. In their synthetic form, opioids can be manufactured anywhere, independent of soil and climatic conditions. Marketing and distribution have also become easier thanks to the internet and related technologies. And drug cocktails are becoming more common, attracting new users but posing greater health risks.

This year’s U.N. report also highlights links between drug use and other social issues. For example, an entire chapter is dedicated to the environmental impact cocaine and other drugs have on the Amazon Basin. The report also links drugs to deforestation, logging, mining and water pollution.

How Middle Powers Are Quietly Dominating Global Diplomacy

Kairat Umarov

It is not a secret that international peace and stability are increasingly at risk. This is primarily a result of tensions between major world powers that are struggling to address global challenges as their interests diverge on multiple fronts.

This precarious global situation has opened the door for the so-called middle powers to step in to mediate complex conflicts and promote unity in the international arena. ‘Middle powers’ is a concept that sprung during the Cold War to characterize states that have some degree of influence globally, but do not dominate in any one area. Today, the influence of these middle powers is growing rapidly, as they have the resources and the will to facilitate the resolution of current crises.

For instance, Saudi Arabia, a growing middle power, recently hosted talks on the Ukraine war, which included representatives from nearly 40 countries. Last year it was Türkiye, another middle power, that provided a platform for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine at the start of the conflict. While these talks have not yet resolved the conflict, it is evident that middle powers may still play their significant role in the resolution of the most pressing global problems.

There are several reasons why the influence of middle powers has expanded recently.

Firstly, these states purposefully aim to establish good relations with all sides. Türkiye is a NATO member yet engages with Russia. Saudi Arabia has positive relations with both the United States and Russia. India, Indonesia, and other similar states have created a new middle path, preserving relations with both East and West by not taking sides in geopolitical conflicts.

Scoring 50 years of US industrial policy, 1970–2020

Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Euijin Jung

Industrial policy is making a comeback in the United States. It is more urgent than ever to understand how and whether industrial policy has worked to strengthen the US economy. This study analyzes and scores 18 US industrial policy episodes implemented between 1970 and 2020, in an effort to assess what went right and what went wrong—and how the current initiatives might fare. These case studies can guide policymakers as they embark on what appears to be a major initiative in US government involvement in the economy today. The authors divide the 18 case studies into three broad categories: cases where trade measures blocked the US market or opened foreign markets, cases where federal or state subsidies were targeted to specific firms, and cases where public and private R&D was funded to advance technology.

Is Industrial Policy Making a Comeback?

Anshu Siripurapu and Noah Berman

Summary

Industrial policy refers to government efforts to support particular industries that are considered strategically important, such as semiconductors.
It has been employed in many countries, including the United States, though it fell out of favor in the 1980s. Some experts warn that, done poorly, it can backfire.
The Joe Biden administration has supported advanced manufacturing to contend with worsening climate change, tumult in global supply chains, and China’s economic rise.

Introduction

As the United States confronts a series of challenges—climate change, global supply chain instability, and the rise of China foremost among them—experts are again debating the role of industrial policy, or government support for industries that are deemed strategically important.

To its supporters, a new U.S. industrial policy is essential to respond to China’s state-led development, secure a supply of critical materials and products, and develop technologies that could preserve the planet. They point to the use of industrial policy not only in China, but also in countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea, as well as its historical use in the United States. To critics, such a policy inevitably distorts the free market and rewards companies not for the quality of their products and services but for their skill at lobbying lawmakers. President Donald Trump upended the Republican Party’s traditional stance on economic policy by imposing new barriers to trade, while President Joe Biden has overseen the passage of major industrial policy legislation, including the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act.

War, Money, and America’s Future

Douglas Macgregor

When Richard Nixon lost the election to John F. Kennedy, Nixon told supporters, “I know Jack Kennedy. He’s a patriot.” Nixon knew that the nation would be safe in President Kennedy’s hands.

Most Americans do not have the same confidence in President Biden. In April 2023, fewer than four in ten U.S. adults (37 percent) said they approved of Joe Biden’s job performance as president, with six in ten saying they disapproved. By a 2-to-1 margin, American voters now believe controlling the U.S. border is more important than helping Ukraine fight Russia. For the first time in 30 years, the U.S. Government’s interest payments on the sovereign debt equal defense spending.

These revelations would shake the confidence of any White House, but there is much more for Washington and its NATO Allies to consider. Alleged efforts by the Department of State to freeze the conflict in Ukraine are dismissed out of hand in Moscow by every knowledgeable observer of the Russian government. In the absence of a freeze, Washington has no idea how to end the 600-day conflict.

Meanwhile, the Biden Administration’s sanctions continue to seriously weaken the collective West. European economies are sliding toward recession. Germany’s economy, the largest in the Eurozone, is stagnating for the third quarter in a row. In 2022, German automakers produced nearly 40 percent fewer vehicles than they did 10 years ago. In the words of one of Germany’s leading industrialists, Germany’s deindustrialization has begun.

US bolsters Ukraine air defence and weapons development

John Hill

Under the latest 47th tranche of military assistance to Ukraine worth $325m, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has donated more shells and munitions to secure Ukrainian airspace from indiscriminate Russian strikes against civilian and military personnel alike.

This comes off the heels of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (UDCG) on the 19 September, when the US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin called for partners and allies to “dig deep and donate” more air defence equipment.

Since then, the US awarded several contracts that have expanded America’s domestic industrial infrastructure as a way of sustaining an appropriate level of munitions for the DoD’s inventory as well as Ukraine.

This endeavour has proven even more significant now that Poland, one of the first nations to provide military aid to Ukraine at the start of the invasion, has announced it will halt its military donations to its neighbour.

This decision was prompted in response to the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s claim that some European countries “simulate solidarity while indirectly supporting Russia” over the exports of Ukrainian crops putting Polish farmers at economic risk.

‘Nobody is helping us’: Inside the fall of Nagorno-Karabakh

GABRIEL GAVIN

Devastation in Nagorno-Karabakh from the 2020 war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

When news broke on Tuesday that Azerbaijan had launched a major attack into the ethnic-Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh, dozens of them pulled on warm jackets and wooly hats and drove towards the checkpoint. Now they can only watch the road, once the sole highway cutting through the mountains to the breakaway region where their families live, hoping their relatives are able to get out.

Sleeping in their cars, peering through binoculars, or standing around smoking in small circles on the dusty asphalt, the group of about 40 Karabakh Armenians is only growing, with a sense of angry desperation permeating the air.

“Nobody is helping us. Not Armenia, not Russia, not the world,” said one man, spitting out his words with fury. “Look at my hands” — he held out a palm blackened with dirt — “I’m an honest guy, I’ve worked with these my whole life. Now they’re all I have to protect my family.”

A day earlier, he said, a fellow Karabakh Armenian had flown in from Russia and joined the group at the checkpoint on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. Hours later he found out his two brothers had died in the fighting as the Azerbaijani army poured in. “He went crazy, he couldn’t sleep, he had to leave.”

Flying high with Europe and Africa: A conversation with General James B. Hecker

As the latest installment of the Forward Defense program’s latest Commanders Series event, the Commander of US Air Forces in Europe – Air Forces Africa and NATO’s Allied Air Command General James B. Hecker joined Vice President and Senior Director of the Scowcroft Center Dr. Matthew Kroenig for a discussion about the future of US and allied airpower in the European and African theaters, lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, and General’s Hecker’s five key priorities for the US Air Forces and NATO.

General Hecker: Well, things have been busy as you know, in both USAFE and AF-Africa. And I think I’ll start off with talking about the Ukraine crisis that started in February of 2022. We’ve looked and analyze a lot of lessons learned that have come out of that. And based on that, I’ve come up with five priorities that we need to make sure that we’re ready should we have to invoke Article five. And of course, you know, number one is deterrence. We don’t want to go to war. So all these priorities that are discuss, really align towards deterrence. So we don’t have to do this.

But the first priority and really came out of the lessons learned out of the Ukraine war was we know either side has not been able to get air superiority and we know how important air superiority has is. We’ve had it for a long time. You know, if you look back to Desert Storm, we had to fight for it a little bit. Primarily that was in the air is how we fought for it. And then we gained air superiority and we’ve had it ever since. We’ve had it through Afghanistan, largely contested Syria and all of these things.

Is the ATACMS tactical missile already in Ukraine?

STEPHEN BRYEN

Russian defense sources say that an ATACMS tactical ballistic missile was launched from Kulbakino Air Field in Ukraine. If the Russian report is correct then the Washington debate about sending tactical ATACMS missiles to Ukraine is fake, as they already are there.

The Russian report has not been confirmed. What is clear is that the Ukrainians used missiles to attack Sevastopol on September 21st, targeting Russia’s Black Sea headquarters. The historic HQ building was hit.

Reports say that President Biden told Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelensky that he agreed to send a “small number” of ATACMS missiles to Ukraine. Apparently Biden acted against Pentagon recommendations. Biden had been warned that ATACMS would be a war escalation. He was also told that there were not many ATACMS in inventory.

ATACMS has a range of around 300km. It is ground launched.

Kulbakino is the home of the 299th Ukrainian Tactical Air Brigade. It is located in Mykolaiv Oblast. It supports a number of aircraft – most importantly the Su-24M fighter-bomber, which has been modified to fire the Stormshadow cruise missile.

Tactical Strike Damages Ukrainian MiG-29 Fighter Jets, Sheds Light on Russian Suicide Drones

Jocelyn Hong

A recent video shared on social media revealed the use of a Russian suicide drone, known as the Lancet, targeting parked MiG-29 fighter jets at the Dolgintsevo airbase near the city of Kryvyi Rih in central Ukraine. The attack demonstrated the capability of these unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to reach new targets, including the Ukrainian air force.

Military expert David Axe suggests that the strike may have damaged the radar and electronic systems of the MiG-29s, but it did not cause significant losses to the Ukrainian air force. Moreover, with the ability to repair and restore combat capabilities, the Ukrainian air force can easily recover from such attacks. The biggest concern, however, is that Dolgintsevo airbase is located 70 km south of the frontlines in Ukraine, indicating that the Russian suicide drones have a longer range than previously believed.

The Lancet, the most widely deployed and effective suicide drone in Ukraine, has targeted over 500 Kiev assets in the past 13 months. The original version of the Lancet, known as “Izdeliye 52,” had a range of only 40 km, limiting the Russian forces’ ability to attack key Ukrainian airbases in the rear. This allowed Ukraine to deploy MiG-29 and Su-27 squadrons closer to the frontlines, enhancing their combat effectiveness.

The Morality of Ukraine’s War Is Very Murky

Stephen M. Walt

What is the morally preferable course of action in Ukraine? At first glance, it seems obvious. Ukraine is the victim of an illegal war, its territory is occupied, its citizens have suffered mightily at the hands of the invader, and its adversary is an autocratic regime with any number of unsavory qualities. Strategic calculations aside, surely the proper moral course is to back Ukraine to the hilt. As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky told a gathering at the Yalta European Strategy meeting in Kyiv this month: “When we are talking about this war, we are always talking about morality.” Not surprisingly, he conveyed the same message when he visited Washington this week.

How small drones changed modern warfare

JOSHUA SKOVLUND

With the current ease of access to social media, war has never been more visible worldwide than it is today. Videos of small drones carrying out devastating attacks targeting Russian personnel on Ukrainian soil have permeated popular social media feeds like X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, and TikTok.

However, small unmanned aircraft systems (sUAS) can be complex, encompassing everything from large unmanned planes with massive payloads to small palm-sized quadcopters conducting reconnaissance in hard-to-reach areas. Small drones come in various models, from top-of-the-line drones the US Military has to quadcopters right off Amazon or your local Walmart’s shelves.

What is a small unmanned aircraft system (sUAS)?

Simply put, a sUAS is a small drone. Each drone typically has a camera, four rotors, and a remote control. Depending on the model, of which there are several different types, each drone can have variable ranges as low as 50 meters up to as far out as 20,000 meters.

The US Military has used drones of all sizes for decades for reconnaissance and surgical strikes. The types of drones many Americans saw in the news are fixed-wing Reaper or Predator-style drones capable of devastating surgical strikes on an intended target with low collateral damage.

Cyber attacks reveal uncomfortable truths about US defenses

Chad Heitzenrater

As has been reported time and again, the U.S. critical infrastructure is under constant attack, held at risk by the insecurity of the computing systems that operate its most essential services. Increasingly, the means for this misconduct are the very tools employed in the name of cybersecurity.

In May. Microsoft identified Volt Typhoon, a Chinese actor targeting critical infrastructure in Guam – a critical U.S. interest in the Pacific – since at least 2021. While the campaign involved many notable features, there is one aspect that has yet to garner the attention it deserves: the security devices employed to protect the system contained the very vulnerabilities used by the actors to gain access.

This is not the first time security software has been abused, as it presents a juicy target: operating at elevated levels of privilege and storing some of the most sensitive data.

Once again, the security community is faced with a few uncomfortable truths. First, it should be recognized that cybersecurity systems can be just as flawed as the systems they protect. Development of cybersecurity tools falls victim to the same pressures and incentives that leave other software insecure, such as rushed delivery cycles and a market that values new features over greater quality.

In an ideal world where buyers select for security and developers meet that need, this would not be the case. Second, and perhaps more controversial, there is mounting evidence that the current approach to cybersecurity may not meet U.S. security needs in conflict. Until now, the U.S. experience of cyber has largely been in the form of espionage and crime.

How the U.N. Plans to Shape the Future of AI

WILL HENSHALL

As the United Nations General Assembly gathered this week in New York, the U.N. Secretary-General's envoy on technology, Amandeep Gill, hosted an event titled Governing AI for Humanity, where participants discussed the risks that AI might pose and the challenges of achieving international cooperation on artificial intelligence.

Secretary-General António Guterres and Gill have said they believe that a new U.N. agency will be required to help the world cooperate in managing this powerful technology. But the issues that the new entity would seek to address and its structure are yet to be determined, and some observers say that ambitious plans for global cooperation like this rarely get the required support of powerful nations.

Gill has led efforts to make advanced forms of technology safer before. He was chair of the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons when the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, which sought to compel governments to outlaw the development of lethal autonomous weapons systems, failed to gain traction with global superpowers including the U.S. and Russia. Now, Gill is shepherding an even more ambitious effort to foster international cooperation on AI.

AI has developed at a blistering pace in the last few years, and experts don’t expect this progress to slow any time soon. The impacts of AI will be felt far beyond the borders of the countries in which it is developed, leading world leaders and technologists to call for international cooperation on AI issues.

US Army Testing Drone-Borne Electronic Warfare Capability

JOE SABALLA

The US Army has begun testing a new electronic warfare (EW) payload designed to be integrated into unmanned aerial vehicles.

The drone-borne tech, called the Multi-Function Electronic Warfare – Air Large (MFEW-AL), is being assessed at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey ahead of its integration into an MQ-1C Gray Eagle.

According to the service, the system features cutting-edge components to provide improved electronic attack and EW support capability to warfighters.

It also has a modular open-system approach to enable integration of modern technologies for addressing future threats.

“The MFEW-AL program office is on track to successfully meet its near-term test and evaluation requirements and equip soldiers for operational use shortly thereafter,” the army said in a press release.

‘One-of-a-Kind’

The MFEW-AL is designed to allow the US Army to establish EW spectrum dominance in modern battle spaces.

Milley Waves a White Flag — When Strength and Strategy are Needed Instead

Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Kenneth Israel

With his retirement as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff looming on Oct. 1, 2023, Gen. Mark Milley once again waved a white flag on behalf of his chain of command superiors, President Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, in a CNN interview on Sept. 17. Astonishingly, Milley conjectured how hard it would be to evict 200,000 Russian troops from Ukraine after more than 570 days of intense fighting.

I am sure Milley’s public admission of the “eviction difficulty” was music to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ears. Certainly, it will be difficult to win the war against Russia’s naked aggression and restore Ukraine’s borders unless the U.S. and the NATO allies significantly increase air power, precision munitions and national resolve. We must wholeheartedly commit to enabling Ukraine to win. It makes no difference how many soldiers are left on the battlefield when defeat and death are the only options available.

At the end of World War II, German soldiers surrendered en masse; more than 1.5 million German soldiers surrendered in April 1945 alone. However, if you are managing a long-distance war so as not to irritate the primary belligerent — in this case, the U.S. trying not to “provoke” Putin — then every operation becomes longer, more complicated and more costly. Putin does not want a satisfactory bargain or friendly compromise. What he really desires is an excuse to take over all of a mutilated Ukraine and re-establish the limits of the former Soviet Union. “Accommodation” at any price, or any other clever verbal maneuver expressed on public national news, is the modern-day equivalent of “appeasement” and “defeatism.”

26 September 2023

China’s Tech Industry Shows It Still Means Business

Rishi Iyengar and Christina Lu

The United States has spent the last two administrations, and certainly the last year of this one, trying to blunt what seems to be aggressive Chinese technology development, especially when it comes to semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and all the other nuts and bolts of the next industrial revolution.

Will the Russia-Ukraine War lead to World War III?

Jacob Nagel & Boaz Golany

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Oleksiy Danilov, secretary of Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council, recently warned attendees at the Kiev Security Forum that “World War III is already underway.” He may be onto something.

The war between Russia and Ukraine began on February 24, 2022. In the first few weeks, it seemed as if the Russians would crush the Ukrainians in a blitzkrieg-style offensive. That prediction was wildly inaccurate. The Russian army was ill-prepared for the mission, and its equipment was far less effective than expected. To say that the morale of its soldiers was not high is an understatement.

By late Spring 2022, the Washington Blob was once again wildly off-base, with experts predicting that Russia would capitulate under the Western sanctions. Those expecting a calamity for the Russian economy learned nothing from Western sanctions on North Korea and Iran—two countries much smaller than Russia that have endured severe sanctions over many years. The sanctions undeniably damaged their economies but didn’t change the fundamental nature of the regimes.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE CAMPAIGN ASSESSMENT, SEPTEMBER 21, 2023

Riley Bailey

Ukrainian armored vehicles are operating beyond the final line of the Russian defensive layer that Ukrainian forces in western Zaporizhia Oblast are currently penetrating, although ISW is not yet prepared to assess that Ukrainian forces have broken fully through this Russian defensive layer. Geolocated footage posted on September 21 indicates that Ukrainian armored vehicles advanced south of the Russian anti-tank ditches and dragon’s teeth obstacles that are part of a tri-layered defense and engaged in limited combat immediately west of Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv).[1] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces retain these positions, however. This is the first observed instance of Ukrainian forces operating armored vehicles beyond the Russian tri-layer defense.[2] The presence of Ukrainian armored vehicles beyond the final line of the current Russian defensive layer indicates that the Ukrainians have secured their breach of the first two lines of this layer sufficiently to operate vehicles through the breach. Ukrainian forces have likely suppressed Russian artillery and other anti-tank systems in the area enough to bring their vehicles forward.[3] The Ukrainian ability to bring armored vehicles to and through the most formidable Russian defenses intended to stop them and to operate these vehicles near prepared Russian defensive positions are important signs of progress in the Ukrainian counteroffensive.[4] Additional geolocated footage published on September 20 and 21 indicates that Ukrainian forces also advanced west and southwest of Verbove.[5]

The Black Box of Moscow

Sam Greene

Wagner mercenary chief Yevgeny Prigozhin is dead, but the West’s desperation to interpret the larger meaning of his final weeks lives on. Western policymakers and pundits are still sifting through the details of Prigozhin’s odyssey from mercenary to mutineer to apparent murder victim, looking for the clues that would crack the mystery of the Kremlin’s behavior during the Ukraine war and help guide the West’s responses.

Many analysts see evidence that the Russian regime is brittle and that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s hold on power is tenuous. According to this analysis, Prigozhin’s beef with the Defense Ministry signals a deeper rot within the Russian military. The fact that the mutiny ended only when Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko intervened signifies Putin’s inability to manage conflicts within his own regime. And the fact that Prigozhin met with Putin a few days after he marched on Moscow suggests that Putin is no longer invincible.

Other analysts point to the fact that the head of the Russian Aerospace Forces, Sergei Surovikin, was apparently sacked in August, after Prigozhin praised him; numerous lower-ranked officers faced a similar fate. And thus they conclude the opposite: that the whole mutiny was a false flag, designed by Putin to smoke out disloyal officers. With this mission accomplished, the story goes, Prigozhin was either killed to cover Putin’s tracks or perhaps was not killed at all.

But this hunt for meaning obscures the real lesson Westerners should take from Prigozhin’s arc: that they understand very little about Russian politics today. Despite a glut of intelligence and information, the truth is that the Western analytical establishment—both within and outside governments—was at a loss to illuminate Prigozhin’s motives to march on Moscow; the Kremlin’s immediate, forgiving response; and the ensuing weeks’ twists and turns.

Nagorno-Karabakh Shows Russia Has No Credibility as a Regional Peacekeeper

Mikhail Turchenko

Violence has once again returned to Nagorno-Karabakh. On Tuesday, Azerbaijan launched what it called an “anti-terrorism exercise” in the breakaway territory, effectively breaking the resistance separatist authorities had put up against Baku for 30 years with the support of Armenia, their closest ally.

There is a remarkable difference between Yerevan’s response to the most recent outbreak of violence and Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, as well as its subsequent border clashes. Back then, Armenia, as a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), appealed for military assistance from the alliance. Now the Armenian authorities have not even made such an attempt.

That said, as in 2020, Russia today would probably refuse to help Armenia during the conflict on based on legal grounds. Moscow recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan, rather than Armenian territory. But it would have been worth asking for help. Why did Yerevan not turn to CSTO and what does the decision not to do so say about Russia’s positions in the post-Soviet space?

CSTO was established in 2002 as a collective security organization in the post-Soviet space. From the very beginning, Russia has played a leading role by contributing a disproportionate share of its funding, and providing military resources and infrastructure to other member states in return for their support of Moscow’s policies

How to Make Russia Really Pay for Invading Ukraine

Bret Stephens

Volodymyr Zelensky will visit Washington this week to give thanks to the United States for its generosity — while asking for $24 billion more, which is what the Biden administration is seeking from Congress in additional military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. That will bring the total amount of American aid to $135 billion, which so far has been $223 million a day since the war began, according to one calculation.

Maybe it’s time to open a new funding source before American largess runs out — this time from Russia.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States and our democratic partners have frozen roughly $300 billion in Russian central bank assets, amounting to a little less than half of the Kremlin’s foreign currency and gold reserves. Some of us have been arguing ever since that the money should be transferred to Ukraine, both as a matter of justice and as a deterrent against this kind of aggression. As the former Treasury secretary Larry Summers has put it, “Bank robbers should not expect banks to honor their safe deposit boxes.”

So far, the Biden administration has disagreed. “It would not be legal now in the United States for the government to seize” Russia’s assets, Janet Yellen, the Treasury secretary, said in May 2022. The Economist magazine has argued that such measures would violate international law, and there are worries that they would also harm American economic interests as foreign countries sought to de-dollarize their economies.

Amid Reports on Chinese Expansion of Bases, Sri Lanka Unveils SOP: Need for a Reality Check?

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera

India has realized it cannot possibly balance China’s growing influence on its own, nor can it afford to have the U.S. leave the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) given China’s significant presence in the island littorals. New Delhi requires the island nations much more than in the past to collectively balance Indian Ocean security. Sri Lanka is pivotal in this equation. Reports published by Aid Data and RAND have identified the Sri Lankan port Hambantota as a highly probable PLA military base. This issue brief attempts to analyze the US research reports and further draws attention to the geopolitical trends in the IOR, where India, China, and the U.S. are entangled in a great power competition. Against this backdrop, how will Sri Lanka maneuver its foreign policy? Will India further facilitate space for the U.S., just like in the past establishment of Diego Garcia? What will be the success of the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) introduced by the Sri Lankan government due to security sensitivities concerning New Delhi?

Does the BRI Increase China’s Influence?

Ethan B. Kapstein

Political leaders in the United States and other democratic nations have been expressing concern about growing Chinese “influence” around the world. In a 2022 speech at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., for example, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said: “China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition,” which has been using this power to alter the multilateral institutions and arrangements that have shaped the international system since the end of World War II. More recently, the former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, while introducing a new “foreign interference” law, called China “the most active state and political party seeking to influence public affairs in Australia.”

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