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8 November 2022

How Washington and New Delhi Can Further Tech Ties

RUDRA CHAUDHURI, PRIYADARSHINI D., KONARK BHANDARI

INTRODUCTION

On May 24, 2022, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and U.S. President Joe Biden launched the bilateral Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) in Tokyo. The initiative is “spearheaded by the National Security Councils of the two countries,” and its primary objective is to “expand partnership in critical and emerging technologies.” Scientific and technological cooperation between India and the United States goes back to the Green Revolution. Since then, a range of government-led initiatives have set out joint funds for projects, created dialogue platforms to focus on easing export controls, and set up forums and projects to focus on clean energy, among other creative initiatives.

Yet, what sets the iCET apart from any other initiative thus far is that it is co-led by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) in India and the National Security Council (NSC) in the United States. From AI to space to quantum computing to semiconductors, the NSCS and the NSC are tasked to “forge closer linkages between government, academia and industry of the two countries.” As those who have long worked in government and industry in both countries put it, the NSCS and the NSC have the potential to coordinate a set of imperatives that is focused, outcome-oriented, and implementation-minded.

These administrative bodies have every chance to coordinate policies more clearly across line ministries in both countries, seek out prospects, clearly outline pain points, and lead a set of conversations more holistically than is structurally possible through any one ministry, department, or government agency. In short, the iCET is a clever, agile, and far-sighted initiative. To an extent, it has the potential to cut through red tape, avoid bureaucratic minefields, and enable the growth of an interoperable critical technologies ecosystem within and between India and the United States. Setting an agenda for the iCET will require making tough calls across a laundry list of potential areas of cooperation.

To this end, the Technology and Society Program at Carnegie India offers a set of recommendations in four specific areas of critical technologies: building a stronger science and technology cooperation ecosystem, collaborating in quantum computing, civilian space cooperation, and building a framework for cooperation on specific aspects of the semiconductor supply chain. The team has spent the months since the announcement of the iCET in May 2022 speaking with stakeholders in government, industry, and academia in both countries.

This compendium offers initial thinking on what might be considered within the iCET framework. In each of the sections, the authors provide specific recommendations that can be achieved within the next six months, the following year, and beyond. They have balanced the need to focus on cutting-edge ways in which cooperation could be quickly but substantially advanced without losing sight of the longer-term and traditional areas of disagreements, such as the urgent need to focus on export control regimes that are essential to “forge closer linkages.”

Importantly, the aim is to provide an independent and research-driven bridge for dialogue between government, academia, and industry in the two countries, the parties that have the most to gain from deeper, immersive levels of cooperation in and across emerging and critical technologies.

Indo-U.S. scientific and technological cooperation has a long history. American funds, philanthropic organizations, and scientists all played a role in helping usher in the Green Revolution in India in the 1960s. The following decades, especially the last two, significantly expanded the bilateral cooperation in science and technology (S&T). Both countries established the jointly funded Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum (IUSSTF) in 2000. The IUSSTF facilitates scientific research and development through joint workshops, student and faculty exchanges, virtual research centers, and technology transfer programs. It also administers the U.S.-India Science and Technology Endowment Fund (USISTEF), which was established in 2009 and has an annual budget of up to $3 million. It is earmarked to promote commercialization of jointly developed innovative technologies. Both countries also launched the Partnership to Advance Clean Energy (PACE) the same year to support research and commercialization of clean energy technologies.

Other examples include the India-U.S. High Technology Cooperation Group established in 2002. To an extent, the group has eased exports of high technology, including dual-use items, to India. A biennial process of Joint Committee meetings agreed to in 2005 provides strategic guidance to scientific agencies in both countries on current and future S&T initiatives. The Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal of 2005 is perhaps the most significant, coming on the heels of a dip in bilateral relations between the two following India’s nuclear tests. The more recent IUSSTF’s U.S.-India Artificial Intelligence Initiative provides a platform for strategic cooperation in AI.

The S&T cooperation between both countries has been wide ranging, from collaboration in fundamental scientific research to applications in clean energy, health, agriculture, environment, and climate change. Formal mechanisms as above have coexisted alongside informal, people-to-people linkages in academia. The recently announced iCET program offers a new avenue to take this bilateral engagement further. Based on preliminary research and stakeholder consultations, the iCET could strengthen Indo-U.S. cooperation in critical and emerging technologies (CETs) by providing a platform for fixing information asymmetries; developing a future-ready technical workforce; establishing robust stakeholder linkages via translational institutions or centers of excellence; facilitating risk capital for research, development, and deployment of CETs; and creating appropriate institutional frameworks and structures to support iCET goals in the short, medium, and long term.

ICET INNOVATION FELLOWSHIPS, HACKATHONS, AND DIALOGUES

The iCET is expected to bring the government, academia, and industry of both countries together on critical and emerging technologies and deliver “outcome-oriented cooperation.” Immediate action points could include the use of tools and strategies like jointly organized fellowship programs, a series of hackathons or competitions, and dialogues.

The iCET fellowship program could help identify and train talent at top institutions and create bilateral networks of specialists and experts. It could be co-funded by both governments and the private sector or fully funded by the private sector. The Quad fellowship program offers an example. It is administered by Schmidt Futures, a private philanthropic organization. The iCET fellowships could similarly look to large university endowments in the United States, philanthropic organizations in both countries, and multinational companies such as IBM or Intel as sponsors. Such fellowships could be offered in quantum technologies or biotechnology, to begin with.

A series of iCET innovation hackathons can be jointly held to forge iCET networks involving industry, academia, government, and civil society. For example, the G20 TechSprint is organized by the G20 president every year to encourage solutions to technological issues. Typically, it has been co-sponsored by central banks, international bodies like the Bank for International Settlements, as well as the private sector, including big tech companies like Facebook. Another example is the series of Challenge Programmes proposed by the recently set up Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic under NATO. Each program is expected to elicit and nurture the best technological solutions to urgent security problems. The iCET innovation hackathons could similarly be organized in collaboration with leading universities and technology companies from both countries. In addition to signaling action, such platforms could mobilize ideas, identify innovative solutions to crucial problems, as well as crowdsource and cultivate private sector and start-up capabilities.

Both countries could also convene a jointly held series of iCET Innovation Dialogues in 2022–2023. As an example, since 2018, the United States Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs has been holding innovation roundtables through which it has engaged various industry stakeholders in areas such as the Internet of Things, blockchain, AI, and cloud computing, among others. Other examples include bilateral dialogues like the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue. Accordingly, the iCET innovation dialogues could be a series of key sector- or technology-specific dialogues with multistakeholder participation. Such dialogues could help map the complementarities between India and the United States in each area, policy-related challenges, as well as opportunities for joint research and development, since each of these could be sector or technology specific. The complementarities would also allow the government and the private sector to indicate their requirements (for example, with regard to skilling and workforce needs in transformational technologies like quantum computing). Industry participation should be diverse to include smaller businesses, too, from both countries. This could help them overcome information gaps related to policies, procedures, opportunities, and funds.

The inaugural dialogue could be organized as a track 1.5 dialogue convened by the two countries’ National Security Councils or co-convened with think tanks and industry associations. This could be in a specific sector of mutual strategic interest and importance such as next generation critical infrastructure like 6G or emerging risks from biotechnological innovations. It could also be in quantum technologies, which both countries have accorded policy priority and significant funding. One of the outcomes could be the announcement of joint research projects as well as the iCET fellowship program mentioned above. These ties could go a long way in fashioning a firm and longer-term agenda for the iCET.

ICET TRANSLATIONAL INSTITUTION(S) AND COMMON FUTURES FUND

The next step, in the medium term, would be to ground the initial exercises in sustainable formats. There are several models that may be considered either individually or collectively. One or more technology-specific centers of excellence and translational institutions could be established to accelerate bilateral cooperation in CETs. Such institutions can support and fund cutting-edge research, translate and scale innovations from lab to market, and train the necessary technical workforce. They can be housed and co-funded by a network of Indian and U.S academic institutions and the private sector. For example, a consortium consisting of premier academic institutions, like the MIT Center for Theoretical Physics and the Indian Institute of Science, along with philanthropic organizations and private companies like Microsoft, IBM, and Google, could set up a center of excellence for quantum technologies. Such centers could also develop and offer dual degree or twinning programs and create relevant curricula for a seamless training and flow of talent.

Another model is UK Research and Innovation (UKRI), a dedicated public body in the United Kingdom with branches around the world, including in India (called UKRI India). It has a dedicated fund for international collaborations. These funds have been allocated through individual cells on a project-to-project basis, rather than through an overarching fund. UKRI has jointly (with the Indian government and other third parties) invested over 300 million pounds (around $345 million) and is understood to be a reasonably successful model. The National Science Foundation—currently identified as one of the implementing mechanisms for iCET on the American side—could also consider establishing a dedicated branch in India. Existing mechanisms like the jointly funded IUSSTF and the USISTEF can also be leveraged by the iCET. In each case, joint bidding of projects by academia and industry (including start-ups) from both countries, in partnership or consortium, must be encouraged to incentivize and increase collaborative projects.

A more ambitious model could be to set up a dedicated fund. One example is the $7.9 million PACEsetter Fund, jointly funded by both governments for early stage innovations in off-grid clean energy solutions. India and the United States also launched a public-private partnership to mobilize $41 million to support clean energy entrepreneurs. Private partners include university-led start-up incubators, U.S. aid agencies, Indian industry associations, and global nonprofit research organizations. Another example is the recently announced, 1-billion-euro NATO Innovation Fund to fund the development of dual-use emerging and disruptive technologies. Interestingly, it has been set up as a venture capital (VC) fund with participation from twenty-two allies and is the world’s first multisovereign VC fund. Currently, no dedicated funds have been announced in relation to iCET. The existing partnership between the U.S. National Science Foundation and the Indian Department of Science and Technology has been identified as an implementing mechanism for iCET at the moment. The current expectation, therefore, appears to be to utilize existing bilateral funding and mechanisms. However, access to sufficient risk capital is a key constraint in accelerating developments in critical and emerging technologies. Therefore, a dedicated fund could be considered to finance CETs projects under the iCET, drawing from the public as well as the private sector resources, including venture funds focused on deep tech.

INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

In the short term, the iCET could leverage existing pools of expertise and resources available within the government, industry, and academia, as illustrated above. A key question for the iCET going forward will be the nature of institutional capacity it will need to create, both within and without, for sustainable bilateral engagement.

The research and policymaking on areas of CETs is fragmented among multiple bodies on both sides. In the longer term, creating a formal joint high-level committee, led by the National Security Councils from both sides, could help in coordinating action among domestic agencies. The committee could act as a nodal agency for both countries on CETs. It could be tasked with developing broader bilateral policies that could then be supplemented with national strategies.

Further, the committee could be assisted by multistakeholder working groups or task forces in specific areas or technologies (for example, supercomputing, quantum, or biotechnology). The latter could be co-anchored in academic institutions or think tanks. The committee would set the broader agenda, and the working groups or task forces would undertake deliberations. They would seek to deliver specific outcomes (in the form of recommendations or action plans) that in turn would provide a feedback loop to the committee. Regular meetings of the committee could review progress.

Examples of similar mechanisms include the India-U.S. High Technology Cooperation Group and the U.S.-India Energy Dialogue, both of which are also augmented by working groups. Working groups or task forces could, as in the case of the Clean Energy Finance Task Force under PACE, focus on specific areas such as identifying innovative financing solutions for early- and late-stage innovations or recommending procedures and documentation for accelerating bilateral cooperation. Another example is the arrangement between Japan and the United States involving the Joint High-Level Committee formed under an agreement in 1988. Since then, the committee has met fourteen times and appears to have had some success in aligning objectives and strategies in S&T. While the Japanese committee lacked a “strategic” or defense angle, due to Japan’s domestic political compulsions, the iCET could bring in the security element and aid a more comprehensive framework for emerging technologies.

A key aspect of this framework will also be to include resolution mechanisms at the appropriate level to address any potential differences or divergences. For example, while both countries identify cooperation in AI as a key agenda under the iCET, policies around access and storage of data will require sustained engagement to move forward.

CONCLUSION

The initiative is both promising and timely, given how rapidly CETs are transforming societies and the economic and security landscape around the world. Washington expects to support at least twenty-five joint research projects in 2022 under the iCET. It has identified areas like AI and data science, and related applications in sectors like agriculture, health, and climate, for this purpose. Meanwhile, India expects to cooperate more broadly on AI, quantum computing, 5G/6G, biotech, space, and semiconductors under the iCET. The enumeration on both sides is presently nonexhaustive. The United States also annually updates a list of what it considers CETs. The list, prepared by the National Science and Technology Council in consultation with the NSC and other federal agencies, contains nineteen areas including AI, biotechnology, advanced computing, and quantum information technologies. India, although it has launched initiatives and acknowledged the importance of emerging technologies, does not have a similar, institutionally prepared list as yet. A common and concrete expression at the outset on the technologies and joint priorities for both National Security Councils may therefore be a useful way forward, to begin with.

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