Matteo Miele
A year after the Russo-Mongol Agreement, in a declaration signed in Peking on November 5, 1913 (October 23 of the Russian calendar), ‘[l]a Russie reconnaît que la Mongolie Extérieure se trouve sous la suzeraineté de la Chine’, while the Chinese accepted Mongolian autonomy (‘La Chine reconnaît l’autonomie de la Mongolie Extérieure’).[1] The Russians had come to that agreement after having faced several difficulties.
Indeed, in April 1913, while preparing to leave Urga, Korostovets had confessed to Morrison the complexity of dealing with the Mongols and also of enforcing the 1912 treaty:
My position here is a trying one in every respect and the Mongols very difficult people to deal with. I have made my best to satisfy both sides that is my own people and the Government of Urga but have hardly succeeded. The treaty has been signed nearly six months ago and according to my opinion is not enforced yet and perhaps will not be. The new Consul General Miller must arrive in a fortnight and will continue my work, but on what lines and in what direction I do not venture to say. [2]
According to the agreement, Peking still had to grant Outer Mongolia ‘le droit exclusif’ in internal administration, in commercial and industrial matters and the newborn Republic of China could not send soldiers, civilian or military officials and obviously not even settlers. Likewise, the Russians also undertook not to colonize the country, nor to send soldiers, except for the consular guards, nor to intervene in the country’s internal affairs. In an exchange of separate notes between Vasiliy Krupenskiy, Russian minister in Peking,[3] and Sun Pao-ch’i, the foreign minister in the Chinese government of Hsiung Hsi-ling,[4] the two countries agreed on the extension of the territory of Outer Mongolia, that is, those territories that had been under the jurisdiction of the amban of Urga, the ‘Général tartare’ of Uliastay and the Chinese amban of Hovd. Actually, as there were no detailed maps of the country and due to the vagueness of the administrative divisions, the Russians and Chinese agreed for a new meeting (already scheduled in point V of the agreement) to define the country’s borders. That point in fact provided for ‘pourparlers ultérieurs’ on questions relating to the interests of Russia and China in Outer Mongolia, but the exchange of notes required Mongolian involvement in these future negotiations. Furthermore, according to the exchange of notes between the foreign minister of the Republic of China and the Russian minister in Peking:
En ce qui concerne les questions d’ordre politique et territorial, le Gouvernement Chinois se mettra d’accord avec le Gouvernement Russe par des négociations auxquelles les autorités de la Mongolie Extérieure prendront part.
Not having obtained a copy of the agreement from the Russians, the Japanese minister in Peking had confidentially handed over to Beilby Alston, of the British embassy in China, the text of the document that the British diplomat had taken care to send to Grey.[5] However, the Russian minister in Peking pointed out to Alston the approximate borders of Outer Mongolia:
On the China Inland Mission atlas, published 1908, map 22, the Russian Minister pointed out to me that the frontier of Outer Mongolia, comprising the four Aimaks[6] of Tsetsen, Sassaktu, Sainoin, Tuchetu, follows closely their boundaries as therein indicated. The exact definition will not be settled until the meeting of the conference which is proposed to hold. The western frontier is roughly the Altai range ; the southern follows the dotted line across the Gobi desert.[7]
Not yet informed of the signature the day before, Sir Edward Grey had therefore written to Alston on November 6, explaining that he had suggested to the India Office and the Board of Trade to get in touch with the Mongolian government ‘with a view to recognising their autonomy and securing fair terms for British commerce’.[8] Furthermore, Grey also proposed to inform Russia of the favorable acceptance by the British of the Sino-Russian Agreement and the Russo-Mongol Treaty of 1912 ‘provided that a satisfactory commercial arrangement can be arrived at with the autonomous Mongolian Government, who were being approached in the matter’.[9] For the head of the Foreign Office it was necessary for ‘the maintenance of the “ open door ” for British commerce’.[10] More important than the commercial conditions was the case of Tibet and the possibility of exploiting for British advantage, as mentioned previously, the changed conditions in Mongolia. However according to Grey – who had spoken to Sazonov – this was not the most suitable time to open the question with Saint Petersburg:
Sir E. Grey has taken into consideration the possibility of making terms with Russia with regard to the Thibetan question in connection with the Russo-Chinese Agreement, but is of the opinion that it would be unwise to do so at present in view of the declared attitude of the Russian Government and the views expressed by M. Sazonof in his interviews with Sir E. Grey and Lord Crewe.[11]
However, the Sino-Russian Agreement was to become the model for an Anglo-Chinese agreement on Tibet and the Russian motivations for arriving at that document on Mongolia were the same as the British on Tibet:
This would not, however, preclude His Majesty’s Government from pointing out to the Russian Government should the necessity arise, that the same reason which has forced the Russian Government to stipulate with China for an autonomous Mongolia forces His Majesty’s Government to make the same stipulation with regard to Thibet, in doing which they are not, as long as they do not ask for anything in Thibet beyond the scope of the pre-existing convention, taking any action contrary to the terms of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.[12]
The problem was linked to the broader question of industrial and railway loans which had been defined in September at the Paris Conference by France, Great Britain, Germany, Japan and precisely Russia, thus opening up the possibility of aid from these states to their respective private companies in China.[13] Grey wrote about the agreement:
At meeting of groups yesterday industrial and railway loans were eliminated from the scope of the Sextuple Agreement, and at the same time the Triple and Quadruple Agreements were formally terminated. His Majesty’s Government are therefore at liberty forthwith to support independent firms and groups in obtaining concessions or making industrial loans to China, since they will henceforth interpret article 17 of the Reorganisation Loan Agreement as precluding the issue but not the negotiation of loans before 5th February next.[14]
The Russian government did not like the terms of the new agreement, and authorized the signing only to avoid isolation from the other powers.[15] Indeed, Russia feared a danger to its interests in Manchuria, Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan.[16] Therefore, following his line of not entering into conflict with Saint Petersburg on Mongolia, Grey wrote on November 13 to Hugh O’Beirne, an official of the British embassy in Russia, to reassure the tsar’s government that British intentions did not aim at prejudicing Russian interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.[17] While recognizing the special interests of Saint Petersburg in Chinese Turkestan, British interest in that region was much higher than in Mongolia, considering the proximity to India, as well as the presence of many British subjects in the territory.[18] So on November 19, O’Beirne communicated to the Russian government a memorandum with Grey’s indications.[19] Probably, according to Jordan, it was precisely on Chinese Turkestan that the Russians could ask for ‘some form of compensation’, in exchange for consent to a redefinition of the 1907 agreement on Tibet.[20] The basis of this consideration was a dispatch by Buchanan from Saint Petersburg addressed to Grey, dated July 22, 1913, where this type of exchange had already been envisaged:
Russia had not, as he [Sazonov] expressed it, a policy in Kashgar as she had in Ili, Mongolia, or Manchuria. She would confine her attention to the protection of her subjects ; and I might give you the positive assurance that she would take no action of a political nature in Kashgar, except in agreement with His Majesty’s Government, as he quite understood the interest which its proximity to British India caused them to take in this question.
M. Sazanof spoke to me in such frank and categorical terms that I see no reason to doubt the sincerity of his assurances. His use, however, of the words “ except in agreement with His Majesty’s Government ” confirm the impression which I have more than once expressed, that, in the event of our proposing to revise the Anglo-Russian Agreement to our advantage with regard to Thibet, he will ask for some counter concessions in Kashgaria.[21]
There was indeed a significant disproportion between Mongolia and Tibet; the status of Tibet had been regulated by the 1907 Convention, while this was not the case for Mongolia. Therefore, any British claim in the new order of High Asia that emerged from the end of the Ch’ing Empire, however logical in geopolitical terms, had to challenge the agreement that had put an end to the Great Game. British requests had to interfere with the delicate balance that had assigned the respective roles in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The Russian interventions in Mongolia, on the other hand, did not formally touch the agreement, even if those actions could mean – without too much imagination – a possible reopening of the issues on the Roof of the World, given the strong link between Urga and Lhasa. Therefore, it was not even possible for Saint Petersburg to pass any alteration of things in Mongolia as unrelated to a broader redefinition of balances and influences in High Asia. Formally, however, the British had to revise a treaty that had been signed in very different geopolitical and institutional conditions, when Tibet and Mongolia were still both within the Manchu imperial system, and not two territories that claimed their independence from a newborn Republic of China.
Therefore, in the event of a modification of the agreement, the British ambassador in Peking advised Grey to also take into consideration China, whose authorities for months had already suspected an Anglo-Russian negotiation on Tibet.[22] A possible loss of territory, without any involvement of Peking, could – according to Jordan – damage the British image in China to such an extent as to put British interests in severe crisis:
any agreement made independently with a third Power, which affected a portion of Chinese territory, would cause deep resentment throughout the country, impair our prestige as traditional upholders of Chinese integrity, and inflict serious damage upon British interests in China, for which any concession in Thibet would be a poor compensation.[23]
Grey found Robert Crewe-Milnes in favor of the position of not communicating to the Russians – for the moment – London’s position on the Tibetan question.[24] The head of the India Office, however, suggested that he wait to inform Saint Petersburg of British views on Mongolia until the Russian attitude towards Tibet was clarified.[25] Crewe-Milnes, knowing the imminent disclosure of the matter, wanted to ascertain in advance the possible Russian reaction:
The Marquess of Crewe agrees with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it is not desirable to couple the Thibetan question with that of Mongolia at the present stage. But as it seems likely that the former question will shortly have to be taken up with the Russian Government, there might be advantage in deferring any communication to them on the subject of Mongolia until their attitude in regard to Thibet has been ascertained. His Lordship would therefore suggest for Sir E. Grey’s consideration that this matter should be held in abeyance for the time being.[26]
In managing relations with Mongolia, prudence was necessary. British interests in the country were extremely limited, but any connection between Urga and London could turn, as a counterpoint, into a pretext for contact between Lhasa and Saint Petersburg:
Lord Crewe is scarcely in a position to estimate the importance of British commercial interests in Mongolia. He agrees, however, as to the desirability of maintaining the “ open door ” for British trade ; and he sees no objection to the course of action proposed, provided Sir E. Grey is satisfied that direct negotiation with the Mongolian Government will not, in the event of our citing the analogy of Russian proceedings in Mongolia in support of our proposals regarding Thibet, lead to a demand by Russia for similar direct negotiation with the authorities at Lhasa.[27]
Furthermore, for Crewe-Milnes it was necessary, in the aftermath of the Sino-Russian Agreement on Mongolia and during the negotiations on Tibet in Simla, to clarify the legitimacy of the treaty between the Tibetans and the Mongols, and therefore to know whether that text had been actually authorized or not by the political leader of Tibet.[28] According to Crewe-Milnes and Grey, therefore, it was necessary to ask the Tibetan minister (blon-chen) Bshad-sgras[29] for clarification on the matter.[30] We have the reply of the blon-chen Bshad-sgras which is explained in a telegram from the Government of India to the Marquis of Crewe:
He pretends to know nothing of conclusion of agreement in question, but does not deny that Thibet and Mongolia have all along had an alliance of mutual support and assistance, and that, irrespective of any new agreement, this is still in force. He adds that Dorjief was given two letters by Dalai Lamai [sic], the first of which laid down that the two countries should give each other help for benefit of Buddhism, while the second authorised Dorjief to work to this end. This second letter confers powers as wide as, if not wider than, those which Lonchen himself now holds ; it was given to Dorjief when Dalai Lama was in Urga, despondent about help from China or His Majesty’s Government, and in close relations with Russia. To judge by phraseology of third article agreement of November 1912 between Russia and Mongolia, and by chain of thought which runs consecutively through series of Mongolian agreements which runs consecutively through series of Mongolian agreements, it appears quite probable that Russia inspired the Thibet-Mongolia agreement ; and whether or not existence of new agreement is admitted by Dalai Lama, we see no reason why its existence should be considered uncertain, or why we should doubt that its terms are as Korostovetz reported. Further, in absence of any provision in it for ratification, Dalai Lama may find difficulty in repudiating it even if he wants to do so, and would, in any case, have difficulty in refusing to Mongolia privileges for which it makes provision.
We think that, in these circumstances, it is safer to reckon on the agreement as really existing, and to get it produced openly.[31]
So, there was a letter from the dalai lama authorizing Dorzhiyev to negotiate with Urga and, according to the Government of India, the Russians were likely at the bottom of the agreement between Lhasa and Urga. It was therefore necessary for the British to act taking into account, without any doubt, the existence of that document.
The Board of Trade was also in favor of Grey’s position:
The Board concur with Sir E. Grey in thinking that, in the interest of British trade, it would be desirable for His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires to be instructed to get into touch with the Mongolian Government with a view to concluding an arrangement for securing fair terms and the maintenance of the “ open door ” for British trade, and that the Russian Government should also be informed that His Majesty’s Government are prepared to receive favourably the Russo-Chinese Agreement and Russo-Mongolian Treaty and Protocol, provided that reasonable conditions can be secured for British subjects and their commerce.[32]
According to the Board the Russians were guaranteed the right to import ‘goods of any origin free of duty’.[33] For the Board of Trade equal rights had to be guaranteed to the British and also
that no import, transit, or other duties shall be imposed on the produce or manufactures of any part of His Majesty’s territories which are not equally imposed on those of any other foreign countries.[34]
A draft agreement with the Mongolian authorities was also proposed by the Board; according to that, Britain was to be granted the status of most favored nation.[35] Naturally, the Board was more interested in the economic-commercial aspects, than in the broader function, in the Asian context, of the Mongolian question and therefore no political analysis was required.
Sayn noyon han Namnansüren’s letter to the British ambassador
In December 1913, Sayn noyon han Namnansüren,[36] president of the Mongolian Council of Ministers and chargé of the extraordinary mission, wrote a letter to the British ambassador in Saint Petersburg, George Buchanan.[37] In the document, the Mongolian politician ‘PAR la volonté de […] le Souverain de Mongolie, et de son Gouvernement’ communicated the transition to independence of Mongolia,
[a]u moment de la chute en Chine de la dynastie mandchoue, à laquelle elle était liée par un pacte spécial […] à l’effet de sauvegarder son unité et son indépendance nationales et l’intégrité de son territoire.
The text is particularly important: it clearly expresses the position of the Mongolian government on the issues at the center of the Sino-Russian dialogue on Urga and it was a further implicit brick of the political-diplomatic pillar that lay at the basis of the Simla agreement. The Mongols told the British that their link with the Empire was to be considered a link with the Manchu dynasty and not with the new Republic. Regarding the Mongol-Russian agreement of 1912, but also that of November (October, according to the Russian calendar) of 1913, Namnansüren expressed enthusiastic terms, considering the documents as proof of the recognition of Mongol independence not only by the Russians, but even by the newly formed Republic of China:
Le Gouvernement mongol a pu constater avec la plus vive satisfaction que lesdits documents comportaient la sanction de la part de l’Empire de Russie et de la République chinoise de l’indépendance de l’État mongol, auquel était garantie pleine liberté dans toutes les affaires touchant à l’administration intérieure, au commerce, à l’industrie, aux lignes de chemin de fer et de télégraphe, et dans toutes les questions financières et économiques, avec toutes les conséquences résultant de cet état de choses, ainsi qu’une parfaite liberté de traiter amicalement avec d’autres États souverains.
The Mongols were evidently not satisfied with the Chinese recognition of internal autonomy. The letter to the British clarified Urga’s interpretation of the agreements of 1912 and 1913, namely that of full Mongol sovereignty, also in terms of foreign affairs. The break with the Republic of China was total and therefore no suzerainty was recognized and the Mongolian government also claimed the right to annex territories inhabited by Mongols, beyond the limits set by the 1913 convention, which although still not defined with absolute certainty, excluded, without any doubt, Inner Mongolia:
Néanmoins, le Gouvernement de Mongolie a cru de son devoir de rappeler aux Gouvernements de l’Empire de Russie et de la République chinoise qu’il a toujours maintenu, et maintient encore, que la Mongolie a rompu définitivement tous liens avec la Chine et qu’aucun droit de suzeraineté ne peut être reconnu à personne sur la Mongolie sans son approbation. En conséquence, le Gouvernement mongol se réserve une parfaite liberté d’appréciation touchant certains points de la déclaration et des notes diplomatiques ayant trait aux relations entre la Caine [sic, ‘Chine’ recte] et la Mongolie. En particulier, la Mongolie affirme son droit d’annexer les territoires qui ont toujours fait corps avec elle et à une telle délimitation de ses frontières qui comprendrait toutes les peuplades de race mongol qui ont déjà adhéré à l’État mongol. Sous ces réserves le Gouvernement de Mongolie se déclare prêt à prendre part aux pourparlers entre la Russie, la Chine et la Mongolie, prévus par la déclaration et les notes susindiquées.
In order to reach a peaceful condition between Mongolia and its neighbors, Namnansüren nevertheless communicated that his government had issued an order to suspend military activities against the Chinese:
De plus, le Gouvernement de Mongolie, désireux de rétablir le plus tôt possible la bonne entente entre la Mongolie et les États limitrophes, a donné ordre à ses troupes de suspendre les opérations militaires contre les troupes chinoises et d’évacuer les positions avancées qu’elles occupaient, et il a adressé en même temps, par l’intermédiaire du Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Russie et du Ministre de Chine à Saint-Pétersbourg, l’invitation au Gouvernement chinois d’avoir à retirer les troupes qui ont envahi le territoire de la Mongolie intérieure dont la population est intimement liée avec nous par affinités de race.
Naturally Ivan Korostovets, the architect – for the Russian side – of the 1912 agreement, had denied to Buchanan that kind of interpretation of the 1913 treaty: there had been no recognition of sovereignty to the Mongols as regards the railways, the telegraphs and foreign policy, nor, of course, was granted the right to annex parts of Inner Mongolia.[38] Korostovets recognized the fact that in the 1912 agreement, by Mongolian will, the name of the country was simply «Mongolia», without the adjective «Outer», but according to Korostovets it was Russia that had the right to define the borders of the territory covered by the convention.[39] Russian foreign minister Sazonov had also confirmed Korostovets’ statements to Buchanan and had also communicated to the British diplomat that a meeting of Russians, Mongols and Chinese had soon be held to define the borders of Outer Mongolia.[40] Russia, of course, did not want to surrender on the Inner Mongolian issue, because, as seen above, it had already committed to a secret agreement with Japan and could not therefore allow that region to end up inside independent Mongolia:
Their task would not be an easy one, and he need not remind me that Russia was precluded by her secret convention with Japan from allowing any portion of Inner to be incorporated in Outer Mongolia.[41]
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