1 May 2022

Russian hacking in Ukraine has been extensive and intertwined with military operations, Microsoft says

Sean Lyngaas

Washington (CNN)At least six different Kremlin-linked hacking groups have conducted nearly 240 cyber operations against Ukrainian targets, Microsoft said Wednesday, in data reveal a broader scope of alleged Russian cyberattacks during the war on Ukraine than previously documented.
"Russia's use of cyberattacks appears to be strongly correlated and sometimes directly timed with its kinetic military operations," said Tom Burt, a Microsoft vice president.

The Microsoft report is the most comprehensive public record yet of Russian hacking efforts related to the war in Ukraine. It fills in some gaps in public understanding of where Russia's vaunted cyber capabilities have been deployed during the war.

Russia plumbs new depths in cyber war on Ukraine

Alex Scroxton

Russian threat actors are sinking to new lows in support of Moscow’s illegal and unprovoked war on Ukraine, according to new intelligence from Microsoft, which has catalogued more than 230 distinct cyber operations from at least six threat groups since the war began in February.

Alongside more broad-brush espionage and intelligence-gathering activities that might be expected during a cyber war, Russia has been conducting destructive cyber attacks that are clearly designed to threaten the welfare of Ukrainian civilians by degrading the systems of Ukrainian institutions, disrupting access to reliable information and critical services, and attempting to damage citizen confidence in the Ukrainian government.

The Real Reason the Russian Orthodox Church’s Leader Supports Putin’s War

Janine di Giovanni

This month in Russia, Kirill, a powerful bishop who has been the patriarch of Moscow and primate of the Russian Orthodox Church since 2009, came out once again in support of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s killing machine in Ukraine. Kirill’s view is that God is on Russia’s side, even as Putin’s forces bomb maternity hospitals and the bodies of mutilated men, women, and children are discovered in Ukrainian towns recently occupied by Russian troops, such as Bucha.

In many ways, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has become a holy war for Russia. His geopolitical ambitions are closely entwined with faith: Like former U.S. President Donald Trump, Putin has woven nationalism, faith, conservative values, and the restoration of the Russky mir (“Russian world”). And he has enlisted Kirill as his wingman, who shares his homophobic views. Freedom House, a democracy watchdog, calls Putin’s anti-LGBT rants “state-sponsored homophobia” used to control Russia and says, “Regulating gender and sexuality remains at the forefront of Russia’s domestic and international political agendas.”

The Real Threat to Social Media Is Europe

Jacob Mchangama

Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter has caused fear and loathing among pundits and politicians wary of his vow to revert the platform to its position as “the free speech wing of the free speech party.” These fearful elites might seek solace in Europe, where Musk’s techno-utopian dreams of online free speech absolutism now face unprecedented obstacles. Whether they will recognize the dystopian aspects of Europe’s own technological culture is another question.

The European Union is in the midst of finalizing the Digital Services Act (DSA), an ambitious legislative attempt to create a “global gold standard” on platform regulation. After five trilogues, on April 23, the European Parliament and European Council reached a provisional political agreement on the DSA. Given the EU’s economic and political clout, the DSA may have a substantial impact beyond Europe through the so-called “Brussels EffectBrussels Effect.” As such, the DSA is likely to affect the practical exercise of free speech on social media platforms, whether located in Silicon Valley or owned by American tech billionaires.

Russia Ramps Up the Pressure in Eastern Ukraine

Thore Schrรถder, Alexander Sarovic, Fritz Schaap

The front runs not far from where the collective farm "Friendship" once stood. Two field artillery pieces are posted to the right and left of the road around 100 kilometers east of Zaporizhzhia. The guns are manned by a dozen soldiers, who load them with propelling charges and 152 mm shells by the minute. The roar of each launch is followed by a cloud of gray smoke floating over the fields.

Professional soldiers and volunteers are here defending the farms, villages and fields of eastern Ukraine, standing up to the Russian army, just a few kilometers behind the border of the Donetsk district. Among them are members of the Territorial Defense Forces, experienced fighters and officers, special forces units and recruits who are experiencing their very first battle. Facing them is Russia’s army, which is no longer focusing its attentions on the capital Kyiv, but is now seeking to gain control of the entirety of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

At war with the whole world’: why Putin might be planning a long conflict in Ukraine

 Max Seddon

 Despite Russia’s failure to break down Ukraine’s defences, heavy casualties and a series of military defeats, the Kremlin has kept up a refrain: the goals of Vladimir Putin’s invasion will be reached in full.

 Russia’s territorial targets have appeared to shift depending on the short-term gains Putin feels his troops can achieve on the battlefield. He scaled back an initial plan to seize central areas including the capital, Kyiv, in favour of a new assault focused on the eastern Donbas region. But Russia’s goals, which the Russian presiden

What If the War in Ukraine Doesn’t End?

Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage

All wars end, and their closing moments are often vivid and memorable. Take, for instance, Confederate General Robert E. Lee’s surrender to Union General Ulysses S. Grant in April 1865, which brought an end to the U.S. Civil War. Or the armistice that terminated World War I, signed by Germany and the Allies in a train car near Paris in November 1918. Or the end of the Cold War, symbolized by the toppling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and, later, the lowering of the Soviet flag from the Kremlin on Christmas Day of 1991. These scenes loom large in the cultural imagination as decisive moments that provided the sense of a definitive ending.

Why Xi Is Trapped in Ukraine Now, it is Russia, not China, sitting in the geopolitical driver’s seat.

Craig Singleton

Among the Ukraine war’s surprising geopolitical takeaways—such as Russia’s military ineptness and the transatlantic alliance’s unexpected resilience—is that China is not yet a great power. Beijing has proven incapable of influencing either Russian President Vladimir Putin’s calculus in Ukraine or the West’s response to Russia’s unprovoked invasion. What’s more, Chinese President Xi Jinping has been reduced to a bystander seemingly at the mercy of decisions made not in Beijing but in Washington, Brussels, and, more importantly, Moscow.

None of this was part of Xi’s plan. His vision for a “new democratic world order” was predicated upon Russia playing an important, albeit supporting, role in advancing Beijing’s own revisionist agenda. Putin, it seems, had other plans. Now, it is Russia, not China, sitting in the geopolitical driver’s seat.

Who’s to Blame for the Global Hunger Crisis?

Colum Lynch

To listen to Qu Dongyu, the director-general of the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), you would never know that Russia has been bombing Ukrainian farms and granaries, imposing a sea blockade on Ukrainian grain exports, and generally accelerating a global food emergency that risks sending tens of millions of additional people into an acute hunger crisis.

Ever since Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24, Qu, a former senior Chinese government agricultural official, has studiously skirted matters of Russian culpability, speaking vaguely about the impact of the war in Ukraine on food supplies, while remaining silent about Russian Black Sea blockade that has prevented Ukraine from exporting millions of tons of grains onto the world market. At the same time, Qu has repeatedly echoed Russian concerns that international restrictions on its exports are responsible for growing food scarcity.

Pakistan’s Military Ends Its Experiment With Hybrid Democracy

Abdul Basit

This month, Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan was ousted in a parliamentary no-confidence vote, ending months of political turmoil. For weeks, Khan had faced public discontent with his mismanagement of the economy and lost the support of Pakistan’s powerful military establishment. The political opposition seized the opportunity. In the end, Khan’s removal was made possible by Supreme Court action: Days before, the court reversed a ruling by the National Assembly’s deputy speaker to dismiss the no-confidence vote.

Who Got China Wrong? Two books take very different approaches on the past and future of engagement.

Bob Davis

Looking to win congressional approval to bring China into the World Trade Organization (WTO), then-U.S. President Bill Clinton rhapsodized how closer economic ties would mean greater freedom for Chinese citizens.

“The more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people,” the president argued in a speech given in March 2000. “And when individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say.”

Why Russia’s Economy Is Holding On

Michael Hirsh

Despite predictions of doom for the heavily sanctioned Russian economy, nearly two months into Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, his country’s oil exports to Europe and nations such as India and Turkey have actually risen, and its financial sector is so far avoiding a serious liquidity crisis.

Sanctions may work in the long run, experts say, but for now many of the same countries that are sanctioning Russia are still seriously undercutting their efforts by buying energy from it—in some cases in even larger amounts during April than in March.

Taiwan Doesn’t Need a Formal U.S. Security Guarantee

Ivan Kanapathy

In September 2020, Richard Haass and David Sacks reignited a debate over providing a formal U.S. security guarantee to Taiwan, ending decades of strategic ambiguity regarding U.S. intentions. They reiterated their support for “strategic clarity”—“to make explicit to China that the United States would respond to an attack against Taiwan with … severe economic sanctions and military force”—in late 2021, two months before Russia’s latest invasion of Ukraine.

Following the invasion, former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe argued, “The time has come for the U.S. to make clear that it will defend Taiwan against any attempted Chinese invasion.” Similarly citing the Russia-Ukraine war example, Eric Edelman and Franklin Miller lobbied for “a clearly stated U.S. commitment to vigorously defend Taiwan against efforts to forcibly incorporate it into the [People’s Republic of China].”

Elites Are Getting Nationalism All Wrong

Stephen M. Walt

If a head of state or foreign minister asked for my advice—don’t be alarmed; that’s not likely to happen—I might start by saying: “Respect the power of nationalism.” Why? Because as I look back over much of the past century and consider what’s happening today, the failure to appreciate this phenomenon seems to have led numerous leaders (and their countries) into costly disasters. I’ve made this point before—in 2019, 2011, and 2021—but recent events suggest a refresher course is in order.

What is nationalism? The answer has two parts. First, it starts by recognizing that the world is made up of social groups that share important cultural traits (a common language, history, ancestry, geographic origins, etc.), and over time, some of these groups have come to see themselves as constituting a unique entity: a nation. A nation’s claims about its essential character need not be strictly accurate in either biological or historical terms. (Indeed, national narratives are usually distorted versions of the past.) What matters is that members of a nation genuinely believe that they are one.

Russia’s war could spread to space; the U.S. should be prepared

Thomas Ayres

In both cyber and space, nefarious and destructive actions can be difficult to attribute to a specific actor or sponsoring nation-state. In the cyber realm, experts puzzle that we haven’t yet experienced a Russian cyber attack given the capability displayed during the Colonial Pipeline ransomware disruption.

So far, Western banks and corporations’ defensive measures may account for the success. Or Russia may be walking a cyber tightrope — seeking not to cross the line of an “act of war” and hazard a U.S. or NATO response.

Is Russia Planning A Cyberwar Against America And Europe?

Stavros Atlamazoglou

As the war in Ukraine enters a more stable phase, Russia might try to utilize its expansive hybrid warfare toolkit, including cyberattacks against the U.S. and Europe.

As a result, the U.S. intelligence community and its intelligence partners from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have issued a warning on what to expect and how to deal with it.

Cyber Advisory

On April 20, the National Security Agency (NSA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), and the FBI issued a joint advisory with the Five Eyes’ cyber intelligence services.

Ukraine Can Show Taiwan How to Win a Cyberwar With China

Omree Wechsler

With the amassing of Russian forces on Ukraine’s borders in January and February 2022, many observers believed that the world was about to witness the first true cyberwar. Despite these predictions, however, the Russian invasion was not accompanied by any major, successful cyber blows to Ukrainian critical infrastructure, and Russian distributed denial of service (DDoS) and wiper attacks largely failed to curb Ukraine’s ability to defend itself.

Prior to the invasion, many had warned that China was closely watching the events in Ukraine and, if Russia invaded, may be prompted to attack Taiwan. Given many Russian military failures, observers pointed out the challenges that China could face if and when it decides to attack Taiwan. While the Ukrainian case study shows that cyberwarfare is not to be paralleled with traditional kinetic warfare, it is worth asking whether Taiwan will face similar attempts to sabotage and disrupt its infrastructure and services.

If the supply of Russian gas to Europe were cut off, could LNG plug the gap?


Editor’s note: On April 26th the state-owned gas firms of Bulgaria and Poland said they had been warned by Gazprom that it would stop all deliveries of gas to them within 24 hours. It would be the first such action by Russia’s energy giant since the outbreak of war in Ukraine. Almost half of Poland’s gas, and nine-tenths of Bulgaria’s, is from Russia.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has led to renewed speculation about the future of European energy, and in particular about its supply of natural gas. The continent gets around a quarter of its energy from gas. In 2019 Russia provided over 40% of that gas. The West has not gone so far as to place limits on Russian gas exports, although Germany has suspended the licensing of Nord Stream 2 (ns2), a completed but not yet operational pipeline between Russia and Germany. But what if Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, were to cut off gas to the West? One alternative source of energy is liquefied natural gas (lng), which is usually transported by sea. To what extent could lng replace piped Russian gas as a source of energy for Europe?

Ranking the World’s Major Powers: A Graphic Comparison of the United States, Russia, China, and Other Selected Countries

Anthony H. Cordesman
The following analysis is a working draft that attempts to provide an initial graphic overview of the comparative strengths of the world’s three major powers: The United States, China, and Russia. It highlights the radically different spending patterns and resources of each major power, and it compares the balance each state has established between the size and development of its economy and the size and cost of its military forces.

The analysis shows that Russia is now a relatively minor power in economic terms and in terms of the resources it can spend on military forces. It also shows that Russia relies heavily on its inheritance of a massive number of nuclear weapons for its increasingly tentative status as a superpower. In contrast, China has succeeded in carrying out a massive expansion of its economy, technology base, and its military forces, and it is far more able to compete at a civil level as well.

How Russia’s war in Ukraine upended the breadbasket of Europe

John Reed, Emiko Terazono, Alexandra Heal

Ukraine has long been a land of natural bounty, not just for its own population but also for people around the world. Products made from its wheat, corn and sunflowers can be found in markets and kitchens from Estonia to Egypt. Its black soil is richly fertile. Its farmland is cheaper to run than that in Europe and the US. And its deep seaports have given it easy access to international markets. The combination has allowed Ukraine to become a key exporter of agricultural commodities, and to be described as the breadbasket of Europe.

30 April 2022

Five ways Elon Musk can transform Twitter

Darrell M. West


News that Elon Musk bought Twitter could usher in substantial changes for the social media platform. Given its influential role in public conversation and policy actions, a shift in management control could have substantial consequences for the role of social media. Here are five things that could happen under Musk’s ownership.

WEAKEN CONTENT MODERATION IN NAME OF FREE SPEECH

Musk brings a strong free speech perspective that likely would alter some of the firm’s current content moderation policies. In the face of public concern over extremism, violence, hate speech, and false information, Twitter and other large social media platforms have strengthened their content moderation policies to remove content that encourages violence or spreads misinformation.

Elon Musk Thinks Social Media Isn’t Rocket Science

Nicholas Konrad
 
When Elon Musk talks about making electric cars, he sounds like he knows what he’s talking about, probably because he does. “We basically messed up almost every aspect of the Model 3 production line, from cells to packs to drive inverters,” he said, earlier this month, during an onstage interview at the ted conference in Vancouver. “I lived in the Fremont and Nevada factories for three years, fixing that production line, running around like a maniac.” He spoke with confidence and without hesitation, his eyes swinging from side to side as if he were watching himself, in his memory, striding purposefully across his factory floor. “At this point,” he concluded, “I think I know more about manufacturing than anyone currently alive on earth.” The audience applauded. They didn’t seem to doubt him.

Training Tomorrow’s AI Workforce

Diana Gehlhaus and Luke Koslosky

Community and technical colleges offer enormous potential to grow, sustain, and diversify the U.S. artificial intelligence (AI) talent pipeline. However, these institutions are not being leveraged effectively. This report evaluates current AI-related programs and the associated number of graduates. The authors find that few AI and AI-related degrees and certificates are being awarded today. They propose five recommendations to address existing challenges and harness the potential of these institutions to train tomorrow’s AI workforce.

The United States, Japan, and Taiwan What Has Russia’s Aggression Changed?

Sheila A. Smith

This essay considers Russia’s recent invasion of Ukraine and analyzes similarities, differences, and lessons from that conflict to date for a cross–Taiwan Strait scenario that involves the U.S. and Japan. main argument Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has sent shockwaves around the globe and upended assumptions about the likelihood of great-power war, including in the Taiwan Strait. Differences abound between the two scenarios. Yet Russia’s war in Ukraine is already reshaping NATO’s future and influencing alliance thinking in the Indo-Pacific. With growing Chinese military activity putting pressure on Taiwan’s defenses, the U.S.-Japan alliance would be instrumental to U.S. strategy in a cross-strait crisis, and a cross-strait contingency would have widespread ramifications for the defense of Japan. The U.S. and Japan must not only develop a comprehensive strategy to deter aggression across the Taiwan Strait but also consider the risks each is willing to take should major-power conflict erupt. Even though Russia’s aggression against Ukraine does not offer a parallel case study, it raises new questions that must be addressed by the U.S. and Japan as they assess how to avoid the outbreak of war around Taiwan. There is already cause for the U.S. and Japan to revisit some of their assumptions about how to prepare for a cross-strait crisis. In particular, China’s use of force against Taiwan would not be a localized conflict; it would have systemic consequences. Understanding this and other risks is paramount to ensuring that such a crisis is deterred.

How the Ukraine War Is Changing Japan

Takako Hikotani

At 6 p.m. on March 23, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky appeared before the Japanese parliament via video link from Kyiv, broadcasters across Japan interrupted their evening programming to carry Zelensky’s address live. Millions of ordinary Japanese citizens watched in real time as Zelensky praised Japan’s courage as the first Asian nation to stand up for Ukrainian democracy, expressed grave concerns about the security of nuclear power plants and the potential use of nuclear weapons—subjects that have particular resonance in Japan—and received a standing ovation from the hundreds of senior Japanese officials and lawmakers who had crowded a meeting room in the lower house of the Japanese Diet for the historic virtual meeting with Zelensky.

A political reckoning in Sri Lanka as debt crisis grows

KRUTIKA PATHI and KRISHAN FRANCIS

COLOMBO, Sri Lanka (AP) — Sherry Fonseka joined millions in 2019 in electing President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a military strategist whose brutal campaign helped end Sri Lanka’s 30-year civil war 10 years earlier.

Now he is one of thousands who, for weeks, have protested outside the president’s office, calling on Rajapaksa and his brother, Mahinda, who is prime minister, to resign for leading the country into its worst economic crisis since its independence from Britain in 1948.

Russia Unable To Fight Another War After Catastrophic Military Losses

GIULIA CARBONARO 

On Monday, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said that the U.S. wanted to see Russia so "weakened" that it won't be able to support another war like the one it initiated in Ukraine.

Now, analysts suggest Moscow might have already reached that point.

In an article published on Wednesday, analysts told The Times they believe Russia already burned through so much of its military strength in the past two months of war that it could be "years" before the Kremlin is able to order another such invasion of a neighboring country.

It took a war for Big Tech to take a side

Peter Kafka

The internet is global. But tech companies do business in individual countries. So tech companies have to obey those countries’ rules, even if they’re onerous or worse.

That’s the rubric that Big Tech companies — almost all of which are based in the United States — have used for years, even when it’s been uncomfortable for the companies, their employees, or their customers. Now that’s over: Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Big Tech has finally taken a side. It’s a move that has real-world consequences today but may be even more meaningful down the line.

SOME CLAUSEWITZIAN THOUGHTS ON THE UKRAINIAN DEFENSE

Olivia Garard

Much of the analysis on the Russian invasion of Ukraine has focused on the Russians. Why did analysts overestimate the strength of the Russian forces? Why is the Russian military performing so poorly? Why did Vladimir Putin miscalculate? The list goes on.

This article seeks to answer none of these questions. Instead, it sets out to reorient focus onto the Ukrainians. In doing so, it reveals a fundamental reason why they have been successful so far: because they have been fighting on defense.

According to Carl von Clausewitz, not only is the defensive form of warfare stronger than its attacking counterpart, but the defense also has access to additional means. These means arise out of the structure of the defense itself and are uniquely afforded to the defender. Enumerated in book six, chapter six of On War, the means include the Landwehr, fortresses, the people, the people in arms, and allies. Observing through the fog, it seems that not only has Ukraine valiantly used all of these means to its advantage, but also in a way that helps to elucidate how these means operate today.

JUST IN: Military Lagging in Data Processing Capabilities

Shreeya Aranake

The U.S. military is falling short in developing and implementing crucial data collection, artificial intelligence and machine learning capabilities, the head of Northcom said April 25.

The U.S. military continues to deploy new sensors, satellites and other technologies to collect and produce data, and that in turn requires more computing power to process volumes of information.

“Candidly, we’re not moving fast enough for me,” said Air Force Gen. Glen VanHerck, commander of North American Aerospace Defense Command during a Defense Writers Group event.

Send Ukraine Cyber Help, Not Bureaucratic Gridlock

Michael Ellis & Dustin Carmack

The United States has sent Ukraine a variety of military equipment, including killer drones, Stinger surface-to-air missiles, Javelin anti-tank missiles, small arms, and ammunition. We should do more.

If ordered, U.S. Cyber Command could develop the ability to temporarily disable key Russian military, intelligence, or logistics networks. This would be a tremendous boon to Ukrainian forces. Moreover, such cyber operations would not be clearly traceable back to the U.S.—reducing the possibility of escalating tensions with Russia.

Germany’s Zeitenwende: Not a War-Ender

Oxana Schmies

Chancellor Olaf Scholz's “turn of the times” (Zeitenwende) speech of February 27 called things by their proper names – the war of aggression, the change of epoch, Putin and his sidekicks an “oppressive regime,” seeking to resurrect the Russian empire and fundamentally reorder Europe to the detriment of free peoples and the benefit of corrupt elites.

It named the challenges and Germany's self-obligations and promised that: “What is needed to secure peace in Europe will be done.” Among other things, Scholz promised to deliver weapons “to defend the country” because “there could be no other answer to Putin's aggression.”

India and the U.S. Navigate Their Differences

Jeff M. Smith

Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in April hosted their Indian counterparts, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh. The ministers met for the fourth edition of the 2+2 defense and foreign policy dialogue that began during the Trump administration.

The talks were preceded by a virtual meeting between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Narendra Modi as the two countries celebrated 75 years of diplomatic relations. The dialogue was largely successful, if not entirely groundbreaking. What was achieved may have been less important than what was avoided: a diplomatic rupture over the Russia-Ukraine crisis.

Preparing for a Cyberattack Starts at the Local Level

Grace Hindmarch, Aaron Clark-Ginsberg

The ongoing Russian war in Ukraine has highlighted the need for federal, state, and local level emergency managers to prepare to respond to a “cyber–Pearl Harbor”—a cyberattack with widespread impacts that significantly disrupt critical infrastructure. Although the war today is mostly being fought on the ground, Russia has been waging cyberwar against Ukraine for years—including an attack in 2016 that shut down much of its power grid, and attacks in 2017 that disrupted its hospital systems and banks. Such acts of aggression have given rise to growing concerns that Russia could successfully launch similar attacks across the United States and other Western nations. In the past, Russian state-sponsored actors have targeted government agencies, election organizations, and critical health care, pharmaceutical, defense, energy, nuclear, water, aviation, and manufacturing infrastructure in the United States, Germany, United Kingdom, and other countries. In fact, at the end of last month, President Biden issued a warning that the Russian Government is exploring options for cyberattacks on the United States.

Russian Cyberattacks May Be Coming. What Might Be an Optimal Strategy for Responding?

Dmitri Alperovitch and Samuel Charap

Russian cyberattacks may be coming. Last month, the White House issued its starkest warning yet that “evolving” intelligence indicates Moscow is planning major cyber operations against the United States in retaliation for the economic penalties that the country has imposed on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. It may only be a matter of time before these warnings become a reality.

This comes as little surprise. Since before the start of the war, cybersecurity experts—including one of us—have predicted that the likelihood of Russian cyber operations against the West would increase as the United States and its allies placed more severe economic sanctions on Moscow. Now, with the Russian economy beginning to feel the effects of sanctions, Russian President Vladimir Putin appears poised to use his intelligence agencies' significant cyber capabilities to hit back at the West.